Strategy, Morality, Courage: Bioethics and Health Law after Dobbs.

Our paper examines what is required to protect and promote effective public discussion and policy development in the current climate of divisive disagreement about many public policy questions. We use abortion as a case example precisely because it is morally fraught. We first consider the changes made by Dobbs, as well as those which led up to the Dobbs decision, accompany it, and follow from it.

Choosing to Provide: Early Medical Abortion and Clinician Conscience in Ireland.

Providers are essential to the delivery of abortion care. Yet, they often occupy an ambiguous space in political discourse around abortion. The introduction of a new abortion service in Ireland invites us to look afresh at providers. Since the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018 came into force, by far the most common form of abortion care has been early medical abortion (EMA). This is typically provided by General Practitioners (GPs), with approximately 10% of GPs having chosen to provide EMA. This article draws on an empirical study of providers to investigate their motivations for, and experiences of, provision and their views on colleagues who have not chosen to provide. The study shows that for many providers, the choice to provide was grounded in a moral commitment to protecting women's rights to autonomy and health and ensuring that the harms of the past were not repeated. The article argues that notwithstanding increased normalisation of EMA in Ireland, conscience still has a role to play in abortion care provision and it is important to reflect on the various aspects of this role.

A Risk Is Not a Harm: Abortion Exceptions in State Laws.

This letter responds to the article "Beneath the Sword of Damocles: Moral Obligations of Physicians in a Post-Dobbs Landscape," by Anne Drapkin Lyerly, Ruth R. Faden, and Michelle M. Mello, in the May-June 2024 issue of the Hastings Center Report.

State Abortion Policy and Moral Distress Among Clinicians Providing Abortion After the Dobbs Decision.

Importance: Moral distress occurs when individuals feel powerless to do what they think is right, including when clinicians are prevented from providing health care they deem necessary. The loss of federal protections for abortion following the Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization Supreme Court decision may place clinicians providing abortion at risk of experiencing moral distress, as many could face new legal and civil penalties for providing care in line with professional standards and that they perceive as necessary. Objective: To assess self-reported moral distress scores among abortion-providing clinicians following the Dobbs decision overall and by state-level abortion policy. Design, Setting, and Participants: This survey study, conducted from May to December 2023, included US abortion-providing clinicians (physicians, advanced practice clinicians, and nurses). A purposive electronic survey was disseminated nationally through professional listservs and snowball sampling. Exposure: Abortion policy in each respondent's state of practice (restrictive vs protective using classifications from the Guttmacher Institute). Main Outcomes and Measures: Using descriptive statistics and unadjusted and adjusted negative binomial regression models, the association between self-reported moral distress on the Moral Distress Thermometer (MDT), a validated psychometric tool that scores moral distress from 0 (none) to 10 (worst possible), and state abortion policy was examined. Results: Overall, 310 clinicians (271 [87.7%] women; mean [SD] age, 41.4 [9.7] years) completed 352 MDTs, with 206 responses (58.5%) from protective states and 146 (41.5%) from restrictive states. Reported moral distress scores ranged from 0 to 10 (median, 5) and were more than double for clinicians in restrictive compared with protective states (median, 8 [IQR, 6-9] vs 3 [IQR, 1-6]; P < .001). Respondents with higher moral distress scores included physicians compared with advanced practice clinicians (median, 6 [IQR, 3-8] vs 4 [IQR, 2-7]; P = .005), those practicing in free-standing abortion clinics compared with those practicing in hospitals (median, 6 [IQR, 3-8] vs 4 [IQR, 2-7]; P < .001), those no longer providing abortion care compared with those still providing abortion care (median, 8 [IQR, 4-9] vs 5 [IQR, 2-8]; P = .004), those practicing in loss states (states with the greatest decline in abortion volume since the Dobbs decision) compared with those in stable states (unadjusted incidence rate [IRR], 1.72 [95% CI, 1.55-1.92]; P < .001; adjusted IRR, 1.59 [95% CI, 1.40-1.79]; P < .001), and those practicing in surge states (states with the greatest increase in abortion volume since the Dobbs decision) compared with those in stable states (unadjusted IRR, 1.27 [95% CI, 1.11-1.46]; P < .001; adjusted IRR, 1.24 [95% CI, 1.09-1.41]; P = .001). Conclusions and Relevance: In this purposive national survey study of clinicians providing abortion, moral distress was elevated among all clinicians and more than twice as high among those practicing in states that restrict abortion compared with those in states that protect abortion. The findings suggest that structural changes addressing bans on necessary health care, such as federal protections for abortion, are needed at institutional, state, and federal policy levels to combat widespread moral distress.

