When liars are considered honest.

This article introduces a theoretical model of truth and honesty from a psychological perspective. We examine its application in political discourse and discuss empirical findings distinguishing between conceptions of honesty and their influence on public perception, misinformation dissemination, and the integrity of democracy.

European Technical Democracy? How Consumer Associations Did-or Did Not-Shape the 1980s Automotive Environmental Standards.

Did the 1980s automotive standards reflect the European Economic Community's move toward a "technical democracy" or a broader democratic deficit? In the early 1980s, Europe's automotive sector faced multiple challenges: the European Commission's desire to harmonize technical standards and achieve greater European integration, intense competition between manufacturers, and environmental issues like acid rain. Debates on reducing air pollution focused on unleaded petrol and catalytic converters. Two associations representing civil society in Brussels responded to the increase in environmental concerns with a 1982 joint campaign. Despite a rich historiography on pollutant emission standards, highlighting the strategies of governments and companies, no study has dealt with the role nongovernmental organizations played. Based on public and private archives, particularly those of the European Bureau of Consumers' Unions, this article argues the new regulations did not result from the EU's consultation with civil society organizations like consumer groups but rather with the automotive industry.

Democratic quality and excess mortality during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The aim of this study is to analyse the relationship between democratic quality and excess mortality produced in the year 2020 before COVID-19 vaccinations were generalised. Using cross-sectional data from 80 countries on five continents, multiple linear regression models between excess mortality, the general democracy index and its disaggregation into five categories: electoral process and pluralism, government functioning, political participation, political culture and civil liberties were estimated. The analysis also considered, public health spending per capita, overweight inhabitants, the average temperature of the country, population over 65 years of age, The KOF Globalisation Index, and the Gross National Income per capita as control variables. It was possible to establish a strong inverse association between excess mortality per million inhabitants and the general democracy index and four of its five categories. There was a particularly strong relationship between excess mortality and the political culture dimension (-326.50, p < 0.001). The results suggest that the higher the democratic quality of the political institutions of a State and particularly of their political culture the more improved the response and management of the pandemic was in preventing deaths and protecting their citizens more effectively. Conversely, countries with lower democracy index values have higher excess mortality. Quality democratic political institutions provide more effective public health policies in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Future governance of the RCVS: democracy or oligarchy?

Bruce Vivash Jones argues that the recent announcement from the RCVS that it is moving to 'scrap elections to council' raises many questions and concerns.

Democracy's limited impact on innovation: Panel data evidence from developing countries.

This study investigates the relationship between democracy and innovation across 61 developing countries from 2013 to 2020, utilizing data from Global Innovation Index. Employing the Freedom House Index and Polity2 indicators as proxies for democracy, research employs Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects and SystemGMM techniques to analyze their impact on innovation. The findings of the study reveal no statistically significant relationships between democracy and innovation in developing nations within specified timeframe. Through empirical analysis, including various econometric approaches, it is observed that the level of democracy as measured by these indicators, does not appear to exert a discernable impact on the innovation landscape of these countries. These results carry important implications for public policy. While the promotion of democracy remains a crucial goal, especially for societal development and political stability, this study suggests that solely focusing on enhancing democratic institutions might not necessarily yield immediate direct improvements in the innovation capacities of developing nations. Policymakers and stakeholders involved in fostering innovation ecosystems in these regions may need to consider a more nuanced approach, encompassing factors beyond the scope of democratic governance to effectively spur innovation. Understanding the nuanced relationship between democracy and innovation in developing countries has significant implications for designing targeted policies aimed at enhancing innovation capacities, economic growth and overall societal development in these regions.

Correlation of geopolitics, education, democracy with COVID-19 vaccination rate.

INTRODUCTION: Vaccine hesitancy is an ongoing problem and determining the factors that increase the vaccination rate in various countries of the world might be useful for further implementation of efficient public health policies and negating anti-vaccination campaigns. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Human Development Index (HDI), Education Index (EI), Democracy Index (DI), COVID-19 vaccination rates, COVID-19 data were collected from public sources such as UNDP - Human Development Reports, UNESCO - Education Index, Economist Intelligence, WHO- COVID-19 Dashboard, Our World In Data, The Financial Times COVID-19 Dashboard. Statistical analysis such as Pearson correlation, and linear regression analyses were done to determine a relation between the above-mentioned indices and COVID-19 vaccination rates (1-dose, 2-dose, booster, and combined). RESULTS: HDI had the strongest positive correlation with the vaccination rates (1-dose- r (181) = 0.632, p < 0.001, 2-dose- r (181) = 0.671, p < 0.001, booster- r (181) = 0.718, p < 0.001, combined- 0.703, p < 0.001). EI (1-dose- r (177) = 0.560, p < 0.001, 2-dose- r (177) = 0.599, p < 0.001, booster- r (177) = 0.642, p < 0.001, combined- 0.626, p < 0.001), DI (1-dose- r (163) = 0.445, p < 0.001, 2-dose- r (163) = 0.479, p < 0.001, booster- r (163) = 0.534, p < 0.001, combined- 0.508, p < 0.001), as well as Geographic location (1-dose- η (Eta) = 0.610 p < 0.001, 2-dose- η (Eta) = 0.633 p < 0.001, booster- η (Eta) = 0.657, p < 0.001, combined- η (Eta) = 0.645, p < 0.001) had positive correlation with vaccination rates. CONCLUSION: There is a strong positive correlation of COVID-19 vaccination rates with HDI and EI.

