Impact of Fee For Service on the Efficiency and Survival of Seguro Popular's Patients With Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia in Mexico.

PURPOSE: Cost containment and efficiency in the provision of health care are primary concerns for health systems that aim to provide affordable, high-quality care. Between 2005 and 2015, Seguro Poplar's Fund against Catastrophic Expenditures (FPGC) funded ALL treatment in Mexico. Before January 1, 2011, FPGC reimbursed a fixed amount per patient according to risk. In 2011, the per capita reimbursement method changed to fee for service. We used this natural experiment to estimate the impact of the reimbursement policy change on average expenditure and quality of care for ALL treatment in Mexico. METHODS: We used nationwide reimbursement data from the Seguro Poplar's FPGC from 2005 to 2015. We created a patient cohort to assess 3-year survival and estimate the average reimbursement before and after the fee-for-service policy. We examined survival and expenditure impacts, controlling for patients' and providers' characteristics, including sex, risk (standard and high), the volume of patients served, type of institution (federally funded v other), and level of care. To quantify the impact, we used a regression discontinuity approach. RESULTS: The average reimbursement for standard-risk patients in the 3-year survival cohort was $16,512 US dollars (USD; 95% CI, 16,042 to 17,032) before 2011 and $10,205 USD (95% CI, 4,659 to 12,541) under the fee-for-service reimbursement scheme after 2011. The average annual reimbursement per patient decreased by 136% among high-risk patients. The reduction was also significant for the standard-risk cohort, although the magnitude was substantially smaller (34%). CONCLUSION: As Mexico's government is currently restructuring the health system, our study provides evidence of the efficiency and effectiveness of the funding mechanism in the Mexican context. It also serves as a proof of concept for using administrative data to evaluate economic performance and quality of care of publicly funded health programs.

How medical insurance payment systems affect the physicians' provision behavior in China-based on experimental economics.

Background: It introduced an artefactual field experiment to analyze the influence of incentives from fee-for-service (FFS) and diagnosis-intervention package (DIP) payments on physicians' provision of medical services. Methods: This study recruited 32 physicians from a national pilot city in China and utilized an artefactual field experiment to examine medical services provided to patients with different health status. Results: In general, the average quantities of medical services provided by physicians under the FFS payment were higher than the optimal quantities, the difference was statistically significant. While the average quantities of medical services provided by physicians under the DIP payment were very close to the optimal quantities, the difference was not statistically significant. Physicians provided 24.49, 14.31 and 5.68% more medical services to patients with good, moderate and bad health status under the FFS payment than under the DIP payment. Patients with good, moderate and bad health status experienced corresponding losses of 5.70, 8.10 and 9.42% in benefits respectively under the DIP payment, the corresponding reductions in profits for physicians were 10.85, 20.85 and 35.51%. Conclusion: It found patients are overserved under the FFS payment, but patients in bad health status can receive more adequate treatment. Physicians' provision behavior can be regulated to a certain extent under the DIP payment and the DIP payment is suitable for the treatment of patients in relatively good health status. Doctors sometimes have violations under DIP payment, such as inadequate service and so on. Therefore, it is necessary to innovate the supervision of physicians' provision behavior under the DIP payment. It showed both medical insurance payment systems and patients with difference health status can influence physicians' provision behavior.

Medicare in the 21 st Century: Understanding the Program to Promote Improvements.

Medicare is the largest single purchaser of health care in the United States and currently helps to pay medical expenses for approximately one-fifth of the US population. The impetus for Medicare to move away from fee-for-service and toward value-based care payments reflects the need to incentivize and improve healthcare quality while containing increasing costs. This primer provides a detailed overview of several interrelated topics for an improved understanding of the Medicare program for orthopaedic surgeons, other clinicians, healthcare administrators, policymakers, and business leaders. An improved understanding may stimulate additional ideas for successful program advancements.

Early Experiences With Bundled Payments for Care Improvement for Major Bowel Surgery.

