Minding some animals but not others: Strategic attributions of mental capacities and moral worth to animals used for food in pescatarians, vegetarians, and omnivores.

While moral concern for animals has become increasingly important for both consumer food choice and food policy makers, previous research demonstrated that meat eaters attribute lower moral status and mental capacities to animals raised for meat compared to non-food animals. The current research investigated whether this strategic flexibility in moral concern and mind perceptions also occurs when considering aquatic food animals and animals used for dairy and egg products, and the degree to which these concerns and perceptions are evident in pescatarians and vegetarians. We compared perceptions (mind attributions and moral concern) of land food animals versus aquatic food animals, and of animals in the meat versus dairy and egg industry between omnivores (n = 122), pescatarians (n = 118), vegetarians (n = 138), vegans (n = 120), and flexitarians (n = 60). Pescatarians scored lower than other dietary groups on moral concern and mind attribution for aquatic animals relative to farmed land animals. Unlike the other dietary groups, pescatarians and vegetarians scored lower on moral concern and mind attribution for dairy than beef cows and for layer chickens than broiler chickens. These findings demonstrate that pescatarians and vegetarians were flexible in their moral thinking about different types of food animals in ways that suited their consumption habits, even when the same animal was evaluated (e.g., dairy vs beef cows). This research highlights the psychological barriers that might prevent people from reducing animal product consumption and may need to be addressed in interventions to encourage transitioning towards more plant-based diets.

Children Value Animals More Than Adults Do: A Conceptual Replication and Extension.

Recent psychological research finds that U.S. American children have a weaker tendency than U.S. American adults to value humans more than animals. We aimed to conceptually replicate and extend this finding in a preregistered study (N = 412). We investigated whether 6- to 9-year-old Polish children (Study 1a) are less likely to prioritize humans over animals than Polish adults are (Studies 1b and 1c). We presented participants with moral dilemmas where they had to prioritize either humans or animals (dogs or chimpanzees) in situations that involved harming (i.e., a trolley problem) or benefiting (i.e., giving a snack). We found that Polish children prioritized humans over animals less than Polish adults did. This was the case both in dilemmas that involved preventing harm and in dilemmas that involved providing snacks. Both children and adults prioritized humans over chimpanzees more than humans over dogs.

Is Dignity Still Necessary in Health Care? From Definition to Recognition of Human Dignity.

The concept of dignity is not, as some scholars claim, an unnecessary moral idea, and nor need it have religious overtones or be characterised by speciesism. In this article, I try to show that dignity can be defined and recognised. The starting point for the argumentation is the four typologies of dignity, which show that the term 'dignity' can denote significantly different concepts, and that the different concepts of dignity can have significantly different ontological senses. A unified typology of dignity allows for five categories to be distinguished: inherent dignity, dignity based on changeable qualities, moral dignity, bestowed dignity and comportment dignity. I take the first two categories of dignity as the object of the analysis, with which I seek to formulate a philosophical response to the charge of speciesism and to show on what basis it can be maintained that all human beings possess dignity. To this end, I distinguish between existential dignity, actual dignity, and potential dignity. Distinguishing these types of dignity becomes possible in the light of Aquinas' and Aristotle's views. In the final section, I point to two ways of recognising dignity. The first is based on certain narratives and emotional states ('ecumenical model of dignity'), while the second is related to a specific moral experience developed within ethical personalism.

An anthropologist's voice in a veterinarian's noise: gearing up for new cultural realities.

