Reception of experimental pedagogy and psychology in Chile. Analysis of the intellectual influences of Wilhelm Mann, 1904-1915.

This article provides a detailed analysis of the intellectual research project of Wilhelm Mann, one of the pioneers of experimental and educational psychology in Chile. Mann's work has been the object of so little analysis that his intellectual influences and networks are not clearly known. We analyzed 338 intratext citations from 22 works by Wilhelm Mann published during the period 1904-1915. As a result, we obtained a mapping of his cooperation networks and used a quantitative approach to study the authors who most influenced his career, among whom were William Stern, Herbert Spencer, Wilhelm Wundt, Alfred Binet, and Ernst Meumann. Mann was closely connected to the international and contemporary advances and discussions of his time, despite the lack of infrastructure and difficulties in communication. Mann was the first psychologist to develop a long-term project in Chile that aimed to measure the individualities of Chilean students and their intellectual development.

Reconstruction of Wilhelm Wundt's last residence in Saxony and the search for subsequent use as a research institute, fellowship house, or museum of psychotechnics.

The German physiologist Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) is now recognized worldwide as the founding figure of academic psychology. He founded the first Institute for Experimental Psychology in Leipzig in 1879 and gained recognition during his lifetime. The scientist's last home in the small village of Großbothen in East Germany, about 100 miles (160 km) south of Berlin, was left to decay after German reunification in 1989/1990. Wundt's other homes in Leipzig were destroyed during World War II. During the GDR period, when the house was owned by the public sector, an inscription in honor of Wundt was added. It then stood empty for many years and fell into disrepair. In June 2016, an association was founded at Schloss Altranstädt near Leipzig with the aim of acquiring the rights to use the Wilhelm Wundt House. Thanks to their efforts, the house has now been entrusted to a conservationist as of 2018. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Attention and Free Will in Experimental Psychology: An Unexpected Analysis of Voluntary Action by William James and Theodule Ribot.

This article aims to highlight the difficulties encountered by the experimental psychology promoted by Ribot, at the end of the nineteenth century up until the beginning of the twentieth century, with regard to the question of free will as part of his analysis of voluntary attention. It also aims to shed some light on William James's possible role in Ribot's subtle change of opinion in regards to the power of attention, as a mental effort somehow revealing the possibility of a top-down voluntary activity. In most of Ribot's work, at first glance, the will is understood as a determined product of our idiosyncratic character, of our affective and physiological tendencies-rather than as an autonomous faculty of self-determination. But what might look like Ribot's commitment to determinism calls for some nuance. Some uses of the term "voluntary" in his work, particularly to describe the phenomenon of attention, seem to refer to a form of free will looking a lot more like an autonomous faculty than like a mere illusion induced by an epiphenomenal conscious state. We end the paper with remarks about the current state of studies of consciousness and voluntary action in relation to Ribot and James's accounts of attention and will.

Unconscious inferences in perception in early experimental psychology: From Wundt to Peirce.

What are unconscious inferences in psychology? This article investigates their journey from the early philosophical psychology of Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) to the experimental psychology of the American pragmatist Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914). Peirce's reception of Wundt's early works situates him in an international web of 19th-century experimental psychologists and its reconstruction opens new perspectives on the relation between philosophy, psychology, and epistemology. Moreover, this reception testifies to a heretofore overlooked strand of influence of Wundt on North American experimental psychology. The notion of unconscious inferences, of which Hermann von Helmholtz is usually considered the chief exponent, becomes the backbone of Peirce's theory of perception mostly because of the affinity between Wundt's early philosophy of mind and Peirce's logic-mediated approach to psychology.

Kurt Danziger y la historia social de la psicología: un proceso de dominación sobre la experiencia psicológica / Kurt Danziger and the social history of psychology: a process of domination over the psychological experience

La tesis central sostenida en este breve escrito es que la autonomización de la psicología respecto de la filosofía no se debió fundamentalmente a razones epistémicas, esto es, a la delimitación de un objeto de investigación propio, ni al empleo del método experimental. La automatización de la psicología se debió fundamentalmente a razones políticas que luego hicieron posible que pueda reclamar para sí misma ese objeto y ese método. Kurt Danziger permite sostener esta afirmación a partir de la identificación de tres condiciones históricas de posibilidad para dicha autonomización: a) la definición un objeto de estudio, b) el establecimiento de un método de investigación y c) la institucionalización de la relación entre ese objeto y ese método. Estas tres condiciones, a su vez, pueden ser interpretadas en dos niveles de análisis considerando la crítica que formula el filósofo chileno Carlos Pérez a la superioridad del conocimiento científico sostenida por Imre Lakatos. En un primer nivel, de carácter epistémico, se pueden ubicar las dos primeras condiciones históricas que refieren únicamente a las diversas formas de relación entre objetos y métodos. En un segundo nivel, de carácter político, se puede ubicar la tercera condición histórica que refiere a las instituciones que producen esas diversas formas de relación entre objetos y métodos. Junto a Pérez se puede sostener que históricamente la psicología, así como el resto del conocimiento científico, fundará su superioridad frente a otras formas de conocimiento psicológico a partir de su rápida institucionalización y consecuente control sobre la producción del saber psicológico.

