Taking stock of an idiom's background assumptions: an alternative relevance theoretic account.

This paper begins by presenting the theoretical background of, and the accompanying psycholinguistic findings on, idiom processing. The paper then widens its lens by comparing the idiom processing literature to that of metaphor and irony. We do so partly to better understand the idiom superiority effect, according to which idiomatic sentences (unlike metaphoric and ironic ones) are generally processed faster than their literal controls; part of our motivation is to reconcile the differences between idiom processing, on the one hand, and metaphor and irony processing on the other. This ultimately leads us to Relevance Theory (RT), which has provided original insights into the processing of figurative language generally, but especially with respect to metaphor and irony. RT has paid less attention to idiomatic expressions (such as break the ice, fan the flames, or spill the beans), where one finds a single RT account that likens idioms to conventional metaphors. Through our overview, we ultimately arrive at an alternative RT account of idioms: We argue that idioms include a procedural meaning that takes into account relevant presuppositional information. For example, an idiomatic string such as break the ice not only asserts initiate social contact, it prompts the recovery of background assumptions such as there exists a social distance that calls for relief. This leads us (a) to apply linguistic-intuition tests of our presuppositional hypothesis, and; (b) to describe the paradigm and results from a pilot experiment. Both provide support for our claims. In doing so, we provide an original explanation for the idiom superiority effect.

Effects of Montessori Education on the Academic, Cognitive, and Social Development of Disadvantaged Preschoolers: A Randomized Controlled Study in the French Public-School System.

Previous research on Montessori preschool education is inconsistent and prone to analytic flexibility. In this preregistered study, disadvantaged preschoolers in a French public school were randomly assigned to either conventional or Montessori classrooms, with the latter being adapted to French public education. Adaptations included fewer materials, shorter work periods, and relatively limited Montessori teacher training. Cross-sectional analyses in kindergarten (N = 176; Mage  = 5-6) and longitudinal analyses over the 3 years of preschool (N = 70; Mage  = 3-6) showed that the adapted Montessori curriculum was associated with outcomes comparable to the conventional curriculum on math, executive functions, and social skills. However, disadvantaged kindergarteners from Montessori classrooms outperformed their peers on reading (d = 0.68). This performance was comparable to that of advantaged children from an accredited Montessori preschool.

Neural interaction between logical reasoning and pragmatic processing in narrative discourse.

Logical connectives (e.g., or, if, and not) are central to everyday conversation, and the inferences they generate are made with little effort in pragmatically sound situations. In contrast, the neural substrates of logical inference-making have been studied exclusively in abstract tasks where pragmatic concerns are minimal. Here, we used fMRI in an innovative design that employed narratives to investigate the interaction between logical reasoning and pragmatic processing in natural discourse. Each narrative contained three premises followed by a statement. In Fully-deductive stories, the statement confirmed a conclusion that followed from two steps of disjunction-elimination (e.g., Xavier considers Thursday, Friday, or Saturday for inviting his girlfriend out; he removes Thursday before he rejects Saturday and declares "I will invite her out for Friday"). In Implicated-premise stories, an otherwise identical narrative included three premises that twice removed a single option from consideration (i.e., Xavier rejects Thursday for two different reasons). The conclusion therefore necessarily prompts an implication (i.e., Xavier must have removed Saturday from consideration as well). We report two main findings. First, conclusions of Implicated-premise stories are associated with more activity than conclusions of Fully-deductive stories in a bilateral frontoparietal system, suggesting that these regions play a role in inferring an implicated premise. Second, brain connectivity between these regions increases with pragmatic abilities when reading conclusions in Implicated-premise stories. These findings suggest that pragmatic processing interacts with logical inference-making when understanding arguments in narrative discourse.

When is irony effortful?

