Spatial Transmission Characteristics of the Bluetongue Virus Serotype 3 Epidemic in The Netherlands, 2023.

A devastating bluetongue (BT) epidemic caused by bluetongue virus serotype 3 (BTV-3) has spread throughout most of the Netherlands within two months since the first infection was officially confirmed in the beginning of September 2023. The epidemic comes with unusually strong suffering of infected cattle through severe lameness, often resulting in mortality or euthanisation for welfare reasons. In total, tens of thousands of sheep have died or had to be euthanised. By October 2023, more than 2200 locations with ruminant livestock were officially identified to be infected with BTV-3, and additionally, ruminants from 1300 locations were showing BTV-associated clinical symptoms (but not laboratory-confirmed BT). Here, we report on the spatial spread and dynamics of this BT epidemic. More specifically, we characterized the distance-dependent intensity of the between-holding transmission by estimating the spatial transmission kernel and by comparing it to transmission kernels estimated earlier for BTV-8 transmission in Northwestern Europe in 2006 and 2007. The 2023 BTV-3 kernel parameters are in line with those of the transmission kernel estimated previously for the between-holding spread of BTV-8 in Europe in 2007. The 2023 BTV-3 transmission kernel has a long-distance spatial range (across tens of kilometres), evidencing that in addition to short-distance dispersal of infected midges, other transmission routes such as livestock transports probably played an important role.

Manifestation of SARS-CoV-2 Infections in Mink Related to Host-, Virus- and Farm-Associated Factors, The Netherlands 2020.

SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks on 69 Dutch mink farms in 2020 were studied to identify risk factors for virus introduction and transmission and to improve surveillance and containment measures. Clinical signs, laboratory test results, and epidemiological aspects were investigated, such as the date and reason of suspicion, housing, farm size and distances, human contact structure, biosecurity measures, and presence of wildlife, pets, pests, and manure management. On seven farms, extensive random sampling was performed, and age, coat color, sex, and clinical signs were recorded. Mild to severe respiratory signs and general diseases such as apathy, reduced feed intake, and increased mortality were detected on 62/69 farms. Throat swabs were more likely to result in virus detection than rectal swabs. Clinical signs differed between virus clusters and were more severe for dark-colored mink, males, and animals infected later during the year. Geographical clustering was found for one virus cluster. Shared personnel could explain some cases, but other transmission routes explaining farm-to-farm spread were not elucidated. An early warning surveillance system, strict biosecurity measures, and a (temporary) ban on mink farming and vaccinating animals and humans can contribute to reducing the risks of the virus spreading and acquisition of potential mutations relevant to human and animal health.

SARS-CoV-2 infection in cats and dogs in infected mink farms.

Animals like mink, cats and dogs are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection. In the Netherlands, 69 out of 127 mink farms were infected with SARS-CoV-2 between April and November 2020 and all mink on infected farms were culled after SARS-CoV-2 infection to prevent further spread of the virus. On some farms, (feral) cats and dogs were present. This study provides insight into the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2-positive cats and dogs in 10 infected mink farms and their possible role in transmission of the virus. Throat and rectal swabs of 101 cats (12 domestic and 89 feral cats) and 13 dogs of 10 farms were tested for SARS-CoV-2 using PCR. Serological assays were performed on serum samples from 62 adult cats and all 13 dogs. Whole Genome Sequencing was performed on one cat sample. Cat-to-mink transmission parameters were estimated using data from all 10 farms. This study shows evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in 12 feral cats and 2 dogs. Eleven cats (18%) and two dogs (15%) tested serologically positive. Three feral cats (3%) and one dog (8%) tested PCR-positive. The sequence generated from the cat throat swab clustered with mink sequences from the same farm. The calculated rate of mink-to-cat transmission showed that cats on average had a chance of 12% (95%CI 10%-18%) of becoming infected by mink, assuming no cat-to-cat transmission. As only feral cats were infected it is most likely that infections in cats were initiated by mink, not by humans. Whether both dogs were infected by mink or humans remains inconclusive. This study presents one of the first reports of interspecies transmission of SARS-CoV-2 that does not involve humans, namely mink-to-cat transmission, which should also be considered as a potential risk for spread of SARS-CoV-2.