The central thesis of brief writing is that the autonomization of psychology to philosophy was not due fundamentally to epistemic reasons -that is, to the delimitation of an object of own research, nor the use of the experimental method. The autonomization of psychology was fundamentally due to political reasons that later made it possible to claim that object and that method for itself. Kurt Danziger allows to sustain this statement by identifying three historical conditions of possibility for said autonomization: a) the definition of an object of study; b) the establishment of a research method; and c) the institutionalization of the relationship between that object and that method. These three conditions, in turn, can be interpreted at two levels of analysis, considering the critique of the Chilean philosopher Carlos Pérez to the superiority of scientific knowledge sustained by Imre Lakatos. At a first level -of an epistemic nature, the first two historical conditions can be located that refer only to the various forms of relationship between objects and methods. At a second level -of a political nature, the third historical condition can be located, which refers to the institutions that produce these various forms of relationship between objects and methods. Along with Pérez, it can be argued that historically psychology -as well as the rest of scientific knowledge, founded its superiority over other forms of psychological knowledge based on its rapid institutionalization and consequent control over the production of psychological knowledge.

Memories of 100 years of human fear conditioning research and expectations for its future.

This special issue celebrates the 100th anniversary of the Little Albert study, published in February 1920, which marked the birth of human fear conditioning research. The collection of papers in this special issue provides a snapshot of the thriving state of this field today. In this Editorial, we first trace the historical roots of the field and then provide a conceptual analysis of the many ways in which human fear conditioning is currently used in theory and treatment development, with special reference to the contributions in this special issue. Ivan P. Pavlov allegedly claimed that "If you want new ideas, read old books". We could not agree more; it is our conviction that tracing the roots of our field illuminates current trends and will contribute to shaping new directions for the next 100 years of research.

Levels of communication: The talking horse experiments.

In the early twentieth century, counting and speaking horses, like the famous Clever Hans or the "Horses of Elberfeld," became widely debated subjects in experimental psychology. The idea was to determine whether their learning success was only a fraud, or if it might open up a new chapter in "animal psychology" - or even belong to the realm of parapsychology and telepathy. When their tricks were discovered, the teachers of the animals were marked as charlatans. Both the attempts to detect charlatans and the efforts to avoid this accusation during the talking horse experiments proceeded using the method of introducing new levels of communication into the human-animal interaction process in order to substantiate each respective standpoint. This paper argues that the scientific studies and debates on the talking horses are relevant not only from psychological, biological, and semiotic vantage points, but also from the perspective of communications theory, giving rise to the foundational issue of levels of communication.

Roberto Ardigò as a forerunner of George M. Stratton's experiments on inverted vision.

After Johannes Kepler's supposition of inverted and reversed retinal images and Christoph Scheiner's anatomical demonstration of such an inversion, the question arose whether this inversion is necessary and how it is possible to see an upright world based on an inverted image. The answer to this question is commonly attributed to the American psychologist George M. Stratton, who produced, in 1896, upright retinal images by means of lenses and showed that after a phase of inverted perception, upright vision is restored. However, prior to 1886, the Italian philosopher Roberto Ardigò had already performed optical experiments with a prism, obtaining a similar result. The intend of his optical investigation was essentially psychological, in opposition to contemporary physiological approaches. He accepted Hermann von Helmholtz's basic assumptions, but interpreted the results of his experiments in the framework of a more detailed theory of perception. The present article aims to analyze Ardigò's experiments and compare them with Stratton's in order to give them the place they deserve in the history of experimental psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Fenomenologia aplicada: porque é seguro ignorar a epoché / Applied phenomenology: why is it safe to ignore the epoché / Fenomenología aplicada: ¿por qué es seguro ignorar epoché?

A questão de saber se uma investigação e análise propriamente fenomenológicas requerem a performance da epoché e a redução não tem sido apenas discutida dentro da filosofia fenomenológica. É também uma questão que tem sido intensamente debatida dentro da pesquisa qualitativa. Amedeo Giorgi, em particular, insistiu que nenhuma pesquisa científica pode reivindicar um status fenomenológico a menos que seja apoiada por algum uso da epoché e redução. Giorgi fundamenta parcialmente tal afirmação em idéias encontradas nos escritos de Husserl sobre psicologia fenomenológica. No presente artigo examino as ideias de Husserl e argumento que enquanto a epoché e a redução são cruciais para a fenomenologia transcendental, é algo muito mais questionável se elas também são relevantes para uma aplicação não-filosófica da fenomenologia.