BACKGROUND: Bundled Payment (BP) models are becoming more common in surgery. We share our early experiences with Bundled Payments for Care Improvement for major bowel surgery. METHODS: Patients undergoing major bowel surgery between January and October 2021 were identified using Medicare Severity-Diagnosis Related Group (MS-DRG) codes. Major drivers of cost in a BP model are reported and compared to the Fee-For-Service (FFS) payment model. RESULTS: A total of 202 cases (173 FFS vs 29 BP) were analyzed. The mean BP cost per Clinical Episode was $28,340. Eleven patients (38%) in the BP model had costs greater than the Target Price. The drivers of cost in the BP model were 59% acute care facility, 17% physician services, 9% post-acute care facilities, 8% other, and 7% readmissions. Clinical Episode of care costs varied considerably by MS-DRG case complexity. Robotic surgery increased costs by 35% (mean increase $3724, P < .01). The 90-day readmission rate was 17% for a mean cost of $11,332 per readmission. Three patients (10%) were discharged to a skilled nursing facility at an average cost of $11,009, while fifteen patients (52%) received home health services at a mean cost of $2947. Acute care facility costs were similar in the BP vs FFS groups (mean difference $1333, P = .22). CONCLUSIONS: Patients undergoing major bowel surgery are a heterogeneous population. Physicians are ideally positioned to deliver high-value, patient-centered care and are crucial to the success of a BP model. The post-acute care setting is a key component of improving efficiency and quality of care.

Effects of the Million Hearts Model on Myocardial Infarctions, Strokes, and Medicare Spending: A Randomized Clinical Trial.

Importance: The Million Hearts Model paid health care organizations to assess and reduce cardiovascular disease (CVD) risk. Model effects on long-term outcomes are unknown. Objective: To estimate model effects on first-time myocardial infarctions (MIs) and strokes and Medicare spending over a period up to 5 years. Design, Setting, and Participants: This pragmatic cluster-randomized trial ran from 2017 to 2021, with organizations assigned to a model intervention group or standard care control group. Randomized organizations included 516 US-based primary care and specialty practices, health centers, and hospital-based outpatient clinics participating voluntarily. Of these organizations, 342 entered patients into the study population, which included Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries aged 40 to 79 years with no previous MI or stroke and with high or medium CVD risk (a 10-year predicted probability of MI or stroke [ie, CVD risk score] ≥15%) in 2017-2018. Intervention: Organizations agreed to perform guideline-concordant care, including routine CVD risk assessment and cardiovascular care management for high-risk patients. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services paid organizations to calculate CVD risk scores for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. CMS further rewarded organizations for reducing risk among high-risk beneficiaries (CVD risk score ≥30%). Main Outcomes and Measures: Outcomes included first-time CVD events (MIs, strokes, and transient ischemic attacks) identified in Medicare claims, combined first-time CVD events from claims and CVD deaths (coronary heart disease or cerebrovascular disease deaths) identified using the National Death Index, and Medicare Parts A and B spending for CVD events and overall. Outcomes were measured through 2021. Results: High- and medium-risk model intervention beneficiaries (n = 130 578) and standard care control beneficiaries (n = 88 286) were similar in age (median age, 72-73 y), sex (58%-59% men), race (7%-8% Black), and baseline CVD risk score (median, 24%). The probability of a first-time CVD event within 5 years was 0.3 percentage points lower for intervention beneficiaries than control beneficiaries (3.3% relative effect; adjusted hazard ratio [HR], 0.97 [90% CI, 0.93-1.00]; P = .09). The 5-year probability of combined first-time CVD events and CVD deaths was 0.4 percentage points lower in the intervention group (4.2% relative effect; HR, 0.96 [90% CI, 0.93-0.99]; P = .02). Medicare spending for CVD events was similar between the groups (effect estimate, -$1.83 per beneficiary per month [90% CI, -$3.97 to -$0.30]; P = .16), as was overall Medicare spending including model payments (effect estimate, $2.11 per beneficiary per month [90% CI, -$16.66 to $20.89]; P = .85). Conclusions and Relevance: The Million Hearts Model, which encouraged and paid for CVD risk assessment and reduction, reduced first-time MIs and strokes. Results support guidelines to use risk scores for CVD primary prevention. Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT04047147.

Prescription Drug Spending in Fee-for-Service Medicare, 2008-2019.