Recomendação nº 007, de 14 de março de 2024: recomenda ao Congresso Nacional que aprove o Projeto de Lei nº 2630/2020, incorporando o relatório apresentado pelo deputado Orlando Silva.

Recomenda ao Congresso Nacional que o PL nº 2.630/2020 (PL das Fake News) seja aprovado, incorporando o relatório apresentado pelo relator, Deputado Orlando Silva, em busca do fortalecimento da democracia e valorização da saúde física e mental da população brasileira, buscando combater os discursos de ódio e a desinformação. Aos Conselhos de Saúde Municipais, Estaduais e do Distrito Federal que promovam atividades sobre os riscos da desinformação para a democracia brasileira. Plenário do Conselho Nacional de Saúde, em sua Trecentésima Quinquagésima Segunda Reunião Ordinária, realizada nos dias 13 e 14 de março de 2024.

MAGA Republicans' views of American democracy and society and support for political violence in the United States: Findings from a nationwide population-representative survey.

BACKGROUND: Identifying groups at increased risk for political violence can support prevention efforts. We determine whether "Make America Great Again" (MAGA) Republicans, as defined, are potentially such a group. METHODS: Nationwide survey conducted May 13-June 2, 2022 of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. MAGA Republicans are defined as Republicans who voted for Donald Trump in the 2020 presidential election and deny the results of that election. Principal outcomes are weighted proportions of respondents who endorse political violence, are willing to engage in it, and consider it likely to occur. FINDINGS: The analytic sample (n = 7,255) included 1,128 (15.0%) MAGA Republicans, 640 (8.3%) strong Republicans, 1,571 (21.3%) other Republicans, and 3,916 (55.3%) non-Republicans. MAGA Republicans were substantially more likely than others to agree strongly/very strongly that "in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States" (MAGA Republicans, 30.3%, 95% CI 27.2%, 33.4%; strong Republicans, 7.5%, 95% CI 5.1%, 9.9%; other Republicans, 10.8%, 95% CI 9.0%, 12.6%; non-Republicans, 11.2%, 95% CI 10.0%, 12.3%; p < 0.001) and to consider violence usually/always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives (MAGA Republicans, 58.2%, 95% CI 55.0%, 61.4%; strong Republicans, 38.3%, 95% CI 34.2%, 42.4%; other Republicans, 31.5%, 95% CI 28.9%, 34.0%; non-Republicans, 25.1%, 95% CI 23.6%, 26.7%; p < 0.001). They were not more willing to engage personally in political violence. INTERPRETATION: MAGA Republicans, as defined, are more likely than others to endorse political violence. They are not more willing to engage in such violence themselves; their endorsement may increase the risk that it will occur.

Assessing the interplay between political globalization, social globalization, democracy, militarization, and sustainable development: evidence from G-7 economies.

Sustainable development can act as a catalyst in boosting environmental sustainability and human welfare by alleviating unsustainable production and consumption practices. Political globalization emerges as indispensable in increasing global environmental governance. In addition, social globalization, militarization, and democracy can also affect sustainable development. In light of the overlooked impacts of these crucial variables on sustainable development within prior research studies, this study investigates the heterogeneous effects of political globalization, militarization, social globalization, and democracy on sustainable development from 1990 to 2019 in the G-7 panel. The results obtained from the application of the methods of moment quantile regressions reveal that a one-percentage-point increase in political globalization yields a significant enhancement in sustainable development, ranging from 0.015 to 0.017% across the 10th to 90th quantiles. Contrarily, sustainable development exhibits a decline within the range of 0.025 to 0.028% across the 10th to 90th quantiles, on account of a 1% increase in social globalization. Likewise, militarization hampers sustainable development with a slightly increasing effect from the 10th to 90th quantiles. Gross fixed capital formation decreases sustainable development while the relationship between democracy and sustainable development indicates a negative correlation, which has not achieved statistical significance across the majority of quantiles. These novel outcomes are also verified by using some other regression tests. Subsequently, a detailed policy framework is presented for the purpose of fostering sustainable growth within the G-7 group.

