Double resonance induced by group coupling with quenched disorder.

Results show that the astrocytes can not only listen to the talk of large assemble of neurons but also give advice to the conversations and are significant sources of heterogeneous couplings as well. In the present work, we focus on such regulation character of astrocytes and explore the role of heterogeneous couplings among interacted neuron-astrocyte components in a signal response. We consider reduced dynamics in which the listening and advising processes of astrocytes are mapped into the form of group coupling, where the couplings are normally distributed. In both globally coupled overdamped bistable oscillators and an excitable FitzHugh-Nagumo (FHN) neuron model, we numerically and analytically demonstrate that two types of bell-shaped collective response curves can be obtained as the ensemble coupling strength or the heterogeneity of group coupling rise, respectively, which can be seen as a new type of double resonance. Furthermore, through the bifurcation analysis, we verify that these resonant signal responses stem from the competition between dispersion and aggregation induced by heterogeneous group and positive pairwise couplings, respectively. Our results contribute to a better understanding of the signal propagation in coupled systems with quenched disorder.

Diversity-induced resonance in a globally coupled bistable system with diversely distributed heterogeneity.

A moderate degree of diversity, in form of quenched noise or intrinsic heterogeneity, can significantly strengthen the collective response of coupled extended systems. As yet, related discoveries on diversity-induced resonance are mainly concentrated on symmetrically distributed heterogeneity, e.g., the Gaussian or uniform distributions with zero-mean. The necessary conditions that guarantee the arise of resonance phenomenon in heterogeneous oscillators remain largely unknown. In this work, we show that the standard deviation and the ratio of negative entities of a given distribution jointly modulate diversity-induced resonance and the concomitance of negative and positive entities is the prerequisite for this resonant behavior emerging in diverse symmetrical and asymmetrical distributions. Particularly, for a proper degree of diversity of a given distribution, the collective signal response behaves like a bell-shaped curve as the ratio of negative oscillator increases, which can be termed negative-oscillator-ratio induced resonance. Furthermore, we analytically reveal that the ratio of negative oscillators plays a gating role in the resonance phenomenon on the basis of a reduced equation. Finally, we examine the robustness of these results in globally coupled bistable elements with asymmetrical potential functions. Our results suggest that the phenomenon of diversity-induced resonance can arise in arbitrarily distributed heterogeneous bistable oscillators by regulating the ratio of negative entities appropriately.

Game-theoretical approach for opinion dynamics on social networks.

Opinion dynamics on social networks have received considerable attentions in recent years. Nevertheless, just a few works have theoretically analyzed the condition in which a certain opinion can spread in the whole structured population. In this article, we propose an evolutionary game approach for a binary opinion model to explore the conditions for an opinion's spreading. Inspired by real-life observations, we assume that an agent's choice to select an opinion is not random but is based on a score rooted from both public knowledge and the interactions with neighbors. By means of coalescing random walks, we obtain a condition in which opinion A can be favored to spread on social networks in the weak selection limit. We find that the successfully spreading condition of opinion A is closely related to the basic scores of binary opinions, the feedback scores on opinion interactions, and the structural parameters including the edge weights, the weighted degrees of vertices, and the average degree of the network. In particular, when individuals adjust their opinions based solely on the public information, the vitality of opinion A depends exclusively on the difference of basic scores of A and B. When there are no negative (positive) feedback interactions between connected individuals, we find that the success of opinion A depends on the ratio of the obtained positive (negative) feedback scores of competing opinions. To complete our study, we perform computer simulations on fully connected, small-world, and scale-free networks, respectively, which support and confirm our theoretical findings.

Kuramoto dilemma alleviated by optimizing connectivity and rationality.

Recently, Antonioni and Cardillo proposed a coevolutionary model based on the intertwining of oscillator synchronization and evolutionary game theory [Phys. Rev. Lett. 118, 238301 (2017)PRLTAO0031-900710.1103/PhysRevLett.118.238301], in which each Kuramoto oscillator can decide whether to interact or not with its neighbors, and all oscillators can receive some benefits from the local synchronization, but those who choose to interact must pay a cost. Oscillators are allowed to update their strategies according to payoff difference, wherein the strategy of an oscillator who has obtained higher payoff is more likely to be followed. Utilizing this coevolutionary model, we find that the global synchronization level reaches the highest level when the average degree of the underlying interaction network is moderate. We also study how synchronization is affected by the individual rationality in choosing strategy.

