Impact of a sweetened beverage tax on beverage prices in Seattle, WA.

Seattle's Sweetened Beverage Tax is an excise tax of 1.75 cents per ounce on sugar-sweetened beverages and is one of the highest beverage taxes in the U.S. This study examined the impact of Seattle's tax on the prices of beverages. We conducted audits of 407 retail food stores and eating places (quick service restaurants and coffee shops) before and 6 months after the tax was implemented in Seattle and in a comparison area. Ordinary least squares difference-in-differences models with store fixed effects were used to estimate the effect of the tax on prices, stratified by beverage type and store type. In secondary analyses, we assessed the effect of the tax on the price of non-taxed beverages and foods. Results from the adjusted difference-in-differences models indicated the tax was associated with an average increase of 1.58 cents per ounce among Seattle retailers, representing 90 % of the price of the tax. By store type, price increases were highest in smaller grocery stores and drug stores. By beverage type, price increases were highest for energy beverages and soda and lowest for bottled coffee and juice drinks. Prices of some non-taxed beverages also increased while the prices of select healthy foods generally did not. The sweetened beverage tax in Seattle is higher than beverage taxes in most other cities, and nearly the full cost of the tax is being passed through to consumers for many beverage types and stores types.

Are laws restricting soft drinks sales in Brazilian schools able to lower their availability?

OBJECTIVE: To describe students protected by laws and exposed to soft drinks sales and assess whether forbidding laws are associated with lower availability of these beverages. METHODS: We identified laws forbidding non-government administered cafeterias or sales of soft drinks in schools in the 27 Brazilian state capitals. Data on soft drinks sales were obtained from Pesquisa Nacional de Saúde do Escolar 2015 (PeNSE - National Survey of School Health 2015), for a representative sample of 9th graders from public and private schools. Students were attributed with the status of their school regarding the law and sale of soft drinks. Co-variables were school status (public or private), school size, geographic regions, mother's educational level, score of goods and services. We performed multivariate analyses using Poisson regression. RESULTS: The total of 23 laws forbidding sales of soft drinks covered 63.0% of capitals, comprising 56.9% of students. Law coverage was higher among students from more developed regions (67.6%) and in public schools (60.6%), compared with those from less developed regions (38.0%) and private schools (45.8%). Soft drinks were available for 33.9% of students. Students attending public schools in less developed regions had the lowest availability of soft drinks, regardless of law coverage (14.8%; 12.0%); while students attending private schools in these regions had a high availability, regardless of law coverage (82.1%; 73.4%). Restrictive laws were associated with lower sales of soft drinks in more developed regions, and restrictions had a greater association with the availability of soft drinks in public schools (PR = 0.25; 95%CI = 0.15-0.41), compared with private schools (PR = 0.48; 95%CI = 0.35-0.66). CONCLUSION: Laws restricting soft drinks in schools were associated with fewer sales in more developed regions. Private schools were less compliant with the law than public schools. A broadly enforced national law could reduce the availability of soft drinks in schools.

Impact of the announcement and implementation of the UK Soft Drinks Industry Levy on sugar content, price, product size and number of available soft drinks in the UK, 2015-19: A controlled interrupted time series analysis.

BACKGROUND: Dietary sugar, especially in liquid form, increases risk of dental caries, adiposity, and type 2 diabetes. The United Kingdom Soft Drinks Industry Levy (SDIL) was announced in March 2016 and implemented in April 2018 and charges manufacturers and importers at £0.24 per litre for drinks with over 8 g sugar per 100 mL (high levy category), £0.18 per litre for drinks with 5 to 8 g sugar per 100 mL (low levy category), and no charge for drinks with less than 5 g sugar per 100 mL (no levy category). Fruit juices and milk-based drinks are exempt. We measured the impact of the SDIL on price, product size, number of soft drinks on the marketplace, and the proportion of drinks over the lower levy threshold of 5 g sugar per 100 mL. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We analysed data on a total of 209,637 observations of soft drinks over 85 time points between September 2015 and February 2019, collected from the websites of the leading supermarkets in the UK. The data set was structured as a repeat cross-sectional study. We used controlled interrupted time series to assess the impact of the SDIL on changes in level and slope for the 4 outcome variables. Equivalent models were run for potentially levy-eligible drink categories ('intervention' drinks) and levy-exempt fruit juices and milk-based drinks ('control' drinks). Observed results were compared with counterfactual scenarios based on extrapolation of pre-SDIL trends. We found that in February 2019, the proportion of intervention drinks over the lower levy sugar threshold had fallen by 33.8 percentage points (95% CI: 33.3-34.4, p < 0.001). The price of intervention drinks in the high levy category had risen by £0.075 (£0.037-0.115, p < 0.001) per litre-a 31% pass through rate-whilst prices of intervention drinks in the low levy category and no levy category had fallen and risen by smaller amounts, respectively. Whilst the product size of branded high levy and low levy drinks barely changed after implementation of the SDIL (-7 mL [-23 to 11 mL] and 16 mL [6-27ml], respectively), there were large changes to product size of own-brand drinks with an increase of 172 mL (133-214 mL) for high levy drinks and a decrease of 141 mL (111-170 mL) for low levy drinks. The number of available drinks that were in the high levy category when the SDIL was announced was reduced by 3 (-6 to 12) by the implementation of the SDIL. Equivalent models for control drinks provided little evidence of impact of the SDIL. These results are not sales weighted, so do not give an account of how sugar consumption from drinks may have changed over the time period. CONCLUSIONS: The results suggest that the SDIL incentivised many manufacturers to reduce sugar in soft drinks. Some of the cost of the levy to manufacturers and importers was passed on to consumers as higher prices but not always on targeted drinks. These changes could reduce population exposure to liquid sugars and associated health risks.

