Zika-Associated Birth Defects Reported in Pregnancies with Laboratory Evidence of Confirmed or Possible Zika Virus Infection - U.S. Zika Pregnancy and Infant Registry, December 1, 2015-March 31, 2018.

Zika virus infection during pregnancy can cause serious birth defects of the brain and eyes, including intracranial calcifications, cerebral or cortical atrophy, chorioretinal abnormalities, and optic nerve abnormalities (1,2). The frequency of these Zika-associated brain and eye defects, based on data from the U.S. Zika Pregnancy and Infant Registry (USZPIR), has been previously reported in aggregate (3,4). This report describes the frequency of individual Zika-associated brain and eye defects among infants from pregnancies with laboratory evidence of confirmed or possible Zika virus infection. Among 6,799 live-born infants in USZPIR born during December 1, 2015-March 31, 2018, 4.6% had any Zika-associated birth defect; in a subgroup of pregnancies with a positive nucleic acid amplification test (NAAT) for Zika virus infection, the percentage was 6.1% of live-born infants. The brain and eye defects most frequently reported included microcephaly, corpus callosum abnormalities, intracranial calcification, abnormal cortical gyral patterns, ventriculomegaly, cerebral or cortical atrophy, chorioretinal abnormalities, and optic nerve abnormalities. Among infants with any Zika-associated birth defect, one third had more than one defect reported. Certain brain and eye defects in an infant might prompt suspicion of prenatal Zika virus infection. These findings can help target surveillance efforts to the most common brain and eye defects associated with Zika virus infection during pregnancy should a Zika virus outbreak reemerge, and might provide a signal to the reemergence of Zika virus, particularly in geographic regions without ongoing comprehensive Zika virus surveillance.

Shelter Characteristics, Infection Prevention Practices, and Universal Testing for SARS-CoV-2 at Homeless Shelters in 7 US Urban Areas.

Objectives. To examine shelter characteristics and infection prevention practices in relation to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection point prevalence during universal testing at homeless shelters in the United States.Methods. SARS-CoV-2 testing was offered to clients and staff at homeless shelters, irrespective of symptoms. Site assessments were conducted from March 30 to June 1, 2020, to collect information on shelter characteristics and infection prevention practices. We assessed the association between SARS-CoV-2 infection prevalence and shelter characteristics, including 20 infection prevention practices by using crude risk ratios (RRs) and exact unconditional 95% confidence intervals (CIs).Results. Site assessments and SARS-CoV-2 testing results were reported for 63 homeless shelters in 7 US urban areas. Median infection prevalence was 2.9% (range = 0%-71.4%). Shelters implementing head-to-toe sleeping and excluding symptomatic staff from working were less likely to have high infection prevalence (RR = 0.5; 95% CI = 0.3, 0.8; and RR = 0.5; 95% CI = 0.4, 0.6; respectively); shelters with medical services available were less likely to have very high infection prevalence (RR = 0.5; 95% CI = 0.2, 1.0).Conclusions. Sleeping arrangements and staffing policies are modifiable factors that might be associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection prevalence in homeless shelters. Shelters should follow recommended practices to reduce the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission.

Risk Factors for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Infection in Homeless Shelters in Chicago, Illinois-March-May, 2020.

