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Observational studies are increasingly used to provide real-world evidence in regulatory decision-making. The RCT-DUPLICATE initiative conducted observational studies emulating two trials in patients with asthma and three in COPD. For each trial, new-user cohorts were constructed from two US healthcare claims databases, comparing initiators of the study and comparator drugs, matched on propensity scores. Proportional hazards models were used to compare the treatments on study outcomes. The observational studies involved more subjects than the corresponding trials, with treatment arms well-matched on baseline characteristics. An asthma example involved emulation of the 26-week FDA-mandated D5896 trial. With 6,494 asthma patients per arm, the hazard ratio (HR) of a serious asthma-related event with budesonide-formoterol versus budesonide was 1.29 (95% CI: 0.63-2.65), compared with 1.07 (95% CI: 0.70-1.65) in the trial. A COPD example is the emulation of the one-year IMPACT trial. With 4,365 COPD patients per arm, the HR of a COPD exacerbation with triple therapy versus dual bronchodilators was 1.08 (95% CI: 1.00-1.17), compared with 0.84 (95% CI: 0.78-0.91) in the trial. We found mainly discordant results between observational analyses and randomized trials, likely from the forced discontinuation of treatments prior to randomization in the trials, not mimicable in the observational analyses.
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Policy Points Health care systems around the world rely on a range of methods to ensure the affordability of prescription drugs, including negotiating prices soon after drug approval and relying on formal clinical assessments that compare newly approved therapies with existing alternatives. The negotiation framework established under the Inflation Reduction Act is far more limited than other frameworks explored in this study. Adding elements from these frameworks could lead to more effective price negotiation in the United States. CONTEXT: In 2022, Congress passed the Inflation Reduction Act, which allowed Medicare, for the first time, to begin negotiating the prices for certain high-cost brand-name prescription drugs. Many other industrialized countries negotiate drug prices, and we sought to compare and contrast key features of the negotiation process across several health systems. We focused, in particular, on the criteria for selecting drugs for price negotiation, procedures for negotiation, factors that influence negotiated prices, and how prices are implemented. METHODS: We included four G7 countries in our analysis (Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom [England]), two Benelux countries (Belgium and the Netherlands), and one Scandinavian country (Norway) with long-established frameworks for drug price negotiation. We also analyzed the Veterans Affairs Health System in the United States. For each system, we gathered relevant legislation, government publications, and guidelines to understand negotiation frameworks, and we reached out to key drug price negotiators in each system to conduct semistructured interviews. All interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded, and data were analyzed based on an internal assessment tool that we developed. FINDINGS: All eight systems negotiate the prices of brand-name prescription drugs soon after approval and rely on formal clinical assessments that compare newly approved drugs with existing therapies. Systems in our study differed on characteristics such as whether the body performing clinical assessments is separate from the negotiating authority, how added health benefit is assessed, whether explicit willingness-to-pay thresholds are employed, and how specific approaches for priority disease areas are taken. CONCLUSIONS: High-income countries around the world adopt different approaches to conducting price negotiations on brand-name drugs but coalesce around a set of practices that will largely be absent from the current Medicare negotiation framework. US policymakers might consider adding some of these characteristics in the future to improve negotiation outcomes.
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Eligible pediatric hospitals can purchase clinician-administered drugs at discounted rates through the 340B Drug Pricing Program and charge payers prices exceeding drug acquisition costs, but the magnitude of these markups is not known. In a study of newly approved oncology drugs at pediatric 340B hospitals, median negotiated prices ranged from 102% (interquartile range [IQR]: 91%-156%) of average sales price (ASP) at Phoenix Children's Hospital to 630% (IQR: 526%-630%) at Driscoll Children's Hospital. Pediatric hospitals participating in the federal 340B Drug Pricing Program can extract steep payments on new drugs from commercial insurers, though with wide variation between and within hospitals.
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Antineoplásicos , Custos de Medicamentos , Hospitais Pediátricos , Humanos , Hospitais Pediátricos/economia , Antineoplásicos/economia , Criança , Estados Unidos , Neoplasias/tratamento farmacológico , Neoplasias/economiaRESUMO
BACKGROUND: In 2019, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the first generic maintenance inhaler for asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). The inhaler, Wixela Inhub (fluticasone-salmeterol; Viatris), is a substitutable version of the dry powder inhaler Advair Diskus (fluticasone-salmeterol; GlaxoSmithKline). When approving complex generic products like inhalers, the FDA applies a special "weight-of-evidence" approach. In this case, manufacturers were required to perform a randomized controlled trial in patients with asthma but not COPD, although the product received approval for both indications. OBJECTIVE: To compare the effectiveness and safety of generic (Wixela Inhub) and brand-name (Advair Diskus) fluticasone-salmeterol among patients with COPD treated in routine care. DESIGN: A 1:1 propensity score-matched cohort study. SETTING: A large, longitudinal health care database. PATIENTS: Adults older than 40 years with a diagnosis of COPD. MEASUREMENTS: Incidence of first moderate or severe COPD exacerbation (effectiveness outcome) and incidence of first pneumonia hospitalization (safety outcome) in the 365 days after cohort entry. RESULTS: Among 45 369 patients (27 305 Advair Diskus users and 18 064 Wixela Inhub users), 10 012 matched pairs were identified for the primary analysis. Compared with Advair Diskus use, Wixela Inhub use was associated with a nearly identical incidence of first moderate or severe COPD exacerbation (hazard ratio [HR], 0.97 [95% CI, 0.90 to 1.04]) and first pneumonia hospitalization (HR, 0.99 [CI, 0.86 to 1.15]). LIMITATIONS: Follow-up times were short, reflecting real-world clinical practice. The possibility of residual confounding cannot be completely excluded. CONCLUSION: Use of generic and brand-name fluticasone-salmeterol was associated with similar outcomes among patients with COPD treated in routine practice. PRIMARY FUNDING SOURCE: National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute.
