Narrative Capacity.

What develops in adulthood? More specifically, what develops in adult analysis, not just in terms of thwarted childhood capacities, not just through accrued experience, but even more fundamentally in terms of abilities or structures not possible until the present moment? In this paper, I posit narrative capacity-the capacity to organize conflictual aspects of self and other in a temporary causal-motivational sequence-as a core feature of what develops in the clinical encounter between the analyst and adult patient. It develops, as I demonstrate, through play with narrative fragments, contrasts, and integrations in the analytic field. I present a clinical process note to show how these elements texture and problematize one another. A successful analysis leads not to any one life story but to the more basic ability to weave and unweave our stories.

Obsessions And Compulsions: A Lifespan Perspective.

Freud traced the origin of the obsessional neurosis, which he considered a model condition for psychoanalytic inquiry, to a fixation in the anal phase of psychosexual development. Although many analysts have raised doubts about his account, and while the Sullivanian and Lacanian traditions have proposed alternatives, no approach has accounted for what Freud observed as the dizzying variety of obsessive presentations, which seem to defy a singular explanation. The broader research community has moved on, meanwhile, to genetic, neurological, and cognitive-behavioral explanations of what we now call obsessive-compulsive disorder. I argue that we can best account for the variety of obsessive presentations and meaningfully contribute to this interdisciplinary dialogue by framing obsessive-compulsive symptoms as the result of a disorder of volition, an exaggerated sense of willpower, not tied to any one developmental phase or bodily zone. Such a disorder evolves through the lifespan processes of introjection, identification, and repudiation in relation to an anxious/critical parent or an unpredictable environment. I trace these processes through three major developmental milestones. The implication is that, by looking in depth at how the obsessive person internalizes relationships, psychoanalysis can make a unique contribution to a conversation beyond its own borders.

The Specter of the Primitive.

Traditional psychoanalytic theories of development hold that the adult neurotic can regress, or has already regressed, to the childhood arrests and/or fixations in which his pathology originated. More recent critiques have called this possibility into question. It is unlikely that anyone can roll back the additions and modifications of lifespan development in a full-fledged return to the needs, wishes, and anxieties of childhood. By regression, though, some analysts mean not a full-fledged return to an earlier developmental phase, but a non-phase-specific slip into primitive fantasies and defenses. The operational term, in this particular variation, is not regression but primitive. The shift from the depressive to the paranoid-schizoid position is, for instance, considered not a phase-specific regression but a regression to primitive forms of mentation. The psychoanalytic conception of the primitive originated in Freud's reading of late nineteenth and early twentieth century anthropology. Freud and later Klein believed that the neurotic regresses to a psychological childhood, which in turn preserves the thought patterns of our prehistoric ancestors. Although this proposition and the underlying principle of recapitulation have been disproven, its traces are nonetheless preserved in what are termed the primary processes and primitive defenses. A tradition of theoretical critique and developmental research, however, shows that the primary processes and primitive defenses are not in fact primitive. That is, they are neither evolutionarily nor developmentally primary in human life. By implication, psychoanalysis should discard the term primitive and adopt a lifespan approach to the processes it describes.

The Critique of Regression: The Person, The Field, The Lifespan.

The term regression refers to the idea that a person can return to earlier phases of mental development and the primitive modes of functioning associated with them. A core concept in both conflict and deficit models of development, the idea has nonetheless come under increasing scrutiny from critics who argue that it misleads us into a genetic fallacy whereby we reduce the issues of adolescent and adult development to their childhood precursors. Inderbitzen and Levy (2000) suggest that we focus on transformations, or shifts, in mental organization, instead of on regressions. But discarding the concept of regression has theoretical implications: to adopt instead a focus on shifts in mental organization we must (1) consider our object of study to be the meaning-making person, not isolated instincts or needs; (2) understand conscious and unconscious mental life to be embedded in the here-and-now relational field; and (3) adopt a lifespan model of development. The aim here is to outline a theoretical framework in which we can more fully explore the possibility of discarding "regression" in favor of a focus on transformations in the developmental present.

The Intrapsychic and Interactional Realms: A Hermeneutic approach to Mental Space.

This paper addresses the tension between Freud's emphasis on the intrapsychic world and the emphasis placed by the Boston Change Process Study Group (BCPSG) on real interaction. Freud claimed that the intrapsychic world is primary; the BCPSG claim that interaction is primary. Both assume that these "levels" are discrete domains that can be isolated empirically, and that interact according to regulative rules in the natural world. This assumption reifies the metaphorical concept of mental space and freezes it at the metapsychological level of discourse. From a hermeneutic perspective, we must put these metaphorical concepts in dialogue with the context-specific processes of interpreting the patient's communication and intervening therapeutically. It then becomes clear that (1) the meaning of the terms "intrapsychic" and "interactive" is context-sensitive; (2) the question of primacy is a pragmatic one that cannot be decided through metapsychological debate; (3) when we say that a behavior or mental process operates on the "intrapsychic" or "interactive" level, we are making a judgment call that is not based on reason (even if our judgment enlists reason in its support). These metapsychological constructs help us think about our experience with patients. However, their meaning exists largely as a potential and is never definitively determined.