Impaired neural replay of inferred relationships in schizophrenia.

An ability to build structured mental maps of the world underpins our capacity to imagine relationships between objects that extend beyond experience. In rodents, such representations are supported by sequential place cell reactivations during rest, known as replay. Schizophrenia is proposed to reflect a compromise in structured mental representations, with animal models reporting abnormalities in hippocampal replay and associated ripple activity during rest. Here, utilizing magnetoencephalography (MEG), we tasked patients with schizophrenia and control participants to infer unobserved relationships between objects by reorganizing visual experiences containing these objects. During a post-task rest session, controls exhibited fast spontaneous neural reactivation of presented objects that replayed inferred relationships. Replay was coincident with increased ripple power in hippocampus. Patients showed both reduced replay and augmented ripple power relative to controls, convergent with findings in animal models. These abnormalities are linked to impairments in behavioral acquisition and subsequent neural representation of task structure.

Human Replay Spontaneously Reorganizes Experience.

Knowledge abstracted from previous experiences can be transferred to aid new learning. Here, we asked whether such abstract knowledge immediately guides the replay of new experiences. We first trained participants on a rule defining an ordering of objects and then presented a novel set of objects in a scrambled order. Across two studies, we observed that representations of these novel objects were reactivated during a subsequent rest. As in rodents, human "replay" events occurred in sequences accelerated in time, compared to actual experience, and reversed their direction after a reward. Notably, replay did not simply recapitulate visual experience, but followed instead a sequence implied by learned abstract knowledge. Furthermore, each replay contained more than sensory representations of the relevant objects. A sensory code of object representations was preceded 50 ms by a code factorized into sequence position and sequence identity. We argue that this factorized representation facilitates the generalization of a previously learned structure to new objects.

Decoding cognition from spontaneous neural activity.

In human neuroscience, studies of cognition are rarely grounded in non-task-evoked, 'spontaneous' neural activity. Indeed, studies of spontaneous activity tend to focus predominantly on intrinsic neural patterns (for example, resting-state networks). Taking a 'representation-rich' approach bridges the gap between cognition and resting-state communities: this approach relies on decoding task-related representations from spontaneous neural activity, allowing quantification of the representational content and rich dynamics of such activity. For example, if we know the neural representation of an episodic memory, we can decode its subsequent replay during rest. We argue that such an approach advances cognitive research beyond a focus on immediate task demand and provides insight into the functional relevance of the intrinsic neural pattern (for example, the default mode network). This in turn enables a greater integration between human and animal neuroscience, facilitating experimental testing of theoretical accounts of intrinsic activity, and opening new avenues of research in psychiatry.

Trajectories through semantic spaces in schizophrenia and the relationship to ripple bursts.

Human cognition is underpinned by structured internal representations that encode relationships between entities in the world (cognitive maps). Clinical features of schizophrenia-from thought disorder to delusions-are proposed to reflect disorganization in such conceptual representations. Schizophrenia is also linked to abnormalities in neural processes that support cognitive map representations, including hippocampal replay and high-frequency ripple oscillations. Here, we report a computational assay of semantically guided conceptual sampling and exploit this to test a hypothesis that people with schizophrenia (PScz) exhibit abnormalities in semantically guided cognition that relate to hippocampal replay and ripples. Fifty-two participants [26 PScz (13 unmedicated) and 26 age-, gender-, and intelligence quotient (IQ)-matched nonclinical controls] completed a category- and letter-verbal fluency task, followed by a magnetoencephalography (MEG) scan involving a separate sequence-learning task. We used a pretrained word embedding model of semantic similarity, coupled to a computational model of word selection, to quantify the degree to which each participant's verbal behavior was guided by semantic similarity. Using MEG, we indexed neural replay and ripple power in a post-task rest session. Across all participants, word selection was strongly influenced by semantic similarity. The strength of this influence showed sensitivity to task demands (category > letter fluency) and predicted performance. In line with our hypothesis, the influence of semantic similarity on behavior was reduced in schizophrenia relative to controls, predicted negative psychotic symptoms, and correlated with an MEG signature of hippocampal ripple power (but not replay). The findings bridge a gap between phenomenological and neurocomputational accounts of schizophrenia.