Importance: Prescription drug spending is a topic of increased interest to the public and policymakers. However, prior assessments have been limited by focusing on retail spending (Part D-covered drugs), omitting clinician-administered (Part B-covered) drug spending, or focusing on all fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries, regardless of their enrollment into prescription drug coverage. Objective: To estimate the proportion of health care spending contributed by prescription drugs and to assess spending for retail and clinician-administered prescriptions. Design, Setting, and Participants: Descriptive, serial, cross-sectional analysis of a 20% random sample of fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries in the United States from 2008 to 2019 who were continuously enrolled in Parts A (hospital), B (medical), and D (prescription drug) benefits, and not in Medicare Advantage. Exposure: Calendar year. Main Outcomes and Measures: Net spending on retail (Part D-covered) and clinician-administered (Part B-covered) prescription drugs; prescription drug spending (spending on Part B-covered and Part D-covered drugs) as a percentage of total per-capita health care spending. Measures were adjusted for inflation and for postsale rebates (for Part D-covered drugs). Results: There were 3 201 284 beneficiaries enrolled in Parts A, B, and D in 2008 and 4 502 718 in 2019. In 2019, beneficiaries had a mean (SD) age of 71.7 (12.0) years, documented sex was female for 57.7%, and 69.5% had no low-income subsidies. Total per-capita spending was $16 345 in 2008 and $20 117 in 2019. Comparing 2008 with 2019, per-capita Part A spending was $7106 (95% CI, $7084-$7128) vs $7120 (95% CI, $7098-$7141), Part B drug spending was $720 (95% CI, $713-$728) vs $1641 (95% CI, $1629-$1653), Part B nondrug spending was $5113 (95% CI, $5105-$5122) vs $6702 (95% CI, $6692-$6712), and Part D net spending was $3122 (95% CI, $3117-$3127) vs $3477 (95% CI, $3466-$3489). The proportion of total annual spending attributed to prescription drugs increased from 24.0% in 2008 to 27.2% in 2019, net of estimated rebates and discounts. Conclusions and Relevance: In 2019, spending on prescription drugs represented approximately 27% of total spending among fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Part D, even after accounting for postsale rebates.

AMCP Pay-for-Performance Principles: Performance-Based Reimbursement and Direct and Indirect Remuneration (DIR) Fees.

DISCLOSURE: At the direction of its Board of Directors, the AMCP Public Policy and Professional Practice committees developed these principles for pay-for-performance to promote the use of these arrangements that lead to improved patient outcomes. This document was first released on the AMCP website on December 14, 2021.

Alternative Payment Models and Associations With Stroke Outcomes, Spending, and Service Utilization: A Systematic Review.

Stroke contributes an estimated $28 billion to US health care costs annually, and alternative payment models aim to improve outcomes and lower spending over fee-for-service by aligning economic incentives with high value care. This systematic review evaluates historical and current evidence regarding the impacts of alternative payment models on stroke outcomes, spending, and utilization. Included studies evaluated alternative payment models in 4 categories: pay-for-performance (n=3), prospective payments (n=14), shared savings (n=5), and capitated payments (n=14). Pay-for-performance models were not consistently associated with improvements in clinical quality indicators of stroke prevention. Studies of prospective payments suggested that poststroke spending was shifted between care settings without consistent reductions in total spending. Shared savings programs, such as US Medicare accountable care organizations and bundled payments, were generally associated with null or decreased spending and service utilization and with no differences in clinical outcomes following stroke hospitalizations. Capitated payment models were associated with inconsistent effects on poststroke spending and utilization and some worsened clinical outcomes. Shared savings models that incentivize coordination of care across care settings show potential for lowering spending with no evidence for worsened clinical outcomes; however, few studies evaluated clinical or patient-reported outcomes, and the evidence, largely US-based, may not generalize to other settings.

Patient selection in the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement model.

OBJECTIVE: To understand whether the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) program induces participating hospitals to (1) preferentially select lower risk patients, (2) reduce 90-day episode-of-care costs, (3) improve quality of care, and (4) achieve greater cost reduction during its second year, when downside financial risk was applied. DATA SOURCES: We identified beneficiaries of age 65 years or older undergoing hip or knee joint replacement in the 100% sample of Medicare fee-for-service inpatient (Part A) claims from January 1, 2013 to August 31, 2017. Cases were linked to subsequent outpatient, Part B, home health agency, and skilled nursing facility claims, as well as publicly available participation status for CJR. STUDY DESIGN: We estimated the effect of CJR for hospitals in the 67 metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) selected to participate in CJR (785 hospitals), compared to those in 104 non-CJR MSAs (962 hospitals; maintaining fee-for-service). A difference-in-differences approach was used to detect patient selection, as well as to compare 90-day episode-of-care costs and quality of care between CJR and non-CJR hospitals over the first two performance years. DATA COLLECTION: We excluded 172 hospitals from our analysis due to their preexisting BPCI participation. We focused on elective admissions in the main analysis. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: While reductions in 90-day episode-of-care costs were greater among CJR hospitals (-$902, 95% CI: -$1305, -$499), largely driven by a 16.8% (p < 0.01) decline in 90-day spending in skilled nursing facilities, CJR hospitals significantly reduced the 90-day readmission rate (-3.9%; p < 0.05) and preferentially avoided patients aged 85 years or older (-5.9%; p < 0.01) and Black (-7.0%; p < 0.01). Cost reduction was greater in 2017 than in 2016, corresponding to the start of downside risk. CONCLUSIONS: Participation in CJR was associated with a modest cost reduction and a reduction in 90-day readmission rates; however, we also observed evidence of preferential avoidance of older patients perceived as being higher risk among CJR hospitals.

