Resurgent rotavirus diarrhoea outbreak five years after introduction of rotavirus vaccine in Botswana, 2018.

INTRODUCTION: Botswana had a resurgent diarrhea outbreak in 2018, mainly affecting children under five years old. Botswana introduced rotavirus vaccine (RotarixTM) into the national immunization programme in July 2012. Official rotavirus vaccine coverage estimates averaged 77.2% over the five years following introduction. MATERIALS AND METHODS: The outbreak was investigated using multiple data sources, including stool laboratory testing, immunization data review, water assessment, and vaccine storage assessment. We reviewed official reports of the routine immunization data from 2013 to 2017 and compared district-level rotavirus vaccine coverage with district-level attack rates during the outbreak. RESULTS: During the outbreak, a total of 228 stool samples were tested at the national health laboratory and 152 (67%) of the specimens were positive for rotavirus. A portion of adequate samples (80) were selected for referral to the Regional Reference Lab. The laboratory testing of 80 samples at the Regional Reference Laboratory in South Africa showed that 91% of the stool samples were positive for rotavirus, and the dominant strain 47/80 (58.7%) was G3P[8]. The immunization data showed that rotavirus vaccine coverage varied widely among districts, and there was no correlation between districts with high attack rates and those with low immunization coverage. Water assessment showed that some water sources were contaminated with E Coli. There was no problem with vaccine storage. CONCLUSION: The outbreak was caused by rotavirus G3P[8], a strain that was not common in the country prior to the outbreak. Despite the significant pressure and anxiety that outbreaks cause, the number of diarrhea cases and deaths were less compared to pre-vaccine era due to the impact of vaccination. This highlights the need for continuous implementation of high impact child survival interventions.

Mpox in Children and Adolescents during Multicountry Outbreak, 2022-2023.

The 2022-2023 mpox outbreak predominantly affected adult men; 1.3% of reported cases were in children and adolescents <18 years of age. Analysis of global surveillance data showed 1 hospital intensive care unit admission and 0 deaths in that age group. Transmission routes and clinical manifestations varied across age subgroups.

Description of the first global outbreak of mpox: an analysis of global surveillance data.

BACKGROUND: In May 2022, several countries with no history of sustained community transmission of mpox (formerly known as monkeypox) notified WHO of new mpox cases. These cases were soon followed by a large-scale outbreak, which unfolded across the world, driven by local, in-country transmission within previously unaffected countries. On July 23, 2022, WHO declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. Here, we aim to describe the main epidemiological features of this outbreak, the largest reported to date. METHODS: In this analysis of global surveillance data we analysed data for all confirmed mpox cases reported by WHO Member States through the global surveillance system from Jan 1, 2022, to Jan 29, 2023. Data included daily aggregated numbers of mpox cases by country and a case reporting form (CRF) containing information on demographics, clinical presentation, epidemiological exposure factors, and laboratory testing. We used the data to (1) describe the key epidemiological and clinical features of cases; (2) analyse risk factors for hospitalisation (by multivariable mixed-effects binary logistic regression); and (3) retrospectively analyse transmission trends. Sequencing data from GISAID and GenBank were used to analyse monkeypox virus (MPXV) genetic diversity. FINDINGS: Data from 82 807 cases with submitted CRFs were included in the analysis. Cases were primarily due to clade IIb MPXV (mainly lineage B.1, followed by lineage A.2). The outbreak was driven by transmission among males (73 560 [96·4%] of 76 293 cases) who self-identify as men who have sex with men (25 938 [86·9%] of 29 854 cases). The most common reported route of transmission was sexual contact (14 941 [68·7%] of 21 749). 3927 (7·3%) of 54 117 cases were hospitalised, with increased odds for those aged younger than 5 years (adjusted odds ratio 2·12 [95% CI 1·32-3·40], p=0·0020), aged 65 years and older (1·54 [1·05-2·25], p=0·026), female cases (1·61 [1·35-1·91], p<0·0001), and for cases who are immunosuppressed either due to being HIV positive and immunosuppressed (2·00 [1·68-2·37], p<0·0001), or other immunocompromising conditions (3·47 [1·84-6·54], p=0·0001). INTERPRETATION: Continued global surveillance allowed WHO to monitor the epidemic, identify risk factors, and inform the public health response. The outbreak can be attributed to clade IIb MPXV spread by newly described modes of transmission. FUNDING: WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies. TRANSLATIONS: For the French and Spanish translations of the abstract see Supplementary Materials section.