The pregnancy rescue case versus typical abortion.

Hendricks' pregnancy rescue case (PRC) tries to show that abortion is typically morally wrong. I argue here that there are at least two morally relevant differences between the abortion in PRC and the typical abortion so that the latter isn't morally wrong even if the former is morally wrong. I develop five modifications to PRC to show that these two differences are morally important. First, in PRC we don't know whether the person gives informed consent to the abortion, nor does the medical professional who will perform the abortion, and so the abortion can't be performed because the patient gives informed consent to it. Second, not preventing the death of the fetus in PRC brings about the death of an additional fetus gestating in a separate pregnant person, whereas most abortions don't entail the termination of another's pregnancy.

Baruch Brody and the principle of justifiable homicide.

In a series of papers in the early 1970s and in his important book Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life (1975), Baruch Brody offered what remains to this day one of the most philosophically rigorous contributions to the debate concerning the morality of abortion and the ethics of homicide more generally. In this paper I would like to critically examine Brody's argument that abortion is sometimes justifiable in some cases even when (1) one cannot claim self-defense, or (2) diminished responsibility, and (3) the abortion is a 'killing' rather than a 'not saving.' This justification, I argue, is limited to certain cases in which the life of the mother is at stake. The cautious principle which he finally formulates merits serious attention and consideration. While I find a great deal of value in Brody's discussion, I will argue that there are several difficulties with the principle of justifiable homicide he constructs. Accordingly, I will further amend and supplement his final version by offering my own alternative principle.

The IAPM New York 2024 declaration on professional responsibility and abortion.

The International Academy of Perinatal Medicine (IAPM) firmly supports abortion as a fundamental reproductive right, as declared at their annual meeting on June 28, 2024, in New York City. This stance, grounded in professional responsibility, respects both autonomy and beneficence-based obligations to pregnant patients and fetal patients. The IAPM asserts that access to safe, legal abortion services is essential for gender equality, public health, and social justice. Their declaration aligns with international human rights standards, advocating for abortion legalization up to fetal viability and beyond in cases of maternal health risks or severe fetal anomalies. This comprehensive approach underscores the critical role of healthcare professionals in providing compassionate reproductive healthcare, aiming to reduce maternal mortality and improve public health outcomes globally.

Beneath the Sword of Damocles: Moral Obligations of Physicians in a Post-Dobbs Landscape.

Since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs vs. Jackson Women's Health Organization, a growing web of state laws restricts access to abortion. Here we consider how, ethically, doctors should respond when terminating a pregnancy is clinically indicated but state law imposes restrictions on doing so. We offer a typology of cases in which the dilemma emerges and a brief sketch of the current state of legal prohibitions against providing such care. We examine the issue from the standpoints of conscience, professional ethics, and civil disobedience and conclude that it is almost always morally permissible and praiseworthy to break the law and that, in a subset of cases, it is morally obligatory to do so. We further argue that health care institutions that employ or credential physicians to provide reproductive health care have an ethical duty to provide a basic suite of practical supports for them as they work to ethically resolve the dilemmas before them.

Another Defense of Abortion: What Transplant Ethics Tells Us about the Ethics of Abortion after Dobbs.