Adaptation, spread and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in farmed minks and associated humans in the Netherlands.

In the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic (April 2020), SARS-CoV-2 was detected in farmed minks and genomic sequencing was performed on mink farms and farm personnel. Here, we describe the outbreak and use sequence data with Bayesian phylodynamic methods to explore SARS-CoV-2 transmission in minks and humans on farms. High number of farm infections (68/126) in minks and farm workers (>50% of farms) were detected, with limited community spread. Three of five initial introductions of SARS-CoV-2 led to subsequent spread between mink farms until November 2020. Viruses belonging to the largest cluster acquired an amino acid substitution in the receptor binding domain of the Spike protein (position 486), evolved faster and spread longer and more widely. Movement of people and distance between farms were statistically significant predictors of virus dispersal between farms. Our study provides novel insights into SARS-CoV-2 transmission between mink farms and highlights the importance of combining genetic information with epidemiological information when investigating outbreaks at the animal-human interface.

Occupational and environmental exposure to SARS-CoV-2 in and around infected mink farms.

OBJECTIVE: Unprecedented SARS-CoV-2 infections in farmed minks raised immediate concerns regarding transmission to humans and initiated intensive environmental investigations to assess occupational and environmental exposure. METHODS: Air sampling was performed at infected Dutch mink farms, at farm premises and at nearby residential sites. A range of other environmental samples were collected from minks' housing units, including bedding materials. SARS-CoV-2 RNA was analysed in all samples by quantitative PCR. RESULTS: Inside the farms, considerable levels of SARS-CoV-2 RNA were found in airborne dust, especially in personal inhalable dust samples (approximately 1000-10 000 copies/m3). Most of the settling dust samples tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA (82%, 75 of 92). SARS-CoV-2 RNA was not detected in outdoor air samples, except for those collected near the entrance of the most recently infected farm. Many samples of minks' housing units and surfaces contained SARS-CoV-2 RNA. CONCLUSIONS: Infected mink farms can be highly contaminated with SARS-CoV-2 RNA. This warns of occupational exposure, which was substantiated by considerable SARS-CoV-2 RNA concentrations in personal air samples. Dispersion of SARS-CoV-2 to outdoor air was found to be limited and SARS-CoV-2 RNA was not detected in air samples collected beyond farm premises, implying a negligible risk of environmental exposure to nearby communities. Our occupational and environmental risk assessment is in line with whole genome sequencing analyses showing mink-to-human transmission among farm workers, but no indications of direct zoonotic transmission events to nearby communities.

Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 on mink farms between humans and mink and back to humans.

Animal experiments have shown that nonhuman primates, cats, ferrets, hamsters, rabbits, and bats can be infected by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). In addition, SARS-CoV-2 RNA has been detected in felids, mink, and dogs in the field. Here, we describe an in-depth investigation using whole-genome sequencing of outbreaks on 16 mink farms and the humans living or working on these farms. We conclude that the virus was initially introduced by humans and has since evolved, most likely reflecting widespread circulation among mink in the beginning of the infection period, several weeks before detection. Despite enhanced biosecurity, early warning surveillance, and immediate culling of animals in affected farms, transmission occurred between mink farms in three large transmission clusters with unknown modes of transmission. Of the tested mink farm residents, employees, and/or individuals with whom they had been in contact, 68% had evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Individuals for which whole genomes were available were shown to have been infected with strains with an animal sequence signature, providing evidence of animal-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2 within mink farms.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza subtype H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4 outbreaks in Dutch poultry farms, 2014-2018: Clinical signs and mortality.

