The world as witty agent-Donna Haraway on the object of knowledge.

In her essay "Situated Knowledges," the biologist and philosopher of science Donna Haraway tackles the question of scientific objectivity from a feminist perspective and opts for a 're-vision' of science that overcomes the traditional dualisms of epistemic subject and object as well as of nature and culture (science). Beyond scientific realism and radical social constructivism, Haraway understands 'nature' or 'world' neither as a passive resource nor as a human product of imagination. Rather, she argues, the world is to be understood as a 'witty agent' that has its own efficacy and historicity in the production of knowledge. Instead of epistemic reification, possession, and appropriation of 'nature', knowledge production should be understood as a conversation between material-semiotic actors, human, and non-human, from which none of the actors leaves as they entered. In this study, I want to explore what it means to conceive of nature or world in knowledge processes as a "witty agent" and how exactly one is to imagine this form of non-human agency. To this end, I will first explain Haraway's re-vision of "nature" beyond scientific realism and radical social constructivism (sect. 2). From this, I will discuss her underlying conception of agency (sect. 3). This involves first, a reconception of the traditional relation between epistemic subject and object as dynamic and situational relation (sect. 3.1). Second, Haraway characterizes the world's epistemic agency in more positive terms by using the 'trickster' figure as it appears in Southwest Native American representations in the form of a Coyote (sect. 3.2). Finally, I will come back to Haraway's initial question of an objective scientific approach to the world, which for her consists in a power-charged social relation of conversations with the world. I will conclude with a critical reflection of what Haraway's conception of the world as an agent means for scientific practice and its engagement with objects of knowledge.

Theoretical concepts as goal-derived concepts.

In this paper, I will focus on the nature of theoretical concepts, i.e., the psychological entities related to theoretical terms in science. I will first argue that the standard picture of theoretical concepts in twentieth-century philosophy of science understood them as representation-oriented common taxonomic concepts. However, I will show how, in light of recent pragmatist approaches to scientific laws and theories, several important theoretical concepts in science do not seem to fit such picture. I will then argue that these theoretical concepts should be understood instead as goal-derived concepts, since their construction and use exhibit the typical characteristics that cognitive scientists assign to goal-derived concepts. I will furthermore argue that the existence of theoretical concepts that are goal-derived concepts represents yet another example of the central role that human goals play in science.

Milking a spherical cow: Toy models in neuroscience.

There are many different kinds of models, and they play many different roles in the scientific endeavour. Neuroscience, and biology more generally, has understandably tended to emphasise empirical models that are grounded in data and make specific, experimentally testable predictions. Meanwhile, strongly idealised or 'toy' models have played a central role in the theoretical development of other sciences such as physics. In this paper, we examine the nature of toy models and their prospects in neuroscience.

Forced Friends: Why the Free Energy Principle Is Not the New Hamilton's Principle.

The claim that the free energy principle is somehow related to Hamilton's principle in statistical mechanics is ubiquitous throughout the subject literature. However, the exact nature of this relationship remains unclear. According to some sources, the free energy principle is merely similar to Hamilton's principle of stationary action; others claim that it is either analogous or equivalent to it, while yet another part of the literature espouses the claim that it is a version of Hamilton's principle. In this article, we aim to clarify the nature of the relationship between the two principles by investigating the two most likely interpretations of the claims that can be found in the subject literature. According to the strong interpretation, the two principles are equivalent and apply to the same subset of physical phenomena; according to the weak interpretation, the two principles are merely analogous to each other by virtue of their similar formal structures. As we show, adopting the stronger reading would lead to a dilemma that is untenable for the proponents of the free energy principle, thus supporting the adoption of the weaker reading for the relationship between the two constructs.

Ivan Pavlov's conditioned reflexes and Ivane Beritashvili's doctrine of image-driven behavior: Materialism, myth, and politics.

Ivane Beritashvili has been regarded as an "anti-Pavlovian" for nearly a century. One respect in which Beritashvili is said to be anti-Pavlovian is in granting an explanatory role to subjective mental states in his doctrine of image-driven behavior. In this article, I aim to problematize the anti-Pavlovian assessment and argue that Beritashvili did not deviate from Pavlovian scientific norms, minor points of theoretical and methodological differences between them notwithstanding. Furthermore, several respects in which Beritashvili is claimed to be anti-Pavlovian are ways in which he resembles Pavlov. Turning my attention to Beritashvili's critics in the Soviet Union, those responsible for his censure, I argue that it is the critique of Beritashvili that runs counter to the norms Pavlov embraced. I contest the claim that his alleged deviations from Pavlovian orthodoxy justify classification as anti-Pavlovian in a sense that is either historically accurate or philosophically interesting, and submit that the grounds on which Beritashvili is derided as anti-Pavlovian would also justify labeling Pavlov himself as anti-Pavlovian. Informed by the case of Beritashvili and others who were politically persecuted for their scientific work in the Soviet Union, I conclude with reflections on science, politics, and the intrusion of the latter in the former.

