International challenge to predict the impact of radioxenon releases from medical isotope production on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty sampling station.

The International Monitoring System (IMS) is part of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO). At entry-into-force, half of the 80 radionuclide stations will be able to measure concentrations of several radioactive xenon isotopes produced in nuclear explosions, and then the full network may be populated with xenon monitoring afterward. An understanding of natural and man-made radionuclide backgrounds can be used in accordance with the provisions of the treaty (such as event screening criteria in Annex 2 to the Protocol of the Treaty) for the effective implementation of the verification regime. Fission-based production of (99)Mo for medical purposes also generates nuisance radioxenon isotopes that are usually vented to the atmosphere. One of the ways to account for the effect emissions from medical isotope production has on radionuclide samples from the IMS is to use stack monitoring data, if they are available, and atmospheric transport modeling. Recently, individuals from seven nations participated in a challenge exercise that used atmospheric transport modeling to predict the time-history of (133)Xe concentration measurements at the IMS radionuclide station in Germany using stack monitoring data from a medical isotope production facility in Belgium. Participants received only stack monitoring data and used the atmospheric transport model and meteorological data of their choice. Some of the models predicted the highest measured concentrations quite well. A model comparison rank and ensemble analysis suggests that combining multiple models may provide more accurate predicted concentrations than any single model. None of the submissions based only on the stack monitoring data predicted the small measured concentrations very well. Modeling of sources by other nuclear facilities with smaller releases than medical isotope production facilities may be important in understanding how to discriminate those releases from releases from a nuclear explosion.

Detection of radioxenon in Darwin, Australia following the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant accident.

A series of (133)Xe detections in April 2011 made at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) International Monitoring System noble gas station in Darwin, Australia, were analysed to determine the most likely source location. Forward and backwards atmospheric transport modelling simulations using FLEXPART were conducted. It was shown that the most likely source location was the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant accident. Other potential sources in the southern hemisphere were analysed, including the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) radiopharmaceutical facility, but it was shown that sources originating from these locations were highly unlikely to be the source of the observed (133)Xe Darwin detections.

Estimation of the radioactive source dispersion from Fukushima nuclear power plant accident.

Following the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident detections of (133)Xe have been made in various locations. Using results of these remote measurements the Fukushima (133)Xe source term has been reconstructed and compared with previously reconstructed (137)Cs and (131)I source terms. The reconstruction is accomplished by applying atmospheric transport modeling and an adapted least square error method. The obtained results are in agreement with previous estimations of the Fukushima radionuclide source, and also serve as a proof of principle for source term reconstruction based on atmospheric transport modeling.

Estimation of the time-dependent radioactive source-term from the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident using atmospheric transport modelling.

Caesium-137 and Iodine-131 radionuclides released after the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant accident in March 2011 were detected at monitoring stations throughout the world. Using the CTBT radionuclide data and the assumption that the Fukushima accident was the only source of these radionuclides, it was possible to estimate their time-dependent source-term fourteen days following the accident by using atmospheric transport modelling. A reasonable agreement was obtained between the modelling results and the estimated radionuclide release rates from the Fukushima accident.