The impact of the Philadelphia beverage tax on purchases and consumption by adults and children.

Numerous U.S. cities have recently enacted taxes on sweetened beverages. To examine the effects of the beverage tax of 1.5 cents per ounce in Philadelphia, we surveyed adults and children in Philadelphia and nearby comparison communities both before the tax and nearly one year after implementation. We find that the tax reduced purchases in Philadelphia stores and that Philadelphia residents increased purchases of taxed beverages outside of the city. The tax reduced the frequency of adults' soda consumption by 31 percent, but had no detectable impacts on adults' consumption of other beverages. The tax had no detectable impact on children's consumption of soda or all taxed beverages, although children who were frequent consumers prior to the tax reduced their consumption after the tax.

Coca-Cola's political and policy influence in Mexico: understanding the role of institutions, interests and divided society.

In response to Mexico's burgeoning industrial epidemics of obesity and type-2 diabetes, triggered in part by sugar-sweetened carbonated beverages' ability to readily market their products and influence consumption, the government has responded through a variety of non-communicable disease (NCD) policies. Nevertheless, major industries, such as Coca-Cola, have been able to continuously obstruct the prioritization of those policies targeting the consumption, marketing and sale of their products. To better understand why this has occurred, this article introduces a political science agenda-setting framework and applies it to the case of Coca-Cola in Mexico. Devised from political science theory and subsequently applied to the case of Coca-Cola in Mexico, my framework, titled Institutions, Interests, and Industry Civic Influence (IPIC), emphasizes Coca-Cola's access to institutions, supportive presidents and industry efforts to hamper civic mobilization and pressures for greater regulation of the soda industry. Methodologically, I employ qualitative single case study analysis, combining an analysis of 26 case study documents and seven in-depth stake-holder interviews. My proposed analytical framework helps to underscore the fact that Coca-Cola's influence is not solely shaped by the corporation's increased economic importance, but more importantly, its access to politicians, institutions and strategies to divide civil society. Additionally, my proposed framework provides several real-world policy recommendations for how governments and civil society can restructure their relationship with the soda industry, such as the government's creation of laws prohibiting the industry's ability to influence NCD policy and fund scientific research.

Following in the footsteps of tobacco and alcohol? Stakeholder discourse in UK newspaper coverage of the Soft Drinks Industry Levy.

OBJECTIVE: In politically contested health debates, stakeholders on both sides present arguments and evidence to influence public opinion and the political agenda. The present study aimed to examine whether stakeholders in the Soft Drinks Industry Levy (SDIL) debate sought to establish or undermine the acceptability of this policy through the news media and how this compared with similar policy debates in relation to tobacco and alcohol industries. DESIGN: Quantitative and qualitative content analysis of newspaper articles discussing sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) taxation published in eleven UK newspapers between 1 April 2015 and 30 November 2016, identified through the Nexis database. Direct stakeholder citations were entered in NVivo to allow inductive thematic analysis and comparison with an established typology of industry stakeholder arguments used by the alcohol and tobacco industries. SETTING: UK newspapers. PARTICIPANTS: Proponents and opponents of SSB tax/SDIL cited in UK newspapers. RESULTS: Four hundred and ninety-one newspaper articles cited stakeholders' (n 287) arguments in relation to SSB taxation (n 1761: 65 % supportive and 35 % opposing). Stakeholders' positions broadly reflected their vested interests. Inconsistencies arose from: changes in ideological position; insufficient clarity on the nature of the problem to be solved; policy priorities; and consistency with academic rigour. Both opposing and supportive themes were comparable with the alcohol and tobacco industry typology. CONCLUSIONS: Public health advocates were particularly prominent in the UK newspaper debate surrounding the SDIL. Advocates in future policy debates might benefit from seeking a similar level of prominence and avoiding inconsistencies by being clearer about the policy objective and mechanisms.