Distinct replay signatures for prospective decision-making and memory preservation.

Theories of neural replay propose that it supports a range of functions, most prominently planning and memory consolidation. Here, we test the hypothesis that distinct signatures of replay in the same task are related to model-based decision-making ("planning") and memory preservation. We designed a reward learning task wherein participants utilized structure knowledge for model-based evaluation, while at the same time had to maintain knowledge of two independent and randomly alternating task environments. Using magnetoencephalography and multivariate analysis, we first identified temporally compressed sequential reactivation, or replay, both prior to choice and following reward feedback. Before choice, prospective replay strength was enhanced for the current task-relevant environment when a model-based planning strategy was beneficial. Following reward receipt, and consistent with a memory preservation role, replay for the alternative distal task environment was enhanced as a function of decreasing recency of experience with that environment. Critically, these planning and memory preservation relationships were selective to pre-choice and post-feedback periods, respectively. Our results provide support for key theoretical proposals regarding the functional role of replay and demonstrate that the relative strength of planning and memory-related signals are modulated by ongoing computational and task demands.

The influence of subcortical shortcuts on disordered sensory and cognitive processing.

The very earliest stages of sensory processing have the potential to alter how we perceive and respond to our environment. These initial processing circuits can incorporate subcortical regions, such as the thalamus and brainstem nuclei, which mediate complex interactions with the brain's cortical processing hierarchy. These subcortical pathways, many of which we share with other animals, are not merely vestigial but appear to function as 'shortcuts' that ensure processing efficiency and preservation of vital life-preserving functions, such as harm avoidance, adaptive social interactions and efficient decision-making. Here, we propose that functional interactions between these higher-order and lower-order brain areas contribute to atypical sensory and cognitive processing that characterizes numerous neuropsychiatric disorders.

Parallel cognitive maps for multiple knowledge structures in the hippocampal formation.

The hippocampal-entorhinal system uses cognitive maps to represent spatial knowledge and other types of relational information. However, objects can often be characterized by different types of relations simultaneously. How does the hippocampal formation handle the embedding of stimuli in multiple relational structures that differ vastly in their mode and timescale of acquisition? Does the hippocampal formation integrate different stimulus dimensions into one conjunctive map or is each dimension represented in a parallel map? Here, we reanalyzed human functional magnetic resonance imaging data from Garvert et al. (2017) that had previously revealed a map in the hippocampal formation coding for a newly learnt transition structure. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging adaptation analysis, we found that the degree of representational similarity in the bilateral hippocampus also decreased as a function of the semantic distance between presented objects. Importantly, while both map-like structures localized to the hippocampal formation, the semantic map was located in more posterior regions of the hippocampal formation than the transition structure and thus anatomically distinct. This finding supports the idea that the hippocampal-entorhinal system forms parallel cognitive maps that reflect the embedding of objects in diverse relational structures.

Boosting Serotonin Increases Information Gathering by Reducing Subjective Cognitive Costs.

Serotonin is implicated in the valuation of aversive costs, such as delay or physical effort. However, its role in governing sensitivity to cognitive effort, for example, deliberation costs during information gathering, is unclear. We show that treatment with a serotonergic antidepressant in healthy human individuals of either sex enhances a willingness to gather information when trying to maximize reward. Using computational modeling, we show this arises from a diminished sensitivity to subjective deliberation costs during the sampling process. This result is consistent with the notion that serotonin alleviates sensitivity to aversive costs in a domain-general fashion, with implications for its potential contribution to a positive impact on motivational deficits in psychiatric disorders.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Gathering information about the world is essential for successfully navigating it. However, sampling information is costly, and we need to balance between gathering too little and too much information. The neurocomputational mechanisms underlying this arbitration between a putative gain, such as reward, and the associated costs, such as allocation of cognitive resources, remain unclear. In this study, we show that week-long daily treatment with a serotonergic antidepressant enhances a willingness to gather information when trying to maximize reward. Computational modeling indicates this arises from a reduced perception of aversive costs, rendering information gathering less cognitively effortful. This finding points to a candidate mechanism by which serotonergic treatment might help alleviate motivational deficits in a range of mental illnesses.

