Parity is Not Enough! Mental Health, Managed Care, and Medicaid.

This commentary describes limitations of mental health parity requirements in ensuring access to insurance coverage for mental health treatment and surveys regulatory options employed by states in Medicaid managed care programs as supplements to parity that can further reduce the risk of inappropriate denials of coverage.

The Economic Burden of Out-of-Pocket Expenses for Plastic Surgery Procedures.

BACKGROUND: Health insurance reimbursement structure has evolved, with patients becoming increasingly responsible for their health care costs through rising out-of-pocket expenses. High levels of cost sharing can lead to delays in access to care, influence treatment decisions, and cause financial distress for patients. METHODS: Patients undergoing the most common outpatient reconstructive plastic surgery operations were identified using Truven MarketScan databases from 2009 to 2017. Total cost of the surgery paid to the insurer and out-of-pocket expenses, including deductible, copayment, and coinsurance, were calculated. Multivariable generalized linear modeling with log link and gamma distribution was used to predict adjusted total and out-of-pocket expenses. All costs were inflation-adjusted to 2017 dollars. RESULTS: The authors evaluated 3,165,913 outpatient plastic and reconstructive surgical procedures between 2009 and 2017. From 2009 to 2017, total costs had a significant increase of 25 percent, and out-of-pocket expenses had a significant increase of 54 percent. Using generalized linear modeling, procedures performed in outpatient hospitals conferred an additional $1999 in total costs (95 percent CI, $1978 to $2020) and $259 in out-of-pocket expenses (95 percent CI, $254 to $264) compared with office procedures. Ambulatory surgical center procedures conferred an additional $1698 in total costs (95 percent CI, $1677 to $1718) and $279 in out-of-pocket expenses (95 percent CI, $273 to $285) compared with office procedures. CONCLUSIONS: For outpatient plastic surgery procedures, out-of-pocket expenses are increasing at a faster rate than total costs, which may have implications for access to care and timing of surgery. Providers should realize the increasing burden of out-of-pocket expenses and the effect of surgical location on patients' costs when possible.

Examining Misaligned Incentives for Payers and Manufacturers in Value-Based Pharmaceutical Contracts.

Value-based pharmaceutical contracts (VBPCs) are performance-based reimbursement agreements between health care payers and pharmaceutical manufacturers in which the price, quantity, or nature of reimbursement is tied to value-based outcomes. As value-based payment models have permeated through much of the health care payment landscape via reimbursement to payers and providers, VBPCs offer opportunities for manufacturers to similarly engage in performance-based models. This article compares 2 VBPC schemes: "pay-for-failure" schemes, in which manufacturers offer rebates or discounts to payers for treatment failure, and "pay-for-success" schemes, in which manufacturers offer rebates or discounts to payers for treatment success. Each method has its own short-term and long-term trade-offs, and both lead to some degree of misaligned incentives between payers and manufacturers. These incentive differences have important downstream effects, influencing patient selection, provision of wraparound services, and nature of reimbursements. This analysis contrasts potential benefits and disadvantages for each of these approaches and offers potential solutions to address misalignment. For example, although pay-for-success models may be more aligned between payers and manufacturers, pay-for-failure contracts can be innovative and effective in controlling costs and/or improving outcomes. To illustrate, VBPCs aimed to reduce costs could incorporate total cost of care reduction as a value-based outcome. The authors encourage payers and manufacturers to consider a blended alternative where pay-for-failure and pay-for-success outcomes could be incorporated as VBPC outcomes. Since little is known about the effect of each scheme on outcomes, further research on VBPCs is necessary to fully understand how differing incentives ultimately affect clinical outcomes and costs. DISCLOSURES: No outside funding supported the writing of this article. Good and Kelly are employed by the UPMC Centers for Value-Based Pharmacy Initiatives and High-Value Health Care, and Parekh was employed by the UPMC Centers for Value-Based Pharmacy Initiatives and High-Value Health Care at the time of this study. The authors have no other disclosures to report.

