First Year of Skilled Nursing Facility Value-based Purchasing Program Penalizes Facilities With Poorer Financial Performance.

BACKGROUND: The Skilled Nursing Facility Value-based Purchasing Program (SNF-VBP) incentivizes facilities to coordinate care, improve quality, and lower hospital readmissions. However, SNF-VBP may unintentionally punish facilities with lower profit margins struggling to invest resources to lower readmissions. OBJECTIVE: The objective of this study was to estimate the SNF-VBP penalty amounts by skilled nursing facility (SNF) profit margin quintiles and examine whether facilities with lower profit margins are more likely to be penalized by SNF-VBP. RESEARCH DESIGN: We combined the first round of SNF-VBP performance data with SNF profit margins and characteristics data. Our outcome variables included estimated penalty amount and a binary measure for whether facilities were penalized by the SNF-VBP. We categorized SNFs into 5 profit margin quintiles and examined the relationship between profit margins and SNF-VBP performance using descriptive and regression analysis. RESULTS: The average profit margins for SNFs in the lowest profit margin quintile was -14.4% compared with the average profit margin of 11.1% for SNFs in the highest profit margin quintile. In adjusted regressions, SNFs in the lowest profit margin quintile had 17% higher odds of being penalized under SNF-VBP compared with facilities in the highest profit margin quintile. The average penalty for SNFs in the lowest profit margin quintile was $22,312. CONCLUSIONS: SNFs in the lowest profit margins are more likely to be penalized by the SNF-VBP, and these losses can exacerbate quality problems in SNFs with lower quality. Alternative approaches to measuring and rewarding SNFs under SNF-VBP or programs to assist struggling SNFs is warranted, particularly considering the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, which requires resources for prevention and management.

The financial advantages of medical scribes extend beyond increased visits.

Employing medical scribes can boost revenue for a practice, the authors show, well beyond being an opportunity to expand patient volume.

Self-efficacy remains a vital factor in reducing the risk of dialysis in type 2 diabetes care.

ABSTRACT: Studies have provided promising outcomes of the pay-for-performance (P4P) program or with good continuity of care levels in diabetes control.We investigate the different exposures in continuity of care (COC) with their providers and those who participate in the P4P program and its effects on the risk of diabetes diabetic nephropathy in the future.We obtained COC and P4P information from the annual database, to which we applied a hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) in 3 levels adjusted to account for other covariates as well as the effects of hospital clustering and accumulating time.Newly diagnosed type 2 diabetes in 2003At the individual level, those with a higher Diabetes Complications Severity Index (DCSI) score have a higher likelihood of diabetic nephropathy than those with a lower DCSI (OR, 1.46), whereas contrasting results were obtained for the Charlson Comorbidity Index (CCI) (odds ratio[OR], 0.88). Patients who visited family physicians, endocrinologists, and gastroenterologists showed a lower likelihood of diabetic nephropathy (OR, 0.664, 0.683, and 0.641, respectively), whereas those who continued to visit neurologists showed an increased risk of diabetic nephropathy by 4 folds. At the hospital level, patients with diabetes visiting primary care clinics had a lower risk of diabetic nephropathy with an OR of 0.584 than those visiting hospitals of other higher levels. Regarding the repeat time level, the patients who had a higher COC score and participated in the P4P program had a reduced diabetic nephropathy risk with an OR of 0.339 and 0.775, respectively.Diabetes control necessitates long-term care involving the patients' healthcare providers for the management of their conditions to reduce the risk of diabetic nephropathy. Indeed, most contributing factors are related to patients, but we cannot eliminate the optimal outcomes related to good relationships with healthcare providers and participation in the P4P program.

Use of behavioral health care in Medicaid managed care carve-out versus carve-in arrangements.