Human subjects exploit a cognitive map for credit assignment.

An influential reinforcement learning framework proposes that behavior is jointly governed by model-free (MF) and model-based (MB) controllers. The former learns the values of actions directly from past encounters, and the latter exploits a cognitive map of the task to calculate these prospectively. Considerable attention has been paid to how these systems interact during choice, but how and whether knowledge of a cognitive map contributes to the way MF and MB controllers assign credit (i.e., to how they revaluate actions and states following the receipt of an outcome) remains underexplored. Here, we examine such sophisticated credit assignment using a dual-outcome bandit task. We provide evidence that knowledge of a cognitive map influences credit assignment in both MF and MB systems, mediating subtly different aspects of apparent relevance. Specifically, we show MF credit assignment is enhanced for those rewards that are related to a choice, and this contrasted with choice-unrelated rewards that reinforced subsequent choices negatively. This modulation is only possible based on knowledge of task structure. On the other hand, MB credit assignment was boosted for outcomes that impacted on differences in values between offered bandits. We consider mechanistic accounts and the normative status of these findings. We suggest the findings extend the scope and sophistication of cognitive map-based credit assignment during reinforcement learning, with implications for understanding behavioral control.

Disrupted state transition learning as a computational marker of compulsivity.

BACKGROUND: Disorders involving compulsivity, fear, and anxiety are linked to beliefs that the world is less predictable. We lack a mechanistic explanation for how such beliefs arise. Here, we test a hypothesis that in people with compulsivity, fear, and anxiety, learning a probabilistic mapping between actions and environmental states is compromised. METHODS: In Study 1 (n = 174), we designed a novel online task that isolated state transition learning from other facets of learning and planning. To determine whether this impairment is due to learning that is too fast or too slow, we estimated state transition learning rates by fitting computational models to two independent datasets, which tested learning in environments in which state transitions were either stable (Study 2: n = 1413) or changing (Study 3: n = 192). RESULTS: Study 1 established that individuals with higher levels of compulsivity are more likely to demonstrate an impairment in state transition learning. Preliminary evidence here linked this impairment to a common factor comprising compulsivity and fear. Studies 2 and 3 showed that compulsivity is associated with learning that is too fast when it should be slow (i.e. when state transition are stable) and too slow when it should be fast (i.e. when state transitions change). CONCLUSIONS: Together, these findings indicate that compulsivity is associated with a dysregulation of state transition learning, wherein the rate of learning is not well adapted to the task environment. Thus, dysregulated state transition learning might provide a key target for therapeutic intervention in compulsivity.

Resilient functioning is associated with altered structural brain network topology in adolescents exposed to childhood adversity.

Childhood adversity is one of the strongest predictors of adolescent mental illness. Therefore, it is critical that the mechanisms that aid resilient functioning in individuals exposed to childhood adversity are better understood. Here, we examined whether resilient functioning was related to structural brain network topology. We quantified resilient functioning at the individual level as psychosocial functioning adjusted for the severity of childhood adversity in a large sample of adolescents (N = 2406, aged 14-24). Next, we examined nodal degree (the number of connections that brain regions have in a network) using brain-wide cortical thickness measures in a representative subset (N = 275) using a sliding window approach. We found that higher resilient functioning was associated with lower nodal degree of multiple regions including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex, and the posterior superior temporal sulcus (z > 1.645). During adolescence, decreases in nodal degree are thought to reflect a normative developmental process that is part of the extensive remodeling of structural brain network topology. Prior findings in this sample showed that decreased nodal degree was associated with age, as such our findings of negative associations between nodal degree and resilient functioning may therefore potentially resemble a more mature structural network configuration in individuals with higher resilient functioning.

