RESUMO
We propose a fully passive linear optical quantum key distribution (QKD) source that implements both random decoy-state and encoding choices with postselection only, thus eliminating all side channels in active modulators. Our source is general purpose and can be used in, e.g., BB84, the six-state protocol, and reference-frame-independent QKD. It can even potentially be combined with measurement-device-independent QKD to achieve robustness against side channels in both detectors and modulators. We also perform a proof-of-principle experimental source characterization to show its feasibility.
RESUMO
The passive approach to quantum key distribution (QKD) consists of removing all active modulation from the users' devices, a highly desirable countermeasure to get rid of modulator side channels. Nevertheless, active modulation has not been completely removed in QKD systems so far, due to both theoretical and practical limitations. In this Letter, we present a fully passive time-bin encoding QKD system and report on the successful implementation of a modulator-free QKD link. According to the latest theoretical analysis, our prototype is capable of delivering competitive secret key rates in the finite key regime.
RESUMO
The performance of quantum key distribution (QKD) is severely limited by multiphoton pulses emitted by laser sources due to the photon-number splitting attack. Coherent-one-way (COW) QKD has been introduced as a promising solution to overcome this limitation, and thus extend the achievable distance of practical QKD. Indeed, thanks to its experimental simplicity, the COW protocol is already used in commercial applications. Here, we derive simple upper security bounds on its secret key rate, which demonstrate that it scales at most quadratically with the system's transmittance, thus solving a long-standing problem. That is, in contrast to what has been claimed, this approach is inappropriate for long-distance QKD transmission. Remarkably, our findings imply that all implementations of the COW protocol performed so far are insecure.
RESUMO
The twin-field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol and its variants are highly attractive because they can beat the well-known fundamental limit of the secret key rate for point-to-point QKD without quantum repeaters (repeaterless bound). In this Letter, we perform a proof-of-principle experimental demonstration of TFQKD based on the protocol proposed by Curty, Azuma, and Lo, which removes the need for postselection on the matching of a global phase from the original TFQKD scheme and can deliver a high secret key rate. Furthermore, we employ a Sagnac loop structure to help overcome the major difficulty in the practical implementation of TFQKD, namely, the need to stabilize the phase of the quantum state over kilometers of fiber. As a proof-of-principle demonstration, the estimated secure key rate from our experimental TFQKD data at the high loss region surpasses the repeaterless bound of QKD with current technology.
RESUMO
Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution (DDI-QKD) held the promise of being robust to detector side channels, a major security loophole in quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations. In contrast to what has been claimed, however, we demonstrate that the security of DDI-QKD is not based on postselected entanglement, and we introduce various eavesdropping strategies that show that DDI-QKD is in fact insecure against detector side-channel attacks as well as against other attacks that exploit devices' imperfections of the receiver. Our attacks are valid even when the QKD apparatuses are built by the legitimate users of the system themselves, and thus, free of malicious modifications, which is a key assumption in DDI-QKD.
RESUMO
Quantum physics allows for unconditionally secure communication between parties that trust each other. However, when the parties do not trust each other such as in the bit commitment scenario, quantum physics is not enough to guarantee security unless extra assumptions are made. Unconditionally secure bit commitment only becomes feasible when quantum physics is combined with relativistic causality constraints. Here we experimentally implement a quantum bit commitment protocol with relativistic constraints that offers unconditional security. The commitment is made through quantum measurements in two quantum key distribution systems in which the results are transmitted via free-space optical communication to two agents separated with more than 20 km. The security of the protocol relies on the properties of quantum information and relativity theory. In each run of the experiment, a bit is successfully committed with less than 5.68×10(-2) cheating probability. This demonstrates the experimental feasibility of quantum communication with relativistic constraints.
RESUMO
How to remove detector side channel attacks has been a notoriously hard problem in quantum cryptography. Here, we propose a simple solution to this problem--measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (QKD). It not only removes all detector side channels, but also doubles the secure distance with conventional lasers. Our proposal can be implemented with standard optical components with low detection efficiency and highly lossy channels. In contrast to the previous solution of full device independent QKD, the realization of our idea does not require detectors of near unity detection efficiency in combination with a qubit amplifier (based on teleportation) or a quantum nondemolition measurement of the number of photons in a pulse. Furthermore, its key generation rate is many orders of magnitude higher than that based on full device independent QKD. The results show that long-distance quantum cryptography over say 200 km will remain secure even with seriously flawed detectors.