"Social science is explanation or it is nothing." Introduction to a debate.

This essay introduces contributions to a special section, which documents and extends a debate on the proposition "Social Science is Explanation or it is Nothing" held at the London School of Economics on October 13th, 2022. It discusses the history of the "Group for Theoretical Debates in Anthropology" led by Tim Ingold, Peter Wade and Soumhya Venkatesan, which has handed down a list of credible candidates for issues that had a chance of engaging every anthropologist, including students and those with interdisciplinary interests. It raises questions about the specific affordances of debates as forms of academic engagements. It argues that the chosen proposition concerning explanation invites a discussion about the contributions of the social sciences at a time when impulses from science and technology studies as well as fruitful exchanges across the boundary between "theory" and "method" have helped us moved beyond the older question as to whether or not sociology is "a science".

Living happily alone in Plato's cave? On loneliness, technology and the metaphysics of presence.

In a lot of research on loneliness and technology, there is an underlying premise that actual, physical presence is more real than 'virtual' presence. This premise is rarely explicit, yet it implies a hierarchy of reality, where the 'here and now' is always on top. In this theoretical paper, we examine this latent hierarchy and the understandings of presence and mediation it implies. We point towards potential consequences of this understanding for research on the role of technology in reducing loneliness and social isolation. To do this, we draw on the philosophical analysis made by Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida of what they called 'the metaphysics of presence'. This is the tendency to privilege presence as the only immediate and truthful access to reality, whereas all forms of mediations constitute mere approximations, derivations and second-rate realities with dubious truth value. First, we present their diagnosis, and then we show how it pertains to research on virtual presence and loneliness by analysing some examples from this research. Finally, we discuss some potential implications of the metaphysics of presence through a case story compiled from our empirical research. Our foundational assertion is that the question of whether anyone experiences loneliness is an empirical and not a metaphysical question. If we want to properly understand loneliness and the potential for alleviating it through the use of teletechnologies, we might get off on the wrong foot if we carry with us assumptions suggesting the existence of ascending levels of reality and presence.

Disruption, transformation and silos: medical humanities and the management gurus.

To disrupt, to transform and to break through silos are common sense aims for the medical humanities and other interdisciplinary endeavours. These keywords arise because of the influence upon the academy of management and business gurus, reputed experts who arose in response to the economic crises of the 1980s. Despite the noted analytic deficiencies in the concept of disruption, and its association with product innovation, the term has been extended to academic research, where it connotes radical novelty in research practice, typically accompanied by profound organisational and managerial change. 'Disruption' has become wedded to the word 'transformation' as national funders seek to support more radically innovative research that will maintain Western economic hegemony. A distorted version of Kuhn's model of scientific revolutions underpins the discourse of transformation, which fits humanities research to a template in which revolutionary, transformative shifts can be instrumentally favoured by funders, at the expense of inferior 'incremental' progress. Disruptive and transformative research are, according to funders, more readily produced in organisations that have broken through silos between disciplines. The silo metaphor misleadingly models academic disciplines as if they were essentially unitary entities, akin to the functionally specialised units of a business organisation. The discourse of silos arises from the guru doctrine of the learning organisation. This theory supposes that the organisation-including the university-is literally a living organism, and thereby susceptible to corporate sickness, mortality, infection and disability. Medical humanity researchers should be aware of, and reject, this vitalist metaphysic in which the optimal organisation is a culturally homogeneous supra-personal organism whose immense capacities are harnessed by visionary leaders. Moreover, a new vocabulary should be developed for research evaluation, superseding the supposed hierarchical opposition between transformative and incremental research.

Diverse sources of normativity in open science and their implications for ethical governance.

Over the past decade, open science (OS) has emerged as a global science policy and research initiative with implications for most aspects of research, including planning, funding, publishing, evaluation, data sharing and access. As OS has gained increasing prominence, it has also faced substantial criticism. Whether it is the worries about the equality of access associated with open-access publishing or the more recent allegations of OS benefitting those who act in the private interest without giving back to OS, there are, indeed, many potential as well as actual harms that can be linked to the practice of OS. These criticisms often revolve around ethical challenges and fairness concerns, prompting the question of whether a comprehensive ethical governance framework is needed for OS. This commentary contends that owing to the heterogeneous nature of the normative foundations of OS and the inherent diversity within scientific practices, a pluralistic and deliberative approach to governance is needed.