In 1971, two years before Roe v. Wade affirmed federal protection for abortion, Judith Jarvis Thomson attempted to demonstrate the wrongs of forced gestation through analogy: you awake to find that the world's most esteemed violinist is wholly, physically dependent on you for life support. Here, the authors suggest that Thomson's intuition, that there is a relevant similarity between providing living kidney support and forced gestation, is realized in the contemporary practice of living organ donation. After detailing the robust analogy between living kidney donation and gestation, we turn to current ethical guidelines incorporated in the United Network for Organ Sharing's requirements for legally authorized organ donation and transplantation. We conclude that if, as we-and Thomson-suggest, organ donation and gestation are relevantly similar, then the ethical framework supporting donation may aid in articulating ethical grounds that will be compelling in informing the legal grounds for a defense of abortion.

The Dead Unborn, Postmortem Privacy Cases, and Abortion Rights.

The privacy of the dead is an interesting area of concern for bioethicists. There is a legal doctrine that the dead can't have privacy rights, but also a body of contrary law ascribing privacy rights to the deceased and kin in relation to the deceased. As women's abortion privacy is under assault by American courts and legislatures, the implications of ascribing privacy rights to embryos and fetuses is more important than ever. Caution is called for in this domain.

"I Went Into This Field to Empower Other People, and I Feel Like I Failed": Residents Experience Moral Distress Post-Dobbs.

Background The 2022 Supreme Court ruling in Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization nullified the constitutional right to abortion, which led to effective bans in at least 14 US states and placed obstetrics and gynecology (OB/GYN) residents in dilemmas where they may have to withhold care, potentially causing moral distress-a health care workforce phenomenon less understood among resident physicians. Objective To identify and explore moral distress experienced by OB/GYN residents due to care restrictions post-Dobbs. Methods In 2023, we invited OB/GYN residents, identified by their program directors, training in states with restricted abortion access, to participate in one-on-one, semi-structured interviews via Zoom about their experiences caring for patients post-Dobbs. We used thematic analysis to analyze interview data. Results Twenty-one residents described their experiences of moral distress due to restrictions. We report on 3 themes in their accounts related to moral distress (and 4 subthemes): (1) challenges to their physician identity (inability to do the job, internalized distress, and reconsidering career choices); (2) participating in care that exacerbates inequities (and erodes patient trust); and (3) determination to advocate for and provide abortion care in the future. Conclusions OB/GYN residents grappled with moral distress and identified challenges from abortion restrictions.

Health-care workforce implications of the Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization decision.

The Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization Supreme Court decision, which revoked the constitutional right to abortion in the USA, has impacted the national medical workforce. Impacts vary across states, but providers in states with restrictive abortion laws now must contend with evolving legal and ethical challenges that have the potential to affect workforce safety, mental health, education, and training opportunities, in addition to having serious impacts on patient health and far-reaching societal consequences. Moreover, Dobbs has consequences on almost every facet of the medical workforce, including on physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and others who work within the health-care system. Comprehensive research is urgently needed to understand the wide-ranging implications of Dobbs on the medical workforce, including legal, ethical, clinical, and psychological dimensions, to inform evidence-based policies and standards of care in abortion-restrictive settings. Lessons from the USA might also have global relevance for countries facing similar restrictions on reproductive care.

The Texas Medical Board and the Futility of Medical Exceptions to Abortion Bans.

This Viewpoint describes the failure of yet another state institution to generate meaningful guidance about medical exceptions to abortion bans.

Do Not Risk Homicide: Abortion After 10 Weeks Gestation.

When an abortion is performed, someone dies. Are we killing a human person? Widespread disagreement exists. However, it is not necessary to establish personhood in order to establish the wrongness of abortion: a substantial chance of personhood is enough. We defend The Do Not Risk Homicide Argument: abortions are wrong after 10 weeks gestation because they substantially and unjustifiably risk homicide, the unjust killing of a human person. Why 10 weeks? Because the cumulative evidence establishes a substantial chance (a more than one in five chance) that preborn human beings are persons after 10 weeks (if not before then). We submit evidence from our bad track record, widespread disagreement about personhood (after 10 weeks gestation), problems with theories of personhood, the similarity between preborn human beings and premature newborns, miscalculations of gestational age, and the common intuitive responses of women to their pregnancies and miscarriages. Our argument is cogent because it bypasses the stalemate over preborn personhood and rests on common ground rather than contentious metaphysics. It also strongly suggests that society must do more to protect preborn human beings. We briefly discuss its practical implications for fetal pain relief, social policy, and abortion law.