Over the past three decades, the veterinary profession has faced a cultural shift towards postspeciesism that requires a reassessment of the foundations of the existing distinctions between human and non-human animals proclaimed by the speciesism paradigm, which represents institutionalized discrimination against species and recognizes only the subjectivity of humans. Based on ethnographic observations in anthropological fieldwork and using speciesism/postspeciesism distinction, we aimed to explain the main causes of small animal practitioners' work-related stress and apply humanistic knowledge to recommend ways to alleviate the negative effects of the work environment. The explanatory model of disease, illness, and sickness, the example of the concept of family, and the circumstances of the feminization of the veterinary profession are discussed to illustrate the divergence between speciesist naturalistic veterinary knowledge and the postspeciesist cultural framework and its consequences. By failing to accommodate the changing values towards animals and by failing to challenge the anthropocentric hierarchy of values, the speciesist rationale of the veterinary profession contributes to many of the problems faced by practicing veterinarians. The incorporation of a modern moral-philosophical mindset towards animals may not even be possible because veterinary science is subject to a paradigm that is irreversibly tied to institutional discrimination against species and defies reflection on veterinary science itself. However, the veterinary profession has a privileged position in establishing an alternative ontological thinking and an alternative conception of "animal life." Anthropological knowledge was applied to anticipate further intervention of social and cultural sciences in the problems of small animal practitioners. Rather than further diversifying and increasing expectations towards veterinarians by expecting them to acquire additional skills, we propose another practitioner who can support, mediate, and enhance veterinary performance - the cultural anthropologist. With their deep knowledge of cultural differences and social dynamics, they can collaborate with veterinarians to act as a liaison between cultures, paradigms, and species.

Increasing acceptance of medical AI: The role of medical staff participation in AI development.

BACKGROUND: Medical artificial intelligence (AI) in varying degrees has exerted significant influence on many medical fields, especially in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, little is known regarding how to address the reluctance of medical staff to use AI technology. While recent research has highlighted the importance of medical staff participation in the development of AI, the current understanding of influence of medical staff participation on acceptance of AI is limited. OBJECTIVES: To provide insights into the mechanism that how medical staff participation impacts on the medical staff's acceptance of AI and to examine the moderating effect of speciesism. METHODS: This study was conducted from 6th August to 3rd September. Data was collected from doctors and nurses and a total of 288 valid questionnaires were obtained. Smart PLS 3.2.8 was used as partial least square (PLS) software to validate the research model. RESULTS: The study determined that medical staff participation had a significant impact on acceptance of medical AI-IDT (ß = 0.35, p ≤ 0.001) and acceptance of medical AI-ADT (ß = 0.44, p ≤ 0.001). The results also show that AI self-efficacy and AI anxiety have significant mediating effects and speciesism has significant moderating effects among the theoretical model. CONCLUSIONS: This study provides insights into ways to explore influence factors of acceptance of AI based on user participation perspective. The results indicate that medical staff participation enhances acceptance of medical AI through the cognitive path (i.e., AI self-efficacy) and the affective path (i.e., AI anxiety). These results have practical implications for how organizations assist the staff to accommodate themselves to AI technology in the future.

Changing minds about minds: Evidence that people are too sceptical about animal sentience.

Our relationships with other animals are governed by how we view their capacity for sentience and suffering. However, there is currently little agreement as to whether people's beliefs about animal minds are largely accurate or inaccurate. We used an innovative task to examine how people update their beliefs in response to noisy but informative clues about animal minds. This allowed us to compare participants' posterior beliefs to what a normative participant ought to believe if they conform to Bayes' theorem. Five studies (four pre-registered; n = 2417) found that participants shifted their beliefs too far in response to clues that suggested animals do not have minds (i.e., overshooting what a normative participant ought to believe), but not far enough in response to clues that suggested animals have minds (i.e., falling short of what a normative participant ought to believe). A final study demonstrated that this effect was attenuated when humans were the targets of belief. The findings demonstrate that people underestimate animal minds in a way that can be said to be inaccurate and highlight the role of belief updating in downplaying evidence of animal minds. The findings are discussed in relation to speciesist beliefs about the supremacy of humans over animals.

Speciesism in everyday language.

Speciesism, like other forms of prejudice, is thought to be underpinned by biased patterns of language use. Thus far, however, psychological science has primarily focused on how speciesism is reflected in individuals' thoughts as opposed to wider collective systems of meaning such as language. We present a large-scale quantitative test of speciesism by applying machine-learning methods (word embeddings) to billions of English words derived from conversation, film, books, and the Internet. We found evidence of anthropocentric speciesism: words denoting concern (vs. indifference) and value (vs. valueless) were more closely associated with words denoting humans compared to many other animals. We also found evidence of companion animal speciesism: the same words were more closely associated with words denoting companion animals compared to most other animals. The work describes speciesism as a pervasive collective phenomenon that is evident in a naturally occurring expression of human psychology - everyday language.

