Regional gender bias and year predict gender representation on civil trial teams.

OBJECTIVE: There are documented gender disparities in the legal field. We examined whether gender representation on civil trial teams varied on the basis of (a) the degree of regional gender bias "in the air" and (b) time. HYPOTHESES: We hypothesized that women were underrepresented both on trial teams and in leadership roles within those teams. We predicted that these gender disparities were exacerbated in regions with stronger regional gender bias and that these gender disparities attenuated over time. METHOD: We coded attorney gender and case outcomes in real civil trials (N = 655). We created regional implicit and explicit gender bias scores based on the year and region of the case using Project Implicit data. Finally, we used order-constrained inference and Bayesian modeling to identify the best-performing models. RESULTS: Overall, women represented only 17% of attorneys at trial and 13% in leadership roles-indicating vast gender disparities. Gender disparities on teams and in leadership roles were more extreme in regions with high (vs. low) regional gender bias (teams: Bayes factor [BF] = 9,182; leadership: BF = 91,667) and improved over time (teams: BF = 6,420; leadership: BF = 3,495). Gender alone best predicted the likelihood of serving in a leadership role (BF = 1,197,397). CONCLUSIONS: Female attorneys were grossly underrepresented on civil trial teams. Gender representation on teams, but not leadership roles, has improved slightly over time. Culture may also contribute; women were less represented on trial teams in regions with greater gender bias in the air-particularly in leadership roles. Despite these slight improvements in representation on trial teams over time and in low-bias regions, gender disparities in leadership roles persist over time and levels of regional bias. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

White mock jurors' moral emotional responses to viewing female victim photographs depend on the victim's race.

OBJECTIVE: Jurors often see both premortem photographs of female murder victims before death and postmortem photographs after death. Postmortem photographs are often probative but might prejudicially heighten jurors' other-condemning emotions, such as anger and disgust. Premortem photographs are often not probative and might prejudicially heighten jurors' other-suffering emotions, such as sympathy and empathy. We examined how victim race changes the impact of pre- and postmortem photographs on participants' moral emotions and, in turn, their verdicts. HYPOTHESES: We hypothesized that seeing postmortem (vs. no) photographs would increase convictions through other-condemning emotions for White, but not Latina or Black, victims. We also hypothesized that seeing both pre- and postmortem (vs. only postmortem) photographs would further increase convictions through other-suffering emotions, again for White, but not Latina or Black, female victims. METHOD: White participants (N = 1,261) watched a murder trial video. We manipulated the victim's race (White, Black, or Latina) and whether participants saw no victim photographs, premortem photographs of a female victim, postmortem photographs of a female victim, or both pre- and postmortem photographs. Participants reported the emotions they felt during the trial and chose a verdict. RESULTS: Seeing postmortem (vs. no) victim photographs increased White participants' guilty verdicts through other-condemning emotions when the female victim was White or Latina but not when she was Black. Seeing the combination of pre- and postmortem photographs increased White participants' convictions through other-suffering emotions when the victim was a White woman but not when she was Latina or Black. CONCLUSIONS: Attorneys and judges should consider that jurors' emotional reactions to victim photographs are felt selectively depending on the victim's race and could exacerbate racial biases in jurors' judgments. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Counterintuitive race effects in legal and nonlegal contexts.

OBJECTIVE: Despite documented racial disparities in all facets of the criminal justice system, recent laboratory attempts to investigate racial bias in legal settings have produced null effects or racial-bias reversals. These counterintuitive findings may be an artifact of laboratory participants' attempts to appear unprejudiced in response to social norms that proscribe expressions of racial bias against Black individuals. Furthermore, given pervasive stereotypes linking Black people with crime and heightened attention to issues of racial injustice in the legal system, laboratory participants may be especially likely to attempt to appear unprejudiced in studies examining judgments of Black individuals in legal as opposed to nonlegal contexts. HYPOTHESES: We predicted that counterintuitive race effects (null and pro-Black effects) are more likely to occur in laboratory research examining race in legal than in nonlegal contexts. METHOD: We conducted a quantitative review of race effects in three leading social psychology and legal psychology journals over the last four decades (Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin [PSPB]; Law and Human Behavior [LHB]; Psychology, Public Policy, and Law [PPPL]). We then conducted two experiments in which students (N = 314; Experiment 1) and Mechanical Turk workers (N = 695; Experiment 2) read descriptions of White and Black targets in either legal or nonlegal contexts and rated each target along various characteristics (e.g., dangerous, trustworthy). RESULTS: Our analysis of the literature indicated that counterintuitive race effects were more frequent in studies examining race in legal compared with nonlegal contexts. Our experiments likewise revealed that pro-Black race effects were stronger in legal than in nonlegal contexts. CONCLUSIONS: Laboratory research on racial bias against Black people-especially in legal settings-may produce misleading conclusions about the effects of race on important real-world outcomes. Methodological innovations for studying racial bias are needed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

The role of social desirability and establishing nonracist credentials on mock juror decisions about Black defendants.

