Legionellosis incidents associated with spa pools, England, 2002-2018.

BACKGROUND: Spa pools (SPs) pose risks of Legionella infection for users and bystanders. METHODS: We searched the National Enhanced Legionella Surveillance System for reported SP-associated legionellosis incidents in England between 2002 and 2018 involving at least two cases. RESULTS: For seven legionellosis SP-associated incidents, six were in commercial settings such as hotels. The median number of cases per outbreak was four (range 2-115). CONCLUSION: SP-associated legionellosis incidents were mainly located in commercial settings with a wider range of cases than those recognised in previous publications, reinforcing the need for effective environmental controls for SPs in a range of settings.

Heated birthing pools as a source of Legionnaires' disease.

In June 2014 Public Health England confirmed a case of Legionnaires' disease (LD) in a neonate following birth at home in a hired birthing pool incorporating a heater and a recirculation pump which had been filled in advance of labour. The case triggered a public health investigation and a microbiological survey of an additional ten heated birthing pools hired or recently hired to the general public across England. The birthing pool used by the parent of the confirmed case was identified as the source of the neonate's infection following detection of Legionella pneumophila ST48 in both patient and environmental samples. Legionella species were detected by quantitative polymerase chain reaction but not culture in a further three pools together with other opportunistic pathogens identified by culture and matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization-time of flight (MALDI-ToF) mass spectrometry. A Patient Safety Alert from NHS England and Public Health England was issued stating that heated birthing pools filled in advance of labour should not be used for home births. This recommendation remains in place. This investigation in conjunction with other recent reports has highlighted a lack of awareness regarding the microbiological safety of heated birthing pools and their potential to be a source of LD and other opportunistic infections. Furthermore, the investigation raised important considerations with regards to microbiological sampling and testing in such incidents. Public health authorities and clinicians should consider LD in the differential diagnosis of severe respiratory infection in neonates within 14 days of a water birth.

Public health response to two incidents of confirmed MERS-CoV cases travelling on flights through London Heathrow Airport in 2014 ­ lessons learnt.

In May 2014, Public Health England was alerted to two separate laboratory-confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection who transited through London Heathrow Airport while symptomatic on flights from Saudi Arabia to the United States of America. We present the rationale for the public health response to both incidents, and report results of contact tracing. Following a risk assessment, passengers seated two seats around the cases were prioritised for contact tracing and a proactive media approach was used to alert all passengers on the planes of their possible exposure in both incidents. In total, 64 United Kingdom (UK) residents were successfully contacted, 14 of whom were sat in the priority area two seats all around the case(s). Five passengers reported respiratory symptoms within 14 days of the flight, but all tested were negative for MERS-CoV. Details of non-UK residents were passed on to relevant World Health Organization International Health Regulation focal points for follow-up, and no further cases were reported back. Different approaches were used to manage contact tracing for each flight due to variations in the quality and timeliness of the passenger contact information provided by the airlines involved. No evidence of symptomatic onward transmission was found.

Case of Legionnaires disease in a neonate following a home birth in a heated birthing pool, England, June 2014.

Public Health England was notified of Legionnaires' disease in a neonate following a home birth in a heated birthing pool filled from the domestic hot water supply two weeks earlier. We describe the incident, sampling results, and public health actions. It is recommended that heated birthing pools should not be used for home births. Neonates developing pneumonia within 14 days of labour or birth in any birthing pool should be tested for Legionnaires' disease.

Guidance on the use of respiratory and facial protection equipment.

Infectious micro-organisms may be transmitted by a variety of routes, and some may be spread by more than one route. Respiratory and facial protection is required for those organisms that are usually transmitted via the droplet/airborne route, or when airborne particles have been artificially created, such as during 'aerosol-generating procedures'. A range of personal protective equipment that provides different degrees of facial and respiratory protection is available. It is apparent from the recent experiences with severe acute respiratory syndrome and pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza that healthcare workers may have difficulty in choosing the correct type of facial and respiratory protection in any given clinical situation. To address this issue, the Scientific Development Committee of the Healthcare Infection Society established a short-life working group to develop guidance. The guidance is based upon a review of the literature, which is published separately, and expert consensus.