The first 8 months of COVID-19 pandemic in three West African countries: leveraging lessons learned from responses to the 2014-2016 Ebola virus disease outbreak.

Experience gained from responding to major outbreaks may have influenced the early coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) pandemic response in several countries across Africa. We retrospectively assessed whether Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the three West African countries at the epicentre of the 2014-2016 Ebola virus disease outbreak, leveraged the lessons learned in responding to COVID-19 following the World Health Organization's (WHO) declaration of a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). We found relatively lower incidence rates across the three countries compared to many parts of the globe. Time to case reporting and laboratory confirmation also varied, with Guinea and Liberia reporting significant delays compared to Sierra Leone. Most of the selected readiness measures were instituted before confirmation of the first case and response measures were initiated rapidly after the outbreak confirmation. We conclude that the rapid readiness and response measures instituted by the three countries can be attributed to their lessons learned from the devastating Ebola outbreak, although persistent health systems weaknesses and the unique nature of COVID-19 continue to challenge control efforts.

Implementing epidemic intelligence in the WHO African region for early detection and response to acute public health events.

Epidemic intelligence activities are undertaken by the WHO Regional Office for Africa to support member states in early detection and response to outbreaks to prevent the international spread of diseases. We reviewed epidemic intelligence activities conducted by the organisation from 2017 to 2020, processes used, key results and how lessons learned can be used to strengthen preparedness, early detection and rapid response to outbreaks that may constitute a public health event of international concern. A total of 415 outbreaks were detected and notified to WHO, using both indicator-based and event-based surveillance. Media monitoring contributed to the initial detection of a quarter of all events reported. The most frequent outbreaks detected were vaccine-preventable diseases, followed by food-and-water-borne diseases, vector-borne diseases and viral haemorrhagic fevers. Rapid risk assessments generated evidence and provided the basis for WHO to trigger operational processes to provide rapid support to member states to respond to outbreaks with a potential for international spread. This is crucial in assisting member states in their obligations under the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005). Member states in the region require scaled-up support, particularly in preventing recurrent outbreaks of infectious diseases and enhancing their event-based surveillance capacities with automated tools and processes.

Reactive vaccination as a control strategy for pneumococcal meningitis outbreaks in the African meningitis belt: Analysis of outbreak data from Ghana.

Streptococcus pneumoniae is increasingly recognised as an important cause of bacterial meningitis in the African meningitis belt. The World Health Organization sets guidelines for response to outbreaks of meningococcal meningitis, but there are no current guidelines for outbreaks where S. pneumoniae is implicated. We aimed to evaluate the impact of using a similar response to target outbreaks of vaccine-preventable pneumococcal meningitis in the meningitis belt. Here, we adapt a previous model of reactive vaccination for meningococcal outbreaks to estimate the potential impact of reactive vaccination in a recent pneumococcal meningitis outbreak in the Brong-Ahafo region of central Ghana using weekly line list data on all suspected cases over a period of five months. We determine the sensitivity and specificity of various epidemic thresholds and model the cases and deaths averted by reactive vaccination. An epidemic threshold of 10 suspected cases per 100,000 population per week performed the best, predicting large outbreaks with 100% sensitivity and more than 85% specificity. In this outbreak, reactive vaccination would have prevented a lower number of cases per individual vaccinated (approximately 15,300 doses per case averted) than previously estimated for meningococcal outbreaks. Since the burden of death and disability from pneumococcal meningitis is higher than that from meningococcal meningitis, there may still be merit in considering reactive vaccination for outbreaks of pneumococcal meningitis. More outbreak data are needed to refine our model estimates. Whatever policy is followed, we emphasize the importance of timely laboratory confirmation of suspected cases to enable appropriate decisions about outbreak response.