OBJECTIVE: Recently, experimental work on racial bias in legal settings has diverged from real-world field data demonstrating racial disparities, instead often producing null or potential overcorrection effects favoring Black individuals over White individuals. We explored the role of social desirability in these counterintuitive effects and tested whether allowing participants to establish nonracist moral credentials increased their willingness to convict a Black defendant. HYPOTHESES: We predicted that establishing nonracist moral credentials would increase convictions of Black defendants-especially for participants likely to harbor racial bias and external motivation to control it. METHOD: In two experiments, we randomly assigned White mock jurors (Study 1: N = 1,018; Study 2: N = 1,253) to establish nonracist moral credentials by acquitting a Black defendant in an initial case, acquit a White defendant in the same case, or see no prior case. Next, they judged an ambiguous case against a Black (Studies 1 and 2) or White (Study 2) defendant. After choosing verdicts, they provided open-ended guesses of what the study was about. Participants completed measures of explicit prejudice, motivations to control prejudice, and political orientation. RESULTS: Most participants who were asked to judge at least one Black defendant guessed that the study was about racial bias and convicted Black defendants less often than did those who guessed the study was about something else. White participants who established nonracist credentials were significantly more likely to convict Black defendants compared with White participants who did not establish nonracist credentials. Subsequent analyses revealed that conservatives showed this predicted credentialing pattern, whereas liberals did not. Credentialed liberals' convictions of Black defendants remained low; instead, they convicted White defendants more than did noncredentialed liberals. CONCLUSIONS: Social desirability plays a clear role in whether White people acquit Black defendants in experiments, which does not align with persistent racial bias in the legal system. Research participants' concern about looking prejudiced might undermine the validity of experiments investigating racial bias in legal settings by artificially inflating pro-Black judgments. The opportunity to credential oneself as nonracist, however, might make conservatives more comfortable making anti-Black legal judgments-whereas credentialed liberals continue to judge Black individuals more favorably than White individuals in legal settings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Finding the perfect match: Fingerprint expertise facilitates statistical learning and visual comparison decision-making.

Forensic feature-comparison examiners compare-or "match"-evidence samples (e.g., fingerprints) to provide judgments about the source of the evidence. Research demonstrates that examiners in select disciplines possess expertise in this task by outperforming novices-yet the psychological mechanisms underpinning this expertise are unclear. This article investigates one implicated mechanism: statistical learning, the ability to learn how often things occur in the environment. This ability is likely important in forensic decision-making as samples sharing rarer statistical information are more likely to come from the same source than those sharing more common information. We investigated 46 fingerprint examiners' and 52 novices' statistical learning of fingerprint categories and application of this knowledge in a source-likelihood judgment task. Participants completed four measures of their statistical learning (frequency discrimination judgments, bounded and unbounded frequency estimates, and source-likelihood judgments) before and after familiarization to the "ground-truth" category frequencies. Compared to novices, fingerprint examiners had superior domain-specific statistical learning across all measures-both before and after familiarization. This suggests that fingerprint expertise facilitates domain-specific statistical learning-something that has important theoretical and applied implications for the development of training programs and statistical databases in forensic science. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Statistical feature training improves fingerprint-matching accuracy in novices and professional fingerprint examiners.

Forensic science practitioners compare visual evidence samples (e.g. fingerprints) and decide if they originate from the same person or different people (i.e. fingerprint 'matching'). These tasks are perceptually and cognitively complex-even practising professionals can make errors-and what limited research exists suggests that existing professional training is ineffective. This paper presents three experiments that demonstrate the benefit of perceptual training derived from mathematical theories that suggest statistically rare features have diagnostic utility in visual comparison tasks. Across three studies (N = 551), we demonstrate that a brief module training participants to focus on statistically rare fingerprint features improves fingerprint-matching performance in both novices and experienced fingerprint examiners. These results have applied importance for improving the professional performance of practising fingerprint examiners, and even other domains where this technique may also be helpful (e.g. radiology or banknote security).

Morality, punishment, and revealing other people's secrets.