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate differences in access to behavioral health services for Medicaid enrollees covered by a Medicaid entity that integrated the financing of behavioral and physical health care ("carve-in group") versus a Medicaid entity that separated this financing ("carve-out group"). DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: Medicaid claims data from two Medicaid entities in the Portland, Oregon tri-county area in 2016. STUDY DESIGN: In this cross-sectional study, we compared differences across enrollees in the carve-in versus carve-out group, using a machine learning approach to incorporate a large set of covariates and minimize potential selection bias. Our primary outcomes included behavioral health visits for a variety of different provider types. Secondary outcomes included inpatient, emergency department, and primary care visits. DATA COLLECTION: We used Medicaid claims, including adults with at least 9 months of enrollment. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The study population included 45,786 adults with mental health conditions. Relative to the carve-out group, individuals in the carve-in group were more likely to access outpatient behavioral health (2.39 percentage points, p < 0.0001, with a baseline rate of approximately 73%). The carve-in group was also more likely to access primary care physicians, psychologists, and social workers and less likely to access psychiatrists and behavioral health specialists. Access to outpatient behavioral health visits was more likely in the carve-in arrangement among individuals with mild or moderate mental health conditions (compared to individuals with severe mental illness) and among black enrollees (compared to white enrollees). CONCLUSIONS: Financial integration of physical and behavioral health in Medicaid managed care was associated with greater access to behavioral health services, particularly for individuals with mild or moderate mental health conditions and for black enrollees. Recent changes to incentivize financial integration should be monitored to assess differential impacts by illness severity, race and ethnicity, provider types, and other factors.

Evaluating inpatient adverse outcomes under California's Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment Program.

OBJECTIVE: The California Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment Program (DSRIP) provided incentive payments to Designated Public Hospitals (DPHs) to improve quality of care. We assessed the program's impact on reductions in sepsis mortality, central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs), venous thromboembolisms (VTEs), and hospital-acquired pressure ulcers (HAPUs). DATA SOURCES: We used 2009-2014 discharge data from California hospitals. STUDY DESIGN: We used a pre-post study design with a comparison group. We constructed propensity scores and used them to assign inverse probability weights according to their similarity to DPH discharges. Interaction term coefficients of time trends and treatment group provided significance testing. DATA EXTRACTION: We used Patient Safety Indicators for CLABSI, HAPU, and VTE, and constructed a sepsis mortality measure. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Discharges from DPHs and non-DPHs both saw decreases in the four outcomes over the DSRIP period (2010-2014). The difference-in-difference estimator (DD) for sepsis was only significant during two time periods, comparing 2010 with 2012 (DD: -2.90 percent, 95% CI: -5.08, -0.72 percent) and 2010 with 2014 (DD: -5.74, 95% CI: -8.76 percent, -2.72 percent); the DD estimator was not significant comparing 2010 with 2012 (DD: -1.30, 95% CI: -3.18 percent, 0.58 percent) or comparing 2010 with 2013 (DD: -3.05 percent, 95% CI: -6.50 percent, 0.40 percent). For CLABSI, we did not find any meaningful differences between DPHs and non-DPHs across the four time periods. For HAPU and VTE, the only significant DD estimator compared 2014 with 2010. CONCLUSIONS: We did not find that DPHs participating in DSRIP outperformed non-DPHs during the DSRIP program. Our results were robust to multiple sensitivity analyses. Given multiple concurrent inpatient safety initiatives, it was challenging to assign improvements over time periods to DSRIP.

How should community health workers in fragile contexts be supported: qualitative evidence from Sierra Leone, Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo.

BACKGROUND: Community health workers (CHWs) are critical players in fragile settings, where staff shortages are particularly acute, health indicators are poor and progress towards Universal Health Coverage is slow. Like other health workers, CHWs need support to contribute effectively to health programmes and promote health equity. Yet the evidence base of what kind of support works best is weak. We present evidence from three fragile settings-Sierra Leone, Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo on managing CHWs, and synthesise recommendations for best approaches to support this critical cadre. METHODS: We used a qualitative study design to explore how CHWs are managed, the challenges they face and potential solutions. We conducted interviews with decision makers and managers (n = 37), life history interviews with CHWs (n = 15) and reviewed policy documents. RESULTS: Fragility disrupts education of community members so that they may not have the literacy levels required for the CHW role. This has implications for the selection, role, training and performance of CHWs. Policy preferences about selection need discussion at the community level, so that they reflect community realities. CHWs' scope of work is varied and may change over time, requiring ongoing training. The modular, local and mix of practical and classroom training approach worked well, helping to address gender and literacy challenges and developing a supportive cohort of CHWs. A package of supervision, community support, regular provision of supplies, performance rewards and regular remuneration is vital to retention and performance of CHWs. But there are challenges with supervision, scarcity of supplies, inadequate community recognition and unfulfilled promises about allowances. Clear communication about incentives with facility staff and communities is required as is their timely delivery. CONCLUSIONS: This is the first study that has explored the management of CHWs in fragile settings. CHWs' interface role between communities and health systems is critical because of their embedded positionality and the trusting relationships they (often) have. Their challenges are aligned to those generally faced by CHWs but chronic fragility exacerbates them and requires innovative problem solving to ensure that countries and communities are not left behind in reforming the way that CHWs are supported.