Traffic-driven epidemic spreading in correlated networks.

In spite of the extensive previous efforts on traffic dynamics and epidemic spreading in complex networks, the problem of traffic-driven epidemic spreading on correlated networks has not been addressed. Interestingly, we find that the epidemic threshold, a fundamental quantity underlying the spreading dynamics, exhibits a nonmonotonic behavior in that it can be minimized for some critical value of the assortativity coefficient, a parameter characterizing the network correlation. To understand this phenomenon, we use the degree-based mean-field theory to calculate the traffic-driven epidemic threshold for correlated networks. The theory predicts that the threshold is inversely proportional to the packet-generation rate and the largest eigenvalue of the betweenness matrix. We obtain consistency between theory and numerics. Our results may provide insights into the important problem of controlling and/or harnessing real-world epidemic spreading dynamics driven by traffic flows.

Peer pressure: enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment.

An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. We investigate a symmetric punishment strategy, in which an individual will punish each neighbor if their strategies are different, and vice versa. Because of the symmetry in imposing the punishment, one might intuitively expect the strategy to have little effect on cooperation. Utilizing the prisoner's dilemma game as a prototypical model of interactions at the individual level, we find, through simulation and theoretical analysis, that proper punishment, when even symmetrically imposed on individuals, can enhance cooperation. Also, we find that the initial density of cooperators plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation driven by mutual punishment.

Impact of heterogeneous activity and community structure on the evolutionary success of cooperators in social networks.

Recent empirical studies suggest that heavy-tailed distributions of human activities are universal in real social dynamics [L. Muchnik, S. Pei, L. C. Parra, S. D. S. Reis, J. S. Andrade Jr., S. Havlin, and H. A. Makse, Sci. Rep. 3, 1783 (2013)]. On the other hand, community structure is ubiquitous in biological and social networks [M. E. J. Newman, Nat. Phys. 8, 25 (2012)]. Motivated by these facts, we here consider the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game taking place on top of a real social network to investigate how the community structure and the heterogeneity in activity of individuals affect the evolution of cooperation. In particular, we account for a variation of the birth-death process (which can also be regarded as a proportional imitation rule from a social point of view) for the strategy updating under both weak and strong selection (meaning the payoffs harvested from games contribute either slightly or heavily to the individuals' performance). By implementing comparative studies, where the players are selected either randomly or in terms of their actual activities to play games with their immediate neighbors, we figure out that heterogeneous activity benefits the emergence of collective cooperation in a harsh environment (the action for cooperation is costly) under strong selection, whereas it impairs the formation of altruism under weak selection. Moreover, we find that the abundance of communities in the social network can evidently foster the formation of cooperation under strong selection, in contrast to the games evolving on randomized counterparts. Our results are therefore helpful for us to better understand the evolution of cooperation in real social systems.

Promoting collective motion of self-propelled agents by distance-based influence.

We propose a dynamic model for a system consisting of self-propelled agents in which the influence of an agent on another agent is weighted by geographical distance. A parameter α is introduced to adjust the influence: The smaller value of α means that the closer neighbors have a stronger influence on the moving direction. We find that there exists an optimal value of α leading to the highest degree of direction consensus. The value of optimal α increases as the system size increases, while it decreases as the absolute velocity, the sensing radius, and the noise amplitude increase.

Social dilemma alleviated by sharing the gains with immediate neighbors.

We study the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) and snowdrift game (SG), within which a fraction α of the payoffs of each player gained from direct game interactions is shared equally by the immediate neighbors. The magnitude of the parameter α therefore characterizes the degree of the relatedness among the neighboring players. By means of extensive Monte Carlo simulations as well as an extended mean-field approximation method, we trace the frequency of cooperation in the stationary state. We find that plugging into relatedness can significantly promote the evolution of cooperation in the context of both studied games. Unexpectedly, cooperation can be more readily established in the spatial PDG than that in the spatial SG, given that the degree of relatedness and the cost-to-benefit ratio of mutual cooperation are properly formulated. The relevance of our model with the stakeholder theory is also briefly discussed.