Early child health in Africa: do ICT and democracy matter?

This article examines the effect of information and communication technologies (ICT) and democracy on early child health using data from 51 African countries. We first specify and estimate a panel data model using ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares over the period 2001-2019. We apply the Hodrick-Prescott filter before analysis. Our results show that the extension of mobile phone use significantly contributes to the improvement of early child health in Africa. This effect is indifferent to the state or the level of democracy. Also, the internet diffusion plays a positive role in early child health when the democracy environment improves and becomes better. We suggest policies in favour of a large access to ICT tools and internet infrastructure as well as the promotion of democracy in Africa to better prevent infant mortality.

Discurso do Analista e Democracia em Risco: Por Que o Psicanalista Não Pode Ser Bolsonarista? / The Analyst Discourse and Democracy at Risk: Why Can't the Psychoanalyst Be Bolsonarista? / El Discurso del Analista y la Democracia en Riesgo: ¿Por Qué el Psicoanalista No Puede Ser Bolsonarista?

O objetivo deste trabalho é responder por que um psicanalista não pode ser bolsonarista. Para isso, partimos da articulação entre a noção de pós-verdade e verdade sob uma perspectiva psicanalítica. Por meio de uma revisão teórica, discorremos sobre tais perspectivas tendo como cenário o contexto brasileiro das últimas eleições presidenciais e da gestão da pandemia de COVID-19. Articulamos pós-verdade e verdade a uma terceira noção, a autoverdade, a partir da discussão sobre a importância que assume o discurso do psicanalista quando este se posiciona diante dos outros discursos propostos por Lacan, sobretudo em um contexto de risco à democracia. Concluímos que a partir da dimensão clínica, eixo central de sua prática, o psicanalista não pode ser bolsonarista porque, ao ocupar o lugar de a, não estabelece com o outro uma relação de manutenção de um gozo destrutivo, gozo que não leva em conta a responsabilidade subjetiva cujas incidências mais prementes se dão sobre a vivência da alteridade.

The objective of this work is to answer why a psychoanalyst cannot be a bolsonarista. For this, we start from the articulation between the notion of post-truth and the truth in a psychoanalytical perspective. Through a predominantly psychoanalytical theoretical review, we discuss such perspectives against the brazilian's last presidential elections and the management of the COVID-19 pandemic background. We intend to articulate the discussion about the importance that the psychoanalyst's discourse assumes when it takes a position in relation to other discourses, proposed by Lacan, especially in a democracy risk's context. We conclude that from the clinical practice, the central axis of his job, the psychoanalyst cannot be a bolsonarista because, by occupying the place of a, he does not establish with the other a relationship of maintenance of a destructive jouissance, jouissance that does not take into account the subjective responsibility whose most pressing incidences are on the experience of alterity.

El objetivo de este trabajo es responder por qué un psicoanalista no puede ser bolsonarista. Para ello, partimos de la articulación entre la noción de posverdad y la verdad en una perspectiva psicoanalítica. A través de una revisión teórica predominantemente psicoanalítica, discutimos tales perspectivas en el contexto brasileño de las últimas elecciones presidenciales y la gestión de la pandemia de COVID-19. Nosotros partimos de la discusión sobre la importancia que asume el discurso del psicoanalista cuando toma posición en relación a otros discursos, propuestos por Lacan, especialmente en un contexto de riesgo para la democracia. Concluimos que desde la dimensión clínica, eje central de su práctica, el psicoanalista no puede ser bolsonarista porque, al ocupar el lugar de a, no establece con el otro una relación de mantenimiento de un goce destructivo, goce que no tomar en cuenta la responsabilidad subjetiva cuyas incidencias más apremiantes son sobre la experiencia de la alteridad.

Lockdowns, Bioethics, and the Public: Policy-Making in a Liberal Democracy.

Commentaries on the ethics of Covid lockdowns nearly all focus on offering substantive guidance to policy-makers. Lockdowns, however, raise many ethical questions that admit of a range of reasonable answers. In such cases, policy-making in a liberal democracy ought to be sensitive to which reasonable views the public actually holds-a topic existing bioethical work on lockdowns has not explored in detail. In this essay, I identify several important questions connected to the kind of influence the public ought to have on lockdown decision-making, including how policy-makers ought to handle misinformed or morally suspect viewpoints, and how policy-makers ought to respond to minority viewpoints. I argue that questions like this, concerning the appropriate influence of the public on decision-making, will be central to the field of bioethics as it increasingly focuses on policy and population-level issues and therefore ought to be priorities for future work.