Nine studies represent the first investigation into when and why people reveal other people's secrets. Although people keep their own immoral secrets to avoid being punished, we propose that people will be motivated to reveal others' secrets to punish them for immoral acts. Experimental and correlational methods converge on the finding that people are more likely to reveal secrets that violate their own moral values. Participants were more willing to reveal immoral secrets as a form of punishment, and this was explained by feelings of moral outrage. Using hypothetical scenarios (Studies 1, 3-6), two controversial events in the news (hackers leaking citizens' private information; Study 2a-2b), and participants' behavioral choices to keep or reveal thousands of diverse secrets that they learned in their everyday lives (Studies 7-8), we present the first glimpse into when, how often, and one explanation for why people reveal others' secrets. We found that theories of self-disclosure do not generalize to others' secrets: Across diverse methodologies, including real decisions to reveal others' secrets in everyday life, people reveal others' secrets as punishment in response to moral outrage elicited from others' secrets. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Can neuroimaging prove pain and suffering?: The influence of pain assessment techniques on legal judgments of physical versus emotional pain.

OBJECTIVES: It is difficult to "prove" pain and suffering-particularly emotional suffering. Neuroimaging technology might bolster pain claims in civil cases by making pain seem less subjective. We examined how neuroimaging of physical and emotional pain influences judgments of pain and suffering across nonlegal and legal contexts. HYPOTHESES: We hypothesized that participants would rate pain assessed using neuroimaging as more severe and award higher compensation than pain assessed using self-report measures. We also hypothesized that participants would rate physical (vs. emotional) pain as more severe, except when the pain claim was bolstered by a neuroimaging assessment. METHOD: In two experiments, we tested how pain assessment techniques influence perceptions of pain severity and monetary compensation differently for physical or emotional pain. Using a within-subjects design, participants (Experiment 1, N = 411, 59% male, 80% White) read 6 vignettes that described a person's chronic physical or emotional pain, evaluated using a clinical assessment, neuropsychological assessment, or neuroimaging assessment. We conceptually replicated Experiment 1 in a legal context (Experiment 2, N = 353, 42% male; 80% White) and tested whether the neuroimaging effect was due to knowing that the pain was assessed by neuroimaging or also required the inclusion of a neuroimage. RESULTS: When pain was assessed using neuroimaging (vs. non-neuroimaging assessments), participants rated the pain as more severe and gave larger monetary awards. When a person alleged physical (vs. emotional) pain, participants rated the pain as more severe and gave larger monetary awards. We conceptually replicated these findings in Experiment 2 and found that the neuroimaging effect was due to hearing about neuroimaging assessment and did not necessitate the inclusion of a neuroimage. CONCLUSION: Neuroimaging technology could be extremely useful for plaintiffs trying to overcome the difficult hurdle of proving their pain. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Subjective interpretation of "objective" video evidence: Perceptions of male versus female police officers' use-of-force.

OBJECTIVE: The police face great scrutiny after highly publicized instances of lethal force. Dash-camera footage ostensibly provides "objective" evidence of whether the force was excessive. We tested whether participants interpreted the same "objective" video of an officer exerting force differently based on the officer's gender and race. HYPOTHESIS: We predicted that when (a) a male (vs. female) officer used force and (b) a Black (vs. White) officer used force, participants would endorse more internal and less external explanations for their use-of-force, which would be associated with less trust in and perceived effectiveness of the officer. METHOD: We randomly assigned Amazon's Mechanical Turk workers (N = 452; 53% female, 80% White) to (a) see a segment of a police-civilian interaction video that either included or did not include exertion of force, and to believe that the officer was (b) male versus female, and (c) Black versus White. They reported their trust in the officer and perceptions of the officer's effectiveness, and their degree of agreement with external and internal attributions for the officer's behavior. RESULTS: When officers used force, people trusted officers less (d = 1.13) and perceived them to be less effective (d = .78) relative to when they did not. Despite all participants viewing the same interaction, people who thought they saw a male (vs. female) officer perceived his use-of-force to be driven more by internal traits, such as being aggressive and emotionally reactive, and less by the external situation, which was associated with decreased trust and perceived effectiveness. In contrast, people perceived female (vs. male) officers' force to be driven more by external aspects of the dangerous situation, which was associated with increased trust and perceived effectiveness. This pattern did not depend on the officers' race or participants' gender. CONCLUSION: This constitutes a rare instance of women benefiting from violating gender stereotypes in the workplace because people assumed her counterstereotypical behavior was more justified by the situation and less about her being an aggressive and emotionally reactive person. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Closing with emotion: The differential impact of male versus female attorneys expressing anger in court.