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Asma , Pneumonia , Doença Pulmonar Obstrutiva Crônica , Adulto , Humanos , Combinação Fluticasona-Salmeterol/efeitos adversos , Broncodilatadores/efeitos adversos , Estudos de Coortes , Doença Pulmonar Obstrutiva Crônica/tratamento farmacológico , Doença Pulmonar Obstrutiva Crônica/diagnóstico , Xinafoato de Salmeterol/uso terapêutico , Fluticasona/uso terapêutico , Asma/tratamento farmacológico , Administração por Inalação , Pneumonia/tratamento farmacológico , Combinação de Medicamentos , Androstadienos/efeitos adversosRESUMO
BACKGROUND: Insulin is the primary treatment for type 1 and some type 2 diabetes but remains costly in the United States, even though it was discovered more than a century ago. High prices can lead to nonadherence and are often sustained by patents and regulatory exclusivities that limit competition on brand-name products. We sought to examine how manufacturers have used patents and regulatory exclusivities on insulin products approved from 1986 to 2019 to extend periods of market exclusivity. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We used the publicly available Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book) to identify all approved biosynthetic insulin products. Individual products approved under the same New Drug Application (NDA)-e.g., a vial and pen-were considered as separate products for the purposes of analysis. We recorded all patents and regulatory exclusivities listed in the Orange Book on each product and used Google Patents to extract the timing of patent application and whether patents were obtained on delivery devices or others aspects of the product. The primary outcome was the duration of expected protection, which was determined by subtracting the FDA approval date for each product from its last-to-expire patent or regulatory exclusivity (whichever occurred later). We performed a secondary analysis that considered overall protection on insulin lines-defined as groups of products approved under the same NDA with the same active ingredients manufactured by the same company. We also examined competition from follow-on insulin products-defined as products approved with the same active ingredients as originators but manufactured by different companies (approved via a specific drug approval pathway under section 505(b)(2) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). During the study period, the FDA approved 56 individual products across 25 different insulin lines and 5 follow-ons across 3 different insulin lines. Thirty-three (59%) of the 56 products were drug-device combinations. Manufacturers of 9 products approved during the study period obtained patents filed after FDA approval that extended their duration of expected protection (by a median of 6 years). Approximately 63% of all patents on drug-device combinations approved during the study period were related to delivery devices. The median duration of expected protection on insulin products was 16.0 years, and the median protection on insulin lines was 17.6 years. An important limitation of our analysis is that manufacturers may continue to add patents on existing insulin products while competitors may challenge patents; therefore, periods of protection may change over time. CONCLUSIONS: Among several strategies that insulin manufacturers have employed to extend periods of market exclusivity on brand-name insulin products are filing patents after FDA approval and obtaining a large number of patents on delivery devices. Policy reforms are needed to promote timely competition in the pharmaceutical market and ensure that patients have access to low-cost drugs.
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Diabetes Mellitus Tipo 2 , Humanos , Estados Unidos , United States Food and Drug Administration , Preparações Farmacêuticas , Aprovação de Drogas , Combinação de Medicamentos , InsulinaRESUMO
Importance: Glucagon-like peptide 1 (GLP-1) receptor agonists were first approved for the treatment of type 2 diabetes in 2005. Demand for these drugs has increased rapidly in recent years, as indications have expanded, but they remain expensive. Objective: To analyze how manufacturers of brand-name GLP-1 receptor agonists have used the patent and regulatory systems to extend periods of market exclusivity. Evidence Review: The annual US Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Approved Drug Products With Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations was used to identify GLP-1 receptor agonists approved from 2005 to 2021 and to record patents and nonpatent statutory exclusivities listed for each product. Google Patents was used to extract additional data on patents, including whether each was obtained on the delivery device or another aspect of the product. The primary outcome was the duration of expected protection from generic competition, defined as the time elapsed from FDA approval until expiration of the last-to-expire patent or regulatory exclusivity. Findings: On the 10 GLP-1 receptor agonists included in the cohort, drug manufacturers listed with the FDA a median of 19.5 patents (IQR, 9.0-25.8) per product, including a median of 17 patents (IQR, 8.3-22.8) filed before FDA approval and 1.5 (IQR, 0-2.8) filed after FDA approval. Fifty-four percent of all patents listed on GLP-1 receptor agonists were on the delivery devices rather than active ingredients. Manufacturers augmented patent protection with a median of 2 regulatory exclusivities (IQR, 0-3) obtained at approval and 1 (IQR, 0.3-4.3) added after approval. The median total duration of expected protection after FDA approval, when accounting for both preapproval and postapproval patents and regulatory exclusivities, was 18.3 years (IQR, 16.0-19.4). No generic firm has successfully challenged patents on GLP-1 receptor agonists to gain FDA approval. Conclusions and Relevance: Patent and regulatory reform is needed to ensure timely generic entry of GLP-1 receptor agonists to the market.