The evaluation of comprehensive medication management for chronic diseases in primary care clinics, a Texas delivery system reform incentive payment program.

BACKGROUND: The Institute of Medicine reported that more than 1.5 million preventable adverse drug events occur annually in the United States. Comprehensive Medication Management (CMM) is the medication review process to improve clinical outcomes, enhance patient adherence, reduce drug therapy problems and reduce health care costs. University of Texas (UT) Physicians implemented a CMM program in several community-based clinics. We evaluated the effectiveness of CMM to reduce drug therapy problems and achieve medical cost savings. METHODS: This was a retrospective, observational study of CMM participants from October 2015 to September 2016. Program participants included patients aged 18 years or older who had taken more than 4 prescribed medications and were diagnosed with at least one of the following chronic diseases: hypertension, congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, asthma or diabetes. Under the CMM program, a clinical pharmacist reviewed patients' electronic health records and created action plans to resolve identified drug problems. As part of the evaluation of the clinical process, two independent physicians conducted peer review on the recommendations issued by the pharmacist in order to establish inter-rater reliability of drug therapy problems and potential consequent medical services. The drug therapy problems were identified and classified into four categories: indication, effectiveness, safety and/or compliance. The average cost of avoided medical services was obtained based on cost extrapolations from the literature, combined with hospital discharge data. Potential medical services avoided were linked to the average cost of those services to calculate the total cost savings of the program from the payers' perspective. RESULTS: By reviewing electronic health records of 3280 patients, the pharmacist identified 301 drug therapy problems and resolved 49.8% of these problems with collaboration from the patient's primary care physician or care team. The most commonly identified drug problems were related to potentially adverse drug reactions or inappropriate drug dosage. The CMM program resulted in potential cost savings of $1,143,015. CONCLUSIONS: The CMM program resolved medication therapy problems among program participants and achieved significant health care cost savings.

A pay for performance scheme in primary care: Meta-synthesis of qualitative studies on the provider experiences of the quality and outcomes framework in the UK.

BACKGROUND: The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is an incentive scheme for general practice, which was introduced across the UK in 2004. The Quality and Outcomes Framework is one of the biggest pay for performance (P4P) scheme in the world, worth £691 million in 2016/17. We now know that P4P is good at driving some kinds of improvement but not others. In some areas, it also generated moral controversy, which in turn created conflicts of interest for providers. We aimed to undertake a meta-synthesis of 18 qualitative studies of the QOF to identify themes on the impact of the QOF on individual practitioners and other staff. METHODS: We searched 5 electronic databases, Medline, Embase, Healthstar, CINAHL and Web of Science, for qualitative studies of the QOF from the providers' perspective in primary care, published in UK between 2004 and 2018. Data was analysed using the Schwartz Value Theory as a theoretical framework to analyse the published papers through the conceptual lens of Professionalism. A line of argument synthesis was undertaken to express the synthesis. RESULTS: We included 18 qualitative studies that where on the providers' perspective. Four themes were identified; 1) Loss of autonomy, control and ownership; 2) Incentivised conformity; 3) Continuity of care, holism and the caring role of practitioners' in primary care; and 4) Structural and organisational changes. Our synthesis found, the Values that were enhanced by the QOF were power, achievement, conformity, security, and tradition. The findings indicated that P4P schemes should aim to support Values such as benevolence, self-direction, stimulation, hedonism and universalism, which professionals ranked highly and have shown to have positive implications for Professionalism and efficiency of health systems. CONCLUSIONS: Understanding how practitioners experience the complexities of P4P is crucial to designing and delivering schemes to enhance and not compromise the values of professionals. Future P4P schemes should aim to permit professionals with competing high priority values to be part of P4P or other quality improvement initiatives and for them to take on an 'influencer role' rather than being 'responsive agents'. Through understanding the underlying Values and not just explicit concerns of professionals, may ensure higher levels of acceptance and enduring success for P4P schemes.

Implementation of a Physician Incentive Program for 18-Month Developmental Screening in Ontario, Canada.