The design and implementation of the re-vitalised integrated disease surveillance and response (IDSR) in Uganda, 2013-2016.

BACKGROUND: Uganda adopted and has been implementing the Integrated Disease Surveillance (IDSR) strategy since 2000. The goal was to build the country's capacity to detect, report promptly, and effectively respond to public health emergencies and priorities. The considerable investment into the program startup realised significant IDSR core performance. However, due to un-sustained funding from the mid-2000s onwards, these achievements were undermined. Following the adoption of the revised World Health Organization guidelines on IDSR, the Uganda Ministry of Health (MoH) in collaboration with key partners decided to revitalise IDSR and operationalise the updated IDSR guidelines in 2012. METHODS: Through the review of both published and unpublished national guidelines, reports and other IDSR program records in addition to an interview of key informants, we describe the design and process of IDSR revitalisation in Uganda, 2013-2016. The program aimed to enhance the districts' capacity to promptly detect, assess and effectively respond to public health emergencies. RESULTS: Through a cascaded, targeted skill-development training model, 7785 participants were trained in IDSR between 2015 and 2016. Of these, 5489(71%) were facility-based multi-disciplinary health workers, 1107 (14%) comprised the district rapid response teams and 1188 (15%) constituted the district task forces. This training was complemented by other courses for regional teams in addition to the provision of logistics to support IDSR activities. Centrally, IDSR implementation was coordinated and monitored by the MoH's national task force (NTF) on epidemics and emergencies. The NTF and in close collaboration with the WHO Country Office, mobilised resources from various partners and development initiatives. At regional and district levels, the technical and political leadership were mobilised and engaged in monitoring and overseeing program implementation. CONCLUSION: The IDSR re-vitalization in Uganda highlights unique features that can be considered by other countries that would wish to strengthen their IDSR programs. Through a coordinated partner response, the program harnessed resources which primarily were not earmarked for IDSR to strengthen the program nation-wide. Engagement of the local district leadership helped promote ownership, foster accountability and sustainability of the program.

Meningitis Outbreak Caused by Vaccine-Preventable Bacterial Pathogens - Northern Ghana, 2016.

Bacterial meningitis is a severe, acute infection of the fluid surrounding the brain and spinal cord that can rapidly lead to death. Even with recommended antibiotic treatment, up to 25% of infected persons in Africa might experience neurologic sequelae (1). Three regions in northern Ghana (Upper East, Northern, and Upper West), located in the sub-Saharan "meningitis belt" that extends from Senegal to Ethiopia, experienced periodic outbreaks of meningitis before introduction of serogroup A meningococcal conjugate vaccine (MenAfriVac) in 2012 (2,3). During December 9, 2015-February 16, 2016, a total of 432 suspected meningitis cases were reported to health authorities in these three regions. The Ghana Ministry of Health, with assistance from CDC and other partners, tested cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) specimens from 286 patients. In the first 4 weeks of the outbreak, a high percentage of cases were caused by Streptococcus pneumoniae; followed by an increase in cases caused by Neisseria meningitidis, predominantly serogroup W. These data facilitated Ghana's request to the International Coordinating Group* for meningococcal polysaccharide ACW vaccine, which was delivered to persons in the most affected districts. Rapid identification of the etiologic agent causing meningitis outbreaks is critical to inform targeted public health and clinical interventions, including vaccination, clinical management, and contact precautions.

An outbreak of pneumococcal meningitis among older children (≥5 years) and adults after the implementation of an infant vaccination programme with the 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine in Ghana.