BACKGROUND: People experiencing homelessness are at increased risk of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), but little is known about specific risk factors for infection within homeless shelters. METHODS: We performed widespread severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) polymerase chain reaction testing and collected risk factor information at all homeless shelters in Chicago with at least 1 reported case of COVID-19 (n = 21). Multivariable, mixed-effects log-binomial models were built to estimate adjusted prevalence ratios (aPRs) for SARS-CoV-2 infection for both individual- and facility-level risk factors. RESULTS: During March 1 to May 1, 2020, 1717 shelter residents and staff were tested for SARS-CoV-2; 472 (27%) persons tested positive. Prevalence of infection was higher for residents (431 of 1435, 30%) than for staff (41 of 282, 15%) (prevalence ratio = 2.52; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.78-3.58). The majority of residents with SARS-CoV-2 infection (293 of 406 with available information about symptoms, 72%) reported no symptoms at the time of specimen collection or within the following 2 weeks. Among residents, sharing a room with a large number of people was associated with increased likelihood of infection (aPR for sharing with >20 people compared with single rooms = 1.76; 95% CI, 1.11-2.80), and current smoking was associated with reduced likelihood of infection (aPR = 0.71; 95% CI, 0.60-0.85). At the facility level, a higher proportion of residents leaving and returning each day was associated with increased prevalence (aPR = 1.08; 95% CI, 1.01-1.16), whereas an increase in the number of private bathrooms was associated with reduced prevalence (aPR for 1 additional private bathroom per 100 people = 0.92; 95% CI, 0.87-0.98). CONCLUSIONS: We identified a high prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infections in homeless shelters. Reducing the number of residents sharing dormitories might reduce the likelihood of SARS-CoV-2 infection. When community transmission is high, limiting movement of persons experiencing homelessness into and out of shelters might also be beneficial.

Characteristics of Intracranial Group A Streptococcal Infections in US Children, 1997-2014.

BACKGROUND: Few data on intracranial group A Streptococcus (GAS) infection in children are available. Here, we describe the demographic, clinical, and diagnostic characteristics of 91 children with intracranial GAS infection. METHODS: Cases of intracranial GAS infection in persons ≤18 years of age reported between 1997 and 2014 were identified by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's population- and laboratory-based Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs) system. Medical charts were abstracted using a active, standardized case report form. All available isolates were emm typed. US census data were used to calculate rates. RESULTS: ABCs identified 2596 children with invasive GAS infection over an 18-year period; 91 (3.5%) had an intracranial infection. Intracranial infections were most frequent during the winter months and among children aged <1 year. The average annual incidence was 0.07 cases per 100000 children. For 83 patients for whom information for further classification was available, the principal clinical presentations included meningitis (35 [42%]), intracranial infection after otitis media, mastoiditis, or sinusitis (34 [41%]), and ventriculoperitoneal shunt infection (14 [17%]). Seven (8%) of these infections progressed to streptococcal toxic shock syndrome. The overall case fatality rate was 15%. GAS emm types 1 (31% of available isolates) and 12 (13% of available isolates) were most common. CONCLUSIONS: Pediatric intracranial (GAS) infections are uncommon but often severe. Risk factors for intracranial GAS infection include the presence of a ventriculoperitoneal shunt and contiguous infections in the middle ear or sinuses.

Ability To Serologically Confirm Recent Zika Virus Infection in Areas with Varying Past Incidence of Dengue Virus Infection in the United States and U.S. Territories in 2016.

Cross-reactivity within flavivirus antibody assays, produced by shared epitopes in the envelope proteins, can complicate the serological diagnosis of Zika virus (ZIKAV) infection. We assessed the utility of the plaque reduction neutralization test (PRNT) to confirm recent ZIKAV infections and rule out misleading positive immunoglobulin M (IgM) results in areas with various levels of past dengue virus (DENV) infection incidence. We reviewed PRNT results of sera collected for diagnosis of ZIKAV infection from 1 January through 31 August 2016 with positive ZIKAV IgM results, and ZIKAV and DENV PRNTs were performed. PRNT result interpretations included ZIKAV, unspecified flavivirus, DENV infection, or negative. For this analysis, ZIKAV IgM was considered false positive for samples interpreted as a DENV infection or negative. In U.S. states, 208 (27%) of 759 IgM-positive results were confirmed to be ZIKAV compared to 11 (21%) of 52 in the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI), 15 (15%) of 103 in American Samoa, and 13 (11%) of 123 in Puerto Rico. In American Samoa and Puerto Rico, more than 80% of IgM-positive results were unspecified flavivirus infections. The false-positivity rate was 27% in U.S. states, 18% in the USVI, 2% in American Samoa, and 6% in Puerto Rico. In U.S. states, the PRNT provided a virus-specific diagnosis or ruled out infection in the majority of IgM-positive samples. Almost a third of ZIKAV IgM-positive results were not confirmed; therefore, providers and patients must understand that IgM results are preliminary. In territories with historically higher rates of DENV transmission, the PRNT usually could not differentiate between ZIKAV and DENV infections.