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Diabetes Mellitus Tipo 2 , Aprovação de Drogas , Medicamentos Genéricos , Receptor do Peptídeo Semelhante ao Glucagon 1 , Hipoglicemiantes , Patentes como Assunto , Humanos , Diabetes Mellitus Tipo 2/tratamento farmacológico , Diabetes Mellitus Tipo 2/economia , Aprovação de Drogas/legislação & jurisprudência , Medicamentos Genéricos/economia , Medicamentos Genéricos/uso terapêutico , Receptor do Peptídeo Semelhante ao Glucagon 1/agonistas , Preparações Farmacêuticas/economia , Hipoglicemiantes/economia , Hipoglicemiantes/uso terapêutico , Patentes como Assunto/legislação & jurisprudência , Estados Unidos , Equivalência Terapêutica , Comércio , Competição Econômica/economia , Competição Econômica/legislação & jurisprudência , Fatores de TempoRESUMO
Policy Points Only a small minority of new drugs in "nonprotected" classes are widely covered by Part D plans nationwide in the year after US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. Part D plans frequently apply utilization management restrictions such as prior authorizations to newly approved drugs in both protected and nonprotected classes. Drug price influences both formulary inclusion (in nonprotected classes) and coverage restrictions (in both protected and nonprotected classes), while other drug characteristics such as therapeutic benefits are not consistently associated with formulary design. Plans do not seem to favor the minority of drugs that are determined to offer added therapeutic benefit over existing alternatives. CONTEXT: Medicare Part D is an outpatient prescription drug benefit for older Americans covering more than 46 million beneficiaries. Except for mandatory coverage for essentially all drugs in six protected classes, plans have substantial flexibility in how they design their formularies: which drugs are covered, which drugs are subject to restrictions, and what factors determine formulary placement. Our objective in this paper was to document the extent to which Part D plans limit coverage of newly approved drugs. METHODS: We examined the formulary design of 4,582 Part D plans from 2014 through 2018 and measured (1) the decision to cover newly approved drugs in nonprotected classes, (2) use of utilization management tools in protected and nonprotected classes, and (3) the association between plan design and drug-level characteristics such as 30-day cost, therapeutic benefit, and the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) expedited regulatory pathway. FINDINGS: The FDA approved 109 new drugs predominantly used in outpatient settings between 2013 and 2017. Of these, 75 fell outside of the six protected drug classes. One-fifth of drugs in nonprotected classes (15 out of 75) were covered by more than half of plans during the first year after approval. Coverage was often conditional on utilization management strategies in both protected and nonprotected classes: only seven drugs (6%) were covered without prior authorization requirements in more than half of plans. Higher 30-day drug costs were associated with more widespread coverage in nonprotected classes: drugs that cost less than $150 for a 30-day course were covered by fewer than 20% of plans while those that cost more than $30,000 per 30 days were covered by more than 50% of plans. Plans were also more likely to implement utilization management tools on high-cost drugs in both protected and nonprotected classes. A higher proportion of plans implemented utilization management strategies on covered drugs with first-in-class status than drugs that were not first in class. Other drug characteristics, including availability of added therapeutic benefit and inclusion in FDA expedited regulatory approval, were not consistently associated with plan coverage or formulary restrictions. CONCLUSIONS: Newly approved drugs are frequently subject to formulary exclusions and restrictions in Medicare Part D. Ensuring that formulary design in Part D is linked closely to the therapeutic value of newly approved drugs would improve patients' welfare.
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Medicare Part D , Medicamentos sob Prescrição , Idoso , Custos de Medicamentos , Humanos , Estados Unidos , United States Food and Drug AdministrationAssuntos
Antineoplásicos , Custos de Medicamentos , Desenvolvimento de Medicamentos , Medicare , Neoplasias , Idoso , Humanos , Antineoplásicos/economia , Antineoplásicos/uso terapêutico , Custos de Medicamentos/legislação & jurisprudência , Medicare/economia , