Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program; Accountable Care Organizations--Pathways to Success and Extreme and Uncontrollable Circumstances Policies for Performance Year 2017. Final rules.

Under the Medicare Shared Savings Program (Shared Savings Program), providers of services and suppliers that participate in an Accountable Care Organization (ACO) continue to receive traditional Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) payments under Parts A and B, but the ACO may be eligible to receive a shared savings payment if it meets specified quality and savings requirements. The policies included in this final rule provide a new direction for the Shared Savings Program by establishing pathways to success through redesigning the participation options available under the program to encourage ACOs to transition to two-sided models (in which they may share in savings and are accountable for repaying shared losses). These policies are designed to increase savings for the Trust Funds and mitigate losses, reduce gaming opportunities, and promote regulatory flexibility and free-market principles. This final rule also provides new tools to support coordination of care across settings and strengthen beneficiary engagement; and ensure rigorous benchmarking. In this final rule, we also respond to public comments we received on the extreme and uncontrollable circumstances policies for the Shared Savings Program that were used to assess the quality and financial performance of ACOs that were subject to extreme and uncontrollable events, such as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and the California wildfires, in performance year 2017, including the applicable quality data reporting period for performance year 2017.

Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Extreme and Uncontrollable Circumstances Policies for Performance Year 2017. Interim final rule with comment period.

This interim final rule with comment period establishes policies for assessing the financial and quality performance of Medicare Shared Savings Program (Shared Savings Program) Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) affected by extreme and uncontrollable circumstances during performance year 2017, including the applicable quality reporting period for the performance year. Under the Shared Savings Program, providers of services and suppliers that participate in ACOs continue to receive traditional Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) payments under Parts A and B, but the ACO may be eligible to receive a shared savings payment if it meets specified quality and savings requirements. ACOs in performance-based risk agreements may also share in losses. This interim final rule with comment period establishes extreme and uncontrollable circumstances policies for the Shared Savings Program that will apply to ACOs subject to extreme and uncontrollable events, such as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and the California wildfires, effective for performance year 2017, including the applicable quality data reporting period for the performance year.

Antitrust and Accountable Care Organizations: Observations for the Physician Market.

The creation of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) under the Medicare Shared Savings Program has generated antitrust concerns. Utilizing a framework developed by the antitrust authorities for analyzing provider concentration for potential ACO participants, we examine the market for physician services, with a focus on the share of practices that could potentially be subject to antitrust scrutiny. Our findings suggest that while most physician practices would fall below the threshold that could raise anticompetitive concerns, this varies considerably by market and specialty. Furthermore, we find that the largest physician practice in most markets potentially remains at risk for antitrust review under the existing criteria.

Advanced Alternative Payment Models Part II: Understanding the Next Generation Accountable Care Organization Model.

With CMS establishing preliminary definitions for fully qualifying Advanced Alternative Payment Models (APMs) in May of 2016, it has become crucial to many care providers accepting Medicare and Medicaid payments to understand the nature of these entities if they wish to eventually participate in one of the current or future payment models. Changes under the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 specifically identify subsets of APMs that allow providers to avoid possible negative adjustments for poor relative performance compared with their respective peer groups through the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System beginning in 2017. This article reviews the nature of one of the fully qualifying Advanced APMs, the Next Generation Accountable Care Organization (ACO) Model, and its risk-benefit sharing principles based on prior experience with the Medicare Shared Savings Program and other previous ACO models. This model represents a more sophisticated option for organizations with significant ACO experience seeking an Advanced APM for the 2018 reporting reriod and beyond.

Count on this no matter who wins the election.

The Accountable Care Organization demonstrations around the country have shown that some, but not all, health care organizations are able to bend the steep cost incline downward using incentives, bundled payments, excellent primary care access, and care coordination.

No Pipe Dream: Achieving Care That Is Accountable for Cost, Quality, and Outcomes.

The April 2015 passage of the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act is accelerating the move of the US health care industry from traditional fee-for-service provider payments to alternative payment methods that are focused on value rather than volume of services. Medicaid, private employers, and consumer groups are also developing similar payment models. Learning from the experience of the 27 early accountable care organizations in North Carolina, such as Cornerstone Health Care, will help to accelerate the transformation that will be necessary across the health care delivery ecosystem in our state.

Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program; Accountable Care Organizations--Revised Benchmark Rebasing Methodology, Facilitating Transition to Performance-Based Risk, and Administrative Finality of Financial Calculations. Final rule.

Under the Medicare Shared Savings Program (Shared Savings Program), providers of services and suppliers that participate in an Accountable Care Organization (ACO) continue to receive traditional Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) payments under Parts A and B, but the ACO may be eligible to receive a shared savings payment if it meets specified quality and savings requirements. This final rule addresses changes to the Shared Savings Program, including: Modifications to the program's benchmarking methodology, when resetting (rebasing) the ACO's benchmark for a second or subsequent agreement period, to encourage ACOs' continued investment in care coordination and quality improvement; an alternative participation option to encourage ACOs to enter performance-based risk arrangements earlier in their participation under the program; and policies for reopening of payment determinations to make corrections after financial calculations have been performed and ACO shared savings and shared losses for a performance year have been determined.

After the "Doc Fix": Implications of Medicare Physician Payment Reform for Academic Medicine.

The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) introduces incentives for clinicians serving Medicare patients to move away from traditional "fee-for-service" and into alternative payment models (APMs) such as accountable care organizations and bundled payment arrangements. Thus, MACRA creates strong reasons for various teaching clinical services to participate in APMs, not only for Medicare patients but for other public and private payers as well. Unfortunately, different APMs may be more or less applicable to the diverse teaching physician roles, academic clinical programs, and patient populations served by medical schools and teaching hospitals. Therefore, this time of transition will complicate the work of academic clinical program leaders endeavoring to sustain the tripartite mission of patient care, health professional education, and research. Nonetheless, payment reforms promoted by MACRA can reward efforts to reinvent medical education to better incorporate value into medical decision making, as well as to give clinical learners the tools and insights needed to recognize their personal financial (and other) conflicts and navigate these to meet their patients' needs. This post-MACRA environment may intensify the need for researchers in academic medicine to stay independent of the short-term financial interests of affiliated clinical institutions. Health sciences scholars must be able to study effectively and speak forcefully regarding the actual benefits, risks, and costs of health care services so that educators and clinicians can identify high-value care and deliver it to their patients.

A return to the dark days of unaccountable care?

The ACA forced the kind of accountability that had been mostly talk, with little action, for the better part of two decades. It set standards for the development of quality measures and, through more than a dozen programs, tied Medicare payments to performance on those measures and others related to readmission rates, safety standards, and patient satisfaction. What happens if it goes?

A soft opening seems in store.

Despite its complexity and swarm of new acronyms, MACRA seems like a habitable dry land in comparison to the turbulent waters of the rest of health care-predictable, supported by both parties, and adjusted in the final rule so its effect on providers in 2017 will be milder than feared.

Encouraging Competition and Cooperation: The Affordable Care Act's Contradiction?

This introductory essay to JHPPL's special issue on accountable care organizations (ACOs) presents the broader themes addressed in the issue, including (1) a central tension between cooperation versus competition in health care markets with regard to how to bring about improved quality, lower costs, and better access; (2) US regulatory policy - whether it will be able to achieve the appropriate balance in health care markets under which ACOs could realize expected outcomes; and (3) ACO realities - whether ACOs will be able to overcome or further embed existing inequities in US health care markets.

Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection With the Shared Savings Program. Final rule.

This final rule finalizes waivers of the application of the physician self-referral law, the Federal anti-kickback statute, and the civil monetary penalties (CMP) law provision relating to beneficiary inducements to specified arrangements involving accountable care organizations (ACOs) under section 1899 of the Social Security Act (the Act) (the "Shared Savings Program''), as set forth in the Interim Final Rule with comment period (IFC) dated November 2, 2011. As explained in greater detail below, in light of legislative changes that occurred after publication of the IFC, this final rule does not finalize waivers of the application of the CMP law provision relating to "gainsharing'' arrangements. Section 1899(f) of the Act, as added by the Affordable Care Act, authorizes the Secretary to waive certain fraud and abuse laws as necessary to carry out the provisions of section 1899 of the Act.