Whereas some studies indicate that ironic-as opposed to literal-readings of utterances take longer to process, others indicate that the 2 are processed at comparable speeds. We propose that mindreading processes are at least partly responsible for the mixed results, as we present 3 experiments that include stories having a target utterance with either an Ironic or Literal reading. Experiment 1 replicates earlier findings (Spotorno, Koun, Prado, Van Der Henst, & Noveck, 2012) showing that ironic readings take longer than literal ones when fillers include decoys, stories that call for an ironic remark but present a banal utterance instead and thus diffuse participants' expectations for irony. Starting with Experiment 2, decoys are removed, leading to effects that are arguably revealing of Theory of Mind processes. One is an Early-Late effect, which occurs when ironic utterances are read as readily as literal ones in the 2nd half of an experimental session, creating "mixed" results in the laboratory. In Experiment 3, we further added antecedents before a critical event so that, later, the target utterance would be echoing an explicitly stated thought and would facilitate irony comprehension (Gibbs, 1986; Sperber & Wilson, 1981). Results reveal an Early-Late effect here, too. Further evidence of Theory of Mind activity follows from analyses of participants' Social Skill subscale scores in the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). Socially inclined participants are more likely than the socially disinclined to use a story's negative event to portend the arrival of an irony; in contrast, socially disinclined participants appear more reactive than the socially inclined to explicit antecedents.

Show me the pragmatic contribution: a developmental investigation of contrastive inference.

An utterance such as 'Show me the large rabbit' potentially generates a contrastive inference, i.e., the article the and the adjective large allow listeners to pragmatically infer the existence of other entities having the same noun (e.g. a small rabbit). The primary way to measure children's ability to carry out this pragmatic inference has been through tasks that measure infelicity detection. We argue that such studies are not as revealing as one might assume because they force children to adopt a metalinguistic stance and they consider infelicity detection as tantamount to contrastive inference-making. To address these concerns, we develop a game-like situation in which all utterances remain felicitous. Moreover, we make a distinction between responses that are revealing of a pragmatic interpretation and responses that are revealing of a reliance on the utterance's linguistically encoded meaning (i.e., a lack of contrastive inference). Three experiments with seven-year-olds, ten-year-olds, and adults show that pragmatic interpretations do not emerge among seven-year-olds, that ten-year-olds do not show adult-like performance, and that adults are not at ceiling. We conclude that contrastive inference-making is an effortful process and that the ability to detect such gains-in-information through language increases with age.

What's behind a P600? Integration operations during irony processing.

The combined knowledge of word meanings and grammatical rules does not allow a listener to grasp the intended meaning of a speaker's utterance. Pragmatic inferences on the part of the listener are also required. The present work focuses on the processing of ironic utterances (imagine a slow day being described as "really productive") because these clearly require the listener to go beyond the linguistic code. Such utterances are advantageous experimentally because they can serve as their own controls in the form of literal sentences (now imagine an active day being described as "really productive") as we employ techniques from electrophysiology (EEG). Importantly, the results confirm previous ERP findings showing that irony processing elicits an enhancement of the P600 component (Regel et al., 2011). More original are the findings drawn from Time Frequency Analysis (TFA) and especially the increase of power in the gamma band in the 280-400 time-window, which points to an integration among different streams of information relatively early in the comprehension of an irony. This represents a departure from traditional accounts of language processing which generally view pragmatic inferences as late-arriving. We propose that these results indicate that unification operations between the linguistic code and contextual information play a critical role throughout the course of irony processing and earlier than previously thought.

Neural evidence that utterance-processing entails mentalizing: the case of irony.

