RESUMO
In 2008, an outbreak of isoniazid-resistant tuberculosis was identified among residents of homeless shelters in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. When initial control efforts involving standard targeted testing failed, a comprehensive approach that involved all providers of services for the homeless successfully interrupted the outbreak.
Assuntos
Antituberculosos/farmacologia , Pessoas Mal Alojadas , Isoniazida/farmacologia , Mycobacterium tuberculosis/efeitos dos fármacos , Tuberculose Resistente a Múltiplos Medicamentos/epidemiologia , Tuberculose Resistente a Múltiplos Medicamentos/microbiologia , Antituberculosos/uso terapêutico , Surtos de Doenças , Georgia/epidemiologia , História do Século XXI , Humanos , Incidência , Isoniazida/uso terapêutico , Tuberculose Resistente a Múltiplos Medicamentos/tratamento farmacológico , Tuberculose Resistente a Múltiplos Medicamentos/históriaRESUMO
The first patients with laboratory-confirmed cases of Zika virus disease in American Samoa had symptom onset in January 2016 (1). In response, the American Samoa Department of Health (ASDoH) implemented mosquito control measures (1), strategies to protect pregnant women (1), syndromic surveillance based on electronic health record (EHR) reports (1), Zika virus testing of persons with one or more signs or symptoms of Zika virus disease (fever, rash, arthralgia, or conjunctivitis) (1-3), and routine testing of all asymptomatic pregnant women in accordance with CDC guidance (2,3). All collected blood and urine specimens were shipped to the Hawaii Department of Health Laboratory for Zika virus testing and to CDC for confirmatory testing. Early in the response, collection and testing of specimens from pregnant women was prioritized over the collection from symptomatic nonpregnant patients because of limited testing and shipping capacity. The weekly numbers of suspected Zika virus disease cases declined from an average of six per week in January-February 2016 to one per week in May 2016. By August, the EHR-based syndromic surveillance (1) indicated a return to pre-outbreak levels. The last Zika virus disease case detected by real-time, reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) occurred in a patient who had symptom onset on June 19, 2016. In August 2016, ASDoH requested CDC support in assessing whether local transmission had been reduced or interrupted and in proposing a timeline for discontinuation of routine testing of asymptomatic pregnant women. An end date (October 15, 2016) was determined for active mosquito-borne transmission of Zika virus and a timeline was developed for discontinuation of routine screening of asymptomatic pregnant women in American Samoa (conception after December 10, 2016, with permissive testing for asymptomatic women who conceive through April 15, 2017).
Assuntos
Doenças Assintomáticas , Testes Diagnósticos de Rotina , Surtos de Doenças/prevenção & controle , Vigilância da População/métodos , Guias de Prática Clínica como Assunto , Complicações Infecciosas na Gravidez/prevenção & controle , Infecção por Zika virus/prevenção & controle , Samoa Americana/epidemiologia , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. , Feminino , Humanos , Gravidez , Complicações Infecciosas na Gravidez/epidemiologia , Fatores de Tempo , Estados Unidos , Zika virus/isolamento & purificação , Infecção por Zika virus/epidemiologiaRESUMO
In October 2001, the greater New York City Metropolitan Area was the scene of a bioterrorism attack. The scale of the public response to this attack was not foreseen and threatened to overwhelm the Bioterrorism Response Laboratory's (BTRL) ability to process and test environmental samples. In a joint effort with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the cooperation of the Department of Defense, a massive effort was launched to maintain and sustain the laboratory response and return test results in a timely fashion. This effort was largely successful. The development and expansion of the facility are described, as are the special needs of a BTRL. The establishment of a Laboratory Bioterrorism Command Center and protocols for sample intake, processing, reporting, security, testing, staffing, and and quality control are also described.