Facility-Associated Release of Polioviruses into Communities-Risks for the Posteradication Era.

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative continues to make progress toward the eradication target. Indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) type 2 was last detected in 1999, WPV type 3 was last detected in 2012, and over the past 2 years WPV type 1 has been detected only in parts of 2 countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan). Once the eradication of poliomyelitis is achieved, infectious and potentially infectious poliovirus materials retained in laboratories, vaccine production sites, and other storage facilities will continue to pose a risk for poliovirus reintroduction into communities. The recent breach in containment of WPV type 2 in an inactivated poliovirus vaccine manufacturing site in the Netherlands prompted this review, which summarizes information on facility-associated release of polioviruses into communities reported over >8 decades. Successful polio eradication requires the management of poliovirus containment posteradication to prevent the consequences of the reestablishment of poliovirus transmission.

Exceptional Financial Support for Introduction of Inactivated Polio Vaccine in Middle-Income Countries.

In May 2012, the World Health Assembly declared the completion of poliovirus eradication a programmatic emergency for global public health and called for a comprehensive polio endgame strategy. The Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018 was developed in response to this call and demands that all countries using Oral Polio Vaccine (OPV) only introduce at least 1 dose of Inactivated Polio Vaccine (IPV) into routine immunization schedules by the end of 2015. In November 2013, the Board of Gavi (the Vaccine Alliance) approved the provision of support for IPV introduction in the 72 Gavi-eligible countries. Following analytical work and stakeholder consultations, the IPV Immunization Systems Management Group (IMG) presented a proposal to provide exceptional financial support for IPV introduction to additional OPV-only using countries not eligible for Gavi support and that would otherwise not be able to mobilize the necessary financial resources within the Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan timelines. In June 2014, the Polio Oversight Board (POB) agreed to make available a maximum envelope of US $45 million toward supporting countries not eligible for Gavi funding. This article describes the design of the funding mechanism that was developed, its implementation and the lessons learned through this process.

Polio Endgame: Lessons Learned From the Immunization Systems Management Group.

The Immunization Systems Management Group (IMG) was established to coordinate and oversee objective 2 of the Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018, namely, (1) introduction of ≥1 dose of inactivated poliovirus vaccine in all 126 countries using oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) only as of 2012, (2) full withdrawal of OPV, starting with the withdrawal of its type 2 component, and (3) using polio assets to strengthen immunization systems in 10 priority countries. The IMG's inclusive, transparent, and partnership-focused approach proved an effective means of leveraging the comparative and complementary strengths of each IMG member agency. This article outlines 10 key factors behind the IMG's success, providing a potential set of guiding principles for the establishment and implementation of other interagency collaborations and initiatives beyond the polio sphere.