BACKGROUND: An outbreak of pneumococcal meningitis among non-infant children and adults occurred in the Brong-Ahafo region of Ghana between December 2015 and April 2016 despite the recent nationwide implementation of a vaccination programme for infants with the 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV13). METHODS: Cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) specimens were collected from patients with suspected meningitis in the Brong-Ahafo region. CSF specimens were subjected to Gram staining, culture and rapid antigen testing. Quantitative PCR was performed to identify pneumococcus, meningococcus and Haemophilus influenzae. Latex agglutination and molecular serotyping were performed on samples. Antibiogram and whole genome sequencing were performed on pneumococcal isolates. RESULTS: Eight hundred eighty six patients were reported with suspected meningitis in the Brong-Ahafo region during the period of the outbreak. In the epicenter district, the prevalence was as high as 363 suspected cases per 100,000 people. Over 95 % of suspected cases occurred in non-infant children and adults, with a median age of 20 years. Bacterial meningitis was confirmed in just under a quarter of CSF specimens tested. Pneumococcus, meningococcus and Group B Streptococcus accounted for 77 %, 22 % and 1 % of confirmed cases respectively. The vast majority of serotyped pneumococci (80 %) belonged to serotype 1. Most of the pneumococcal isolates tested were susceptible to a broad range of antibiotics, with the exception of two pneumococcal serotype 1 strains that were resistant to both penicillin and trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole. All sequenced pneumococcal serotype 1 strains belong to Sequence Type (ST) 303 in the hypervirulent ST217 clonal complex. CONCLUSION: The occurrence of a pneumococcal serotype 1 meningitis outbreak three years after the introduction of PCV13 is alarming and calls for strengthening of meningitis surveillance and a re-evaluation of the current vaccination programme in high risk countries.

Epidemiology of Ebola virus disease transmission among health care workers in Sierra Leone, May to December 2014: a retrospective descriptive study.

BACKGROUND: Anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the continuing infection of health care workers (HCWs) with Ebola virus during the current outbreak in Sierra Leone has occurred in settings other than Ebola isolation units, and it is likely that some proportion of acquisition by HCWs occurs outside the workplace. There is a critical need to define more precisely the pathways of Ebola infection among HCWs, to optimise measures for reducing risk during current and future outbreaks. METHODS: We conducted a retrospective descriptive study of Ebola acquisition among health workers in Sierra Leone during May-December 2014. The data used were obtained mainly from the national Ebola database, a cross-sectional survey conducted through administration of a structured questionnaire to infected HCWs, and key informant interviews of select health stakeholders. RESULTS: A total of 293 HCWs comprising 277 (95 %) confirmed, 6 (2 %) probable, and 10 (3 %) suspected cases of infection with Ebola virus were enrolled in the study from nine districts of the country. Over half of infected HCWs (153) were nurses; others included laboratory staff (19, 6.5 %), doctors (9, 3.1 %), cleaners and porters (9, 3.1 %), Community Health Officers (8, 2.7 %), and pharmacists (2, 0.7 %). HCW infections were mainly reported from the Western Area (24.9 %), Kailahun (18.4 %), Kenema (17.7 %), and Bombali (13.3 %) districts. Almost half of the infected HCWs (120, 47.4 %) believed that their exposure occurred in a hospital setting. Others believed that they were exposed in the home (48, 19 %), at health centres (45, 17.8 %), or at other types of health facilities (13, 5.1 %). Only 27 (10.7 %) of all HCW infections were associated with Ebola virus disease (EVD) isolation units. Over half (60 %, 150) of infected HCWs said they had been trained in infection prevention and control prior to their infection, whereas 34 % (85) reported that they had not been so trained. CONCLUSIONS: This study demonstrated the perception that most HCW infections are associated with general health care and home settings and not with dedicated EVD settings, which should provide substantial reassurance to HCWs that measures in place at dedicated EVD facilities generally provide substantial protection when fully adhered to.

Multidistrict Outbreak of Marburg Virus Disease-Uganda, 2012.