Dogmatism manifests in lowered information search under uncertainty.

When knowledge is scarce, it is adaptive to seek further information to resolve uncertainty and obtain a more accurate worldview. Biases in such information-seeking behavior can contribute to the maintenance of inaccurate views. Here, we investigate whether predispositions for uncertainty-guided information seeking relate to individual differences in dogmatism, a phenomenon linked to entrenched beliefs in political, scientific, and religious discourse. We addressed this question in a perceptual decision-making task, allowing us to rule out motivational factors and isolate the role of uncertainty. In two independent general population samples (n = 370 and n = 364), we show that more dogmatic participants are less likely to seek out new information to refine an initial perceptual decision, leading to a reduction in overall belief accuracy despite similar initial decision performance. Trial-by-trial modeling revealed that dogmatic participants placed less reliance on internal signals of uncertainty (confidence) to guide information search, rendering them less likely to seek additional information to update beliefs derived from weak or uncertain initial evidence. Together, our results highlight a cognitive mechanism that may contribute to the formation of dogmatic worldviews.

Uncertainty in learning, choice, and visual fixation.

Uncertainty plays a critical role in reinforcement learning and decision making. However, exactly how it influences behavior remains unclear. Multiarmed-bandit tasks offer an ideal test bed, since computational tools such as approximate Kalman filters can closely characterize the interplay between trial-by-trial values, uncertainty, learning, and choice. To gain additional insight into learning and choice processes, we obtained data from subjects' overt allocation of gaze. The estimated value and estimation uncertainty of options influenced what subjects looked at before choosing; these same quantities also influenced choice, as additionally did fixation itself. A momentary measure of uncertainty in the form of absolute prediction errors determined how long participants looked at the obtained outcomes. These findings affirm the importance of uncertainty in multiple facets of behavior and help delineate its effects on decision making.

Compulsivity is linked to reduced adolescent development of goal-directed control and frontostriatal functional connectivity.

A characteristic of adaptive behavior is its goal-directed nature. An ability to act in a goal-directed manner is progressively refined during development, but this refinement can be impacted by the emergence of psychiatric disorders. Disorders of compulsivity have been framed computationally as a deficit in model-based control, and have been linked also to abnormal frontostriatal connectivity. However, the developmental trajectory of model-based control, including an interplay between its maturation and an emergence of compulsivity, has not been characterized. Availing of a large sample of healthy adolescents (n = 569) aged 14 to 24 y, we show behaviorally that over the course of adolescence there is a within-person increase in model-based control, and this is more pronounced in younger participants. Using a bivariate latent change score model, we provide evidence that the presence of higher compulsivity traits is associated with an atypical profile of this developmental maturation in model-based control. Resting-state fMRI data from a subset of the behaviorally assessed subjects (n = 230) revealed that compulsivity is associated with a less pronounced change of within-subject developmental remodeling of functional connectivity, specifically between the striatum and a frontoparietal network. Thus, in an otherwise clinically healthy population sample, in early development, individual differences in compulsivity are linked to the developmental trajectory of model-based control and a remodeling of frontostriatal connectivity.

Conservative and disruptive modes of adolescent change in human brain functional connectivity.