Suppressing traffic-driven epidemic spreading by edge-removal strategies.

The interplay between traffic dynamics and epidemic spreading on complex networks has received increasing attention in recent years. However, the control of traffic-driven epidemic spreading remains to be a challenging problem. In this Brief Report, we propose a method to suppress traffic-driven epidemic outbreak by properly removing some edges in a network. We find that the epidemic threshold can be enhanced by the targeted cutting of links among large-degree nodes or edges with the largest algorithmic betweenness. In contrast, the epidemic threshold will be reduced by the random edge removal. These findings are robust with respect to traffic-flow conditions, network structures, and routing strategies. Moreover, we find that the shutdown of targeted edges can effectively release traffic load passing through large-degree nodes, rendering a relatively low probability of infection to these nodes.

Traffic-driven epidemic outbreak on complex networks: how long does it take?

Recent studies have suggested the necessity to incorporate traffic dynamics into the process of epidemic spreading on complex networks, as the former provides support for the latter in many real-world situations. While there are results on the asymptotic scope of the spreading dynamics, the issue of how fast an epidemic outbreak can occur remains outstanding. We observe numerically that the density of the infected nodes exhibits an exponential increase with time initially, rendering definable a characteristic time for the outbreak. We then derive a formula for scale-free networks, which relates this time to parameters characterizing the traffic dynamics and the network structure such as packet-generation rate and betweenness distribution. The validity of the formula is tested numerically. Our study indicates that increasing the average degree and/or inducing traffic congestion can slow down the spreading process significantly.

Control of epidemic spreading on complex networks by local traffic dynamics.

Despite extensive work on traffic dynamics and epidemic spreading on complex networks, the interplay between these two types of dynamical processes has not received adequate attention. We study the effect of local-routing-based traffic dynamics on epidemic spreading. For the case of unbounded node-delivery capacity, where the traffic is free of congestion, we obtain analytic and numerical results indicating that the epidemic threshold can be maximized by an optimal routing protocol. This means that epidemic spreading can be effectively controlled by local traffic dynamics. For the case of bounded delivery capacity, numerical results and qualitative arguments suggest that traffic congestion can suppress epidemic spreading. Our results provide quantitative insight into the nontrivial role of traffic dynamics associated with a local-routing scheme in the epidemic spreading.

Transportation dynamics on networks of mobile agents.

Most existing works on transportation dynamics focus on networks of a fixed structure, but networks whose nodes are mobile have become widespread, such as cell-phone networks. We introduce a model to explore the basic physics of transportation on mobile networks. Of particular interest is the dependence of the throughput on the speed of agent movement and the communication range. Our computations reveal a hierarchical dependence for the former, while an algebraic power law is found between the throughput and the communication range with the exponent determined by the speed. We develop a physical theory based on the Fokker-Planck equation to explain these phenomena. Our findings provide insights into complex transportation dynamics arising commonly in natural and engineering systems.

Role of aspiration-induced migration in cooperation.

Both cooperation and migration are ubiquitous in human society and animal world. In this Rapid Communication, we propose an aspiration-induced migration in which individuals will migrate to new sites provided that their payoffs are below some aspiration level. It is found that moderate aspiration level can best favor cooperative behavior. In particular, moderate aspiration level enables cooperator clusters to maintain and expand whereas induces defector clusters to disintegrate, thus promoting the diffusion of cooperation among population. Our results provide insights into understanding the role played by migration in the emergence of cooperative behavior.

Feedback reciprocity mechanism promotes the cooperation of highly clustered scale-free networks.

We study how the clustering coefficient influences the evolution of cooperation in scale-free public goods games. In games played by groups of individuals, triangle loops provide stronger support for mutual cooperation to resist invasion of selfish behavior than that in the absence of such loops, so that diffusion of cooperative behavior is relatively promoted. The feedback reciprocity mechanism of triangle plays a key role in facilitating cooperation in high clustered networks.

Reducing the heterogeneity of payoffs: an effective way to promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game.

