The Australian Health Care Homes trial: quality of care and patient outcomes. A propensity score-matched cohort study.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the impact of the Health Care Homes (HCH) primary health care initiative on quality of care and patient outcomes. DESIGN, SETTING: Quasi-experimental, matched cohort study; analysis of general practice data extracts and linked administrative data from ten Australian primary health networks, 1 October 2017 - 30 June 2021. PARTICIPANTS: People with chronic health conditions (practice data extracts: 9811; linked administrative data: 10 682) enrolled in the HCH 1 October 2017 - 30 June 2019; comparison groups of patients receiving usual care (1:1 propensity score-matched). INTERVENTION: Participants were involved in shared care planning, provided enhanced access to team care, and encouraged to seek chronic condition care at the HCH practice where they were enrolled. Participating practices received bundled payments based on clinical risk tier. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Access to care, processes of care, diabetes-related outcomes, hospital service use, risk of death. RESULTS: During the first twelve months after enrolment, the mean numbers of general practitioner encounters (rate ratio, 1.14; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.11-1.17) and Medicare Benefits Schedule claims for allied health services (rate ratio, 1.28; 95% CI, 1.24-1.33) were higher for the HCH than the usual care group. Annual influenza vaccinations (relative risk, 1.20; 95% CI, 1.17-1.22) and measurements of blood pressure (relative risk, 1.09; 95% CI, 1.08-1.11), blood lipids (relative risk, 1.19; 95% CI, 1.16-1.21), glycated haemoglobin (relative risk, 1.06; 95% CI, 1.03-1.08), and kidney function (relative risk, 1.13; 95% CI, 1.11-1.15) were more likely in the HCH than the usual care group during the twelve months after enrolment. Similar rate ratios and relative risks applied in the second year. The numbers of emergency department presentations (rate ratio, 1.09; 95% CI, 1.02-1.18) and emergency admissions (rate ratio, 1.13; 95% CI, 1.04-1.22) were higher for the HCH group during the first year; other differences in hospital use were not statistically significant. Differences in glycaemic and blood pressure control in people with diabetes in the second year were not statistically significant. By 30 June 2021, 689 people in the HCH group (6.5%) and 646 in the usual care group (6.1%) had died (hazard ratio, 1.07; 95% CI, 0.96-1.20). CONCLUSIONS: The HCH program was associated with greater access to care and improved processes of care for people with chronic diseases, but not changes in diabetes-related outcomes, most measures of hospital use, or risk of death.

Paying hospitals for quality: can we buy better care?

Economic theory predicts that changing financial rewards will change behaviour. This is valid in terms of service use; higher costs reduce health care use. It should follow that paying more for quality should improve quality; however, the research evidence thus far is equivocal, particularly in terms of better health outcomes. One reason is that "financial incentives" encompass a range of payment types and sizes of reward. The design of financial incentives should take into account the desired change and the context of existing payment structures, as well as other strategies for improving quality; further, financial incentives should be fair in rewarding effort. Financial incentives may have unintended consequences, including rewarding hospitals for selecting patients with lower risks, diverting attention from the overall patient population to specific conditions, gaming, and "crowding out" or displacing intrinsic motivation. Managers and clinicians can only respond to financial incentives if they have the data, tools and skills to effect changes. Australia should not adopt widespread use of financial incentives for improving quality in health care without careful consideration of their design and context, the potential for unintended effects (particularly beyond their immediate targets), and evaluation of outcomes. The relative cost-effectiveness of financial incentives compared with, or in concert with, other strategies should also be considered.