Establishing a Timeline to Discontinue Routine Testing of Asymptomatic Pregnant Women for Zika Virus Infection - American Samoa, 2016-2017.

The first patients with laboratory-confirmed cases of Zika virus disease in American Samoa had symptom onset in January 2016 (1). In response, the American Samoa Department of Health (ASDoH) implemented mosquito control measures (1), strategies to protect pregnant women (1), syndromic surveillance based on electronic health record (EHR) reports (1), Zika virus testing of persons with one or more signs or symptoms of Zika virus disease (fever, rash, arthralgia, or conjunctivitis) (1-3), and routine testing of all asymptomatic pregnant women in accordance with CDC guidance (2,3). All collected blood and urine specimens were shipped to the Hawaii Department of Health Laboratory for Zika virus testing and to CDC for confirmatory testing. Early in the response, collection and testing of specimens from pregnant women was prioritized over the collection from symptomatic nonpregnant patients because of limited testing and shipping capacity. The weekly numbers of suspected Zika virus disease cases declined from an average of six per week in January-February 2016 to one per week in May 2016. By August, the EHR-based syndromic surveillance (1) indicated a return to pre-outbreak levels. The last Zika virus disease case detected by real-time, reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) occurred in a patient who had symptom onset on June 19, 2016. In August 2016, ASDoH requested CDC support in assessing whether local transmission had been reduced or interrupted and in proposing a timeline for discontinuation of routine testing of asymptomatic pregnant women. An end date (October 15, 2016) was determined for active mosquito-borne transmission of Zika virus and a timeline was developed for discontinuation of routine screening of asymptomatic pregnant women in American Samoa (conception after December 10, 2016, with permissive testing for asymptomatic women who conceive through April 15, 2017).

Lessons From an Outbreak of Legionnaires' Disease on a Hematology-Oncology Unit.

OBJECTIVES To define the scope of an outbreak of Legionnaires' disease (LD), to identify the source, and to stop transmission. DESIGN AND SETTING Epidemiologic investigation of an LD outbreak among patients and a visitor exposed to a newly constructed hematology-oncology unit. METHODS An LD case was defined as radiographically confirmed pneumonia in a person with positive urinary antigen testing and/or respiratory culture for Legionella and exposure to the hematology-oncology unit after February 20, 2014. Cases were classified as definitely or probably healthcare-associated based on whether they were exposed to the unit for all or part of the incubation period (2-10 days). We conducted an environmental assessment and collected water samples for culture. Clinical and environmental isolates were compared by monoclonal antibody (MAb) and sequence-based typing. RESULTS Over a 12-week period, 10 cases were identified, including 6 definite and 4 probable cases. Environmental sampling revealed Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1 (Lp1) in the potable water at 9 of 10 unit sites (90%), including all patient rooms tested. The 3 clinical isolates were identical to environmental isolates from the unit (MAb2-positive, sequence type ST36). No cases occurred with exposure after the implementation of water restrictions followed by point-of-use filters. CONCLUSIONS Contamination of the unit's potable water system with Lp1 strain ST36 was the likely source of this outbreak. Healthcare providers should routinely test patients who develop pneumonia at least 2 days after hospital admission for LD. A single case of LD that is definitely healthcare associated should prompt a full investigation. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2017;38:306-313.

A Cluster of Group A Streptococcal Infections in a Skilled Nursing Facility-the Potential Role of Healthcare Worker Presenteeism.