The question of whether a proper phenomenological investigation and analysis requires one to perform the epoché and the reduction has not only been discussed within phenomenological philosophy. It is also very much a question that has been hotly debated within qualitative research. Amedeo Giorgi, in particular, has insisted that no scientific research can claim phenomenological status unless it is supported by some use of the epoché and reduction. Giorgi partially bases this claim on ideas found in Husserl's writings on phenomenological psychology. In the present paper, I discuss Husserl's ideas and argue that while the epoché and the reduction are crucial for transcendental phenomenology, it is much more questionable whether they are also relevant for a non-philosophical application of phenomenology.

La cuestión de si una investigación y análisis fenomenológico adecuado requiere que uno realice la época y la reducción no solo se ha discutido dentro de la filosofía fenomenológica. También es una pregunta que se ha debatido acaloradamente dentro de la investigación cualitativa. Amedeo Giorgi, en particular, ha insistido en que ninguna investigación científica puede reclamar un estado fenomenológico a menos que esté respaldada por algún uso de la época y la reducción. Giorgi basa parcialmente esta afirmación en ideas encontradas en los escritos de Husserl sobre psicología fenomenológica. En el presente artículo, discuto las ideas de Husserl y sostengo que si bien la época y la reducción son cruciales para la fenomenología trascendental, es mucho más cuestionable si también son relevantes para una aplicación no filosófica de la fenomenología.

Gold medal award for life achievement in the science of psychology: Alan E. Kazdin.

Alan E. Kazdin is recognized for his extensive and influential contributions to psychological science through exemplary research, influential clinical applications, and inspiring professional leadership. His research has brought innovation and rigor to the study of intervention for children's conduct problems. His Yale Parenting Center has put those interventions into action, demonstrating their realworld relevance. His leadership in founding and editing the major journals of clinical science, and his service as president of our major professional organizations, has spread his scientific and humane values throughout our discipline. The legendary Kazdin eloquence and wit, packed into every presentation, have inspired generations of psychologists, underscoring a legacy that is profound and enduring (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Confusion about confusion: Édouard Toulouse's dementia test, 1905-20.

Psychiatrist Édouard Toulouse (1865-1947) is known today for his 1896 psychometric study of the novelist Émile Zola, and his contributions to mental hygiene, sexology, eugenics, and labour efficiency in inter-war France. This paper examines research undertaken in Toulouse's Laboratory of Experimental Psychology at the Villejuif asylum near Paris. In 1905, Toulouse created a test that could differentiate between dementia and mental confusion, a test that could aid in the classification of patients at the overcrowded Villejuif facility. By 1920, however, the test's early promise was undercut by unforeseen, 'machinic' resistance that emerged in the experimental process. This case study demonstrates the non-linear nature of scientific practice and limits of even the most innovative asylum reforms in this period.

Gertrude Stein's modernist brain.

The modernist writer Gertrude Stein is well known for her innovative approach to literary prose. Far less known is the fact that Stein's career started in the emergent field of the brain sciences, first at Radcliffe College, then at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. In this contribution, I trace Stein's scientific trajectory and examine the reasons that compelled her to abandon a career in science, turning to literature instead. Stein's career as a scientist was initially very promising, and began to decline only in her last two years at Johns Hopkins. With her degree in jeopardy, she was offered one last chance: she would be allowed to graduate if she completed a last piece of assessment, consisting of a model of a young human brain. Alas, Stein's model was a disaster-and possibly a deliberate one. In the Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, written over thirty years after the sour end of her scientific career, Stein attributed her failure to "being frankly openly bored" by medicine. In reconstructing the circumstances that culminated in Stein undermining her own performance by reimagining a "modernist" model of the brain, I show that Stein's rebranding of her failure as "boredom" was itself part of a broader act of disobedience toward the authority of neuroanatomy, whose status was far more uncertain than how its practitioners-Stein's own teachers-viewed it.

On making sense. An exploration of Wundt's apperceptionist account of meaningful speech.

In the wake of the critical reorientation in the historiography of psychology, a number of scholars challenged the one-sided structuralist and positivist interpretation of Wilhelm Wundt's work. This paper aims at contributing to these recent efforts, by providing an analysis of the way in which Wundt's apperceptionism conditioned his account of the relation between thought and speech, and by extrapolation, of disorganized thought and speech. While Wundt's pivotal role in the development of the psychology of language is relatively well-known, discussions on this part of his theorizing tend to focus exclusively on his gestural or motor account of language. This obliterates the complex theoretical background of Wundt's theory of language and speech, as well as its systematic place within his psychological system. Highlighting this neglected dimension of Wundt's theorizing, however, could open up a new horizon of pressing research questions in the historiography of psychology.

