Explicit Instruction of Scientific Uncertainty in an Undergraduate Geoscience Field-Based Course.

Understanding and communicating uncertainty is a key skill needed in the practice of science. However, there has been little research on the instruction of uncertainty in undergraduate science education. Our team designed a module within an online geoscience field course which focused on explicit instruction around uncertainty and provided students with an uncertainty rating scale to record and communicate their uncertainty with a common language. Students then explored a complex, real-world geological problem about which expert scientists had previously made competing claims through geologic maps. Provided with data, expert uncertainty ratings, and the previous claims, students made new geologic maps of their own and presented arguments about their claims in written form. We analyzed these reports along with assessments of uncertainty. Most students explicitly requested geologists' uncertainty judgments in a post-course assessment when asked why scientists might differ in their conclusions and/or utilized the rating scale unprompted in their written arguments. Through the examination of both pre- and post-course assessments of uncertainty and students' course-based assessments, we argue that explicit instruction around uncertainty can be introduced during undergraduate coursework and could facilitate geoscience novices developing into practicing geoscientists.

Spatially and temporally distributed data foraging decisions in disciplinary field science.

How do scientists generate and weight candidate queries for hypothesis testing, and how does learning from observations or experimental data impact query selection? Field sciences offer a compelling context to ask these questions because query selection and adaptation involves consideration of the spatiotemporal arrangement of data, and therefore closely parallels classic search and foraging behavior. Here we conduct a novel simulated data foraging study-and a complementary real-world case study-to determine how spatiotemporal data collection decisions are made in field sciences, and how search is adapted in response to in-situ data. Expert geoscientists evaluated a hypothesis by collecting environmental data using a mobile robot. At any point, participants were able to stop the robot and change their search strategy or make a conclusion about the hypothesis. We identified spatiotemporal reasoning heuristics, to which scientists strongly anchored, displaying limited adaptation to new data. We analyzed two key decision factors: variable-space coverage, and fitting error to the hypothesis. We found that, despite varied search strategies, the majority of scientists made a conclusion as the fitting error converged. Scientists who made premature conclusions, due to insufficient variable-space coverage or before the fitting error stabilized, were more prone to incorrect conclusions. We found that novice undergraduates used the same heuristics as expert geoscientists in a simplified version of the scenario. We believe the findings from this study could be used to improve field science training in data foraging, and aid in the development of technologies to support data collection decisions.

Working memory loads differentially influence frame-induced bias and normative choice in risky decision making.

Risky decision making can be biased by several types of contextual factors-in particular, framing of outcomes. A popular explanation for outcome framing effects is based on presumed affective reactions that contribute to accepting sure gains and avoiding sure losses. Other theories propose that selective weighting of information about gains and losses contributes to framing bias. Prior research on framing bias has focused on preferences rather than on decisions in which choices can be classified as advantageous (correct) or disadvantageous (incorrect) by a normative criterion. The current study used a novel hypothetical risky decision making task offering choices between a sure option and a gamble option. The gamble was advantageous or disadvantageous on different trials based on the normative criterion of expected value. Results showed risk avoidance with a gain frame and risk seeking with a loss frame, comparable to findings when choices involve preferences. We also examined the impact of working memory loads of either non-affective stimuli, most likely to interfere with acquisition of choice information, or affective stimuli, which might influence affective processes contributing to framing. The results were that non-affective working memory load produced the greatest framing magnitude, while affective load produced changes in framing magnitude across trials that varied by valence. In addition, only the non-affective load decreased advantageous choices and reduced the accuracy of answers to knowledge probe questions about the choices. The findings are consistent with the notion that framing effects may arise from cognitive non-engagement with the task, rather than arising by way of affective processes. Affective loads had a limited influence on framing and no reliable impact on choice accuracy or choice knowledge, suggesting that the affective loads influenced the weighting of choice information.

Trait anxiety impairs cognitive flexibility when overcoming a task acquired response and a preexisting bias.

Individuals with high trait anxiety tend to be worse at flexibly adapting goal-directed behavior to meet changing demands relative to those with low trait anxiety. Past research on anxiety and cognitive flexibility has used tasks that involve overcoming a recently acquired rule, strategy, or response pattern after an abrupt change in task requirements (e.g., choice X led to positive outcomes but now leads to negative outcomes). An important limitation of this research is that many decision making situations require overcoming a preexisting bias (e.g., deciding whether to withdraw a historically winning investment that has experienced recent losses). In the present study we examined whether anxiety differences in the ability to overcome an acquired response extend to the ability to overcome a preexisting bias, when the bias produces objectively disadvantageous decisions. High anxiety (n = 78) and low anxiety participants (n = 76) completed a commonly used measure of cognitive flexibility, reversal learning, and a novel Framed Gambling Task that assessed the extent to which they could make advantageous decisions when the normatively correct choice was inconsistent with a preexisting framing bias. High anxiety participants showed the expected diminished reversal learning performance and also had poorer ability to make advantageous choices that were inconsistent with the framing bias. Worse performance in the Framed Gambling Task was not driven by poor knowledge of risk contingencies, because high anxiety participants reported the same explicit knowledge as low anxiety participants. Instead, the results suggest high anxiety is associated with general deficits in resolving interference from prepotent responses.

Age-differences in cognitive flexibility when overcoming a preexisting bias through feedback.

INTRODUCTION: Older adults are often worse than younger adults at adapting to changing situational demands, and this difference is commonly attributed to an age-related decline in acquiring and updating information. Previous research on aging and cognitive flexibility has used measures that require adapting to novel associations learned during a laboratory task (e.g., choice X led to positive outcomes but now leads to negative outcomes). However, in everyday life people must frequently overcome associations based on preexisting beliefs and biases (e.g., you like to eat cake, but your doctor said to limit your sugar intake). The goal of the present study was to examine possible age-differences in overcoming a preexisting bias and determine whether age-related changes in the acquisition and updating of information influence this form of flexibility. METHOD: Older (n = 20) and younger (n = 20) adults completed a novel task in which repeated choices were made between a sure option (gain or loss) and one of two risky options that were initially ambiguous. Optimal performance required overcoming a framing bias toward being risk seeking to avoid a sure loss and risk averse when offered a sure gain. Probe questions assessed knowledge of choice outcomes, while skin conductance assessed physiological reactions to choices and choice outcomes. RESULTS: Both older and younger adults demonstrated flexibility by reducing the impact of bias over trials, but younger adults had better performance overall. Age-differences were associated with distinct aspects of processing. Young adults had more precise knowledge of choice outcomes and developed skin conductance responses in anticipation of bad choices that were not apparent in older adults. CONCLUSIONS: Older adults showed significant improvement over trials in their ability to decrease bias-driven choices, but younger showed greater flexibility. Age-differences in task performance were based on differences in learning and corresponding representations of task-relevant information.