How Did Orthopaedic Surgeons Perform in the 2018 Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System?

BACKGROUND: The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is the latest value-based payment program implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. As performance-based bonuses and penalties continue to rise in magnitude, it is essential to evaluate this program's ability to achieve its core objectives of quality improvement, cost reduction, and competition around clinically meaningful outcomes. QUESTIONS/PURPOSES: We asked the following: (1) How do orthopaedic surgeons differ on the MIPS compared with surgeons in other specialties, both in terms of the MIPS scores and bonuses that derive from them? (2) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving penalties based on the MIPS? (3) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving a perfect score of 100 based on the MIPS? METHODS: Scores from the 2018 MIPS reporting period were linked to physician demographic and practice-based information using the Medicare Part B Provider Utilization and Payment File, the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System Data (NPPES), and National Physician Compare Database. For all orthopaedic surgeons identified within the Physician Compare Database, there were 15,210 MIPS scores identified, representing a 72% (15,210 of 21,124) participation rate in the 2018 MIPS. Those participating in the MIPS receive a final score (0 to 100, with 100 being a perfect score) based on a weighted calculation of performance metrics across four domains: quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and costs. In 2018, orthopaedic surgeons had an overall mean ± SD score of 87 ± 21. From these scores, payment adjustments are determined in the following manner: scores less than 15 received a maximum penalty adjustment of -5% ("penalty"), scores equal to 15 did not receive an adjustment ("neutral"), scores between 15 and 70 received a positive adjustment ("positive"), and scores above 70 (maximum 100) received both a positive adjustment and an additional exceptional performance adjustment with a maximum adjustment of +5% ("bonus"). Adjustments among orthopaedic surgeons were compared across various demographic and practice characteristics. Both the mean MIPS score and the resulting payment adjustments were compared with a group of surgeons in other subspecialties. Finally, multivariable logistic regression models were generated to identify which variables were associated with increased odds of receiving a penalty as well as a perfect score of 100. RESULTS: Compared with surgeons in other specialties, orthopaedic surgeons' mean MIPS score was 4.8 (95% CI 4.3 to 5.2; p < 0.001) points lower. From this difference, a lower proportion of orthopaedic surgeons received bonuses (-5.0% [95% CI -5.6 to -4.3]; p < 0.001), and a greater proportion received penalties (+0.5% [95% CI 0.2 to 0.8]; p < 0.001) and positive adjustments (+4.6% [95% CI 6.1 to 10.7]; p < 0.001) compared with surgeons in other specialties. After controlling for potentially confounding variables such as gender, years in practice, and practice setting, small (1 to 49 members) group size (adjusted odds ratio 22.2 [95% CI 8.17 to 60.3]; p < 0.001) and higher Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) scores (aOR 2.32 [95% CI 1.35 to 4.01]; p = 0.002) were associated with increased odds of a penalty. Also, after controlling for potential confounding, we found that reporting through an alternative payment model (aOR 28.7 [95% CI 24.0 to 34.3]; p < 0.001) was associated with increased odds of a perfect score, whereas small practice size (1 to 49 members) (aOR 0.35 [95% CI 0.31 to 0.39]; p < 0.001), a high patient volume (greater than 500 Medicare patients) (aOR 0.82 [95% CI 0.70 to 0.95]; p = 0.01), and higher HCC score (aOR 0.79 [95% Cl 0.66 to 0.93]; p = 0.006) were associated with decreased odds of a perfect MIPS score. CONCLUSION: Collectively, orthopaedic surgeons performed well in the second year of the MIPS, with 87% earning bonus payments. Among participating orthopaedic surgeons, individual reporting affiliation, small practice size, and more medically complex patient populations were associated with higher odds of receiving penalties and lower odds of earning a perfect score. Based on these findings, we recommend that individuals and orthopaedic surgeons in small group practices strive to forge partnerships with larger hospital practices with adequate ancillary staff to support quality reporting initiatives. Such partnerships may help relieve surgeons of growing administrative obligations and allow for maintained focus on direct patient care activities. Policymakers should aim to produce a shortened panel of performance measures to ensure more standardized comparison and less time and energy diverted from established clinical workflows. The current MIPS scoring methodology should also be amended with a complexity modifier to ensure fair evaluation of surgeons practicing in the safety net setting, or those treating patients with a high comorbidity burden. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level III, therapeutic study.