The United Kingdom public health response to an imported laboratory confirmed case of a novel coronavirus in September 2012.

On 22 September 2012, a novel coronavirus, very closely related to that from a fatal case in Saudi Arabia three months previously, was detected in a previously well adult transferred to intensive care in London from Qatar with severe respiratory illness. Strict respiratory isolation was instituted. Ten days after last exposure, none of 64 close contacts had developed severe disease, with 13 of 64 reporting mild respiratory symptoms. The novel coronavirus was not detected in 10 of 10 symptomatic contacts tested.

An outbreak of Legionnaires' disease associated with a display spa pool in retail premises, Stoke-on-Trent, United Kingdom, July 2012.

Twenty-one confirmed cases of Legionnaires' disease (Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1) were identified in the Stoke-on-Trent area of England with onsets since 2 July 2012. Sequence-based typing results are available for nine cases; all are a unique type (ST1268). Initial interviews highlighted a number of possible environmental sources. Inspection of premises of interest revealed an operating spa pool on display, from which the outbreak strain was identified. All cases had visited the retail premise with this spa pool.

Travel-associated Legionnaires disease in residents from England and Wales travelling to Corfu, Greece, August to October 2011.

Fourteen cases of Legionnaires' disease were confirmed in residents from England and Wales with history of travel to Corfu, Greece, in the 14 days before symptom onset. These cases were reported to the Health Protection Agency national surveillance scheme for Legionnaires' disease in residents of England and Wales between August and October 2011. In addition, one case in a Greek national and a case of non-pneumonic legionellosis in a resident from Scotland were also reported. Few cases shared the same accommodation site in Corfu during their incubation period. Epidemiological investigations and microbiological analysis of clinical and environmental samples excluded a single source but rather implicated several accommodation sites as sources of sporadic infection. Control measures have since been implemented at these accommodation sites and no further cases have been reported. This incident highlights the value of epidemiological typing and the importance of effective international response to control and prevent legionella infection.

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza in the UK: clinical and epidemiological findings from the first few hundred (FF100) cases.

The UK was one of few European countries to document a substantial wave of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza in summer 2009. The First Few Hundred (FF100) project ran from April-June 2009 gathering information on early laboratory-confirmed cases across the UK. In total, 392 confirmed cases were followed up. Children were predominantly affected (median age 15 years, IQR 10-27). Symptoms were mild and similar to seasonal influenza, with the exception of diarrhoea, which was reported by 27%. Eleven per cent of all cases had an underlying medical condition, similar to the general population. The majority (92%) were treated with antiviral drugs with 12% reporting adverse effects, mainly nausea and other gastrointestinal complaints. Duration of illness was significantly shorter when antivirals were given within 48 h of onset (median 5 vs. 9 days, P=0.01). No patients died, although 14 were hospitalized, of whom three required mechanical ventilation. The FF100 identified key clinical and epidemiological characteristics of infection with this novel virus in near real-time.

Oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) viruses detected in Europe during season 2007-8 had epidemiologic and clinical characteristics similar to co-circulating susceptible A(H1N1) viruses.

During the 2007-08 influenza season, high levels of oseltamivir resistance were detected among influenza A(H1N1) viruses ina number of European countries. We used surveillance data to describe influenza A(H1N1) cases for whom antiviral resistance testing was performed. We pooled data from national studies to identify possible risk factors for infection with a resistant virus and to ascertain whether such infections led to influenza illness of different severity. Information on demographic and clinical variables was obtained from patients or their physicians. Odds ratios for infection with an oseltamivir resistant virus and relative risks for developing certain clinical outcomes were computed and adjusted through multivariable analysis. Overall, 727 (24.3%) of 2,992 tested influenza A(H1N1) viruses from 22 of 30 European countries were oseltamivir-resistant. Levels of resistance ranged from 1% in Italy to 67% in Norway. Five countries provided detailed case-based data on 373 oseltamivir resistant and 796 susceptible cases. By multivariable analysis, none of the analysed factors was significantly associated with an increased risk of infection with anoseltamivir-resistant virus. Similarly, infection with an oseltamivir-resistant virus was not significantly associated with a different risk of pneumonia, hospitalisation or any clinical complication. The large-scale emergence of oseltamivir-resistant viruses in Europe calls for a review of guidelines for influenza treatment.

