RESUMO
OBJECTIVES: To quantify contact patterns of UK home delivery drivers and identify protective measures adopted during the pandemic. METHODS: We conducted a cross-sectional online survey to measure the interactions of 170 UK delivery drivers during a working shift between 7 December 2020 and 31 March 2021. RESULTS: Delivery drivers had a mean number of 71.6 (95% CI 61.0 to 84.1) customer contacts per shift and 15.0 (95% CI 11.2 to 19.2) depot contacts per shift. Maintaining physical distancing with customers was more common than at delivery depots. Prolonged contact (more than 5 min) with customers was reported by 5.4% of drivers on their last shift. We found 3.0% of drivers had tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 since the start of the pandemic and 16.8% of drivers had self-isolated due to a suspected or confirmed case of COVID-19. In addition, 5.3% (95% CI 2.3% to 10.2%) of participants reported having worked while ill with COVID-19 symptoms, or with a member of their household having a suspected or confirmed case of COVID-19. CONCLUSION: Delivery drivers had a large number of face-to-face customer and depot contacts per shift compared with other working adults during this time. However, transmission risk may be curtailed as contact with customers was of short duration. Most drivers were unable to maintain physical distance with customers and at depots at all times. Usage of protective items such as face masks and hand sanitiser was widespread.
Assuntos
COVID-19 , Adulto , Humanos , COVID-19/epidemiologia , COVID-19/prevenção & controle , Estudos Transversais , SARS-CoV-2 , Pandemias/prevenção & controle , Reino Unido/epidemiologiaRESUMO
When SARS-CoV-2 Omicron emerged in 2021, S gene target failure enabled differentiation between Omicron and the dominant Delta variant. In England, where S gene target surveillance (SGTS) was already established, this led to rapid identification (within ca 3 days of sample collection) of possible Omicron cases, alongside real-time surveillance and modelling of Omicron growth. SGTS was key to public health action (including case identification and incident management), and we share applied insights on how and when to use SGTS.
Assuntos
COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , COVID-19/epidemiologia , Humanos , Glicoproteínas de Membrana/genética , SARS-CoV-2/genética , Glicoproteína da Espícula de Coronavírus/genética , Proteínas do Envelope Viral/genéticaRESUMO
Nosocomial infections threaten patient safety, and were widely reported during the COVID-19 pandemic. Effective hospital infection control requires a detailed understanding of the role of different transmission pathways, yet these are poorly quantified. Using patient and staff data from a large UK hospital, we demonstrate a method to infer unobserved epidemiological event times efficiently and disentangle the infectious pressure dynamics by ward. A stochastic individual-level, continuous-time state-transition model was constructed to model transmission of SARS-CoV-2, incorporating a dynamic staff-patient contact network as time-varying parameters. A Metropolis-Hastings Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm was used to estimate transmission rate parameters associated with each possible source of infection, and the unobserved infection and recovery times. We found that the total infectious pressure exerted on an individual in a ward varied over time, as did the primary source of transmission. There was marked heterogeneity between wards; each ward experienced unique infectious pressure over time. Hospital infection control should consider the role of between-ward movement of staff as a key infectious source of nosocomial infection for SARS-CoV-2. With further development, this method could be implemented routinely for real-time monitoring of nosocomial transmission and to evaluate interventions.
Assuntos
COVID-19 , Infecção Hospitalar , Humanos , SARS-CoV-2 , COVID-19/epidemiologia , Teorema de Bayes , Infecção Hospitalar/epidemiologia , Pandemias , HospitaisRESUMO
There are concerns that sotrovimab has reduced efficacy at reducing hospitalisation risk against the BA.2 sub-lineage of the Omicron SARS-CoV-2 variant. We performed a retrospective cohort (n = 8850) study of individuals treated with sotrovimab in the community, with the objective of assessing whether there were any differences in risk of hospitalisation of BA.2 cases compared with BA.1. We estimated that the hazard ratio of hospital admission with a length of stay of 2 days or more was 1.17 for BA.2 compared with BA.1 (95%CI 0.74-1.86). These results suggest that the risk of hospital admission was similar between the two sub-lineages.
Assuntos
COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , Humanos , Estudos Retrospectivos , COVID-19/epidemiologia , Inglaterra/epidemiologiaRESUMO
OBJECTIVES: To quantify and characterise non-household contact and to identify the effect of shielding and isolating on contact patterns. DESIGN: Cross-sectional study. SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS: Anyone living in the UK was eligible to take part in the study. We recorded 5143 responses to the online questionnaire between 28 July 2020 and 14 August 2020. OUTCOME MEASURES: Our primary outcome was the daily non-household contact rate of participants. Secondary outcomes were propensity to leave home over a 7 day period, whether contacts had occurred indoors or outdoors locations visited, the furthest distance travelled from home, ability to socially distance and membership of support bubble. RESULTS: The mean rate of non-household contacts per person was 2.9 d-1. Participants attending a workplace (adjusted incidence rate ratio (aIRR) 3.33, 95% CI 3.02 to 3.66), self-employed (aIRR 1.63, 95% CI 1.43 to 1.87) or working in healthcare (aIRR 5.10, 95% CI 4.29 to 6.10) reported significantly higher non-household contact rates than those working from home. Participants self-isolating as a precaution or following Test and Trace instructions had a lower non-household contact rate than those not self-isolating (aIRR 0.58, 95% CI 0.43 to 0.79). We found limited evidence that those shielding had reduced non-household contacts compared with non-shielders. CONCLUSION: The daily rate of non-household interactions remained lower than prepandemic levels measured by other studies, suggesting continued adherence to social distancing guidelines. Individuals attending a workplace in-person or employed as healthcare professionals were less likely to maintain social distance and had a higher non-household contact rate, possibly increasing their infection risk. Shielding and self-isolating individuals required greater support to enable them to follow the government guidelines and reduce non-household contact and therefore their risk of infection.
Assuntos
COVID-19 , Humanos , COVID-19/epidemiologia , COVID-19/prevenção & controle , Pandemias/prevenção & controle , Estudos Transversais , SARS-CoV-2 , Reino Unido/epidemiologiaRESUMO
Since it was first identified, the epidemic scale of the recently emerged novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) in Wuhan, China, has increased rapidly, with cases arising across China and other countries and regions. Using a transmission model, we estimate a basic reproductive number of 3.11 (95% CI, 2.39-4.13), indicating that 58-76% of transmissions must be prevented to stop increasing. We also estimate a case ascertainment rate in Wuhan of 5.0% (95% CI, 3.6-7.4). The true size of the epidemic may be significantly greater than the published case counts suggest, with our model estimating 21 022 (prediction interval, 11 090-33 490) total infections in Wuhan between 1 and 22 January. We discuss our findings in the light of more recent information. This article is part of the theme issue 'Modelling that shaped the early COVID-19 pandemic response in the UK'.