Reimbursement for Female-Specific Compared With Male-Specific Procedures Over Time.

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate whether per-procedure work relative value units (RVUs) have changed over time and to compare time-based compensation for female-specific procedures compared with male-specific procedures. METHODS: Using the National Surgical Quality Improvement Program files for 2015-2018, we compared operative time and RVUs for 12 pairs of sex-specific procedures. Procedures were matched to be anatomically and technically similar. Procedure-assigned RVUs in 2015 were compared with 1997. Procedure compensation was determined using median dollars per RVU provided in SullivanCotter's 2018 Physician Compensation and Productivity Survey. This was compared with specialty-specific McGraw-Hill per-RVU data from 1994. Statistical analysis was performed with chi-square and Kruskal-Wallis tests. RESULTS: A total of 12,120 patients underwent 6,217 male-specific procedures and 5,903 female-specific procedures. Male-specific procedures had a median (interquartile range) RVU of 25.2 (21.4-25.2), compared with 7.5 (7.5-23.4) for female-specific procedures (P<.001). Male-specific procedures were 79 minutes longer (median [interquartile range] 136 minutes [98-186] vs 57 minutes [25-125], P<.001). Female-specific procedures were reimbursed at a higher hourly rate (10.6 RVU/hour [7.2-16.2] vs 9.7 RVU/hour [7.4-12.8], P<.001). However, male-specific procedures were better reimbursed ($599/h [$457-790] vs $555/h [$377-843], P<.001). Overall, per-procedure RVUs for male-specific surgeries have increased 13%, whereas, for female-specific surgeries, per-procedure RVUs have increased 26%. Reimbursement per RVU for male-specific procedures has decreased 8% ($67.30 to $61.65), whereas for female-specific procedures it has increased 14% ($44.50 to $52.02). CONCLUSION: Increases in RVUs and specialty-specific compensation have resulted in more equitable reimbursement for female-specific procedures. However, even with these changes, there is a lower relative value of work, driven by specialty-specific compensation rates, for procedures performed for women-only compared with equivalent men-only procedures.

[Episode-based bundled payment model: evaluation of medical costs for early operable breast cancer]. / Financement à l'épisode de soins : évaluation du coût d'une chirurgie première pour cancer du sein précoce.

INTRODUCTION: Episode-based bundled payment model is actually opposing to fee-for-service model, intending to incentivize coordinated care. The aims of these study were to determine episode-based costs for surgery in early breast cancer patients and to propose a payment model. METHODS: OPTISOINS01 was a multicenter prospective study including early breast cancer patients from diagnosis to one-year follow up. Direct medical costs, quality and patient reported outcomes were collected. RESULTS: Data from 604 patients were analyzed. Episode-based costs for surgery were higher in case of: planned radical surgery (OR=9,47 ; IC95 % [3,49-28,01]; P<0,001), hospitalization during more than one night (OR=6,73; IC95% [2,59-17,46]; P<0,001), home hospitalization (OR=11,07 ; IC95 % [3,01-173][3,01-54][3,01-543][3,01-54,33]; P<0,001) and re-hospitalization (OR=25,71 ; IC95 % [9,24-89,17; P<0,001). The average cost was 5 268 € [2 947-18 461] when a lumpectomy was planned and 7408 € [4 222-22 565] in case of radical mastectomy. Bootstrap method was applied for internal validation of the cost model showing the reliability of the model with an area under the curve of 0,83 (95 % CI [0,80-0,86]). Care quality and patient reported outcomes were not related to the costs. DISCUSSION: This is the first report of episode-based costs for breast cancer surgery. An external validation will be necessary to validate our payment model.

Gender-based differences in physician payments within the fee-for-service system in Ontario: a retrospective, cross-sectional study.