Emotion expression is a key part of trial advocacy. Attorneys are advised to gain credibility with juries by demonstrating conviction through anger expression. In 3 experiments, we tested whether expressing anger in court makes attorneys more effective and whether this depends on their gender. We randomly assigned participants (n = 120 undergraduates) to view a male or female attorney presenting the same closing argument in either a neutral or angry tone (Experiment 1). They reported their impressions of the attorney and how likely they would be to hire the attorney. People used the positive aspects of anger (e.g., conviction, power), to justify hiring an angry male attorney. Yet, they used the negative aspects of anger (e.g., shrill, obnoxious), to justify not hiring a female attorney. We replicated this effect in Experiment 2 with a community sample (n = 294). Experiment 3 (n = 273) demonstrated that the attorney anger by gender interaction generalized to perceptions of effectiveness across a set of additional attorney targets. Finally, a high-powered analysis collapsing across experiments confirmed that when expressing anger relative to when calm, female attorneys were seen as significantly less effective, while angry male attorneys were seen as significantly more effective. Women might not be able to harness the persuasive power of expressing anger in the courtroom, which might prevent female attorneys from advancing in their careers. (PsycINFO Database Record

When Hurt Heroes Do Harm: Collective Guilt and Leniency toward War-Veteran Defendants with PTSD.

Veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are at heightened risk for interfacing with the United States legal system as criminal defendants. Two experiments were used to test the hypothesis that American mock jurors would punish a veteran (vs. a civilian) with PTSD for a violent crime less harshly because of their own collective guilt (i.e., the guilt felt for the transgressions of one's in-group) about the veteran's suffering due to war. The participants were United States citizens recruited online (n = 174) who completed a mock-juror experiment involving a violent assault committed by either a veteran or a civilian with PTSD. As predicted, jurors were more lenient toward the veteran (vs. the civilian). For male mock jurors this was explained by their collective guilt for the veteran's war-related suffering. A second study experimentally induced individual and collective guilt about veteran defendants, finding that mock jurors (n = 533) who are less likely to share a salient in-group identity with the veteran (i.e., women, people with lower national identification with the United States) can be induced to feel the requisite guilt to exhibit leniency toward a veteran. Thus, veterans suffering from PTSD may receive more lenient punishment because they elicit a sense of collective guilt in legal decision-makers.

Individual versus group decision making: Jurors' reliance on central and peripheral information to evaluate expert testimony.

To investigate dual-process persuasion theories in the context of group decision making, we studied low and high need-for-cognition (NFC) participants within a mock trial study. Participants considered plaintiff and defense expert scientific testimony that varied in argument strength. All participants heard a cross-examination of the experts focusing on peripheral information (e.g., credentials) about the expert, but half were randomly assigned to also hear central information highlighting flaws in the expert's message (e.g., quality of the research presented by the expert). Participants rendered pre- and post-group-deliberation verdicts, which were considered "scientifically accurate" if the verdicts reflected the strong (versus weak) expert message, and "scientifically inaccurate" if they reflected the weak (versus strong) expert message. For individual participants, we replicated studies testing classic persuasion theories: Factors promoting reliance on central information (i.e., central cross-examination, high NFC) improved verdict accuracy because they sensitized individual participants to the quality discrepancy between the experts' messages. Interestingly, however, at the group level, the more that scientifically accurate mock jurors discussed peripheral (versus central) information about the experts, the more likely their group was to reach the scientifically accurate verdict. When participants were arguing for the scientifically accurate verdict consistent with the strong expert message, peripheral comments increased their persuasiveness, which made the group more likely to reach the more scientifically accurate verdict.

One angry woman: Anger expression increases influence for men, but decreases influence for women, during group deliberation.

We investigated whether expressing anger increases social influence for men, but diminishes social influence for women, during group deliberation. In a deception paradigm, participants believed they were engaged in a computer-mediated mock jury deliberation about a murder case. In actuality, the interaction was scripted. The script included 5 other mock jurors who provided verdicts and comments in support of the verdicts; 4 agreed with the participant and 1 was a "holdout" dissenter. Holdouts expressed their opinions with no emotion, anger, or fear and had either male or female names. Holdouts exerted no influence on participants' opinions when they expressed no emotion or fear. Participants' confidence in their own verdict dropped significantly, however, after male holdouts expressed anger. Yet, anger expression undermined female holdouts: Participants became significantly more confident in their original verdicts after female holdouts expressed anger-even though they were expressing the exact same opinion and emotion as the male holdouts. Mediation analyses revealed that participants drew different inferences from male versus female anger, which created a gender gap in influence during group deliberation. The current study has implications for group decisions in general, and jury deliberations in particular, by suggesting that expressing anger might lead men to gain influence, but women to lose influence over others (even when making identical arguments). These diverging consequences might result in women potentially having less influence on societally important decisions than men, such as jury verdicts.