Meat and interpersonal motives: the case of self-enhancement.

Meat eaters have a more hierarchical, less egalitarian view at the world than vegetarians. This can be manifested in social dominance orientation, at the intergroup level, but also at the interspecies level, yielding more empathy with nonhuman animals, and at the interpersonal level. We examined if interpersonal motives in human-human relationships and empathy with people are associated with frequency of meat eating, using a cross-sectional survey (N = 580). For the motives power and affiliation, no significant relationships emerged, but the self-enhancement motive was positively related to the number of days that participants ate meat. This predicted additional variance over and above variables at the intergroup and interspecies level, such as social dominance orientation and human-animal continuity. Empathy with people was negatively related to meat consumption, but this was explained by its correlation with empathy with animals. Discussion focuses on the importance of the self-enhancement motive in attachment to meat, the symbol of human superiority, as well as resistance to meat refusers.

Humans first: Why people value animals less than humans.

People routinely give humans moral priority over other animals. Is such moral anthropocentrism based in perceived differences in mental capacity between humans and non-humans or merely because humans favor other members of their own species? We investigated this question in six studies (N = 2217). We found that most participants prioritized humans over animals even when the animals were described as having equal or more advanced mental capacities than the humans. This applied to both mental capacity at the level of specific individuals (Studies 1a-b) and at the level typical for the respective species (Study 2). The key driver behind moral anthropocentrism was thus mere species-membership (speciesism). However, all else equal, participants still gave more moral weight to individuals with higher mental capacities (individual mental capacity principle), suggesting that the belief that humans have higher mental capacities than animals is part of the reason that they give humans moral priority. Notably, participants found mental capacity more important for animals than for humans-a tendency which can itself be regarded as speciesist. We also explored possible sub-factors driving speciesism. We found that many participants judged that all individuals (not only humans) should prioritize members of their own species over members of other species (species-relativism; Studies 3a-b). However, some participants also exhibited a tendency to see humans as having superior value in an absolute sense (pro-human species-absolutism, Studies 3-4). Overall, our work demonstrates that speciesism plays a central role in explaining moral anthropocentrism and may be itself divided into multiple sub-factors.

Animal Research that Respects Animal Rights: Extending Requirements for Research with Humans to Animals.

The purpose of this article is to show that animal rights are not necessarily at odds with the use of animals for research. If animals hold basic moral rights similar to those of humans, then we should consequently extend the ethical requirements guiding research with humans to research with animals. The article spells out how this can be done in practice by applying the seven requirements for ethical research with humans proposed by Ezekiel Emanuel, David Wendler, and Christine Grady to animal research. These requirements are (1) social value, (2) scientific validity, (3) independent review, (4) fair subject selection, (5) favorable risk-benefit ratio, (6) informed consent, and (7) respect for research subjects. In practice, this means that we must reform the practice of animal research to make it more similar to research with humans, rather than completely abolish the former. Indeed, if we ban animal research altogether, then we would also deprive animals of its potential benefits-which would be ethically problematic.

Explaining Animal Abuse Among Adolescents: The Role of Speciesism.

Animal abuse is considered a significant marker of violence towards humans, and understanding its determinants is important. In this first large-scale survey on adolescent animal abuse carried out in France, we introduced and tested the relative explanatory power of a new variable potentially involved in animal abuse: speciesism, defined as the belief that humans are intrinsically more valuable than individuals of other species. In a school sample composed of 12,344 participants aged 13-18 years, we observed that 7.3% of participants admitted having perpetrated animal abuse. Consistent with existing studies, cats and dogs were the animals most often abused. Animal abuse was a solitary behavior approximately half of the time, and in 25% of instances it involved only another person. A multivariate logistic regression revealed that animal abuse was more frequent among males and that it occurred more often among adolescents with less positive family climate, lower support from friends, lower attachment to school, and with higher anxio-depressive symptomatology. As implied by the generalized deviance hypothesis, animal abuse was related to more deviant behavior such as drunkenness and bullying. Moreover, this study showed for the first time that animal abuse was higher among adolescents who endorsed speciesist attitudes. These results suggest that beyond psychopathological factors, normative beliefs regarding the value of animals and their human use may also be involved in animal mistreatment.

