Birth's transformative shift: a response to Waleszczynski.

Waleszczynski critiques my argument for why the relationship between a pregnant person and any fetus they carry is not a relationship between a parent and a child. I argue Waleszczynski does not show that my 'argument from potentiality' is inadequate, and I provide further justification for why birth marks a transformative shift into a moral relationship.

Why there is no dilemma for the birth strategy: a response to Bobier and Omelianchuk.

Bobier and Omelianchuk argue that the Birth Strategy for addressing analogies between abortion and infanticide is saddled with a dilemma. It must be accepted that non-therapeutic late-term abortions are either, impermissible, or they are not. If accepted, then the Birth Strategy is undermined. If not, then the highly unintuitive claim that non-therapeutic late-term abortions are permissible must be accepted. I argue that the moral principle employed to defend the claim that non-therapeutic late-term abortions are morally impermissible fails to do so. Furthermore, the principle that people have a right to bodily autonomy can be used as an argument for the conclusion that non-therapeutic late-term abortions are permissible and is intuitively stronger than the intuition for the opposite of this conclusion. This is because people having a right to bodily autonomy explains the impermissibility of rape and sexual assault. Consequently, the posited dilemma is defused and does not undermine the Birth Strategy.

Orphans cannot be after-birth aborted: a response to Bobier.

I offer a response to an objection to my account of the moral difference between fetuses and newborns, an account that seeks to address an analogy between abortion and infanticide, which is based on the apparent equality of moral value of fetuses and newborns.

Killing and Impairing Fetuses.

Could it be that if a fetus is not a person abortion is still immoral? One affirmative answer comes in the form of 'The Impairment Argument', which utilizes 'The Impairment Principle' to argue that abortion is immoral even if fetuses lack personhood. I argue 'The Impairment Argument' fails. It is not adequately defended from objections, and abortion is, in fact, a counterexample to the impairment principle. Furthermore, it explains neither what the wrong-making features of abortion are nor what features of fetuses ground their supposed moral significance. By presupposing the fetus lacks personhood and providing no alternate account of the basis of fetuses' moral significance, there is nothing to constitute abortion's wrongness. Attempts to modify it fail for the same reasons. Thus, the impairment argument fails to show abortion is immoral.

Defending the distinction between pregnancy and parenthood.

In this paper, I respond to the criticisms towards my account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns. I show my critics have not adequately argued for their view that pregnant women participate in a parent-child relationship. While an important counterexample is raised against my account, this counterexample had already been dealt with in my original paper. Because the criticisms against my account lack argumentative support, they do not pose a problem for my account. I conclude the raised criticisms do not amount to a stron philosophical case against my account.

Fetuses, newborns, & parental responsibility.

I defend a relational account of difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns. The difference in moral status between a fetus and a newborn is that the newborn baby is the proper object of 'parental responsibility' whereas the fetus is not. 'Parental responsibilities' are a moral dimension of a 'parent-child relation', a relation which newborn babies stand in, but fetuses do not. I defend this relational account by analysing the concepts of 'parent' and 'child', and conclude that the difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns means one may claim abortion is morally permissible while also claiming infanticide is not morally permissible, without inconsistency between the two claims.