Action plans can interact to hinder or facilitate reach performance.

Executing a reach action can be delayed while retaining another action in working memory (WM) if the two action plans partly overlap rather than do not overlap. This delay (partial repetition cost) occurs when reach responses are under cognitive control. In this study, we investigated whether facilitation (a partial repetition benefit) occurs when reach responses are automatic. We also examined whether the hemisphere controlling the limb or selection of the preferred limb (based on a free-reach task) influences reach performance when the actions partly overlap. Left- and right-handers reached to different stimulus locations to the left and right of body midline with their ipsilateral hand while maintaining an action plan in WM that required the same or the different hand. The results showed a partial repetition benefit for spatially compatible reaches to left and right stimulus locations far from the body midline, but not for those near the body midline. Also, no partial repetition cost was found at any of the stimulus-reach locations. This indicates that automatic reach responses that partly overlap with an action plan maintained in WM are not delayed, but instead can be facilitated (partial repetition benefit). The roles of hemisphere and reach-hand preference in action control and the importance of the degree of feature overlap in obtaining a partial repetition benefit (and cost) are discussed.

Holding a manual response sequence in memory can disrupt vocal responses that share semantic features with the manual response.

Holding an action plan in memory for later execution can delay execution of another action if the actions share a similar (compatible) feature. This compatibility interference (CI) occurs for actions that share the same response modality (e.g., manual response). We investigated whether CI can generalize to actions that utilize different response modalities (manual and vocal). In three experiments, participants planned and withheld a sequence of key-presses with the left- or right-hand based on the visual identity of the first stimulus, and then immediately executed a speeded, vocal response ('left' or 'right') to a second visual stimulus. The vocal response was based on discriminating stimulus color (Experiment 1), reading a written word (Experiment 2), or reporting the antonym of a written word (Experiment 3). Results showed that CI occurred when the manual response hand (e.g., left) was compatible with the identity of the vocal response (e.g., 'left') in Experiment 1 and 3, but not in Experiment 2. This suggests that partial overlap of semantic codes is sufficient to obtain CI unless the intervening action can be accessed automatically (Experiment 2). These findings are consistent with the code occupation hypothesis and the general framework of the theory of event coding (Behav Brain Sci 24:849-878, 2001a; Behav Brain Sci 24:910-937, 2001b).

An action sequence withheld in memory can delay execution of visually guided actions: the generalization of response compatibility interference.

Withholding an action plan in memory for later execution can delay execution of another action, if the actions share a similar (compatible) action feature (i.e., response hand). This phenomenon, termed compatibility interference (CI), was found for identity-based actions that do not require visual guidance. The authors examined whether CI can generalize to both identity-based and location-based actions that require visual guidance. Participants withheld a planned action based on the identity of a stimulus and then immediately executed a visually guided action (touch response) to a 2nd stimulus based on its color identity (Experiment 1), its spatial location (Experiment 2), or an intrinsic spatial location within an object (Experiment 3). Results showed CI for both left- and right-hand responses in Experiment 1. However, CI occurred for left- but not right-hand responses in Experiment 2 and 3. This suggests that CI can generalize to visually guided actions under cognitive control but not to actions that invoke automatic visual-control mechanisms where the left hemisphere may play a special role (C. Gonzalez, T. Ganel, & M. Goodale, 2006). The code occupation account for CI (G. Stoet & B. Hommel, 2002) is also discussed.