It is now well established that communicators interpret others' mental states through what has been called "Theory of Mind" (ToM). From a linguistic-pragmatics perspective, this mentalizing ability is considered critical because it is assumed that the linguistic code in all utterances underdetermines the speaker's meaning, leaving a vital role for ToM to fill the gap. From a neuroscience perspective, understanding others' intentions has been shown to activate a neural ToM network that includes the right and left temporal parietal junction (rTPJ, lTPJ), the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the precuneus (PC). Surprisingly, however, there are no studies - to our knowledge - that aim to uncover a direct, on-line link between language processing and ToM through neuroimaging. This is why we focus on verbal irony, an obviously pragmatic phenomenon that compels a listener to detect the speaker's (dissociated, mocking) attitude (Wilson, 2009). In the present fMRI investigation, we compare participants' comprehension of 18 target sentences as contexts make them either ironic or literal. Consider an opera singer who tells her interlocutor: "Tonight we gave a superb performance!" when the performance in question was clearly awful (making the statement ironic) or very good (making the statement literal). We demonstrate that the ToM network becomes active while a participant is understanding verbal irony. Moreover, we demonstrate - through Psychophysiological Interactions (PPI) analyses - that ToM activity is directly linked with language comprehension processes. The paradigm, its predictions, and the reported results contrast dramatically with those from seven prior fMRI studies on irony.

Recomposing a fragmented literature: how conditional and relational arguments engage different neural systems for deductive reasoning.

Deductive reasoning is traditionally viewed as a unitary process involving either rule-based or visuo-spatial mechanisms. However, there is a disagreement in the neuroimaging literature on whether the data support one alternative over the other. Here we test the hypothesis that discrepancies in the literature result from the reasoning materials themselves. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we measure brain activity of participants while they integrate the premises of conditional arguments (primarily Modus Tollens: If P then Q; not-Q) and Relational Syllogisms (i.e., linear arguments of the sort P is to the left of Q; Q is to the left of R). We find that reasoning with Modus Tollens activates the left inferior frontal gyrus to a greater extent than the Relational Syllogisms. In contrast, the Relational Syllogisms engage the right temporo-parieto-occipital junction more than conditional arguments. This suggests that conditional reasoning relies more on so-called syntactic processes than relational reasoning, while relational reasoning may rely on visuo-spatial processes and mental imagery more than conditional reasoning. This investigative approach, together with its results, clarifies some apparently inconsistent findings in this literature by showing that the nature of the logical argument, whether it is relational or conditional, determines which neural system is engaged.

Overlapping and distinct neural representations of numbers and verbal transitive series.

It is a familiar and intuitive notion that human numerical and logical reasoning skills are tightly related. However, very little is known about the interaction between numerical knowledge and logical reasoning in the brain. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging in healthy subjects, we investigated ordered relations as they are expressed in number (4 is greater than 2) and in transitive reasoning (A is to the left of C after receiving; A is to the left of B; B is to the left of C) in order to determine the extent to which the same neural substrates support both. We found that representing an ordered series verbally learned by transitive reasoning draws on the representations of numbers in the anterior intraparietal sulcus. We further observed that, unlike numbers, transitive series are additionally encoded in the basal ganglia-dopamine system. Intraparietal and basal ganglia mechanisms are not active to the same extent at the same time. Although the intraparietal representations of number preferentially supports a verbal transitive series soon after learning, the basal ganglia are engaged when the series is well practiced. This finding suggests that the transient activation of number representations supports the representation of verbal transitive series until their late encoding in the basal ganglia-dopamine system by associative reinforcement mechanisms.

Making disjunctions exclusive.

This work examines how people interpret the sentential connective "or", which can be viewed either inclusively (A or B or both) or exclusively (A or B but not both). Following up on prior work concerning quantifiers (Bott & Noveck, 2004; Noveck, 2001; Noveck & Posada, 2003), which shows that the common pragmatic interpretation of "some", some but not all, is conveyed as part of an effortful step, we investigate how extra effort applied to disjunctive statements leads to a pragmatic interpretation of "or", or but not both. Experiment 1 compelled participants to wait for three seconds before answering, hence giving them the opportunity to process the utterance more deeply. Experiments 2 and 3 emphasized "or", either by visual means ("OR") or by prosodic means (contrastive stress) as another way to encourage participants to apply more effort. Following a relevance-theoretic line of argument, we hypothesized that conditions encouraging more processing effort would give rise to more pragmatic inferences and hence to more exclusive interpretations of the disjunction. This prediction was confirmed in the three experiments.