In recent years, different subtypes of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses caused outbreaks in several poultry types worldwide. Early detection of HPAI virus infection is crucial to reduce virus spread. Previously, the use of a mortality ratio threshold to expedite notification of suspicion in layer farms was proposed. The purpose of this study was to describe the clinical signs reported in the early stages of HPAI H5N8 and H5N6 outbreaks on chicken and Pekin duck farms between 2014 and 2018 in the Netherlands and compare them with the onset of an increased mortality ratio (MR). Data on daily mortality and clinical signs from nine egg-producing chicken farms and seven Pekin duck farms infected with HPAI H5N8 (2014 and 2016) and H5N6 (2017-2018) in the Netherlands were analysed. In 12 out of 15 outbreaks for which a MR was available, MR increase preceded or coincided with the first observation of clinical signs by the farmer. In one chicken and two Pekin duck outbreaks, clinical signs were observed prior to MR increase. On all farms, veterinarians observed clinical signs of general disease. Nervous or locomotor signs were reported in all Pekin duck outbreaks, but only in two chicken outbreaks. Other clinical signs were observed less frequently in both chickens and Pekin ducks. Compared to veterinarians, farmers observed and reported clinical signs, especially respiratory and gastrointestinal signs, less frequently. This case series suggests that a MR with a set threshold could be an objective parameter to detect HPAI infection on chicken and Pekin duck farms at an early stage. Observation of clinical signs may provide additional indication for farmers and veterinarians for notifying a clinical suspicion of HPAI infection. Further assessment and validation of a MR threshold in Pekin ducks are important as it could serve as an important tool in HPAI surveillance programs.

Seroprevalence of Schmallenberg virus antibodies among dairy cattle, the Netherlands, winter 2011-2012.

Infections with Schmallenberg virus (SBV) are associated with congenital malformations in ruminants. Because reporting of suspected cases only could underestimate the true rate of infection, we conducted a seroprevalence study in the Netherlands to detect past exposure to SBV among dairy cattle. A total of 1,123 serum samples collected from cattle during November 2011-January 2012 were tested for antibodies against SBV by using a virus neutralization test; seroprevalence was 72.5%. Seroprevalence was significantly higher in the central-eastern part of the Netherlands than in the northern and southern regions (p<0.001). In addition, high (70%-100%) within-herd seroprevalence was observed in 2 SBV-infected dairy herds and 2 SBV-infected sheep herds. No significant differences were found in age-specific prevalence of antibodies against SBV, which is an indication that SBV is newly arrived in the country.

Bluetongue virus serotype 6 in Europe in 2008-Emergence and disappearance of an unexpected non-virulent BTV.

Bluetongue viruses (BTVs) could invade N-W Europe similar to BTV serotype 8 (BTV8/net06), since the source and route of introduction of this virus has not been solved. Therefore, the Dutch survey for Bluetongue by PCR testing was extended by further analysis of PCR positives to identify the involved BTV. In late August 2008, BTV was reported with 12 nucleotide differences in the S10 amplicon (S10 genotyping). This virus was identified as serotype 6, here named BTV6/net08. Promptly, serotype specific real-time PCR tests were developed for serotypes 1, 6, and 8 (S2 genotyping). Agreement was found between results by S10- and S2 genotyping. Further, BTV1 was identified by both S10- and S2 genotyping in one imported animal. After initial discovery of BTV6 in the Netherlands, animals from 18 holdings tested PCR positive for BTV6/net08 in 2008. Remarkably only one or two PCR positive animals per holding were found. Serum neutralization tests did not result in the discovery of more BTV6 infected animals. Retrospective studies indicated no evidence for infections by BTV6/net08 prior to the first discovery. Experimental infections with BTV6/net08 did not cause clinical disease in sheep, calves and cattle, except for a very short fever in some animals. This clearly showed that the vaccine-related BTV6/net08 is not virulent. BTV6/net08 was not found by passive and active surveys in the years after its discovery. Apparently, BTV6/net08 was not efficiently transmitted by endemic species of Culicoides in N-W Europe, and disappeared without the need of any control measure.

Molecular epidemiology of Coxiella burnetii from ruminants in Q fever outbreak, the Netherlands.