OBJECTIVES: To determine the extent of a group A streptococcus (GAS) cluster (2 residents with invasive GAS (invasive case-patients), 2 carriers) caused by a single strain (T antigen type 2 and M protein gene subtype 2.0 (T2, emm 2.0)), evaluate factors contributing to transmission, and provide recommendations for disease control. DESIGN: Cross-sectional analysis and retrospective review. SETTING: Skilled nursing facility (SNF). PARTICIPANTS: SNF residents and staff. MEASUREMENTS: The initial cluster was identified through laboratory notification and screening of SNF residents with wounds. Laboratory and SNF administrative records were subsequently reviewed to identify additional residents with GAS, oropharyngeal and wound (if present) swabs were collected from SNF staff and residents to examine GAS colonization, staff were surveyed to assess infection control practices and risk factors for GAS colonization, epidemiologic links between case-patients and persons colonized with GAS were determined, and facility infection control practices were assessed. RESULTS: No additional invasive case-patients were identified. Oropharyngeal swabs obtained from all 167 SNF residents were negative; one wound swab grew GAS that was the same as the outbreak strain (T2, emm 2.0). The outbreak strain was not identified in any of the 162 staff members. One of six staff members diagnosed with GAS pharyngitis worked while ill and had direct contact with invasive case-patients within a few weeks before their onset of symptoms. Additional minor breaches in infection control were noted. CONCLUSION: Sick healthcare workers may have introduced GAS into the SNF, with propagation by infection control lapses. "Presenteeism," or working while ill, may introduce and transmit GAS to vulnerable in SNF populations. Identification of an invasive GAS case-patient should trigger a prompt response by facilities to prevent further transmission and workplace culture, and policies should be in place to discourage presenteeism in healthcare settings.

Monitoring of Persons with Risk for Exposure to Ebola Virus - United States, November 3, 2014-December 27, 2015.

During November 3, 2014-December 27, 2015, CDC implemented guidance on movement and monitoring of persons in the United States with potential exposure to Ebola virus (Ebola) (1). Monitoring was concluded in December 2015. After CDC modified the guidance for monitoring travelers from Guinea (the last country for which monitoring of travelers was recommended) in late December 2015, jurisdictional reports were no longer collected by CDC. This report documents the number of persons monitored as part of the effort to isolate, test, and, if necessary, treat symptomatic travelers and other persons in the United States who had risk for exposure to Ebola during the period the guidance was in effect. Sixty jurisdictions, including all 50 states, two local jurisdictions, and eight territories and freely associated states, reported a total of 29,789 persons monitored, with >99% completing 21-day monitoring with no loss to follow-up exceeding 48 hours. No confirmed cases of imported Ebola were reported once monitoring was initiated. This landmark public health response demonstrates the robust infrastructure and sustained monitoring capacity of local, state, and territorial health authorities in the United States as a part of a response to an international public health emergency.

Notes from the Field: Outbreak of Zika Virus Disease - American Samoa, 2016.

During December 2015-January 2016, the American Samoa Department of Health (ASDoH) detected through surveillance an increase in the number of cases of acute febrile rash illness. Concurrently, a case of laboratory-confirmed Zika virus infection, a mosquito-borne flavivirus infection documented to cause microcephaly and other severe brain defects in some infants born to women infected during pregnancy (1,2) was reported in a traveler returning to New Zealand from American Samoa. In the absence of local laboratory capacity to test for Zika virus, ASDoH initiated arboviral disease control measures, including public education and vector source reduction campaigns. On February 1, CDC staff members were deployed to American Samoa to assist ASDoH with testing and surveillance efforts.

Epidemiology of Invasive Group A Streptococcal Infections in the United States, 2005-2012.