Spatial associations in relational reasoning: evidence for a SNARC-like effect.

Relational reasoning (A > B, B > C, therefore A > C) shares a number of similarities with numerical cognition, including a common behavioural signature, the symbolic distance effect. Just as reaction times for evaluating relational conclusions decrease as the distance between two ordered objects increases, people need less time to compare two numbers when they are distant (e.g., 2 and 8) than when they are close (e.g., 3 and 4). Given that some remain doubtful about such analogical representations in relational reasoning, we determine whether numerical cognition and relational reasoning have other overlapping behavioural effects. Here, using relational reasoning problems that require the alignment of six items, we provide evidence showing that the subjects' linear mental representation affects motor performance when evaluating conclusions. Items accessible from the left part of a linear representation are evaluated faster when the response is made by the left, rather than the right, hand and the reverse is observed for items accessible from the right part of the linear representation. This effect, observed with the prepositions to the left of and to the right of as well as with above and below, is analogous to the SNARC (Spatial Numerical Association of Response Codes) effect, which is characterized by an interaction between magnitude of numbers and side of response.

Experimental pragmatics: a Gricean turn in the study of language.

Discerning the meaning of an utterance requires not only mastering grammar and knowing the meanings of words but also understanding the communicative (i.e., pragmatic) features of language. Although it has been an ever present aspect of linguistic analyses and discussions, it is only over the last ten years or so that cognitive scientists have been investigating--in a concerted fashion--the pragmatic features of language experimentally. We begin by highlighting Paul Grice's contributions to ordinary language philosophy and show how it has led to this active area of experimental investigation. We then focus on two exemplary phenomena--'scalar inference' and 'reference resolution'--before considering other topics that fit into the paradigm known as 'experimental pragmatics'.

Overcoming perceptual features in logical reasoning: an event-related potentials study.

It is more difficult for reasoners to detect that the letter-number pair H7 verifies the conditional rule If there is not a T then there is not a 4 than to detect that it verifies the rule If there is an H then there is a 7. In prior work [Prado, J., & Noveck, I. A. (2007). Overcoming perceptual features in logical reasoning: a parametric functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 19(4), 642-657], we argued that this difficulty was due to mismatching effects, i.e. perceptual mismatches that arise when the items mentioned in the rule (e.g. T and 4) mismatch those presented in the test-pair (H and 7). The present study aimed to test this claim directly by recording ERPs while participants evaluated conditional rules in the presence or absence of mismatches. We found that mismatches, not only trigger a frontocentral N2 (an ERP known to be related to perceptual mismatch) but that they, parametrically modulate its amplitude (e.g. two mismatches prompt a greater N2 than one). Our results indicate that the main role of negations in conditional rules is to focus attention on the negated constituent but also suggest that there is some inter-individual differences in the way participants apprehend such negations, as indicated by a correlation between N2 amplitude and participants' reaction times. Overall, these findings emphasize how overcoming perceptual features plays a role in the mismatching effect and extend the mismatch-related effects of the N2 into a reasoning task.

Overcoming perceptual features in logical reasoning: a parametric functional magnetic resonance imaging study.

Participants experience difficulty detecting that an item depicting an H-in-a-square confirms the logical rule, "If there is not a T then there is not a circle." Indeed, there is a perceptual conflict between the items mentioned in the rule (T and circle) and in the test item (H and square). Much evidence supports the claim that correct responding depends on detecting and resolving such conflicts. One aim of this study is to find more precise neurological evidence in support of this claim by using a parametric event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigm. We scanned 20 participants while they were required to judge whether or not a conditional rule was verified (or falsified) by a corresponding target item. We found that the right middorsolateral prefrontal cortex (mid-DLPFC) was specifically engaged, together with the medial frontal (anterior cingulate and presupplementary motor area [pre-SMA]) and parietal cortices, when mismatching was present. Activity in these regions was also linearly correlated with the level of mismatch between the rule and the test item. Furthermore, a psychophysiological interaction analysis revealed that activation of the mid-DLPFC, which increases as mismatching does, was accompanied by a decrease in functional integration with the bilateral primary visual cortex and an increase in functional integration with the right parietal cortex. This indicates a need to break away from perceptual cues in order to select an appropriate logical response. These findings strongly indicate that the regions involved in inhibitory control (including the right mid-DLPFC and the medial frontal cortex) are engaged when participants have to overcome perceptual mismatches in order to provide a logical response. These findings are also consistent with neuroimaging studies investigating the belief bias, where prior beliefs similarly interfere with logical reasoning.