In this paper, the accumulated payoff of each agent is regulated so as to reduce the heterogeneity of the distribution of all such payoffs. It is found that there exists an optimal regulation strength at which cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game is optimally promoted. If the heterogeneity is regulated to be either too weak or too strong, the promotive effect disappears and the evolution of cooperation may even be impaired if compared to the absence of the proposed regulatory mechanism. An explanation of the observed results is provided. In particular, it is found that cooperators on the spatial grid are not isolated but form compact clusters and that the distribution of these clusters is crucial for the promotion of cooperation. Our work provides insights into relations between the distribution of payoffs and the evolution of cooperative behavior in situations constituting a social dilemma.

Effects of social diversity on the emergence of global consensus in opinion dynamics.

We propose a variant of the voter model by introducing the social diversity in the evolution process. Each individual is assigned a weight that is proportional to the power of its degree, where the power exponent alpha is an adjustable parameter that controls the level of diversity among individuals in the network. At each time step, a pair of connected individuals, say i and j , are randomly selected to update their opinions. The probability p(i) of choosing is opinion as their common opinion is proportional to i s weight. We consider the scale-free topology and concentrate on the efficiency of reaching the final consensus, which is significant in characterizing the self-organized systems. Interestingly, it is found that there exists an optimal value of alpha, leading to the shortest consensus time. This phenomenon indicates that, although a strong influence of high-degree individuals is helpful for quick consensus achievement, over strong influence inhibits the convergence process. Other quantities, such as the probability of an individual's initial opinion becomes the final opinion as a function of degree, the evolution of the number of opinion clusters, as well as the relationship between average consensus time and the network size, are also studied. Our results are helpful for better understanding the role of degree heterogeneity of the individuals in the opinion dynamics.

Optimal view angle in collective dynamics of self-propelled agents.

We study a system of self-propelled agents with the restricted vision. The field of vision of each agent is only a sector of disk bounded by two radii and the included arc. The inclination of these two radii is characterized by the view angle. The consideration of restricted vision is closer to the reality because natural swarms usually do not have a panoramic view. Interestingly, we find that there exists an optimal view angle, leading to the fastest direction consensus. The value of the optimal view angle depends on the density, the interaction radius, the absolute velocity of swarms, and the strength of noise. Our findings may invoke further efforts and attentions to explore the underlying mechanism of the collective motion.

Diversity-optimized cooperation on complex networks.

We propose a strategy for achieving maximum cooperation in evolutionary games on complex networks. Each individual is assigned a weight that is proportional to the power of its degree, where the exponent alpha is an adjustable parameter that controls the level of diversity among individuals in the network. During the evolution, every individual chooses one of its neighbors as a reference with a probability proportional to the weight of the neighbor, and updates its strategy depending on their payoff difference. It is found that there exists an optimal value of alpha, for which the level of cooperation reaches maximum. This phenomenon indicates that, although high-degree individuals play a prominent role in maintaining the cooperation, too strong influences from the hubs may counterintuitively inhibit the diffusion of cooperation. Other pertinent quantities such as the payoff, the cooperator density as a function of the degree, and the payoff distribution are also investigated computationally and theoretically. Our results suggest that in order to achieve strong cooperation on a complex network, individuals should learn more frequently from neighbors with higher degrees, but only to a certain extent.

Asymmetric negotiation in structured language games.

We propose an asymmetric negotiation strategy to investigate the influence of high-degree agents on the agreement dynamics in a structured language game, the naming game. We introduce a model parameter, which governs the frequency of high-degree agents acting as speakers in communication. It is found that there exists an optimal value of the parameter that induces the fastest convergence to a global consensus on naming an object for both scale-free and small-world naming games. This phenomenon indicates that, although a strong influence of high-degree agents favors consensus achievement, very strong influences inhibit the convergence process, making it even slower than in the absence of influence of high-degree agents. Investigation of the total memory used by agents implies that there is some trade-off between the convergence speed and the required total memory. Other quantities, including the evolution of the number of different names and the relationship between agents' memories and their degrees, are also studied. The results are helpful for better understanding of the dynamics of the naming game with asymmetric negotiation strategy.