Heterogeneous cooperative leadership structure emerging from random regular graphs.

This paper investigates the evolution of cooperation and the emergence of hierarchical leadership structure in random regular graphs. It is found that there exist different learning patterns between cooperators and defectors, and cooperators are able to attract more followers and hence more likely to become leaders. Hence, the heterogeneous distributions of reputation and leadership can emerge from homogeneous random graphs. The important directed game-learning skeleton is then studied, revealing some important structural properties, such as the heavy-tailed degree distribution and the positive in-in degree correlation.

Orderliness predicts academic performance: behavioural analysis on campus lifestyle.

Quantitative understanding of relationships between students' behavioural patterns and academic performances is a significant step towards personalized education. In contrast to previous studies that were mainly based on questionnaire surveys, recent literature suggests that unobtrusive digital data bring us unprecedented opportunities to study students' lifestyles in the campus. In this paper, we collect behavioural records from undergraduate students' (N = 18 960) smart cards and propose two high-level behavioural characters, orderliness and diligence. The former is a novel entropy-based metric that measures the regularity of campus daily life, which is estimated here based on temporal records of taking showers and having meals. Empirical analyses on such large-scale unobtrusive behavioural data demonstrate that academic performance (GPA) is significantly correlated with orderliness. Furthermore, we show that orderliness is an important feature to predict academic performance, which improves the prediction accuracy even in the presence of students' diligence. Based on these analyses, education administrators could quantitatively understand the major factors leading to excellent or poor performance, detect undesirable abnormal behaviours in time and thus implement effective interventions to better guide students' campus lives at an early stage when necessary.

Coupling diversity across human behavior spaces.

The heterogeneous nature of human behaviors contributes to the complexity of human-activated systems. Empirical observations and theoretical models reveal the temporal and spatial heterogeneity of many aspects of human behaviors, including social connections and geographic movements, while little is known whether and how human individual's behavioral diversities are correlated across different aspects. With statistical analysis on large-scale data of aligned online and offline human behaviors, we show that behavior spaces are coupled, independent from the specific choice of measurements. The coupling further expands to individual's direct and indirect social contacts. This finding provides insight into understanding homophily in different social systems and further improving the predictability of human online and offline behaviors.

Correlation between social proximity and mobility similarity.

Human behaviors exhibit ubiquitous correlations in many aspects, such as individual and collective levels, temporal and spatial dimensions, content, social and geographical layers. With rich Internet data of online behaviors becoming available, it attracts academic interests to explore human mobility similarity from the perspective of social network proximity. Existent analysis shows a strong correlation between online social proximity and offline mobility similarity, namely, mobile records between friends are significantly more similar than between strangers, and those between friends with common neighbors are even more similar. We argue the importance of the number and diversity of common friends, with a counter intuitive finding that the number of common friends has no positive impact on mobility similarity while the diversity plays a key role, disagreeing with previous studies. Our analysis provides a novel view for better understanding the coupling between human online and offline behaviors, and will help model and predict human behaviors based on social proximity.

Extortion provides alternative routes to the evolution of cooperation in structured populations.

In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations (individuals are located on either a regular lattice or a scale-free network) in the context of repeated games by involving three types of strategies, namely, unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, and extortion. The strategy updating of the players is ruled by the replicator-like dynamics. We find that extortion strategies can act as catalysts to promote the emergence of cooperation in structured populations via different mechanisms. Specifically, on regular lattice, extortioners behave as both a shield, which can enwrap cooperators inside and keep them away from defectors, and a spear, which can defeat those surrounding defectors with the help of the neighboring cooperators. Particularly, the enhancement of cooperation displays a resonance-like behavior, suggesting the existence of optimal extortion strength mostly favoring the evolution of cooperation, which is in good agreement with the predictions from the generalized mean-field approximation theory. On scale-free network, the hubs, who are likely occupied by extortioners or defectors at the very beginning, are then prone to be conquered by cooperators on small-degree nodes as time elapses, thus establishing a bottom-up mechanism for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.

Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game.

Recently, Press and Dyson have proposed a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies for the two-player iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, so-called zero-determinant strategies. A player adopting zero-determinant strategies is able to pin the expected payoff of the opponents or to enforce a linear relationship between his own payoff and the opponents' payoff, in a unilateral way. This paper considers zero-determinant strategies in the iterated public goods game, a representative multi-player game where in each round each player will choose whether or not to put his tokens into a public pot, and the tokens in this pot are multiplied by a factor larger than one and then evenly divided among all players. The analytical and numerical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-player games: (i) with small number of players or a small multiplication factor, a player is able to unilaterally pin the expected total payoff of all other players; (ii) a player is able to set the ratio between his payoff and the total payoff of all other players, but this ratio is limited by an upper bound if the multiplication factor exceeds a threshold that depends on the number of players.