The interpretation of classically quantified sentences: a set-theoretic approach.

We present a set-theoretic model of the mental representation of classically quantified sentences (All P are Q, Some P are Q, Some P are not Q, and No P are Q). We take inclusion, exclusion, and their negations to be primitive concepts. We show that although these sentences are known to have a diagrammatic expression (in the form of the Gergonne circles) that constitutes a semantic representation, these concepts can also be expressed syntactically in the form of algebraic formulas. We hypothesized that the quantified sentences have an abstract underlying representation common to the formulas and their associated sets of diagrams (models). We derived 9 predictions (3 semantic, 2 pragmatic, and 4 mixed) regarding people's assessment of how well each of the 5 diagrams expresses the meaning of each of the quantified sentences. We report the results from 3 experiments using Gergonne's (1817) circles or an adaptation of Leibniz (1903/1988) lines as external representations and show them to support the predictions.

The neural basis of conditional reasoning with arbitrary content.

Behavioral predictions about reasoning have usually contrasted two accounts, Mental Logic and Mental Models. Neuroimaging techniques have been providing new measures that transcend this debate. We tested a hypothesis from Goel and Dolan (2003) that predicts neural activity predominantly in a left parietal-frontal system when participants reason with arbitrary (non-meaningful) materials. In an event-related fMRI investigation, we employed propositional syllogisms, the majority of which involved conditional reasoning. While investigating conditional reasoning generally, we ultimately focused on the neural activity linked to the two valid conditional forms--Modus Ponens (If p then q; p//q) and Modus Tollens (If p then q; not-q//not-p). Consistent with Goel and Dolan (2003), we found a left lateralized parietal frontal network for both inference forms with increasing activation when reasoning becomes more challenging by way of Modus Tollens. These findings show that the previous findings with more complex Aristotlean syllogisms are robust and cast doubt upon accounts of reasoning that accord primary inferential processes uniquely to either the right hemisphere or to language areas.

Characterizing the time course of an implicature: an evoked potentials study.

This work employs Evoked Potential techniques as 19 participants are confronted with sentences that have the potential to produce scalar implicatures, like in Some elephants have trunks. Such an Underinformative utterance is of interest to pragmatists because it can be considered to have two different truth values. It can be considered true when taken at face value but false if one were to treat Some with the implicature Not All. Two accounts of implicature production are compared. The neo-Gricean approach (e.g., Levinson, 2000) assumes that implicatures intrude automatically on the semantics of a term like Some. Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1985/1996) assumes that implicatures are effortful and not automatic. In this experiment, the participants are presented with 25 Underinformative sentences along with 25 sentences that are Patently True (e.g. Some houses have bricks) and 25 that are Patently False (e.g. Some crows have radios). As reported in an earlier study (Noveck, 2001), Underinformative sentences prompt strong individual differences. Seven participants here responded true to all (or nearly all) of the Underinformative sentences and the remaining 12 responded false to all (or nearly all) of them. The present study showed that those who responded false to the Underinformative sentences took significantly longer to do so that those who responded true. The ERP data indicate that: (a) the Patently True and Patently False sentences prompt steeper N400's--indicating greater semantic integration--than the Underinformative sentences and that (b) regardless of one's ultimate response to the Underinformative sentences, the N400's were remarkably flat, indicating no particular reaction to these sentences. Collectively, the data are taken to show that implicatures are part of a late-arriving, effort-demanding decision process.