Biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of biosafety in the biomedical sciences. While it is often assumed that biosafety is a purely technical matter that has little to do with philosophy or the humanities, biosafety raises important ethical issues that have not been adequately examined in the scientific or bioethics literature. This article reviews some pivotal events in the history of biosafety and biosecurity and explores three different biosafety topics that generate significant ethical concerns, i.e., risk assessment, risk management, and risk distribution. The article also discusses the role of democratic governance in the oversight of biosafety and offers some suggestions for incorporating bioethics into biosafety practice, education, and policy.

Rethinking Gain-of-Function Experiments in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Proponents of the use of gain-of-function (GOF) experiments with pathogens with pandemic potential (PPP) have argued that such experiments are necessary because they reveal important facets of pathogenesis and can be performed safely. Opponents of GOF experiments with PPP have argued that the risks outweigh the knowledge gained. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates the vulnerability of human societies to a new PPP, while also validating some arguments of both camps, questioning others, and suggesting the need to rethink how we approach this class of experiments.

Five Things Students and Clinicians Should Know About "Biocontainment".

Biocontaining was one way that Western, affluent, allopathic cultures tended to respond and make meaning during the 2013-2015 Ebola virus disease (EVD) pandemic. It became a pathway to restore trust in biomedicine itself, which had been shaken by unease across the globe when the EVD threat was at its height. Yet biocontaining barely qualifies as a public health measure. Successful public health efforts rely on trust, which is difficult to maintain during a pandemic. Such efforts require balancing the need to be close to patients to care well for them against the need to remain distant from a virulent pathogen. Biocontainment tries to navigate this tension and, in so doing, simultaneously frustrates and supports public trust. This article suggests 5 things clinicians and health professions students should consider about the project of biocontainment that could affect their orientation to their public health duties.

The Biosafety Level 4 Zoonotic Laboratory Network (BSL4ZNet): Report of a workshop on live animal handling.

The Biosafety Level 4 Zoonotic Laboratory Network (BSL4ZNet) was established in 2016, to provide a means of communication and support for the global high-containment laboratory community. Its working groups focus on international response, institutional cooperation and knowledge sharing, scientific excellence and training. In the latter role, BSL4ZNet sponsored its first international workshop in February 2018, held at the USDA National Centers for Animal Health, Ames, Iowa, USA, focused on necropsy procedures in high-containment laboratories. A second workshop, in November 2018, was held at the National Microbiology Laboratories (CFIA/PHAC) in Winnipeg, Canada, and focused on decontamination. A third workshop, held at the Australian Animal Health Laboratory in Geelong, Australia, in February 2019, was devoted to handling methods and ethical concerns for live animals in high-containment laboratories. The third workshop brought together 12 laboratorians from seven partner organizations in Australia, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. It included both discussion-based and hands-on training sessions on animal welfare, animal models, site-specific infrastructure constraints, health monitoring and humane endpoints, sampling procedures, and carcass disposal. This report summarizes the inception, development, and structure of the BSL4ZNet, and highlights the aims and results of the Geelong workshop.

Awareness and Attitudes of Research Students Toward Dual-use Research of Concern in Pakistan: A Cross-sectional Questionnaire.

Dual-use research poses a significant challenge for scientists in the biomedical field and for global health security in general. As the scientific knowledge and materials required for the development of biological agents become progressively more accessible and inexpensive, there is an increased need to understand and improve the governance of scientific research. Prevention of the misuse of facilities, equipment, agents, and scientific knowledge requires high levels of awareness of the concept of dual-use research, starting with early-career scientists and graduate students. In this study, the attitudes and level of awareness of postgraduate students in Pakistan toward the issues surrounding dual-use research were assessed through a survey containing both quantitative and qualitative questions in 32 universities in 4 provinces, federal area, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir regions of Pakistan; 933 students responded. Most (58.2%) had never heard of dual-use research of concern (DURC), while 18.5% had heard the term but were unsure of its meaning. Irrespective of prior knowledge, a higher percentage of students (68.6%) felt an obligation to report research misuse. Considering the need for DURC training, 94.1% of the respondents agreed that the principal investigator should take the responsibility to train students on DURC at the start of a research project. When experimental results having dual-use potential, 69.1% indicated they would publish with limited protocol, with 43.5% indicating they would publish the limited protocol only if there was a way for scientists to access their data. The survey results revealed limited DURC awareness among researchers across Pakistan. However, the respondents, although not formally educated about DURC, were quite aware of its impact. The information gained in this survey will be valuable in addressing country-specific awareness and training needs.

Surrogate strains of human pathogens for field release.

Surrogate microorganisms, in short surrogates, are an essential part of pathogen research. Compared to surrogates used in controlled laboratory environments, surrogates for field release are restricted by concerns about human and environmental safety. For field research of food-borne pathogens, strains of an attenuated pathogen or strains of genetically close non-pathogenic species have been used as surrogates. Genetic modification is usually performed to attenuate virulence, through for examples deletion of genes of virulence and transcriptional regulators and removal of virulence plasmids, and to facilitate detection and monitoring through observing antibiotic resistance, fluorescence, and bioluminescence. For field research of a biological warfare agent Bacillus anthracis, strains of genetically close non-pathogenic species or strains of genetically distant non-pathogenic species have been used, mostly without any genetic modification. Recently, we constructed strains of Bacillus thuringiensis as surrogates for B. anthracis, demonstrating that strain engineering could significantly enhance the utility of surrogates, and that the application of a simple genetic circuit could significantly impact surrogate safety. Thus far, enormous potential of biotechnology has not been exploited enough due to safety concerns regarding the field release of genetically engineered microorganisms. However, synthetic biology is rapidly developing, providing new concepts for biocontainment as well as ingenious genetic circuits and devices, which should be applied in future research of field-use surrogates.

Code of Conduct on Biosecurity for Biological Resource Centres: procedural implementation.

A globally applicable code of conduct specifically dedicated to biosecurity has been developed together with guidance for its procedural implementation. This is to address the regulations governing potential dual-use of biological materials, associated information and technologies, and reduce the potential for their malicious use. Scientists researching and exchanging micro-organisms have a responsibility to prevent misuse of the inherently dangerous ones, that is, those possessing characters such as pathogenicity or toxin production. The code of conduct presented here is based on best practice principles for scientists and their institutions working with biological resources with a specific focus on micro-organisms. It aims to raise awareness of regulatory needs and to protect researchers, their facilities and stakeholders. It reflects global activities in this area in response to legislation such as that in the USA, the PATRIOT Act of 2001, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001; the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 and subsequent amendments in the UK; the EU Dual-Use Regulation; and the recommendations of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), under their Biological Resource Centre (BRC) Initiative at the beginning of the millennium (OECD, 2001). Two project consortia with international partners came together with experts in the field to draw up a Code of Conduct on Biosecurity for BRCs to ensure that culture collections and microbiologists in general worked in a way that met the requirements of such legislation. A BRC is the modern day culture collection that adds value to its holdings and implements common best practice in the collection and supply of strains for research and development. This code of conduct specifically addresses the work of public service culture collections and describes the issues of importance and the controls or practices that should be in place. However, these best practices are equally applicable to all other microbiology laboratories holding, using and sharing microbial resources. The code was introduced to the Seventh Review Conference to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), United Nations, Geneva, 2011; the delegates to the States' parties recommended that this code of conduct be broadly applied in the life sciences and disseminated amongst microbiologists, hence the publishing of it here along with practical implementation guidance. This paper considers the regulatory and working environment for microbiology, defines responsibilities and provides practical advice on the implementation of best practice in handling the organism itself, associated data and technical know-how.