OBJECTIVES: To evaluate factors associated with uptake of a financial incentive for developmental screening at an enhanced 18-month well-child visit (EWCV) in Ontario, Canada. STUDY DESIGN: Population-based cohort study using linked administrative data of children (17-24 months of age) eligible for EWCV between 2009 and 2017. Logistic regression modeled associations of EWCV receipt by provider and patient characteristics. RESULTS: Of 910 976 eligible children, 54.2% received EWCV (annually, 39.2%-61.2%). The odds of assessment were lower for socially vulnerable children, namely, those from the lowest vs highest neighborhood income quintile (aOR, 0.84; 95% CI, 0.83-0.85), those born to refugee vs nonimmigrant mothers (aOR, 0.90; 95% CI, 0.88-0.93), and to teenaged mothers (aOR, 0.70; 95% CI, 0.69-0.71)). Children were more likely to have had developmental screening if cared for by a pediatrician vs family physician (aOR, 1.28; 95% CI, 1.13-1.44), recently trained physician (aOR, 1.38; 95% CI, 1.29-1.48 for ≤5 years in practice vs ≥21 years) and less likely if the physician was male (aOR, 0.64; 95% CI, 0.61-0.66). For physicians eligible for a pay-for-performance immunization bonus, there was a positive association with screening. CONCLUSIONS: In the context of a universal healthcare system and a specific financial incentive, uptake of the developmental assessment increased over time but remains moderate. The implementation of similar interventions or incentives needs to account for physician factors and focus on socially vulnerable children to be effective.

How are pay-for-performance schemes in healthcare designed in low- and middle-income countries? Typology and systematic literature review.

BACKGROUND: Pay for performance (P4P) schemes provide financial incentives to health workers or facilities based on the achievement of pre-specified performance targets and have been widely implemented in health systems across low and middle-income countries (LMICs). The growing evidence base on P4P highlights that (i) there is substantial variation in the effect of P4P schemes on outcomes and (ii) there appears to be heterogeneity in incentive design. Even though scheme design is likely a key determinant of scheme effectiveness, we currently lack systematic evidence on how P4P schemes are designed in LMICs. METHODS: We develop a typology to classify the design of P4P schemes in LMICs, which highlights different design features that are a priori likely to affect the behaviour of incentivised actors. We then use results from a systematic literature review to classify and describe the design of P4P schemes that have been evaluated in LMICs. To capture academic publications, Medline, Embase, and EconLit databases were searched. To include relevant grey literature, Google Scholar, Emerald Insight, and websites of the World Bank, WHO, Cordaid, Norad, DfID, USAID and PEPFAR were searched. RESULTS: We identify 41 different P4P schemes implemented in 29 LMICs. We find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the design of P4P schemes in LMICs and pinpoint precisely how scheme design varies across settings. Our results also highlight that incentive design is not adequately being reported on in the literature - with many studies failing to report key design features. CONCLUSIONS: We encourage authors to make a greater effort to report information on P4P scheme design in the future and suggest using the typology laid out in this paper as a starting point.

An Assessment of Pay for Performance Under California's Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment Program.

California was the first state to implement the Delivery System Payment Reform Incentive Payment (DSRIP) program, which focused on improving health care delivery for Medicaid beneficiaries in specific public hospitals. With an overall $6.7 billion investment, California provided financial incentives toward transforming infrastructure and care delivery, and toward achieving better outcomes. The authors sought to describe the California DSRIP program's level of investment in transforming infrastructure and care delivery, and self-reported outcomes of care. Data on the level of investment per hospital, project, and specific metrics per project were used to calculate investment per metrics and self-reported reduced mortality and morbidity for specific measures. Most financial incentives were allocated to development of infrastructure and process of care redesign. Among outcomes, allocations per reduction were lowest for prevention of central line-associated bloodstream infection prevention, hospital-acquired pressure ulcers, and sepsis mortality and highest for stroke deaths and surgical site infections. DSRIP is an important example of the mechanism used by California with the goal of promoting system change, improved outcomes, and increased accountability under the Medicaid program. The results highlight the potential level of investment that may be needed to achieve these goals in similar under-resourced safety net providers.

Creating a pathway for public hospital accreditation in Rwanda: progress, challenges and lessons learned.

