From preparedness to risk: from the singular risk of nuclear war to the plurality of all hazards.

Debates on risk have largely assumed risk to be the outcome of calculative practices. There is a related assumption that risk objects come only in one form, and that the reason not everything can be transformed into a risk is because of the difficulties in calculating and creating universal quantitative comparisons. In this article, building on recent studies of preparedness that have broadened understandings of risk, we provide an analysis of how preparedness measures might themselves produce risk, in particular through risk's durable instantiation, or what we call 'concretization'. Our empirical focus is on how government agencies in two countries shifted their attention from the risk of nuclear attack during the Cold War to an all hazards approach to preparedness. Comparing the mid- to late-twentieth century histories of the UK and Switzerland, we show that both countries shifted from focusing from a single risk to plural risks. This shift cannot be explained by a change in prevailing calculative practices, or by the fact that the risks changed historically. Instead, it is driven by historically specific changes in how risks are produced and reproduced in relation to how materializations of risk operate over time.

Healing a Sick World: Psychiatric Medicine and the Atomic Age.

The onset of nuclear warfare in Hiroshima and Nagasaki had far-reaching implications for the world of medicine. The study of the A-bomb and its implications led to the launching of new fields and avenues of research, most notably in genetics and radiation studies. Far less understood and under-studied was the impact of nuclear research on psychiatric medicine. Psychological research, however, was a major focus of post-war military and civilian research into the bomb. This research and the perceived revolutionary impact of atomic energy and warfare on society, this paper argues, played an important role in the global development of post-war psychiatry. Focusing on psychiatrists in North America, Japan and the United Nations, this paper examines the reaction of the profession to the nuclear age from the early post-war period to the mid 1960s. The way psychiatric medicine related to atomic issues, I argue, shifted significantly between the immediate post-war period and the 1960s. While the early post-war psychiatrists sought to help society deal with and adjust to the new nuclear reality, later psychiatrists moved towards a more radical position that sought to resist the establishment's efforts to normalise the bomb and nuclear energy. This shift had important consequences for research into the psychological trauma suffered by victims of nuclear warfare, which, ultimately, together with other research into the impact of war and systematic violence, led to our current understanding of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

Simulation-extrapolation method to address errors in atomic bomb survivor dosimetry on solid cancer and leukaemia mortality risk estimates, 1950-2003.

Analyses of the Life Span Study (LSS) of Japanese atomic bombing survivors have routinely incorporated corrections for additive classical measurement errors using regression calibration. Recently, several studies reported that the efficiency of the simulation-extrapolation method (SIMEX) is slightly more accurate than the simple regression calibration method (RCAL). In the present paper, the SIMEX and RCAL methods have been used to address errors in atomic bomb survivor dosimetry on solid cancer and leukaemia mortality risk estimates. For instance, it is shown that using the SIMEX method, the ERR/Gy is increased by an amount of about 29 % for all solid cancer deaths using a linear model compared to the RCAL method, and the corrected EAR 10(-4) person-years at 1 Gy (the linear terms) is decreased by about 8 %, while the corrected quadratic term (EAR 10(-4) person-years/Gy(2)) is increased by about 65 % for leukaemia deaths based on a linear-quadratic model. The results with SIMEX method are slightly higher than published values. The observed differences were probably due to the fact that with the RCAL method the dosimetric data were partially corrected, while all doses were considered with the SIMEX method. Therefore, one should be careful when comparing the estimated risks and it may be useful to use several correction techniques in order to obtain a range of corrected estimates, rather than to rely on a single technique. This work will enable to improve the risk estimates derived from LSS data, and help to make more reliable the development of radiation protection standards.

[The Chinese nuclear test and 'atoms for peace' as a measure for preventing nuclear armament of Japan: the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the United States and the introduction of light water reactors into Japan, 1964-1968].

Japan and the United States signed in 1968 a new atomic energy agreement through which US light-water nuclear reactors, including those of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant of Tokyo Electric Power Company, were to be introduced into Japan. This paper studies the history of negotiations for the 1968 agreement using documents declassified in the 1990s in the US and Japan. After the success of the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964, the United States became seriously concerned about nuclear armament of other countries in Asia including Japan. Expecting that Japan would not have its own nuclear weapons, the US offered to help the country to demonstrate its superiority in some fields of science including peaceful nuclear energy to counter the psychological effect of the Chinese nuclear armament. Driven by his own political agenda, the newly appointed Prime Minister Eisaku Sato responded to the US expectation favorably. When he met in January 1965 with President Johnson, Sato made it clear that Japan would not pursue nuclear weapons. Although the US continued its support after this visit, it nevertheless gave priority to the control of nuclear technology in Japan through the bilateral peaceful nuclear agreement. This paper argues that the 1968 agreement implicitly meant a strategic measure to prevent Japan from going nuclear and also a tactic to persuade Japan to join the Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty.

[Living with responsibility: Max Born and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker as philosophers with distance]. / Mit der Verantwortung leben: Max Born und Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker als Denker mit Distanz.