Q fever is a zoonosis caused by the bacterium Coxiella burnetii. One of the largest reported outbreaks of Q fever in humans occurred in the Netherlands starting in 2007; epidemiologic investigations identified small ruminants as the source. To determine the genetic background of C. burnetii in domestic ruminants responsible for the human Q fever outbreak, we genotyped 126 C. burnetii-positive samples from ruminants by using a 10-loci multilocus variable-number tandem-repeat analyses panel and compared them with internationally known genotypes. One unique genotype predominated in dairy goat herds and 1 sheep herd in the human Q fever outbreak area in the south of the Netherlands. On the basis of 4 loci, this genotype is similar to a human genotype from the Netherlands. This finding strengthens the probability that this genotype of C. burnetii is responsible for the human Q fever epidemic in the Netherlands.

[Severe clinical problems lasting several weeks on a multiplier pig farm: what if it had been classical swine fever?]. / Ernstige klinische problemen gedurende meerdere weken op een varkensbedrijf: wat als het KVP was geweest?

In the Spring of 2009, a veterinarian reported suspected classical swine fever (CSF) on a multiplier pig farm in the southern part of The Netherlands (close to the Belgian border). Over a 5-week period there had been a number of sick sows and an excessively high percentage of stillborn and preterm piglets. Sick animals were treated with anti-inflammatory drugs and antibiotics, but did not respond as well as anticipated. A visiting specialist team from the Food Safety Authority could not exclude CSF as the cause of the clinical problems and sent blood samples to the reference laboratory in Lelystad for a PCR test on CSF antigen. Fortunately, test results obtained 6 hours later were negative for CSF, and the disease control measures were lifted. It later appeared that porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRSV) might have been responsible for the problems. But what if CSF had caused the clinical problems? A CSF-transmission model was used to simulate CSF outbreaks dependent on the duration of the high-risk period (HRP). As the duration of the HRP increased, there was an exponential growth in the number of pig farms infected during this period. Simulations also showed that with a longer HRP, the virus spread over greater distances from the source herd. It was also investigated whether a possible CSF outbreak could be detected on the basis of an increased mortality and hence increased number of cadavers sent to a rendering plant. However, the calculated mortality incidence was not sensitive enough to serve as an alarm signal. It is recommended that CSF-exclusion diagnostics be used much earlier in similar clinical situations on pig farms.

Epidemiologic characteristics of bluetongue virus serotype 8 laboratory-confirmed outbreaks in The Netherlands in 2007 and a comparison with the situation in 2006.

A major epidemic of bluetongue virus serotype 8 (BTV-8) occurred in Western Europe in 2006. During 2007 it became evident that BTV-8 had survived the winter and a re-emerging epidemic quickly developed. The objective of this study was to describe the severity and clinical impact of the BTV-8 epidemic in 2007 in The Netherlands in laboratory-confirmed outbreaks and to compare this with the situation in 2006. The relative frequency of clinical signs in BTV-8 affected sheep flocks and cattle herds in 2007 and 2006 was similar. The most prominent changes were a higher proportion of sheep flocks with lameness and a much higher proportion of cattle herds reporting a decrease in milk yield in 2007. BTV-8 associated morbidity and mortality incidence rates in sheep flocks and cattle herds were significantly (P<0.001) higher in 2007 than in 2006. Both in sheep flocks and cattle herds, BTV-8 associated case fatality was significantly (P<0.001) lower in 2007, which was probably due to better medical treatment of sick animals. There were significantly (P<0.001) more fertility problems associated with BTV-8 infection in outbreak cattle herds in 2007 compared to 2006.

Field observations during the bluetongue serotype 8 epidemic in 2006. I. Detection of first outbreaks and clinical signs in sheep and cattle in Belgium, France and the Netherlands.

