Taking time to compose thoughts with prefrontal schemata.

Under what conditions can prefrontal cortex direct the composition of brain states, to generate coherent streams of thoughts? Using a simplified Potts model of cortical dynamics, crudely differentiated into two halves, we show that once activity levels are regulated, so as to disambiguate a single temporal sequence, whether the contents of the sequence are mainly determined by the frontal or by the posterior half, or by neither, depends on statistical parameters that describe its microcircuits. The frontal cortex tends to lead if it has more local attractors, longer lasting and stronger ones, in order of increasing importance. Its guidance is particularly effective to the extent that posterior cortices do not tend to transition from state to state on their own. The result may be related to prefrontal cortex enforcing its temporally-oriented schemata driving coherent sequences of brain states, unlike the atemporal "context" contributed by the hippocampus. Modelling a mild prefrontal (vs. posterior) lesion offers an account of mind-wandering and event construction deficits observed in prefrontal patients.

Déjà vu: A botched memory operation, illegitimate to start with.

Rather than a natural product, a computational analysis leads us to characterize déjà vu as a failure of memory retrieval, linked to the activation in neocortex of familiar items from a compositional memory in the absence of hippocampal input, and to a misappropriation by the self of what is of others.

Who am I really? The ephemerality of the self-schema following vmPFC damage.

We studied the role of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) in supporting the self-schema, by asking vmPFC patients, along with healthy and brain-damaged controls, to judge the degree to which they (or another person) were likely to engage in a series of activities, and how confident they were in their responses. Critically, participants provided their judgments on two separate occasions, a week apart. Our underlying assumption was that a strong self-schema would lead to confident and stable self-related judgments. We observed that control groups exhibited higher across-session consistency for self-related compared to other-related judgments, while this self-advantage was absent in vmPFC patients. In addition, regression analyses showed that in control groups the level of confidence associated with a specific (self- or other-related) judgment predicted the stability of that judgment across sessions. In contrast, vmPFC patients' confidence and rating consistency were aligned only for other-related judgments. By contrast, self-related judgments changed across sessions regardless of the confidence level with which they were initially endorsed. These findings indicate that the vmPFC is crucial to maintaining the self-schema and supporting the reliable retrieval of self-related information.

Retrograde amnesia abolishes the self-reference effect in anterograde memory.

Is retrograde amnesia associated with an ability to know who we are and imagine what we will be like in the future? To answer this question, we had S.G., a patient with focal retrograde amnesia following hypoxia, two brain-damaged (control) patients with no retrograde memory deficits, and healthy controls judge whether each of a series of trait adjectives was descriptive of their present self, future self, another person, and that person in the future, and later recognize studied traits among distractors. Healthy controls and control patients were more accurate in recognizing self-related compared to other-related traits, a phenomenon known as the self-reference effect (SRE). This held for both present and future self-views. By contrast, no evidence of (present or future) SRE was observed in SG, who concomitantly showed reduced certainty about his personality traits. These findings indicate that retrograde amnesia can weaken the self-schema and preclude its instantiation during self-related processing.

Computational constraints on the associative recall of spatial scenes.

We consider a model of associative storage and retrieval of compositional memories in an extended cortical network. Our model network is comprised of Potts units, which represent patches of cortex, interacting through long-range connections. The critical assumption is that a memory, for example of a spatial view, is composed of a limited number of items, each of which has a pre-established representation: storing a new memory only involves acquiring the connections, if novel, among the participating items. The model is shown to have a much lower storage capacity than when it stores simple unitary representations. It is also shown that an input from the hippocampus facilitates associative retrieval. When it is absent, it is advantageous to cue rare rather than frequent items. The implications of these results for emerging trends in empirical research are discussed.

Present and future self in memory: the role of vmPFC in the self-reference effect.

Self-related information is remembered better than other-related information (self-reference effect; SRE), a phenomenon that has been convincingly linked to the medial prefrontal cortex. It is not clear whether information related to our future self would also have a privileged status in memory, as medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) regions respond less to the future than to the present self, as if it were an 'other'. Here we ask whether the integrity of the ventral mPFC (vmPFC) is necessary for the emergence of the present and future SRE, if any. vmPFC patients and brain-damaged and healthy controls judged whether each of a series of trait adjectives was descriptive of their present self, future self, another person and that person in the future and later recognized studied traits among distractors. Information relevant to the present (vs future) was generally recognized better, across groups. However, whereas healthy and brain-damaged controls exhibited strong present and future SREs, these were absent in vmPFC patients, who concomitantly showed reduced certainty about their own present and anticipated traits compared to the control groups. These findings indicate that vmPFC is necessary to impart a special mnemonic status to self-related information, including our envisioned future self, possibly by instantiating the self-schema.