Personal protective equipment in an influenza pandemic: a UK simulation exercise.

There is limited experience of both operational and financial impacts that adoption of UK pandemic influenza infection control guidance will have on the use of personal protective equipment (PPE), patients and staff. We attempted to assess these issues from a live exercise in a hospital in north-west England. During this 24h exercise, all staff on an acute general medical ward wore PPE and adopted the procedures described in the UK pandemic influenza infection control guidance. Teams of infection control nurses observed and recorded staff behaviour and practice throughout the exercise, including staff attitudes towards the use of PPE. Although World Health Organization recommendations on the likely use of high-level PPE (FFP3 respirators) proved to be excessive, more gloves and surgical masks were used than expected. Despite pre-exercise training, many staff lacked confidence in using PPE and following infection control measures. They found PPE uncomfortable, with even basic tasks taking longer than usual. Large quantities of clinical waste were generated: an additional 12 bags (570 L) per day. The estimates of PPE usage within this exercise challenge assumptions that large amounts of high-level PPE are required, with significant implications for healthcare budgets. A programme of ongoing infection control education is needed. Healthcare in a pandemic situation is not simply a case of applying pandemic influenza infection control guidance to current practice; hospitals need to consider changing the way care and services are delivered.

Pilot scheme for monitoring sickness absence in schools during the 2006/07 winter in England: can these data be used as a proxy for influenza activity?

During influenza epidemics, school-aged children are amongst the first affected patients. They frequently then spread the virus within their families. Recognising influenza activity in schools may therefore be an important indicator of early activity in the wider community. During 2005/06, influenza B was associated with high levels of morbidity in school-children and over 600 schools outbreaks were reported to the Health Protection Agency by local Health Protection Units. While it is not possible to directly monitor influenza in schools, the feasibility and validity of using sentinel school absenteeism data, as a proxy for influenza in the community can be investigated. From week 02/07 to 20/07, eight primary and three secondary schools from five HPA regions were able, via the Department of Health-funded Health Protection Informatics website, to report daily electronic registration data, relating to absenteeism due to illness. Aggregated absenteeism data due to illness peaked the same week as indices for the age group comparable to that used by the Royal College for General Practitioners and NHS Direct schemes. When illness-defined absenteeism data was stratified into primary and secondary schools, absence in primary schools peaked one week before that in secondary schools and the established schemes for all ages. The start time of the study meant that initial increases in activity could not be measured. These encouraging results justify expanding this sentinel scheme to collect more rigorous evidence of the usefulness of absenteeism as a proxy for influenza activity and a tool to inform policy and trigger local responses.

Outbreaks of influenza and influenza-like illness in schools in England and Wales, 2005/06.

In England and Wales, clinical reports from primary care showed that influenza activity for the season 2005/06 only rose above the base line for four weeks during February 2006. However, outbreaks of influenza-like illness and/or gastrointestinal infection in schools began to be reported to the Health Protection Agency, Centre for Infections in early January 2006. To quantify the type, size and the spread of these outbreaks a reporting form was distributed to local Health Protection Units in England and to Wales for retrospective and prospective weekly completion. Between weeks 48/05 and 11/06, a total of 688 school outbreaks were reported, including 658 outbreaks of influenza-like illness with or without other symptoms. The remaining 30 outbreaks listed as gastrointestinal only were excluded from the present analysis. Influenza B was confirmed in 70 outbreaks where testing took place. 61% of the outbreaks were reported from primary schools for children aged 4-11 years. This large scale outbreak in school children with flu-like illness across England and Wales was not picked up by most of the routine surveillance schemes, therefore, we believe that a school absentee monitoring and reporting system may be needed to give an early warning of increased influenza activity, especially for the mild form of the disease caused by influenza B virus.