The Historical Development of Value-Based Care: How We Got Here.

The original architects of Medicare modeled the payment system on the existing fee-for-service (FFS) structure that historically dominated the health-insurance market. Under the FFS paradigm, health-care expenditures experienced an exponential rise. In response, the managed care and capitation models of health-care delivery were developed. However, changes in Medicare reimbursement, along with an increasing volume of orthopaedic procedures and escalating implant costs, call into question the cost-effectiveness of this service line. The success of the Medicare Acute Care Episode (ACE) Demonstration Project proved the feasibility of value-based care and ushered in a new era of bundled payment initiatives.

Supporting Transformation through Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment Programs: Lessons from New York State.

The New York Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment (DSRIP) waiver was viewed as a prototype for Medicaid and safety net redesign waivers in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) era. After the insurance expansions of the ACA were implemented, it was apparent that accountability, value, and quality improvement would be priorities in future waivers in many states. Despite New York's distinct provider relationships, previous coverage expansions, and local and state politics, it is important to understand the key characteristics of the waiver so that other states can learn how to better incorporate value-based arrangements into future waivers or attempts to limit spending under proposed Medicaid per-capita caps or block grants. In this article, we examine the New York DSRIP waiver by drawing on its design, early experiences, and evolution to inform recommendations for the future renewal, implementation, and expansion of redesigned or transformational Medicaid waivers.

Federal Parity and Access to Behavioral Health Care in Private Health Plans.

OBJECTIVE: The 2008 Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA) sought to improve access to behavioral health care by regulating health plans' coverage and management of services. Health plans have some discretion in how to achieve compliance with MHPAEA, leaving questions about its likely effects on health plan policies. In this study, the authors' objective was to determine how private health plans' coverage and management of behavioral health treatment changed after the federal parity law's full implementation. METHODS: A nationally representative survey of commercial health plans was conducted in 60 market areas across the continental United States, achieving response rates of 89% in 2010 (weighted N=8,431) and 80% in 2014 (weighted N=6,974). Senior executives at responding plans were interviewed regarding behavioral health services in each year and (in 2014) regarding changes. Student's t tests were used to examine changes in services covered, cost-sharing, and prior authorization requirements for both behavioral health and general medical care. RESULTS: In 2014, 68% of insurance products reported having expanded behavioral health coverage since 2010. Exclusion of eating disorder coverage was eliminated between 2010 (23%) and 2014 (0%). However, more products reported excluding autism treatment in 2014 (24%) than 2010 (8%). Most plans reported no change to prior-authorization requirements between 2010 and 2014. CONCLUSIONS: Implementation of federal parity legislation appears to have been accompanied by continuing improvement in behavioral health coverage. The authors did not find evidence of widespread noncompliance or of unintended effects, such as dropping coverage of behavioral health care altogether.

Medicaid Program; The Use of New or Increased Pass-Through Payments in Medicaid Managed Care Delivery Systems. Final rule.

This rule finalizes changes to the pass-through payment transition periods and the maximum amount of pass-through payments permitted annually during the transition periods under Medicaid managed care contract(s) and rate certification(s). This final rule prevents increases in pass-through payments and the addition of new pass-through payments beyond those in place when the pass-through payment transition periods were established, in the final Medicaid managed care regulations effective July 5, 2016.

Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) 2002-15: Review of Office of Inspector General Patient Dumping Settlements.