The Influence of a Juvenile's Abuse History on Support for Sex Offender Registration.

We investigated whether and how a juvenile's history of experiencing sexual abuse affects public perceptions of juvenile sex offenders in a series of 5 studies. When asked about juvenile sex offenders in an abstract manner (Studies 1 and 2), the more participants (community members and undergraduates) believed that a history of being sexually abused as a child causes later sexually abusive behavior, the less likely they were to support sex offender registration for juveniles. Yet when participants considered specific sexual offenses, a juvenile's history of sexual abuse was not considered to be a mitigating factor. This was true when participants considered a severe sexual offense (forced rape; Study 3 and Study 4) and a case involving less severe sexual offenses (i.e., statutory rape), when a juvenile's history of sexual abuse backfired and was used as an aggravating factor, increasing support for registering the offender (Study 3 and Study 5). Theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.

The interactive effect of anger and disgust on moral outrage and judgments.

The two studies reported here demonstrated that a combination of anger and disgust predicts moral outrage. In Study 1, anger toward moral transgressions (sexual assault, funeral picketing) predicted moral outrage only when it co-occurred with at least moderate disgust, and disgust predicted moral outrage only when it co-occurred with at least moderate anger. In Study 2, a mock-jury paradigm that included emotionally disturbing photographs of a murder victim revealed that, compared to anger, disgust was a more consistent predictor of moral outrage (i.e., it predicted moral outrage at all levels of anger). Furthermore, moral outrage mediated the effect of participants' anger on their confidence in a guilty verdict--but only when anger co-occurred with at least a moderate level of disgust--whereas moral outrage mediated the effect of participants' disgust on their verdict confidence at all levels of anger. The interactive effect of anger and disgust has important implications for theoretical explanations of moral outrage, moral judgments in general, and legal decision making.

The promise of a cognitive perspective on jury deliberation.

Despite much psychological research regarding jury decision making, surprisingly little is known about the deliberation process that gives rise to jury verdicts. We review classic jury decision-making research regarding the importance of deliberation and more recent research, investigating deliberation and hung juries, that challenges the view that deliberation does not have an important impact on verdicts. We advocate greater attention to potential cognitive processes during deliberation that might explain the transition between predeliberation preferences and a jury's ultimate verdict. We then review cognitive work in the group context generally, and the jury context specifically, illustrating the promise of a cognitive perspective on jury deliberation. Finally, we identify cognitive phenomena likely to be particularly valuable in illuminating deliberation behavior.

Psychological mechanisms underlying support for juvenile sex offender registry laws: prototypes, moral outrage, and perceived threat.

In three studies, we investigated support for applying sex offender registry laws to juveniles. Family law attorneys supported registry laws less for juveniles than for adults. Laypeople and prosecutors supported juvenile and adult sex offender registration equally--even though they perceived juveniles as generally less threatening than adults (Study 1)--because most people spontaneously envision a severe sex offender prototype regardless of offender age (Study 2). People are less supportive of registry laws, however, when they envision less severe prototypes spontaneously (Study 2) or when induced to do so (Study 3). Effects of offender age, offender prototypes, and offense severity were mediated by perceptions of threat posed by the juvenile sex offender (i.e., utilitarian concerns). The effect of offense severity was also mediated by moral outrage (i.e., retributive concerns).

Emotional evidence and jurors' judgments: the promise of neuroscience for informing psychology and law.

This article is a review of psychological and neuroscience research addressing how juror decision making is influenced by emotion elicited from potentially disturbing evidence such as gruesome autopsy photographs, victim impact statements, and information about a defendant's tragic personal history presented as mitigating evidence. We review (a) converging evidence suggesting that the presence versus absence of such evidence results in more punitive juror judgments, (b) social cognition theories that provide potential explanations for these effects, and (c) neuroscience research aimed at understanding the role of emotion in moral judgments by identifying how brain activity is affected by emotion-eliciting stimuli. We argue that neuroimaging evidence showing that emotional stimuli cause heightened emotion and decreased effortful cognitive processing is relevant in understanding jurors' increased punitiveness after being exposed to emotional evidence, and in turn relevant to debates about the admissibility of emotional evidence in courts of law. Ultimately, we argue for more ecologically valid psychological research to clarify these important issues.