Starting August 2006, a major epidemic of bluetongue (BT) was identified in North-West Europe, affecting The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the North of France. It was caused by BT virus serotype 8 (BTV-8), a serotype previously unknown to the European Union (EU). In this outbreak, the virus caused clinical disease in a few individual animals within cattle herds, whereas overt clinical disease was usually restricted to sheep. Investigations in Belgium suggested that the first clinical signs of BTV-8 appeared mid July 2006 in a cattle herd, while the first suspicion of a BT-outbreak in Belgium was reported on 17 August 2006. In the first 10 BTV-8 outbreaks in the Netherlands, the owners indicated that the first clinical signs started approximately 12-17 days before a suspicion was reported to the veterinary authorities via a veterinary practitioner. In BTV-8 affected sheep flocks, erosions of the oral mucosa, fever, salivation, facial and mandibular oedema, apathy and tiredness, mortality, oedema of the lips, lameness, and dysphagia were among the most frequent clinical signs recorded. The most prominent clinical signs in BTV-8 affected cattle herds were: crusts/lesions of the nasal mucosa, erosions of lips/crusts in or around the nostrils, erosions of the oral mucosa, salivation, fever, conjunctivitis, coronitis, muscle necrosis, and stiffness of the limbs. Crusts/lesions of nasal mucosa, conjunctivitis, hyperaemic/purple coloration and lesions of the teats, and redness/hypersensitivity of the skin were relatively more seen on outbreak farms with cattle compared to sheep. Mortality, oedema of the head and ears, coronitis, redness of the oral mucosa, erosions/ulceration of tongue mucosa, purple coloration of the tongue and tongue protrusion and dyspneu were relatively more seen on outbreak farms with sheep compared to cattle.

Field observations during the Bluetongue serotype 8 epidemic in 2006. II. Morbidity and mortality rate, case fatality and clinical recovery in sheep and cattle in the Netherlands.

Data collected in the Netherlands during the Bluetongue serotype 8 (BTV-8) epidemic indicated that in outbreak cattle herds, predominantly dairy and nursing cows were clinically affected and not young stock, beef cattle, beef calves, or breeding animals. In outbreak sheep flocks, mainly ewes and--if present--rams, were clinically affected and not the lambs. Median morbidity rate in outbreak herds was 1.85 per 100 sheep-month at risk and 0.32 per 100 cattle-month at risk for sheep and cattle, respectively. The mean proportion of BT-affected animals in outbreak herds that recovered from clinical disease was approximately eight times higher for cattle compared to sheep in the Netherlands. Median mortality rate in outbreak herds was 0.5 per 100 sheep-month at risk of dying and 0 per 100 cattle-month at risk of dying for sheep and cattle, respectively. Median recovery time of both sheep and cattle that recovered from clinical disease in outbreak herds was 14 days. Median case fatality was 50% in sheep outbreak flocks and 0% in outbreak cattle herds. It is concluded that morbidity and mortality in outbreak cattle herds was very limited during the BTV-8 epidemic in the Netherlands in 2006. In outbreak sheep flocks, morbidity was limited, with exceptions for a few flocks. However, almost 50% of the clinically sick sheep died in outbreak sheep herds.

[Epidemiology of bluetongue virus serotype 8 outbreaks in the Netherlands in 2006]. / Beschrijvende epidemiologie van de bluetongue serotype 8-uitbraken in Nederland in 2006.

In August 2006 a major epidemic of Bluetongue (BT) occurred in north-western Europe, affecting The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, and the north of France. It was caused by Br virus serotype 8 (BTV-8), a serotype previously unknown to the EU. Although clinical disease is usually restricted to sheep, this virus also caused clinical disease in a small proportion of cattle. The last clinical outbreak of BT in The Netherlands occurred mid-December 2006. The delay between observation of the first clinical signs by the owner and reporting of a clinically suspect BT situation to the veterinary authorities was approximately 2 weeks. BTV-8-associated clinical signs were more prominent in sheep than in cattle, and the relative frequency of specific clinical signs was different in cattle and sheep. Morbidity and mortality rates were significantly higher among sheep than among cattle, and a higher proportion of cattle than sheep recovered from clinical disease.