INTRODUCTION: The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1986 was enacted to prevent hospitals from "dumping" or refusing service to patients for financial reasons. The statute prohibits discrimination of emergency department (ED) patients for any reason. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Health and Human Services enforces the statute. The objective of this study is to determine the scope, cost, frequency and most common allegations leading to monetary settlement against hospitals and physicians for patient dumping. METHODS: Review of OIG investigation archives in May 2015, including cases settled from 2002-2015 ( https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/cmp/patient_dumping.asp ). RESULTS: There were 192 settlements (14 per year average for 4000+ hospitals in the USA). Fines against hospitals and physicians totaled $6,357,000 (averages $33,435 and $25,625 respectively); 184/192 (95.8%, $6,152,000) settlements were against hospitals and eight against physicians ($205,000). Most common settlements were for failing to screen 144/192 (75%) and stabilize 82/192 (42.7%) for emergency medical conditions (EMC). There were 22 (11.5%) cases of inappropriate transfer and 22 (11.5%) more where the hospital failed to transfer. Hospitals failed to accept an appropriate transfer in 25 (13.0%) cases. Patients were turned away from hospitals for insurance/financial status in 30 (15.6%) cases. There were 13 (6.8%) violations for patients in active labor. In 12 (6.3%) cases, the on-call physician refused to see the patient, and in 28 (14.6%) cases the patient was inappropriately discharged. Although loss of Medicare/Medicaid funding is an additional possible penalty, there were no disclosures of exclusion of hospitals from federal funding. There were 6,035 CMS investigations during this time period, with 2,436 found to have merit as EMTALA violations (40.4%). However, only 192/6,035 (3.2%) actually resulted in OIG settlements. The proportion of CMS-certified EMTALA violations that resulted in OIG settlements was 7.9% (192/2,436). CONCLUSION: Of 192 hospital and physician settlements with the OIG from 2002-15, most were for failing to provide screening (75%) and stabilization (42%) to patients with EMCs. The reason for patient "dumping" was due to insurance or financial status in 15.6% of settlements. The vast majority of penalties were to hospitals (95% of cases and 97% of payments). Forty percent of investigations found EMTALA violations, but only 3% of investigations triggered fines.

Medicaid and Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Programs; Medicaid Managed Care, CHIP Delivered in Managed Care, and Revisions Related to Third Party Liability. Final rule.

This final rule modernizes the Medicaid managed care regulations to reflect changes in the usage of managed care delivery systems. The final rule aligns, where feasible, many of the rules governing Medicaid managed care with those of other major sources of coverage, including coverage through Qualified Health Plans and Medicare Advantage plans; implements statutory provisions; strengthens actuarial soundness payment provisions to promote the accountability of Medicaid managed care program rates; and promotes the quality of care and strengthens efforts to reform delivery systems that serve Medicaid and CHIP beneficiaries. It also ensures appropriate beneficiary protections and enhances policies related to program integrity. This final rule also implements provisions of the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA) and addresses third party liability for trauma codes.

Assembled Products: The Key to More Effective Competition And Antitrust Oversight in Health Care.

This Article argues that recent calls for antitrust enforcement to protect health insurers from hospital and physician consolidation are incomplete. The principal obstacle to effective competition in health care is not that one or the other party has too much bargaining power, but that they have been buying and selling the wrong things. Vigorous antitrust enforcement will benefit health care consumers only if it accounts for the competitive distortions caused by the sector's long history of government regulation. Because of regulation, what pass for products in health care are typically small process steps and isolated components that can be assigned a billing code, even if they do little to help patients. Instead of further entrenching weakly competitive parties engaged in artificial commerce, antitrust enforcers and regulators should work together to promote the sale of fully assembled products and services that can be warranted to consumers for performance and safety. As better products emerge through innovation and market entry, competition may finally succeed at lowering medical costs, increasing access to treatment, and improving quality of care.

Medicaid and Children's Health Insurance Programs; Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008; the Application of Mental Health Parity Requirements to Coverage Offered by Medicaid Managed Care Organizations, the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and Alternative Benefit Plans. Final rule.

This final rule will address the application of certain requirements set forth in the Public Health Service Act, as amended by the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, to coverage offered by Medicaid managed care organizations, Medicaid Alternative Benefit Plans, and Children's Health Insurance Programs.

AMCP Seeks an End to 20 Years Of Confusion Over FDAMA Section 114.

The FDA never issued regulations to clarify the boundaries of promotion of pharmacoeconomic data, something it's been dragging its feet on for nearly 20 years. In turn, pharma companies, fearful of being penalized for off-lable promotion, have erred on the side of caution, hesitating to take advantage of Section 114.