Reputational costs of receptiveness: When and why being receptive to opposing political views backfires.

A fast-growing body of research finds that receptiveness to opposing political views carries reputational benefits. A different body of research finds that opposing political views and the people who hold them are seen as repugnant. How could it be that people receptive to opposing political ideas are viewed positively when the political opponents they are receptive to are seen negatively? In seven main (N = 5,286) and nine supplemental studies (N = 3,983 participants in online studies; N = 124,493 observations in field data), we reconcile this tension by arguing that the identity of the person one is receptive to determines whether receptiveness carries reputational benefits or costs. When the information source belongs to the opposing party, receptiveness to opposing political views often carries reputational costs. We find these reputational costs across both strong and weak signals of receptiveness, eight different political and social issues, and multiple types of prototypical out-party sources. We argue that these costs arise because members of the opposing party are frequently stereotyped as immoral, and thus receptiveness to their ideas is seen negatively. As a boundary condition, we find that the costs of receptiveness are pronounced for sources who are prototypical of the out-party and attenuate (or even reverse) for sources who are nonprototypical. These findings resolve a seeming contradiction between two distinct literatures in psychology, contribute to a rapidly expanding literature on the interpersonal consequences of receptiveness, and lay the groundwork for understanding novel barriers to, and ultimately solutions for, the lack of cross-party openness and political polarization. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Tailoring recommendation algorithms to ideal preferences makes users better off.

People often struggle to do what they ideally want because of a conflict between their actual and ideal preferences. ​​​By focusing on maximizing engagement, recommendation algorithms appear to be exacerbating this struggle. However, this need not be the case. Here we show that tailoring recommendation algorithms to ideal (vs. actual) preferences would provide meaningful benefits to both users and companies. To examine this, we built algorithmic recommendation systems that generated real-time, personalized recommendations tailored to either a person's actual or ideal preferences. Then, in a high-powered, pre-registered experiment (n = 6488), we measured the effects of these recommendation algorithms. We found that targeting ideal rather than actual preferences resulted in somewhat fewer clicks, but it also increased the extent to which people felt better off and that their time was well spent. Moreover, of note to companies, targeting ideal preferences increased users' willingness to pay for the service, the extent to which they felt the company had their best interest at heart, and their likelihood of using the service again. Our results suggest that users and companies would be better off if recommendation algorithms learned what each person was striving for and nudged individuals toward their own unique ideals.

Objects and self-identity.

This article reviews how objects can serve as indicators of one's identity and signals of important life events. Objects carry both personal and social meaning, and ownership or usage increases the linkage between the object and the self. Owned objects are valued more due to their linkage with the (positively viewed) self. Similarly, self-views can assimilate to the associations of the owned or used object. We rely on the insights of consistency theories (e.g. Balance Theory) to provide a unifying umbrella for the literature, and we review how the acquisition and abandonment of objects can shape self-views, affect task performance, and serve as inward and outward signals of group membership.

Wanting to Be Different Predicts Nonmotivated Change: Actual-Desired Self-Discrepancies and Susceptibility to Subtle Change Inductions.

Actual-desired discrepancies in people's self-concepts represent structural incongruities in their self-representations that can lead people to experience subjective conflict. Theory and research suggest that structural incongruities predict susceptibility to subtle influences like priming and conditioning. Although typically examined for their motivational properties, we hypothesized that because self-discrepancies represent structural incongruities in people's self-concepts, they should also predict susceptibility to subtle influences on people's active self-views. Across three studies, we found that subtle change inductions (self-evaluative conditioning and priming) exerted greater impact on active self-perceptions and behavior as actual-desired self-discrepancies increased in magnitude. Exploratory analyses suggested that these changes occurred regardless of the compatibility of the change induction with individuals' desired self-views.

Belief in the immutability of attitudes both increases and decreases advocacy.

People with an entity theory of attitudes (i.e., the belief that attitudes are relatively unchanging) are more certain of their attitudes than are people with an incremental theory (i.e., the belief that attitudes are relatively malleable), and people with greater attitude certainty are generally more willing to try to persuade others. Combined, these findings suggest that an entity theory should foster greater advocacy. Yet, people with entity theories may be less willing to advocate because they also perceive others' attitudes as unchanging. Across 5 studies, we show that both of these countervailing effects occur simultaneously and cancel each other out. However, by manipulating how advocacy is framed (as standing up for one's views or exchanging one's views with others), whom people focus on (themselves or others), or which implicit theory applies to oneself versus others, each implicit theory can either increase or decrease willingness to advocate. (PsycINFO Database Record

The good and bad of ambivalence: Desiring ambivalence under outcome uncertainty.