Societal implications of the Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization decision.

On June 24, 2022, the US Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization marked the removal of the constitutional right to abortion in the USA, introducing a complex ethical and legal landscape for patients and providers. This shift has had immediate health and equity repercussions, but it is also crucial to examine the broader impacts on states, health-care systems, and society as a whole. Restrictions on abortion access extend beyond immediate reproductive care concerns, necessitating a comprehensive understanding of the ruling's consequences across micro and macro levels. To mitigate potential harm, it is imperative to establish a research agenda that informs policy making and ensures effective long-term monitoring and reporting, addressing both immediate and future impacts.

Bioethicists Today: Results of the Views in Bioethics Survey.

Bioethicists influence practices and policies in medicine, science, and public health. However, little is known about bioethicists' views. We recently surveyed 824 U.S. bioethicists on a wide range of ethical issues, including topics related to abortion, medical aid in dying, and resource allocation, among others. We also asked bioethicists about their demographic, religious, academic, and professional backgrounds. We find that bioethicists' normative commitments predict their views on bioethical issues. We also find that, in important ways, bioethicists' views do not align with those of the U.S. public: for instance, bioethicists are more likely than members of the public to think abortion is ethically permissible but are less likely to believe compensating organ donors is. Our demographic results indicate the field of bioethics is far less diverse than the U.S. population-less diverse even than other academic disciplines-suggesting far more work needs to be done to build an inclusive field.

Impairment Arguments, Interests, and Circularity.

A common justification for abortion rights is that the death of the fetus does not violate any of the fetus's time-relative interests. The time-relative interest account (TRIA) of harm and wrongdoing tells us that a necessary condition for harming someone is that his or her time-relative interests are frustrated. Regarding the justification for abortion, this account falls prey to impairment arguments. Impairment arguments entertain cases of prenatal injury, such as the mother using illicit drugs that disable the child. The intuition is that the child who is born with such disabilities is harmed by the mother's drug use. But it is unclear what time-relative interest is violated in cases of prenatal harm. Typical responses to impairment arguments point out that the abortion case is different because the child does not exist to experience such harms; but in prenatal injury + survival cases, the child does live to experience those harms. Thus, the TRIA justification for abortion is not impugned by impairment counter-examples. This article argues that this response to impairment arguments is viciously circular. The response must say that so long as you kill the child, no harm is done. But this assumes that killing itself is morally inconsequential and is not itself a case of harm. The response to impairment arguments, then, assumes the permissibility of abortion.

Post-Roe v Wade psychiatry: legal, clinical, and ethical challenges in psychiatry under abortion bans.

In recent history, the world has witnessed a trend towards liberalization of abortion laws driven by an increasing understanding of the negative personal and public health consequences of criminalizing abortion. By contrast, several countries have recently implemented restrictive reproductive laws, joining the 112 countries where access to abortion care is banned completely or with narrow exceptions. On June 24, 2022, the US Supreme Court ruling in Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization overturned its landmark decisions in Roe v Wade that established abortion until the point of viability of the fetus as a constitutional right. After Roe v Wade having been overturned, it is projected that many women in the USA will be prevented from accessing safe abortion care. Importantly, abortion bans not only impose constraints on patient autonomy, they also restrict physicians' ability to practice evidence-based medicine, which will negatively impact psychiatric care. It is therefore crucial for the practicing psychiatrist to be familiar with this new legal landscape. In this Personal View, we aim to provide a topical overview to help clinicians gain a clear understanding of legal, clinical, and ethical responsibilities, focusing on the USA. We also discuss the reality that psychiatrists might be called upon to determine medical necessity for an abortion on psychiatric grounds, which is new for most US psychiatrists. We predict that psychiatrists will be confronted with very difficult situations in which lawful and ethical conduct might be incongruent, and that abortion bans will result in greater numbers of patients needing psychiatric care from a system that is ill-prepared for additional demands.