Both Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker und Max Born belong to the most active scientists, which have raised their voice for peace in the 1950s. While Born, senior to Weizsäcker by one generation, engaged in peace movements at an early stage, which was also due to his emigration, and was a driving force for the Einstein-Russell memorandum, Weizsäcker entered the stage essentially with the Göttingen declaration but quickly dominated the discourse. The comparison of their different engagements for peace sheds new light on Weizsäcker. Unlike the German emigrant with a British passport, who was mainly influenced by EInstein and Russell as well as some socialist thoughts he had encountered at an early age, the son of a noble diplomat and the physicist, who was saved from military duties because of his work in the German wartime nuclear project, had quite a different perspective on the postwar atomic threat. The relation of Born and Weizsäcker remained marked by a certain distance even when both took up very similar roles of 'public scientists' active for peace, be it as delegates at Pugwash conferences, on the air, or as speakers in the Frankfurt Paulskirche.

[Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker and the Society of German Scientists]. / Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker und die Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler.

The Federation of German Scientists (VDW) was founded in 1959 as West-German pendant of the Federation of American Scientists and as West-German group of the Pugwah Conferences. From the beginning, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker played a leading role in the VDW and pleaded for influencing politicians by scientifically and politically uncontestable studies, in the 1960s mainly of the effects of nuclear war and world food affairs. These studies were conducted by a research institute in Hamburg funded by external funds, industry and banks. It was the nucleus of the "Max Planck Institute for living conditions of the technical-industrial world" founded in Starnberg in 1969. Due to a "super inheritance", the research institute was continued in addition to the Starnberg institute. Young Marxist social scientists published several studies here which the executive board of the VDW disapproved of. Numerous prominent members left the VDW, donations decreased rapidly. In 1975, the research institute was closed down.

[Living without atomic power? Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker as expert in the nuclear energy debate of the 1970's]. / Ohne Atomkraft leben? Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker als Experte in der Kernenergiedebatte der 1970er Jahre.

Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker crossed the boundaries separating science, politics and the public sphere. In this he was led by the conviction that scientists in the modern 'technical age' are responsible for consequences resulting from their applied knowledge. Weizsäcker tried to introduce his knowledge into the policy process by advising politicians or by using the public sphere, thus applying pressure on politics. This was not only true for the 'Göttinger Erklärung' in 1957 but also for his engagement in the nuclear energy debate of the 1970s. Influenced by the 'Limits to Growth' discourse, Weizsäcker more and more gravitated towards an ecological world view and increasingly questioned material growth as well as a techno-scientific based understanding of progress. Weizsäcker thought about risks of the technical age in general and of the use of nuclear energy in particular. In the light of a growing fragmentation of scientific authority, Weizsäcker revealed uncertainty as he became fully aware that expertise cannot be based on scientific reason and cannot code the problems in terms of truth, but is inextricably linked with value spheres and contingencies. Nevertheless, his expertise was utilized as he encouraged parts of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) around Erhard Eppler to think about alternatives in energy policy.

[Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker: nuclear disarmament and the search for freedom]. / Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker: Nukleare Abrüstung und die Suche nach Frieden.

Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's comprehensive contributions to nuclear disarmament and arms control, as well as his peace policy impulses are to be understood primarily in the context of his family origin, his comprehensive thinking and the historical circumstances of the emerging nuclear age. They have a scientific, political and a strong philosophical-moral component. Beside the factual problems (nuclear energy, military strategy) he was interested in political power issues and their ambivalence and perception. His actual work is not only based on general academic knowledge, but also serve the immediate political influence on a scientific basis. Weizsäcker was not committed to nuclear disarmament or arms control per se, but about creating a lasting peace policy in the nuclear age. The paper discusses in chronological order of Weizsäcker's work within the policy field peace and disarmament. Family origin, study and work on the nuclear programme by Nazi-Germany laid the foundations for his later career. As a young physicist, he was directly involved in the political and ethical dilemma of the military and civilian use of nuclear energy. After the war, in Göttingen and Hamburg the reflections of the Nazi phase and the discussion of ways out of the dangers of the Cold War followed. The Max-Planck Institute in Starnberg dealt with the science-based treatment of global world problems, including the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Finally, Weizsäcker initiated a Peace Council in 1985. He urged both the perception of the moral responsibility of scientists as well as an ethics of the scientific-technological age. According to him, a general and profound change in the consciousness of humankind is needed to solve the existing power problems and the problem of war.

Individual testimonies of nursing care after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki in 1945.

PURPOSE: To describe the situation with respect to nursing care conducted immediately before and after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki in 1945. METHODS: Nurses who were registered nursing staff in Nagasaki at the time of the bombing volunteered to participate in this research. Individual interviews were conducted to obtain information concerning the nursing activities in affected areas. The collected information was compared with official documents regarding the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and findings of current studies of disaster situation nursing. RESULT: Five participants indicated that starting on the day of the bombing, nursing care activities changed from moment to moment according to the condition of radiation victims, the condition of affected areas, and the relief systems in place. Under these conditions, nurses attempted to provide nursing care to victims of the bombing through any means possible. CONCLUSION: The participants in the present study communicated a single message: that nursing care must be flexible in critical situations. Triage and cooperation with other types of medical professionals were also identified as important factors in nursing care.