Decades of past research point to the downside of evaluative inconsistency (i.e., ambivalence), suggesting that it is an unpleasant state that can result in negative affect. Consequently, people are often motivated to resolve their ambivalence in various ways. We propose that people sometimes desire to be ambivalent as a means of strategic self-protection. Across employment, educational and consumer choice settings, we demonstrate that when people are uncertain they can obtain a desired target, they will cultivate ambivalence in order to protect their feelings in the event that they fail to get what they want. Specifically, we show that people consciously desire to cultivate ambivalence as a way to emotionally hedge and that they seek out and process information in ways to deliberately cultivate ambivalence. We find that people are most likely to generate ambivalence when they are most uncertain that they can obtain their desired target. Depending on the outcome, this cultivated ambivalence can either be useful (when the desired target is not obtained) or backfire (when the desired target is obtained).

Visual perspective influences the use of metacognitive information in temporal comparisons.

Four studies test the proposition that when people look back to past selves as a means of gauging current status, the visual perspective they assume determines the kind of information that they consider in making their judgments of change. In this way, visual perspective, coupled with the kind of change for which people are looking, determines how much change is perceived. The studies demonstrate that in the first-person perspective, experiential information is weighted more heavily than content information, whereas in the third-person perspective, the converse is true. In addition, the effects of perceived change on behavior are revealed, such that greater perceived positive change is associated with behaviors that are congruent with that change, whereas greater perceived negative change is associated with behaviors that are incongruent with that change. Theoretical implications, as well as implications for behavioral interventions, are discussed.

Self-ambivalence and resistance to subtle self-change attempts.

Recent research has demonstrated the malleability of self-views to subtle situational influence but has not uncovered features of the self-concept representation that make it susceptible to such change. Using research on attitude ambivalence as a foundation, the current article predicted that the self would be most likely to respond to a subtle change induction when the targeted self-beliefs were objectively ambivalent (e.g., possessed both positive and negative features). Using self-esteem conditioning (Experiment 1) and outgroup stereotype priming (Experiment 2), it was found that people were more susceptible to subtle change inductions as objective self-ambivalence increased. Notably, the consistency between dominant self-views (positive or negative) and the change induction did not influence these results. These effects held for objective ambivalence, but not subjective ambivalence, and only when the objective ambivalence measure was relevant to the change induction. Mechanisms of the observed moderation and the implications of self-ambivalence for understanding self-change are discussed.

Nonconformity defines the self: the role of minority opinion status in self-concept clarity.

Drawing on distinctiveness and social identity theories, the present studies tested whether minority opinion holders would have a more clearly defined sense of self than majority opinion holders. In Study 1, participants who were induced to believe that they held a minority opinion on a controversial issue had higher subsequent self-concept clarity scores than did those who were induced to believe that they held a majority opinion, controlling for self-esteem. Furthermore, the relationship between minority opinion status and self-concept clarity was strongest among participants whose opinions were highly expressive of their values (Studies 2 and 3), as well as among participants who identified strongly with the group in which they were a minority (Study 3). Theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.

The role of interpersonal perceptions in the prime-to-behavior pathway.

The present research suggests that biased interpersonal perceptions can mediate prime-to-behavior effects and introduces a new moderator for when such mediation will occur. Across 5 experiments, the authors provide evidence that priming effects on behavior in interpersonal contexts are mediated by social perceptions, but only when participants are focused on the other person. These effects occur when other-focus is primed (Experiment 1), when other-focus is high owing to the decision-making situation (Experiment 2), and when other-focus is dispositionally high (Experiment 3). Experiments 4 and 5 bring additional support for a biased perception account by ruling out an alternative behavior-perception link and showing that other-focus can moderate not only the mediating mechanism of prime-to-behavior effects but also the behavioral effects themselves. The implications of these results for increasing understanding of behavioral priming effects in rich social contexts are discussed.

Contextual priming: where people vote affects how they vote.