Phenotype divergence and cooperation in isogenic multicellularity and in cancer.

We discuss the mathematical modelling of two of the main mechanisms that pushed forward the emergence of multicellularity: phenotype divergence in cell differentiation and between-cell cooperation. In line with the atavistic theory of cancer, this disease being specific of multicellular animals, we set special emphasis on how both mechanisms appear to be reversed, however not totally impaired, rather hijacked, in tumour cell populations. Two settings are considered: the completely innovating, tinkering, situation of the emergence of multicellularity in the evolution of species, which we assume to be constrained by external pressure on the cell populations, and the completely planned-in the body plan-situation of the physiological construction of a developing multicellular animal from the zygote, or of bet hedging in tumours, assumed to be of clonal formation, although the body plan is largely-but not completely-lost in its constituting cells. We show how cancer impacts these two settings and we sketch mathematical models for them. We present here our contribution to the question at stake with a background from biology, from mathematics and from philosophy of science.

The need for a change in medical research thinking. Eco-systemic research frames are better suited to explore patterned disease behaviors.

Many practicing physicians struggle to properly evaluate clinical research studies - they either simply do not know them, regard the reported findings as 'truth' since they were reported in a 'reputable' journal and blindly implement these interventions, or they disregard them as having little pragmatic impact or relevance to their daily clinical work. Three aspects for the latter are highlighted: study populations rarely reflect their practice population, the absolute average benefits on specific outcomes in most controlled studies, while statistically significant, are so small that they are pragmatically irrelevant, and overall mortality between the intervention and control groups are unaffected. These observations underscore the need to rethink our research approaches in the clinical context - moving from the predominant reductionist to an eco-systemic research approach will lead to knowledge better suited to clinical decision-making for an individual patient as it takes into account the complex interplay of multi-level variables that impact health outcomes in the real-world setting.

On the scientific credibility of paleoanthropology.

Smith and Smith and Wood proposed that the human fossil record offers special challenges for causal hypotheses because "unique" adaptations resist the comparative method. We challenge their notions of "uniqueness" and offer a refutation of the idea that there is something epistemologically special about human prehistoric data. Although paleontological data may be sparse, there is nothing inherent about this information that prevents its use in the inductive or deductive process, nor in the generation and testing of scientific hypotheses. The imprecision of the fossil record is well-understood, and such imprecision is often factored into hypotheses and methods. While we acknowledge some oversteps within the discipline, we also note that the history of paleoanthropology is clearly one of progress, with ideas tested and resolution added as data (fossils) are uncovered and new technologies applied, much like in sciences as diverse as astronomy, molecular genetics, and geology.

Primacy of theory? Exploring perspectives on validity in conceptual psychometrics.

Several conceptions of validity have emphasized the contingency of validity on theory. Here we revisit several contributions to the discourse on the concept of validity, which we consider particularly influential or insightful. Despite differences in metatheory, both Cronbach and Meehl's construct validity, and Borsboom, Mellenbergh and van Heerden's early concept of validity regard validity as a criterion for successful measurement and thus, as crucial for the soundness of psychological science. Others, such as Borgstede and Eggert, regard recourses to validity as an appeal to an (unscientific) folk psychology. Instead, they advocate theory-based measurement. It will be demonstrated that these divergent positions converge in their view of psychological theory as indispensable for the soundness of psychological measurement. However, the formulation of the concept (and scope) of scientific theory differs across the presented conceptions of validity. These differences can be at least partially attributed to three disparities in metatheoretical and methodological stances. The first concerns the question of the structure of scientific theories. The second concerns the question of psychology's subject matter. The third regards whether, and if, to which extent, correlations can be indicative of causality and therefore point toward validity. These results indicate that metatheory may help to structure the discourse on the concept of validity by revealing the contingencies the concrete positions rely on.

The quality of qualitative research.

In this contribution, we discuss criteria for the quality of qualitative research. We consider reliability and validity as specifications of the comprehensive requirement for 'intersubjective replicability', with which qualitative research should comply. In the data collection phase, 'argumentative' reliability generally must suffice; in the data analysis phase, attention must also be given to 'technical' reliability. Validation of qualitative research has to take place via three approaches: 'communicative', 'critical' or 'empirical' validation. This clarifies the relative validity or 'authenticity' of qualitative research.

Positionality statements in science.

The goal of this essay is to clarify positionality as an epistemological scientific concept and address related misunderstandings to help researchers assess whether statements thereof contribute to their work. Positionality statements can be useful for various research designs across scientific fields, when they are used knowingly.