Adolescent changes in human brain function are not entirely understood. Here, we used multiecho functional MRI (fMRI) to measure developmental change in functional connectivity (FC) of resting-state oscillations between pairs of 330 cortical regions and 16 subcortical regions in 298 healthy adolescents scanned 520 times. Participants were aged 14 to 26 y and were scanned on 1 to 3 occasions at least 6 mo apart. We found 2 distinct modes of age-related change in FC: "conservative" and "disruptive." Conservative development was characteristic of primary cortex, which was strongly connected at 14 y and became even more connected in the period from 14 to 26 y. Disruptive development was characteristic of association cortex and subcortical regions, where connectivity was remodeled: connections that were weak at 14 y became stronger during adolescence, and connections that were strong at 14 y became weaker. These modes of development were quantified using the maturational index (MI), estimated as Spearman's correlation between edgewise baseline FC (at 14 y, [Formula: see text]) and adolescent change in FC ([Formula: see text]), at each region. Disruptive systems (with negative MI) were activated by social cognition and autobiographical memory tasks in prior fMRI data and significantly colocated with prior maps of aerobic glycolysis (AG), AG-related gene expression, postnatal cortical surface expansion, and adolescent shrinkage of cortical thickness. The presence of these 2 modes of development was robust to numerous sensitivity analyses. We conclude that human brain organization is disrupted during adolescence by remodeling of FC between association cortical and subcortical areas.

A Neurocomputational Model for Intrinsic Reward.

Standard economic indicators provide an incomplete picture of what we value both as individuals and as a society. Furthermore, canonical macroeconomic measures, such as GDP, do not account for non-market activities (e.g., cooking, childcare) that nevertheless impact well-being. Here, we introduce a computational tool that measures the affective value of experiences (e.g., playing a musical instrument without errors). We go on to validate this tool with neural data, using fMRI to measure neural activity in male and female human subjects performing a reinforcement learning task that incorporated periodic ratings of subjective affective state. Learning performance determined level of payment (i.e., extrinsic reward). Crucially, the task also incorporated a skilled performance component (i.e., intrinsic reward) which did not influence payment. Both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards influenced affective dynamics, and their relative influence could be captured in our computational model. Individuals for whom intrinsic rewards had a greater influence on affective state than extrinsic rewards had greater ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) activity for intrinsic than extrinsic rewards. Thus, we show that computational modeling of affective dynamics can index the subjective value of intrinsic relative to extrinsic rewards, a "computational hedonometer" that reflects both behavior and neural activity that quantifies the affective value of experience.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Traditional economic indicators are increasingly recognized to provide an incomplete picture of what we value as a society. Standard economic approaches struggle to accurately assign values to non-market activities that nevertheless may be intrinsically rewarding, prompting a need for new tools to measure what really matters to individuals. Using a combination of neuroimaging and computational modeling, we show that despite their lack of instrumental value, intrinsic rewards influence subjective affective state and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) activity. The relative degree to which extrinsic and intrinsic rewards influence affective state is predictive of their relative impacts on neural activity, confirming the utility of our approach for measuring the affective value of experiences and other non-market activities in individuals.

Model based planners reflect on their model-free propensities.

Dual-reinforcement learning theory proposes behaviour is under the tutelage of a retrospective, value-caching, model-free (MF) system and a prospective-planning, model-based (MB), system. This architecture raises a question as to the degree to which, when devising a plan, a MB controller takes account of influences from its MF counterpart. We present evidence that such a sophisticated self-reflective MB planner incorporates an anticipation of the influences its own MF-proclivities exerts on the execution of its planned future actions. Using a novel bandit task, wherein subjects were periodically allowed to design their environment, we show that reward-assignments were constructed in a manner consistent with a MB system taking account of its MF propensities. Thus, in the task participants assigned higher rewards to bandits that were momentarily associated with stronger MF tendencies. Our findings have implications for a range of decision making domains that includes drug abuse, pre-commitment, and the tension between short and long-term decision horizons in economics.

Explaining distortions in metacognition with an attractor network model of decision uncertainty.

