Sustainable and conventional banking in Europe.

At the end of the 20th century a new banking model, the so-called ethical banking, emerged becoming the maximum exponent of a socially responsible investment. The financial crisis in 2008 led to a distrust of the conventional financial system and consequently investors began to look with interest this new banking, which only invests in ethical activities and products, with social and environmental criteria, total transparency and a democratic management. The aim of this article is to analyze the economic structure of ethical banking, compared to that of conventional banking, by paying attention to its liquidity, coverage and solvency. Specifically, We compare the financial statements of Triodos Bank, the main European ethical bank belonging to the Global Alliance for Banking on Values, with two of the main conventional banks of each of the five countries in Europe in which it operates. To do this, we apply a financial and economic analysis to the period from 2015 to 2018, the means difference test and analysis of variance on an array of financial ratios and, finally, probit regressions. The results reveal that ethical banking is growing more than conventional banking and it presents greater liquidity and solvency, although, in general terms, its profitability is not higher. In conclusion, both savers and investors have guarantees that their savings are invested not only in a responsible but also in a confident way in ethical banking.

Strategies to avoid blacklisting: The case of statistics on money laundering.

Financial and legal entities (e.g. banks, casinos, notaries etc.) have to report money laundering suspicions. Countries' engagement in fighting money laundering is evaluated-among others-with statistics on how often these suspicions are reported. Lack of compliance can result in economically harmful blacklisting. Nevertheless, these blacklists repeatedly become empty-in what is known as the emptying blacklist paradox. We develop a principal-agent model with intermediate agents and show that non-harmonized statistics can lead to strategic reporting to avoid blacklisting, and explain the emptying blacklist paradox. We recommend the harmonization of the standards to report suspicion of money laundering.