BACKGROUND: Differences in physician income by gender have been described in numerous jurisdictions, but few studies have looked at a Canadian cohort with adjustment for confounders. In this study, we aimed to understand differences in fee-for-service payments to men and women physicians in Ontario. METHODS: We conducted a cross-sectional analysis of all Ontario physicians who submitted claims to the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) in 2017. For each physician, we gathered demographic information from the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario registry. We compared differences in physician claims between men and women in the entire cohort and within each specialty using multivariable linear regressions, controlling for length of practice, specialty and practice location. RESULTS: We identified a cohort of 30 167 physicians who submitted claims to OHIP in 2017, including 17 992 men and 12 175 women. When controlling for confounding variables in a linear mixed-effects regression model, annual physician claims were $93 930 (95% confidence interval $88 434 to $99 431) higher for men than for women. Women claimed 74% as much as men when adjusting for covariates. This discrepancy was present in nearly all specialty categories. Men claimed more than women throughout their careers, with the greatest gap 10-15 years into practice. INTERPRETATION: We found a gender gap in fee-for-service claims in Ontario, with women claiming less than men overall and in nearly every specialty. Further work is required to understand the root causes of the gender pay gap.

Sepsis Among Medicare Beneficiaries: 4. Precoronavirus Disease 2019 Update January 2012-February 2020.

OBJECTIVES: To provide updated information on the burdens of sepsis during acute inpatient admissions for Medicare beneficiaries. DESIGN: Analysis of paid Medicare claims via the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services DataLink Project. SETTING: All U.S. acute-care hospitals, excluding federally operated hospitals (Veterans Administration and Defense Health Agency). PATIENTS: All Medicare beneficiaries, January 2012-February 2020, with an explicit sepsis diagnostic code assigned during an inpatient admission. INTERVENTIONS: None. MEASUREMENTS AND MAIN RESULTS: The count of Medicare Part A/B (fee-for-service) plus Medicare Advantage inpatient sepsis admissions rose from 981,027 (CY2012) to 1,700,433 (CY 2019). The proportion of total admissions with sepsis in the Medicare Advantage population rose from 21.43% to 35.39%, reflecting the increasing beneficiary proportion enrolled in Medicare Advantage. In CY2019, 6-month mortality rates in Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries for sepsis continued to decline, but remained high: 59.9% for septic shock, 35.5% for severe sepsis, 30.8% for sepsis attributed to a specific organism, and 26.5% for unspecified sepsis. Total fee-for-service-only inpatient hospital costs rose from $17.79B (CY2012) to $22.98B (CY2019). We estimated that the aggregate cost of sepsis hospital care for the entire U.S. population was at least $57.47B in 2019. Inclusion of 14 months' (January 2019-February 2020) newer data exposed new trends: the cost per patient, number of admissions, and fraction of patients with sepsis labeled as present on admission inflected around November 2015, coincident with the change to International Classification of Diseases, 10th Edition, and introduction of the Severe Sepsis and Septic Shock Management Bundle (SEP-1) metric. CONCLUSIONS: Sepsis among Medicare beneficiaries precoronavirus disease 2019 imposed immense burdens upon patients, their families, and the taxpayers.

Carving Out Financial Success: The Power of Insurance Carve-Outs in a Private Plastic Surgery Practice.

BACKGROUND: Since the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was signed into law, there has been a push away from fee-for-service payment models. The rise of bundled payments has drastically impacted plastic surgeons' incomes, especially nonsalaried surgeons in private practice. As a result, physicians must now attempt to optimize contractual reimbursement agreements (carve-outs) with insurance providers. The aim of this article is to explain the economics behind negotiating carve-outs and to offer a how-to guide for plastic surgeons to use in such negotiations. METHODS: Based on work relative value units, Medicare reimbursement, overhead expenses, physician workload, and desired income, the authors present an approach that allows surgeons to evaluate the reimbursement they receive for various procedures. The authors then review factors that influence whether a carve-out can be pursued. Finally, the authors consider relevant nuances of negotiating with insurance companies. RESULTS: Using tissue expander insertion (CPT 19357) as an example, the authors review the mathematics, thought process required, and necessary steps in determining whether a carve-out should be pursued. Strategies for negotiation with insurance companies were identified. The presented approach can be used to potentially negotiate a carve-out for any reconstructive procedure that meets appropriate financial criteria. CONCLUSIONS: Understanding practice costs will allow plastic surgeons to evaluate the true value of insurance reimbursements and determine whether a carve-out is worth pursuing. Plastic surgeons must be prepared to negotiate adequate reimbursement carve-outs whenever possible. Ultimately, by aligning the best quality patient care with insurance companies' financial motivations, plastic surgeons have the opportunity to improve reimbursement for some reconstructive procedures.