Defining equity, its determinants, and the foundations of equity science.

Advancing equity as a priority is increasingly declared in response to decades of evidence showing the association between poorer health outcomes and the unfair distribution of resources, power, and wealth across all levels of society. Quandries present, however, through incongruence, vagueness and disparate interpretations of the meaning of equity dilute and fragment efforts across research, policy and practice. Progress on reducing health inequities is, in this context, unsurprisingly irresolute. In this article, we make a case for equity science that reimagines the ways in which we (as researchers, as systems leaders, as teachers and mentors, and as citizens in society) engage in this work. We offer a definition of equity, its determinants, and the paradigmatic foundations of equity science, including the assumptions, values, and processes., and methods of this science. We argue for an equity science that can more meaningfully promote coherent alignment between intention, knowledge and action within and beyond the health sciences to spark a more equitable future.

The Myth of the Need for Diversity Among Subjects in Theory-Testing Research: Comments on "Racial Inequality in Psychological Research" by Roberts et al. (2020).

Roberts and colleagues focus on two aspects of racial inequality in psychological research, namely an alleged underrepresentation of racial minorities and the effects attributed to this state of affairs. My comment focuses only on one aspect, namely the assumed consequences of the lack of diversity in subject populations. Representativeness of samples is essential in survey research or applied research that examines whether a particular intervention will work for a particular population. Representativeness or diversity is not necessary in theory-testing research, where we attempt to establish laws of causality. Because theories typically apply to all of humanity, all members of humanity (even American undergraduates) are suitable for assessing the validity of theoretical hypotheses. Admittedly, the assumption that a theory applies to all of humanity is also a hypothesis that can be tested. However, to test it, we need theoretical hypotheses about specific moderating variables. Supporting a theory with a racially diverse sample does not make conclusions more valid than support from a nondiverse sample. In fact, cause-effect conclusions based on a diverse sample might not be valid for any member of that sample.

Cultural evolution: A review of theoretical challenges.

The rapid growth of cultural evolutionary science, its expansion into numerous fields, its use of diverse methods, and several conceptual problems have outpaced corollary developments in theory and philosophy of science. This has led to concern, exemplified in results from a recent survey conducted with members of the Cultural Evolution Society, that the field lacks 'knowledge synthesis', is poorly supported by 'theory', has an ambiguous relation to biological evolution and uses key terms (e.g. 'culture', 'social learning', 'cumulative culture') in ways that hamper operationalization in models, experiments and field studies. Although numerous review papers in the field represent and categorize its empirical findings, the field's theoretical challenges receive less critical attention even though challenges of a theoretical or conceptual nature underlie most of the problems identified by Cultural Evolution Society members. Guided by the heterogeneous 'grand challenges' emergent in this survey, this paper restates those challenges and adopts an organizational style requisite to discussion of them. The paper's goal is to contribute to increasing conceptual clarity and theoretical discernment around the most pressing challenges facing the field of cultural evolutionary science. It will be of most interest to cultural evolutionary scientists, theoreticians, philosophers of science and interdisciplinary researchers.

Limits of Optimization.

Optimization is about finding the best available object with respect to an objective function. Mathematics and quantitative sciences have been highly successful in formulating problems as optimization problems, and constructing clever processes that find optimal objects from sets of objects. As computers have become readily available to most people, optimization and optimized processes play a very broad role in societies. It is not obvious, however, that the optimization processes that work for mathematics and abstract objects should be readily applied to complex and open social systems. In this paper we set forth a framework to understand when optimization is limited, particularly for complex and open social systems.

The notorious man-in-the-street: Hermann Weyl and the problem of knowledge.

Hermann Weyl's philosophical reflections remain a topic of considerable interest in the history and philosophy of science. In particular, Weyl's commitment to a form of idealism, as it pertains to his reading of Husserl and Fichte, has garnered much discussion. However, much less attention has been given to Weyl's later, and at that only partial, turn towards a form of empiricism (i.e. from the late 1920s onward). This lack of focus on Weyl's later philosophy has tended to obscure some of the most significant lessons that Weyl sought to draw from his decades of research in the foundations of mathematics and physics. In this paper, I develop some aspects of what I will term as Weyl's 'modest' empiricism. I will argue that Weyl's turn toward empiricism can be read in the context of a development of Helmholtz's epistemological program and his unique form of 'Kantianism'. The hope is that this reading will not only provide a better understanding of Weyl's later thought, especially his (1954) criticism of Cassirer, but that it may also provide the basis for a novel 'Weylian' account of the mathematization of nature underwriting the group-theoretic methodology of parts of modern physics.