International challenge to model the long-range transport of radioxenon released from medical isotope production to six Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty monitoring stations.

After performing a first multi-model exercise in 2015 a comprehensive and technically more demanding atmospheric transport modelling challenge was organized in 2016. Release data were provided by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization radiopharmaceutical facility in Sydney (Australia) for a one month period. Measured samples for the same time frame were gathered from six International Monitoring System stations in the Southern Hemisphere with distances to the source ranging between 680 (Melbourne) and about 17,000 km (Tristan da Cunha). Participants were prompted to work with unit emissions in pre-defined emission intervals (daily, half-daily, 3-hourly and hourly emission segment lengths) and in order to perform a blind test actual emission values were not provided to them. Despite the quite different settings of the two atmospheric transport modelling challenges there is common evidence that for long-range atmospheric transport using temporally highly resolved emissions and highly space-resolved meteorological input fields has no significant advantage compared to using lower resolved ones. As well an uncertainty of up to 20% in the daily stack emission data turns out to be acceptable for the purpose of a study like this. Model performance at individual stations is quite diverse depending largely on successfully capturing boundary layer processes. No single model-meteorology combination performs best for all stations. Moreover, the stations statistics do not depend on the distance between the source and the individual stations. Finally, it became more evident how future exercises need to be designed. Set-up parameters like the meteorological driver or the output grid resolution should be pre-scribed in order to enhance diversity as well as comparability among model runs.

International challenge to predict the impact of radioxenon releases from medical isotope production on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty sampling station.

The International Monitoring System (IMS) is part of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO). At entry-into-force, half of the 80 radionuclide stations will be able to measure concentrations of several radioactive xenon isotopes produced in nuclear explosions, and then the full network may be populated with xenon monitoring afterward. An understanding of natural and man-made radionuclide backgrounds can be used in accordance with the provisions of the treaty (such as event screening criteria in Annex 2 to the Protocol of the Treaty) for the effective implementation of the verification regime. Fission-based production of (99)Mo for medical purposes also generates nuisance radioxenon isotopes that are usually vented to the atmosphere. One of the ways to account for the effect emissions from medical isotope production has on radionuclide samples from the IMS is to use stack monitoring data, if they are available, and atmospheric transport modeling. Recently, individuals from seven nations participated in a challenge exercise that used atmospheric transport modeling to predict the time-history of (133)Xe concentration measurements at the IMS radionuclide station in Germany using stack monitoring data from a medical isotope production facility in Belgium. Participants received only stack monitoring data and used the atmospheric transport model and meteorological data of their choice. Some of the models predicted the highest measured concentrations quite well. A model comparison rank and ensemble analysis suggests that combining multiple models may provide more accurate predicted concentrations than any single model. None of the submissions based only on the stack monitoring data predicted the small measured concentrations very well. Modeling of sources by other nuclear facilities with smaller releases than medical isotope production facilities may be important in understanding how to discriminate those releases from releases from a nuclear explosion.

The total release of xenon-133 from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant accident.

The accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant (FD-NPP) on 11 March 2011 released large amounts of radioactivity into the atmosphere. We determine the total emission of the noble gas xenon-133 ((133)Xe) using global atmospheric concentration measurements. For estimating the emissions, we used three different methods: (i) using a purely observation-based multi-box model, (ii) comparisons of dispersion model results driven with GFS meteorological data with the observation data, and (iii) such comparisons with the dispersion model driven by ECMWF data. From these three methods, we have obtained total (133)Xe releases from FD-NPP of (i) 16.7 ± 1.9 EBq, (ii) 14.2 ± 0.8 EBq, and (iii) 19.0 ± 3.4 EBq, respectively. These values are substantially larger than the entire (133)Xe inventory of FD-NPP of about 12.2 EBq derived from calculations of nuclear fuel burn-up. Complete release of the entire (133)Xe inventory of FD-NPP and additional release of (133)Xe due to the decay of iodine-133 ((133)I), which can add another 2 EBq to the (133)Xe FD-NPP inventory, is required to explain the atmospheric observations. Two of our three methods indicate even higher emissions, but this may not be a robust finding given the differences between our estimates.