Metacognition is the ability to reflect on, and evaluate, our cognition and behaviour. Distortions in metacognition are common in mental health disorders, though the neural underpinnings of such dysfunction are unknown. One reason for this is that models of key components of metacognition, such as decision confidence, are generally specified at an algorithmic or process level. While such models can be used to relate brain function to psychopathology, they are difficult to map to a neurobiological mechanism. Here, we develop a biologically-plausible model of decision uncertainty in an attempt to bridge this gap. We first relate the model's uncertainty in perceptual decisions to standard metrics of metacognition, namely mean confidence level (bias) and the accuracy of metacognitive judgments (sensitivity). We show that dissociable shifts in metacognition are associated with isolated disturbances at higher-order levels of a circuit associated with self-monitoring, akin to neuropsychological findings that highlight the detrimental effect of prefrontal brain lesions on metacognitive performance. Notably, we are able to account for empirical confidence judgements by fitting the parameters of our biophysical model to first-order performance data, specifically choice and response times. Lastly, in a reanalysis of existing data we show that self-reported mental health symptoms relate to disturbances in an uncertainty-monitoring component of the network. By bridging a gap between a biologically-plausible model of confidence formation and observed disturbances of metacognition in mental health disorders we provide a first step towards mapping theoretical constructs of metacognition onto dynamical models of decision uncertainty. In doing so, we provide a computational framework for modelling metacognitive performance in settings where access to explicit confidence reports is not possible.

Mobile Data Collection of Cognitive-Behavioral Tasks in Substance Use Disorders: Where Are We Now?

INTRODUCTION: Over the last decades, our understanding of the cognitive, motivational, and neural processes involved in addictive behavior has increased enormously. A plethora of laboratory-based and cross-sectional studies has linked cognitive-behavioral measures to between-subject differences in drinking behavior. However, such laboratory-based studies inevitably suffer from small sample sizes and the inability to link temporal fluctuations in task measures to fluctuations in real-life substance use. To overcome these problems, several existing behavioral tasks have been transferred to smartphones to allow studying cognition in the field. METHOD: In this narrative review, we first summarize studies that used existing behavioral tasks in the laboratory and self-reports of substance use with ecological momentary assessment (EMA) in the field. Next, we review studies on psychometric properties of smartphone-based behavioral tasks. Finally, we review studies that used both smartphone-based tasks and self-reports with EMA in the field. RESULTS: Overall, studies were scarce and heterogenous both in tasks and in study outcomes. Nevertheless, existing findings are promising and point toward several methodological recommendations: concerning psychometrics, studies show that - although more systematic studies are necessary - task validity and reliability can be improved, for example, by analyzing several measurement sessions at once rather than analyzing sessions separately. Studies that use tasks in the field, moreover, show that power can be improved by choosing sampling schemes that combine time-based with event-based sampling, rather than relying on time-based sampling alone. Increasing sampling frequency can further increase power. However, as this also increases the burden to participants, more research is necessary to determine the ideal sampling frequency for each task. CONCLUSION: Although more research is necessary to systematically study both the psychometrics of smartphone-based tasks and the frequency at which task measures fluctuate, existing studies are promising and reveal important methodological recommendations useful for researchers interested in implementing behavioral tasks in EMA studies.

Endogenous fluctuations in the dopaminergic midbrain drive behavioral choice variability.

Human behavior is surprisingly variable, even when facing the same problem under identical circumstances. A prominent example is risky decision making. Economic theories struggle to explain why humans are so inconsistent. Resting-state studies suggest that ongoing endogenous fluctuations in brain activity can influence low-level perceptual and motor processes, but it remains unknown whether endogenous fluctuations also influence high-level cognitive processes including decision making. Here, using real-time functional magnetic resonance imaging, we tested whether risky decision making is influenced by endogenous fluctuations in blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) activity in the dopaminergic midbrain, encompassing ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra. We show that low prestimulus brain activity leads to increased risky choice in humans. Using computational modeling, we show that increased risk taking is explained by enhanced phasic responses to offers in a decision network. Our findings demonstrate that endogenous brain activity provides a physiological basis for variability in complex human behavior.