QUALITY PROBLEM: Weaknesses in the quality of care delivered at hospitals translates into patient safety challenges and causes unnecessary harm. Low-and-middle-income countries disproportionately shoulder the burden of poor quality of hospital care. INITIAL ASSESSMENT: In the early 2000s, Rwanda implemented a performance-based financing (PBF) system to improve quality and increase the quantity of care delivered at its public hospitals. PBF evaluations identified quality gaps that prompted a movement to pursue an accreditation process for public hospitals. CHOICE OF SOLUTION: Since it was prohibitively costly to implement an accreditation program overseen by an external entity to all of Rwanda's public hospitals, the Ministry of Health developed a set of standards for a national 3-Level accreditation program. IMPLEMENTATION: In 2012, Rwanda launched the first phase of the national accreditation system at five public hospitals. The program was then expected to expand across the remainder of the public hospitals throughout the country. EVALUATION: Out of Rwanda's 43 public hospitals, a total of 24 hospitals have achieved Level 1 status of the accreditation process and 4 have achieved Level 2 status of the accreditation process. LESSONS LEARNED: Linking the program to the country's existing PBF program increased compliance and motivation for participation, especially for those who were unfamiliar with accreditation principles. Furthermore, identifying dedicated quality improvement officers at each hospital has been important for improving engagement in the program. Lastly, to improve upon this process, there are ongoing efforts to develop a non-governmental accreditation entity to oversee this process for Rwanda's health system moving forward.

Looking at the bigger picture: effect of performance-based contracting of district health services on equity of access to maternal health services in Zambia.

Zambia has been using output-based approaches for over two decades to finance whole or part of the public health system. Between 1996 and 2006, performance-based contracting (PBC) was implemented countrywide with the Central Board of Health (CBoH) as the provider of health services. This study reviews the association between PBC and equity of access to maternal health services in Zambia between 1996 and 2006. A comprehensive document review was undertaken to evaluate the implementation process, followed by a trend analysis of health expenditure at district level, and a segmented regression analysis of data on antenatal care (ANC) and deliveries at health facilities that was obtained from five demographic and health survey datasets (1992, 1996, 2002, 2007 and 2014). The results show that PBC was anchored by high-level political support, an overarching policy and legal framework, and collective planning and implementation with all key stakeholders. Decentralization of health service provision was also an enabling factor. ANC coverage increased in both the lower and upper wealth quintiles during the PBC era, followed by a declining trend after the PBC era in both quintiles. Further, the percentage of women delivering at health facilities increased during the PBC era, particularly in rural areas and among the poor. The positive trend continued after the PBC era with similar patterns in both lower and upper wealth quintiles. Despite these gains, per capita health expenditure at district level declined during the PBC era, with the situation worsening after the PBC era. The study concludes that a nationwide PBC approach can contribute to improved equity of access to maternal health services and that PBC is a cost-efficient and sustainable policy reform. The study calls for policymakers to comprehensively evaluate the impact of health system reforms before terminating them.

From Amsterdam to Bamako: a qualitative case study on diffusion entrepreneurs' contribution to performance-based financing propagation in Mali.

For the past 15 years, several donors have promoted performance-based financing (PBF) in Africa for improving health services provision. European and African experts known as 'diffusion entrepreneurs' (DEs) assist with PBF pilot testing. In Mali, after participating in a first pilot PBF in 2012-13, the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene included PBF in its national strategic plan. It piloted this strategy again in 2016-17. We investigated the interactions between foreign experts and domestic actors towards PBF diffusion in Mali from 2009 to 2018. Drawing on the framework on DEs (Gautier et al., 2018), we examine the characteristics of DEs acting at the global, continental and (sub)national levels; and their contribution to policy framing, emulation, experimentation and learning, across locations of PBF implementation. Using an interpretive approach, this longitudinal qualitative case study analyses data from observations (N = 5), interviews (N = 33) and policy documentation (N = 19). DEs framed PBF as the logical continuation of decentralization, contracting policies and existing policies. Policy emulation started with foreign DEs inspiring domestic actors' interest, and succeeded thanks to longstanding relationships and work together. Learning was initiated by European DEs through training sessions and study tours outside Mali, and by African DEs transferring their passion and tacit knowledge to PBF implementers. However, the short-time frame and numerous implementation gaps of the PBF pilot project led to incomplete policy learning. Despite the many pitfalls of the region-wide pilot project, policy actors in Mali decided to pursue this policy in Mali. Future research should further investigate the making of successful African DEs by foreign DEs advocating for a given policy.