Extortion under uncertainty: Zero-determinant strategies in noisy games.

Repeated game theory has been one of the most prevailing tools for understanding long-running relationships, which are the foundation in building human society. Recent works have revealed a new set of "zero-determinant" (ZD) strategies, which is an important advance in repeated games. A ZD strategy player can exert unilateral control on two players' payoffs. In particular, he can deterministically set the opponent's payoff or enforce an unfair linear relationship between the players' payoffs, thereby always seizing an advantageous share of payoffs. One of the limitations of the original ZD strategy, however, is that it does not capture the notion of robustness when the game is subjected to stochastic errors. In this paper, we propose a general model of ZD strategies for noisy repeated games and find that ZD strategies have high robustness against errors. We further derive the pinning strategy under noise, by which the ZD strategy player coercively sets the opponent's expected payoff to his desired level, although his payoff control ability declines with the increase of noise strength. Due to the uncertainty caused by noise, the ZD strategy player cannot ensure his payoff to be permanently higher than the opponent's, which implies dominant extortions do not exist even under low noise. While we show that the ZD strategy player can still establish a novel kind of extortions, named contingent extortions, where any increase of his own payoff always exceeds that of the opponent's by a fixed percentage, and the conditions under which the contingent extortions can be realized are more stringent as the noise becomes stronger.

Peer pressure: enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment.

An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. We investigate a symmetric punishment strategy, in which an individual will punish each neighbor if their strategies are different, and vice versa. Because of the symmetry in imposing the punishment, one might intuitively expect the strategy to have little effect on cooperation. Utilizing the prisoner's dilemma game as a prototypical model of interactions at the individual level, we find, through simulation and theoretical analysis, that proper punishment, when even symmetrically imposed on individuals, can enhance cooperation. Also, we find that the initial density of cooperators plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation driven by mutual punishment.

Impact of heterogeneous activity and community structure on the evolutionary success of cooperators in social networks.

Recent empirical studies suggest that heavy-tailed distributions of human activities are universal in real social dynamics [L. Muchnik, S. Pei, L. C. Parra, S. D. S. Reis, J. S. Andrade Jr., S. Havlin, and H. A. Makse, Sci. Rep. 3, 1783 (2013)]. On the other hand, community structure is ubiquitous in biological and social networks [M. E. J. Newman, Nat. Phys. 8, 25 (2012)]. Motivated by these facts, we here consider the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game taking place on top of a real social network to investigate how the community structure and the heterogeneity in activity of individuals affect the evolution of cooperation. In particular, we account for a variation of the birth-death process (which can also be regarded as a proportional imitation rule from a social point of view) for the strategy updating under both weak and strong selection (meaning the payoffs harvested from games contribute either slightly or heavily to the individuals' performance). By implementing comparative studies, where the players are selected either randomly or in terms of their actual activities to play games with their immediate neighbors, we figure out that heterogeneous activity benefits the emergence of collective cooperation in a harsh environment (the action for cooperation is costly) under strong selection, whereas it impairs the formation of altruism under weak selection. Moreover, we find that the abundance of communities in the social network can evidently foster the formation of cooperation under strong selection, in contrast to the games evolving on randomized counterparts. Our results are therefore helpful for us to better understand the evolution of cooperation in real social systems.

Emergence, evolution and scaling of online social networks.

Online social networks have become increasingly ubiquitous and understanding their structural, dynamical, and scaling properties not only is of fundamental interest but also has a broad range of applications. Such networks can be extremely dynamic, generated almost instantaneously by, for example, breaking-news items. We investigate a common class of online social networks, the user-user retweeting networks, by analyzing the empirical data collected from Sina Weibo (a massive twitter-like microblogging social network in China) with respect to the topic of the 2011 Japan earthquake. We uncover a number of algebraic scaling relations governing the growth and structure of the network and develop a probabilistic model that captures the basic dynamical features of the system. The model is capable of reproducing all the empirical results. Our analysis not only reveals the basic mechanisms underlying the dynamics of the retweeting networks, but also provides general insights into the control of information spreading on such networks.

Boosting cooperation by involving extortion in spatial prisoner's dilemma games.

We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games with and without extortion by adopting the aspiration-driven strategy updating rule. We focus explicitly on how the strategy updating manner (whether synchronous or asynchronous) and also the introduction of extortion strategy affect the collective outcome of the games. By means of Monte Carlo simulations as well as dynamical cluster techniques, we find that the involvement of extortioners facilitates the boom of cooperators in the population (and whom can always dominate the population if the temptation to defect is not too large) for both synchronous and asynchronous strategy updating, in stark contrast to the other case, where cooperation is promoted for an intermediate aspiration level with synchronous strategy updating, but is remarkably inhibited if the strategy updating is implemented asynchronously. We explain the results by configurational analysis and find that the presence of extortion leads to the checkerboard-like ordering of cooperators and extortioners, which enable cooperators to prevail in the population with both strategy updating manners. Moreover, extortion itself is evolutionary stable, and therefore acts as the incubator for the evolution of cooperation.