American voters are assigned to vote at a particular polling location (e.g., a church, school, etc.). We show these assigned polling locations can influence how people vote. Analysis of a recent general election demonstrates that people who were assigned to vote in schools were more likely to support a school funding initiative. This effect persisted even when controlling for voters' political views, demographics, and unobservable characteristics of individuals living near schools. A follow-up experiment using random assignment suggests that priming underlies these effects, and that they can occur outside of conscious awareness. These findings underscore the subtle power of situational context to shape important real-world decisions.

Significant other primes and behavior: motivation to respond to social cues moderates pursuit of prime-induced goals.

Significant others can automatically activate a variety of goals, including goals that significant others have for an individual and the individual's personal goals that are associated with the significant others. Across three studies, this article shows that the effects of significant other primes (i.e., mother, roommate) on behavior depend on individual differences in both personal goals and responsiveness to social cues (i.e., self-monitoring, need to belong). Specifically, individuals who are motivated to respond to social cues assimilate to a goal that their primed significant other has for them, regardless of whether they personally hold the goal. Individuals not so motivated, on the other hand, assimilate to the goal only when it is one that they also personally hold. Implications of these findings for research on the prime-to-behavior relationship and interpersonal goal pursuit are discussed.

Understanding the role of the self in prime-to-behavior effects: the Active-Self account.

In this article, the authors review research showing the different roles that the self-concept can play in affecting prime-to-behavior effects. As an organizing framework, an Active-Self account of stereotype, trait, and exemplar prime-to-behavior effects is presented. According to this view, such primes can influence people's behavior by creating changes in the active self-concept, either by invoking a biased subset of chronic self-content or by introducing new material into the active self-concept. The authors show how involvement of the active self-concept can increase, decrease, or reverse the effects of primes and describe how individual differences in responsiveness of the self to change and usage of the self in guiding behavior (e.g., self-monitoring) can moderate prime-to-behavior effects. The Active-Self account is proposed as an integrative framework that explains how the self is involved in prime-to-behavior effects and helps predict how changes in the self determine which motivational and behavioral representations will guide behavior.

Discrepancies between explicit and implicit self-concepts: Consequences for information processing.

Individuals with discrepancies among their explicit beliefs often engage in greater elaboration of discrepancy-related information in a presumed attempt to reduce the discrepancy. The authors predicted that individuals with discrepancies between explicit and implicit self-conceptions might similarly be motivated to engage in processing of discrepancy-related information, even though they might not be aware of the discrepancy. Four studies were conducted in which various self-dimensions were assessed with explicit and implicit measures. Across several different self-dimensions (e.g., need to evaluate, self-esteem), the authors found that as the discrepancy between the explicit and implicit measure increased (regardless of direction), people engaged in more thinking about information framed as related to the self-dimension on which the discrepancy existed. This research suggests that individuals might be motivated to examine relevant information as a strategy to minimize the implicit doubt that accompanies an inconsistency between explicit and implicit self-conceptions.

Priming a new identity: self-monitoring moderates the effects of nonself primes on self-judgments and behavior.

When a construct is primed, people often act in construct-consistent ways. Several accounts for this effect have been offered, including ideomotor theory and a social functional perspective. The authors tested an additional perspective, the Active-Self account, whereby primes can temporarily alter self-perceptions. In Study 1, non-African American participants reported feeling more aggressive on an implicit measure following an African American prime. In Study 2, participants reported feeling luckier on an implicit measure following a number 7 (vs. 13) prime. In both studies, these effects were obtained only for low self-monitors, who are more likely to change self-conceptions in response to diagnostic self-information and to use their internal states in guiding behavior. Study 3 showed that low self-monitors also show larger behavioral effects of primes.

The impact of personality on cognitive, behavioral, and affective political processes: the effects of need to evaluate.

Need to evaluate (NE) is a personality trait that reflects a person's proclivity to create and hold attitudes; people high in NE are especially likely to form attitudes toward all sorts of objects. Using data from the 1998 National Election Survey Pilot and the 2000 National Election Survey, NE was shown to predict a variety of important attitude-relevant cognitive, behavioral, and affective political processes beyond simply holding attitudes: NE predicted how many evaluative beliefs about candidates a person held, the likelihood that a person would use party identification and issue stances to determine candidate preferences, the extent to which a person engaged in political activism, the likelihood that a person voted or intended to vote, the extent to which a person used the news media for gathering information, and the intensity of emotional reactions a person felt toward political candidates. Thus, NE appears to play a powerful role in shaping important political behavior, emotion, and cognition.