BACKGROUND: Invasive group A Streptococcus (GAS) infections are associated with significant morbidity and mortality rates. We report the epidemiology and trends of invasive GAS over 8 years of surveillance. METHODS: From January 2005 through December 2012, we collected data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Active Bacterial Core surveillance, a population-based network of 10 geographically diverse US sites (2012 population, 32.8 million). We defined invasive GAS as isolation of GAS from a normally sterile site or from a wound in a patient with necrotizing fasciitis (NF) or streptococcal toxic shock syndrome (STSS). Available isolates were emm typed. We calculated rates and made age- and race-adjusted national projections using census data. RESULTS: We identified 9557 cases (3.8 cases per 100 000 persons per year) with 1116 deaths (case-fatality rate, 11.7%). The case-fatality rates for septic shock, STSS, and NF were 45%, 38%, and 29%, respectively. The annual incidence was highest among persons aged ≥65 years (9.4/100 000) or <1 year (5.3) and among blacks (4.7/100 000). National rates remained steady over 8 years of surveillance. Factors independently associated with death included increasing age, residence in a nursing home, recent surgery, septic shock, NF, meningitis, isolated bacteremia, pneumonia, emm type 1 or 3, and underlying chronic illness or immunosuppression. An estimated 10 649-13 434 cases of invasive GAS infections occur in the United States annually, resulting in 1136-1607 deaths. In a 30-valent M-protein vaccine, emm types accounted for 91% of isolates. CONCLUSIONS: The burden of invasive GAS infection in the United States remains substantial. Vaccines under development could have a considerable public health impact.

Active Bacterial Core Surveillance for Legionellosis - United States, 2011-2013.

During 2000­2011, passive surveillance for legionellosis in the United States demonstrated a 249% increase in crude incidence, although little was known about the clinical course and method of diagnosis. In 2011, a system of active, population-based surveillance for legionellosis was instituted through CDC's Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs) program. Overall disease rates were similar in both the passive and active systems, but more complete demographic information and additional clinical and laboratory data were only available from ABCs. ABCs data during 2011­2013 showed that approximately 44% of patients with legionellosis required intensive care, and 9% died. Disease incidence was higher among blacks than whites and was 10 times higher in New York than California. Laboratory data indicated a reliance on urinary antigen testing, which only detects Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1 (Lp1). ABCs data highlight the severity of the disease, the need to better understand racial and regional differences, and the need for better diagnostic testing to detect infections.

Investigation of a prolonged Group A Streptococcal outbreak among residents of a skilled nursing facility, Georgia, 2009-2012.

BACKGROUND: Group A Streptococcus (GAS) is an important bacterial cause of life-threatening illness among the elderly. Public health officials investigated a protracted GAS outbreak in a skilled nursing facility in Georgia housing patients requiring 24-hour nursing or rehabilitation, to prevent additional cases. METHODS: We defined a case as illness in a skilled nursing facility resident with onset after January 2009 with GAS isolated from a usually sterile (invasive) or nonsterile site (noninvasive). Cases were "recurrent" if >1 month elapsed between episodes. We evaluated infection control practices, performed a GAS carriage study, emm-typed available GAS isolates, and conducted a case-control study of risk factors for infection. RESULTS: Three investigations, spanning 36 months, identified 19 residents with a total of 24 GAS infections: 15 invasive (3 recurrent) and 9 noninvasive (2 recurrent) episodes. All invasive cases required hospitalization; 4 patients died. Seven residents were GAS carriers. All invasive cases and resident carrier isolates were type emm 11.0. We observed hand hygiene lapses, inadequate infection documentation, and more frequent wound care staff turnover on wing A versus wing B. Risk factors associated with infection in multivariable analysis included living on wing A (odds ratio [OR], 3.4; 95% confidence interval [CI], .9-16.4) and having an indwelling line (OR, 5.6; 95% CI, 1.2-36.4). Cases ceased following facility-wide chemoprophylaxis in July 2012. CONCLUSIONS: Staff turnover, compromised skin integrity in residents, a suboptimal infection control program, and lack of awareness of infections likely contributed to continued GAS transmission. In widespread, prolonged GAS outbreaks in skilled nursing facilities, facility-wide chemoprophylaxis may be necessary to prevent sustained person-to-person transmission.