How children and adults value different animal lives.

The current study modeled the attributions underlying moral concern for animals during childhood and adulthood with the aim of better understanding how concern for animals develops. In total, 241 children aged 6-10 years and 152 adults appraised a range of animals on seven appraisal dimensions and, subsequently rank-ordered which animals they would save in a medicine allocation task. Structural equation modeling revealed several developmental continuities and discontinuities in the dimensions children and adults used to evaluate animal lives. Whereas participants of all ages valued animals based on their aesthetic qualities, intelligence, and perceived similarity to humans, younger children valued animal aesthetics most of all. They also valued benevolence in animals more than older children and adults. Only older children and adults comprehended and valued animals on the basis of their utility as food for humans. Furthermore, neither younger nor older children grasped the role of sentience in the valuation of animals. Only adults factored sentience into their view of what makes animals similar to humans and worthy of moral concern. The results highlight the ways in which moral concern for animals changes across development in several important respects, reflecting an increasingly human-centric orientation.

VR outreach and meat reduction advocacy: The role of presence, empathic concern and speciesism in predicting meat reduction intentions.

The industrial farming and slaughtering of animals may be considered one of the most pressing ethical problems of our time, yet consumers remain empathically disconnected from food animals and continue to eat meat. Therefore, animal advocacy groups have started using virtual reality (VR) outreach to promote consumers' concern for food animals and persuade them to eat less meat. In this study, we examined whether a short 360° documentary depicting the life cycle of factory farmed pigs (from their lives on the farm to their death in the slaughterhouse) experienced in a VR format versus in a regular video format increases participants' intentions to eat less meat via an increased feeling of presence and empathic concern. Using a single factor experimental design, we randomly allocated participants (n = 84 after data-cleaning) to answer a questionnaire following one of both conditions (VR versus video documentary, each n = 42). Results confirmed our hypothesized serial mediation model; VR (versus video) had a positive influence on presence and additionally on empathic concern, leading to higher intentions of reduced meat consumption among participants. Yet, VR (versus video) also had a direct, negative effect on empathy when controlling for presence, so no total effect of medium format on intentions to reduce meat could be found. This counter-effect of VR on empathic concern could be explained by an increased level of speciesism among participants exposed to the VR (versus video) documentary, a finding that is consistent with prior literature on speciesism, cognitive dissonance and dissociation, and requires further confirmatory investigation. Limitations and implications for theory and practice of the study are considered.

Social dominance orientation predicts lower moral condemnation of causing harm to animals.

BACKGROUND: Recent studies and theorizing (SD-HARM model) suggested that social dominance orientation (SDO) constitutes the ideological foundation of negative attitude towards animals and acceptance of their exploitation. At the same time, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is expected to predict speciesist beliefs only when they are perceived as part of societal tradition. The present studies investigated these predictions with moral condemnation of harm done to animals by humans as an indicator of speciesism. PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE: 400 and 324 people, aged 18-87, took part in two cross-sectional studies. They reported their levels of SDO and RWA and made moral judgments of harm done to animals. RESULTS: In both studies, SDO, but not RWA, negatively predicted moral condemnation of harming animals. CONCLUSIONS: The results offer additional support for the SD-HARM model. The more people accept SDO beliefs, the less they morally condemn harm done to animals by humans.

Children Prioritize Humans Over Animals Less Than Adults Do.

Is the tendency to morally prioritize humans over animals weaker in children than adults? In two preregistered studies (total N = 622), 5- to 9-year-old children and adults were presented with moral dilemmas pitting varying numbers of humans against varying numbers of either dogs or pigs and were asked who should be saved. In both studies, children had a weaker tendency than adults to prioritize humans over animals. They often chose to save multiple dogs over one human, and many valued the life of a dog as much as the life of a human. Although they valued pigs less, the majority still prioritized 10 pigs over one human. By contrast, almost all adults chose to save one human over even 100 dogs or pigs. Our findings suggest that the common view that humans are far more morally important than animals appears late in development and is likely socially acquired.

Institutional resistance to veganism: Constructing vegan bodies as deviant in medical encounters in Estonia.