Decentralized Adaptive Pinning Control for Cluster Synchronization of Complex Dynamical Networks.

In this brief, we investigate pinning control for cluster synchronization of undirected complex dynamical networks using a decentralized adaptive strategy. Unlike most existing pinning-control algorithms with or without an adaptive strategy, which require global information of the underlying network such as the eigenvalues of the coupling matrix of the whole network or a centralized adaptive control scheme, we propose a novel decentralized adaptive pinning-control scheme for cluster synchronization of undirected networks using a local adaptive strategy on both coupling strengths and feedback gains. By introducing this local adaptive strategy on each node, we show that the network can synchronize using weak coupling strengths and small feedback gains. Finally, we present some simulations to verify and illustrate the theoretical results.

Coveting thy neighbors fitness as a means to resolve social dilemmas.

In spatial evolutionary games the fitness of each individual is traditionally determined by the payoffs it obtains upon playing the game with its neighbors. Since defection yields the highest individual benefits, the outlook for cooperators is gloomy. While network reciprocity promotes collaborative efforts, chances of averting the impending social decline are slim if the temptation to defect is strong. It is, therefore, of interest to identify viable mechanisms that provide additional support for the evolution of cooperation. Inspired by the fact that the environment may be just as important as inheritance for individual development, we introduce a simple switch that allows a player to either keep its original payoff or use the average payoff of all its neighbors. Depending on which payoff is higher, the influence of either option can be tuned by means of a single parameter. We show that, in general, taking into account the environment promotes cooperation. Yet coveting the fitness of one's neighbors too strongly is not optimal. In fact, cooperation thrives best only if the influence of payoffs obtained in the traditional way is equal to that of the average payoff of the neighborhood. We present results for the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game, for different levels of uncertainty governing the strategy adoption process, and for different neighborhood sizes. Our approach outlines a viable route to increased levels of cooperative behavior in structured populations, but one that requires a thoughtful implementation.

Emergence of cooperation through coevolving time scale in spatial prisoner's dilemma.

We study evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game by considering adaptive strategy-selection time scale among individuals according to a "win-slower, lose-faster" rule: if an individual successfully resists the invasion of an opponent, she is prone to hold her strategy for longer time through decreasing her strategy-selection time scale; otherwise, she increases the time scale because of losing. We find that the greater the losers increase their strategy-selection time scales, the better for cooperation. Interestingly, optimal cooperation can be induced by proper adaptive rate in the strategy-selection time scale. Our results may have potential implications in the design of consensus protocol in multiagent systems.

Effective usage of credit records promotes cooperation on weighted networks.

The cooperative behaviors of players on weighted networks are investigated by incorporation of trust mechanisms into a well-accepted game model, i.e., the networked prisoner's dilemma game, afterwards some weight-updating schemes are designed according to the credit records. Despite the differences in network topologies and strategy updating protocols, a simple yet significant principle surfaces that, to promote the emergence of cooperation over abundant weighted networks, only the latest credit record of partners is required to be taken into consideration, whereas incorporating more previous records may even deteriorate the cooperation performance. To support such an appealing principle, we have investigated more deeply into the role of credit records so as to give a detailed explanation underlying it. The virtue of this work lies in providing insights into the effective usage of the currently available credit records.

Feedback reciprocity mechanism promotes the cooperation of highly clustered scale-free networks.

We study how the clustering coefficient influences the evolution of cooperation in scale-free public goods games. In games played by groups of individuals, triangle loops provide stronger support for mutual cooperation to resist invasion of selfish behavior than that in the absence of such loops, so that diffusion of cooperative behavior is relatively promoted. The feedback reciprocity mechanism of triangle plays a key role in facilitating cooperation in high clustered networks.

Diversity of reproduction time scale promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games.

We study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection time scale is slower than the interaction time scale. This is done by implementing probabilistic reproduction on an individual level. We observe that both too fast and too slow reproduction rates hamper the emergence of cooperation. In other words, there exists an intermediate selection time scale that maximizes cooperation. Another factor we find to promote cooperation is a diversity of reproduction time scales.

Roles of mixing patterns in cooperation on a scale-free networked game.

We investigate how the degree-mixing pattern affects the emergence of cooperation in the networked prisoner's dilemma game. Our study shows that when a network becomes assortative mixing by degree, the large-degree vertices (hubs) tend to interconnect to each other closely, which destroys the sustainability among cooperators and promotes the invasion of defectors, whereas in disassortative networks, the isolation among hubs protects the cooperative hubs in holding onto their initial strategies to avoid extinction.