In October 2012, a cluster of illnesses and deaths was reported in Uganda and was confirmed to be an outbreak of Marburg virus disease (MVD). Patients meeting the case criteria were interviewed using a standard investigation form, and blood specimens were tested for evidence of acute or recent Marburg virus infection by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and antibody enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay. The total count of confirmed and probable MVD cases was 26, of which 15 (58%) were fatal. Four of 15 laboratory-confirmed cases (27%) were fatal. Case patients were located in 4 different districts in Uganda, although all chains of transmission originated in Ibanda District, and the earliest case detected had an onset in July 2012. No zoonotic exposures were identified. Symptoms significantly associated with being a MVD case included hiccups, anorexia, fatigue, vomiting, sore throat, and difficulty swallowing. Contact with a case patient and attending a funeral were also significantly associated with being a case. Average RT-PCR cycle threshold values for fatal cases during the acute phase of illness were significantly lower than those for nonfatal cases. Following the institution of contact tracing, active case surveillance, care of patients with isolation precautions, community mobilization, and rapid diagnostic testing, the outbreak was successfully contained 14 days after its initial detection.

Epidemiological and laboratory characterization of a yellow fever outbreak in northern Uganda, October 2010-January 2011.

BACKGROUND: In November 2010, following reports of an outbreak of a fatal, febrile, hemorrhagic illness in northern Uganda, the Uganda Ministry of Health established multisector teams to respond to the outbreak. METHODS: This was a case-series investigation in which the response teams conducted epidemiological and laboratory investigations on suspect cases. The cases identified were line-listed and a data analysis was undertaken regularly to guide the outbreak response. RESULTS: Overall, 181 cases met the yellow fever (YF) suspected case definition; there were 45 deaths (case fatality rate 24.9%). Only 13 (7.5%) of the suspected YF cases were laboratory confirmed, and molecular sequencing revealed 92% homology to the YF virus strain Couma (Ethiopia), East African genotype. Suspected YF cases had fever (100%) and unexplained bleeding (97.8%), but jaundice was rare (11.6%). The overall attack rate was 13 cases/100000 population, and the attack rate was higher for males than females and increased with age. The index clusters were linked to economic activities undertaken by males around forests. CONCLUSIONS: This was the largest YF outbreak ever reported in Uganda. The wide geographical case dispersion as well as the male and older age preponderance suggests transmission during the outbreak was largely sylvatic and related to occupational activities around forests.

Assessment of core capacities for the International Health Regulations (IHR[2005])--Uganda, 2009.

BACKGROUND: Uganda is currently implementing the International Health Regulations (IHR[2005]) within the context of Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR). The IHR(2005) require countries to assess the ability of their national structures, capacities, and resources to meet the minimum requirements for surveillance and response. This report describes the results of the assessment undertaken in Uganda. METHODS: We conducted a descriptive cross-sectional assessment using the protocol developed by the World Health Organisation (WHO). The data collection tools were adapted locally and administered to a convenience sample of HR(2005) stakeholders, and frequency analyses were performed. RESULTS: Ugandan national laws relevant to the IHR(2005) existed, but they did not adequately support the full implementation of the IHR(2005). Correspondingly, there was a designated IHR National Focal Point (NFP), but surveillance activities and operational communications were limited to the health sector. All the districts (13/13) had designated disease surveillance offices, most had IDSR technical guidelines (92%, or 12/13), and all (13/13) had case definitions for infectious and zoonotic diseases surveillance. Surveillance guidelines were available at 57% (35/61) of the health facilities, while case definitions were available at 66% (40/61) of the health facilities. The priority diseases list, surveillance guidelines, case definitions and reporting tools were based on the IDSR strategy and hence lacked information on the IHR(2005). The rapid response teams at national and district levels lacked food safety, chemical and radio-nuclear experts. Similarly, there were no guidelines on the outbreak response to food, chemical and radio-nuclear hazards. Comprehensive preparedness plans incorporating IHR(2005) were lacking at national and district levels. A national laboratory policy existed and the strategic plan was being drafted. However, there were critical gaps hampering the efficient functioning of the national laboratory network. Finally, the points of entry for IHR(2005) implementation had not been designated. CONCLUSIONS: The assessment highlighted critical gaps to guide the IHR(2005) planning process. The IHR(2005) action plan should therefore be developed to foster national and international public health security.