RESUMO
Planning a response to an outbreak of a pandemic strain of influenza is a high public health priority. Three research groups using different individual-based, stochastic simulation models have examined the consequences of intervention strategies chosen in consultation with U.S. public health workers. The first goal is to simulate the effectiveness of a set of potentially feasible intervention strategies. Combinations called targeted layered containment (TLC) of influenza antiviral treatment and prophylaxis and nonpharmaceutical interventions of quarantine, isolation, school closure, community social distancing, and workplace social distancing are considered. The second goal is to examine the robustness of the results to model assumptions. The comparisons focus on a pandemic outbreak in a population similar to that of Chicago, with approximately 8.6 million people. The simulations suggest that at the expected transmissibility of a pandemic strain, timely implementation of a combination of targeted household antiviral prophylaxis, and social distancing measures could substantially lower the illness attack rate before a highly efficacious vaccine could become available. Timely initiation of measures and school closure play important roles. Because of the current lack of data on which to base such models, further field research is recommended to learn more about the sources of transmission and the effectiveness of social distancing measures in reducing influenza transmission.
Assuntos
Surtos de Doenças/prevenção & controle , Influenza Humana/epidemiologia , Influenza Humana/prevenção & controle , Modelos Biológicos , Chicago , Simulação por Computador , Comportamento Cooperativo , Humanos , Influenza Humana/transmissão , Isolamento de Pacientes , Estados UnidosRESUMO
BACKGROUND: A bioterrorist release of smallpox is a constant threat to the population of the USA and other countries. DESIGN: A stochastic simulation model of the spread of smallpox due to a large bioterrorist attack in a structured population was constructed. Disease natural history parameter estimates, time lines of behavioral activities, and control scenarios were based on the literature and on the consensus opinion of a panel of smallpox experts. RESULTS: The authors found that surveillance and containment, i.e., isolation of known cases and vaccination of their close contacts, would be sufficient to effectively contain a large intentional smallpox release. Given that surveillance and containment measures are in place, preemptive vaccination of hospital workers would further reduce the number of smallpox cases and deaths but would require large numbers of prevaccinations. High levels of reactive mass vaccination after the outbreak begins would further reduce smallpox cases and deaths to a minimum, but would require even larger numbers of vaccinations. Reactive closure of schools would have a minimal effect. CONCLUSION: A rapid and well-organized response to a bioterrorist attack would be necessary for effective surveillance and containment to control spread. Preemptive vaccination of hospital workers and reactive vaccination of the target population would further limit spread, but at a cost of many more vaccinated. This cost in resources and potential harm due to vaccination will have to be weighed against the potential benefits should an attack occur. Prevaccination of the general population is not necessary.
Assuntos
Bioterrorismo , Surtos de Doenças/prevenção & controle , Varíola/prevenção & controle , Simulação por Computador , Pessoal de Saúde , Humanos , Vacinação em Massa , Gestão da Segurança , Varíola/diagnóstico , Varíola/epidemiologiaRESUMO
Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (subtype H5N1) is threatening to cause a human pandemic of potentially devastating proportions. We used a stochastic influenza simulation model for rural Southeast Asia to investigate the effectiveness of targeted antiviral prophylaxis, quarantine, and pre-vaccination in containing an emerging influenza strain at the source. If the basic reproductive number (R0) was below 1.60, our simulations showed that a prepared response with targeted antivirals would have a high probability of containing the disease. In that case, an antiviral agent stockpile on the order of 100,000 to 1 million courses for treatment and prophylaxis would be sufficient. If pre-vaccination occurred, then targeted antiviral prophylaxis could be effective for containing strains with an R0 as high as 2.1. Combinations of targeted antiviral prophylaxis, pre-vaccination, and quarantine could contain strains with an R(0) as high as 2.4.