Merging with the path not taken: Wilhelm Wundt's work as a precursor to the embedded-processes approach to memory, attention, and consciousness.

Early research on memory was dominated by two researchers forging different paths: Hermann Ebbinghaus, interested in principles of learning and recall, and Wilhelm Wundt, founder of the first formal laboratory of experimental psychology, who was interested in empirical evidence to interpret conscious experience. Whereas the work of Ebbinghaus is a much-heralded precursor of modern research on long-term memory, the work of Wundt appears to be a mostly-forgotten precursor to research on working memory. We show how his scientific perspective is germane to more recent investigations, with emphasis on the embedded-processes approaches of Nelson Cowan and Klaus Oberauer, and how it is in contrast with most other recent theoretical approaches. This investigation is important because the embedded-process theorists, apparently like most modern researchers, have recognized few of Wundt's specific contributions. We explore commonalities between the approaches and suggest that an appreciation of these commonalities might enrich the field going forward.

Franz Brentano and the beginning of experimental psychology: implications for the study of psychological phenomena today.

The manifestation of psychology as an academic discipline more than a 100 years ago was accompanied by a paradigm shift in our understanding of psychological phenomena-with both its light and shadow sides. On the one hand, this development allowed for a rigorous and experimentation-based approach to psychological phenomena; on the other, it led to an alienation from the experiential-or qualia-facets as the topics under inquiry were researched increasingly through third-person (e.g., behavioral or physiological) measures. At the turning point of this development stood an eminent but little known European scholar, Franz Brentano, who called for a synthesis of both third-person and first-person research methods in the study of psychological phenomena. On the occasion of his death, a hundred years ago on March 17, 1917 we wish to illustrate the historical background, introduce the reader to Brentano's approach and work and discuss its relevance for experimental psychology today.

[Emil Kraepelin's time in Dorpat - Did this stay made marks in Russian and Soviet psychiatry?] / Die Dorpater Zeit von Emil Kraepelin ­ Hinterließ dieser Aufenthalt Spuren in der russischen und sowjetischen Psychiatrie?

In Russia, German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926) is regarded as an influential and famous personality in the history of the field. This study discusses whether it was his period in the Russian Empire in the years 1886 to 1891 when he worked at Dorpat University (today Tartu, Estonia) that raised his popularity in Russia. Our research shows that all of his writings which had been translated into Russian language derive from a period much later than Dorpat. Moreover, none of his students has ever reached a scientific position which would have enabled him to become a proponent of Kraepelin's ideas in Russia. Despite his stay at Dorpat was important for Kraepelin's scientific development, it had no major impact on Russian psychiatry.The later perception of Kraepelin in Russia and in the Soviet Union is quite inconsistent. At some point of time, his works on experimental psychology were appreciated, which was probably connected with the rise of reflexology in Russian and, especially, Soviet psychiatry. On the other hand, it was Kraepelin's merits in the classification of psychiatric diseases that have mainly been acknowledged.

Jerome S. Bruner (1915-2016).

Presents an obituary for Jerome S. Bruner, who died in 2016. His long, and productive, life spanned much of the first century of experimental psychology and coincided with the launching of cognitive psychology, a field in which he played an indispensable and pioneering role. His innovative and provocative work constantly challenged the current "mainstream." His impact on education has been equated with that of John Dewey. He was driven throughout his life to pursue the nature of the "human" in both his conceptual and empirical work. The model of an active organizing mind, "going beyond the information given," informed Jerry's work on cognition and led to the influential 1956 book A Study of Thinking, with Jacqueline Goodnow and George Austin. In 1960, Bruner and George Miller established the Center for Cognitive Studies at Harvard, which became a crucible for dynamic innovation across several disciplines and research approaches (PsycINFO Database Record

George Mandler (1924-2016).

Presents an obituary for George Mandler, who died in London on May 6, 2016 at the age of 91. Mandler was one of the pioneers of the cognitive revolution in psychology. He was instrumental in moving the study of human learning from notions based largely on associations to a view of memory as an organized, nested hierarchical structure. Mandler was also a major proponent of the dual-process theory of recognition memory, in which general feelings of familiarity are distinguished from the context-rich experience of recollection. He brought the study of emotion into prominence, suggesting how emotion and cognition are related. Finally, he repatriated the concept of consciousness from its intellectual exile under behaviorism, stating boldly in 1975 that the construct was respectable, useful, and probably necessary. Mandler edited the Psychological Review from 1970 to 1976, chaired the Governing Board of the Psychonomic Society, and was president of APA Divisions 1 (General Psychology) and 3 (Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Science). (PsycINFO Database Record