RESUMO
Distributed-phase-reference quantum key distribution stands out for its easy implementation with present day technology. For many years, a full security proof of these schemes in a realistic setting has been elusive. We solve this long-standing problem and present a generic method to prove the security of such protocols against general attacks. To illustrate our result, we provide lower bounds on the key generation rate of a variant of the coherent-one-way quantum key distribution protocol. In contrast to standard predictions, it appears to scale quadratically with the system transmittance.
RESUMO
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can remove all detection side-channels from quantum communication systems. The security proofs require, however, that certain assumptions on the sources are satisfied. This includes, for instance, the requirement that there is no information leakage from the transmitters of the senders, which unfortunately is very difficult to guarantee in practice. In this paper we relax this unrealistic assumption by presenting a general formalism to prove the security of MDI-QKD with leaky sources. With this formalism, we analyze the finite-key security of two prominent MDI-QKD schemes-a symmetric three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol and a four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol-and determine their robustness against information leakage from both the intensity modulator and the phase modulator of the transmitters. Our work shows that MDI-QKD is feasible within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission given that the sources are sufficiently isolated. Thus, it provides an essential reference for experimentalists to ensure the security of implementations of MDI-QKD in the presence of information leakage.
RESUMO
In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security. In practice, however, it does not due to the discrepancies between the assumptions used in the security proofs and the behavior of the real apparatuses. Recent years have witnessed a tremendous effort to fill the gap, but the treatment of correlations among pulses has remained a major elusive problem. Here, we close this gap by introducing a simple yet general method to prove the security of QKD with arbitrarily long-range pulse correlations. Our method is compatible with those security proofs that accommodate all the other typical device imperfections, thus paving the way toward achieving implementation security in QKD with arbitrary flawed devices. Moreover, we introduce a new framework for security proofs, which we call the reference technique. This framework includes existing security proofs as special cases, and it can be widely applied to a number of QKD protocols.
RESUMO
We propose a method to prepare different non-Poissonian signal pulses from sources of Poissonian photon number distribution, using only linear optical elements and threshold photon detectors. This method allows a simple passive preparation of decoy states for quantum key distribution. We show that the resulting key rates are comparable with the performance of active choices of intensities of Poissonian signals.
RESUMO
Besides being a beautiful idea, device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) is probably the ultimate solution to defeat quantum hacking. Its security is based on a loophole-free violation of a Bell inequality, which results in a very limited maximum achievable distance. To overcome this limitation, DIQKD must be furnished with heralding devices like, for instance, qubit amplifiers, which can signal the arrival of a photon before the measurement settings are actually selected. In this way, one can decouple channel loss from the selection of the measurement settings and, consequently, it is possible to safely post-select the heralded events and discard the rest, which results in a significant enhancement of the achievable distance. In this work, we investigate photonic-based DIQKD assisted by two main types of qubit amplifiers in the finite data block size scenario, and study the resources-particularly, the detection efficiency of the photodetectors and the quality of the entanglement sources-that would be necessary to achieve long-distance DIQKD within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission.
RESUMO
Quantum key distribution promises unconditionally secure communications. However, as practical devices tend to deviate from their specifications, the security of some practical systems is no longer valid. In particular, an adversary can exploit imperfect detectors to learn a large part of the secret key, even though the security proof claims otherwise. Recently, a practical approach--measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution--has been proposed to solve this problem. However, so far its security has only been fully proven under the assumption that the legitimate users of the system have unlimited resources. Here we fill this gap and provide a rigorous security proof against general attacks in the finite-key regime. This is obtained by applying large deviation theory, specifically the Chernoff bound, to perform parameter estimation. For the first time we demonstrate the feasibility of long-distance implementations of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission.
Assuntos
Segurança Computacional , Modelos Teóricos , Teoria Quântica , TelecomunicaçõesRESUMO
We demonstrate that a necessary precondition for an unconditionally secure quantum key distribution is that both sender and receiver can use the available measurement results to prove the presence of entanglement in a quantum state that is effectively distributed between them. One can thus systematically search for entanglement using the class of entanglement witness operators that can be constructed from the observed data. We apply such analysis to two well-known quantum key distribution protocols, namely, the 4-state protocol and the 6-state protocol. As a special case, we show that, for some asymmetric error patterns, the presence of entanglement can be proven even for error rates above 25% (4-state protocol) and 33% (6-state protocol).