This article examines institutional resistance to veganism, with a focus on the medical system. Based on a qualitative analysis of vegans' accounts of medical encounters in Estonia, collected via an online questionnaire, I argue that the vegan body is socially constructed as a deviant entity by medical professionals. I suggest that the medical professionals' perceptions of vegans are based less on the actual conditions of their bodies but more on ideas about what are socially and politically acceptable identities and (bodily) practices. Deviance is produced through association with the uneasy category of 'vegan'. The experiences of vegans in the medical system illuminate the role of powerful social institutions in resisting transition towards more ethical and ecologically sustainable food practices and in endorsing human exploitation of other animals.

Health justice in the Anthropocene: medical ethics and the Land Ethic.

Industrialisation, urbanisation and economic development have produced unprecedented (if unevenly distributed) improvements in human health. They have also produced unprecedented exploitation of Earth's life support systems, moving the planet into a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene-one defined by human influence on natural systems. The health sector has been complicit in this influence. Bioethics, too, must acknowledge its role-the environmental threats that will shape human health in this century represent a 'perfect moral storm' challenging the ethical theories of the last. The US conservationist Aldo Leopold saw this gathering storm more clearly than many, and in his Land Ethic describes the beginnings of a route to safe passage. Its starting point is a reinterpretation of the ethical relationship between humanity and the 'land community', the ecosystems we live within and depend upon; moving us from 'conqueror' to 'plain member and citizen' of that community. The justice of the Land Ethic questions many presuppositions implicit to discussions of the topic in biomedical ethics. By valuing the community in itself-in a way irreducible to the welfare of its members-it steps away from the individualism axiomatic in contemporary bioethics. Viewing ourselves as citizens of the land community also extends the moral horizons of healthcare from a solely human focus. Taking into account the 'stability' of the community requires intergenerational justice. The resulting vision of justice in healthcare-one that takes climate and environmental justice seriously-could offer health workers an ethic fit for the future.

In the name of science: animal appellations and best practice.

BACKGROUND: The practice of giving animal research subjects proper names is frowned on by the academic scientific community. While researchers provide a number of reasons for desisting from giving their animal subjects proper names, the most common are that (1) naming leads to anthropomorphising which, in turn, leads to data and results that are unobjective and invalid; and (2) while naming does not necessarily entail some mistake on the researcher's part, some feature of the research enterprise renders the practice impossible or ill-advised. OBJECTIVES: My aim is to assess whether the scientific community's attitude towards naming animal research subjects is justified. That is, I wish to consider whether the practice of naming animal research subjects is good or bad for the purposes of scientific research. METHOD: After reviewing the extant literature, I constructed a list of the main arguments researchers provide for desisting from naming their animal research subjects. I then analysed these arguments, with a view to determining whether they in fact provide good reasons to avoid naming animal research subjects. CONCLUSION: I argue that none of the aforementioned reasons usually provide good grounds for not naming animal research subjects. Moreover, there are usually powerful reasons in favour of researchers giving their research animals proper names. This is because the practice usually leads to greater empathy and so to improved animal well-being. This, in turn, leads to better animal science. Thus, the scientific community's attitude towards naming animal research subjects is not justified.

On justifying arguments of species membership.

In the debate about the moral status of human beings at the margins of life, arguments of species membership are often considered to be the least plausible ones. Against this backdrop, this article explores two possible ways to formulate feasible arguments of species membership. The first is an (in the broadest sense of the word) Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian argument; the second is an argument from the intrinsic logic of human rights, which Robert Spaemann refers toas a 'transcendental-pragmatic' argument. On these grounds, the article proposes a philosophical justification for an at least moderate speciesism.

Being human: Why and in what sense it is morally relevant.

The debate on the question of the moral status of human beings and the boundaries of the moral community has long been dominated by the antagonism between personism and speciesism: either certain mental properties or membership of the human species is considered morally crucial. In this article, I argue that both schools of thought are equally implausible in major respects, and that these shortcomings arise from the same reason in both cases: a biological notion of being human. By contrast, I show to what extent being human is morally relevant in a non-biological sense. I establish the living human form as the essential criterion for belonging to the moral community, and defend it against a number of possible objections. This new morphological approach is capable of capturing essential elements of personism and speciesism without sharing their faults, and of reconstructing widespread moral intuitions.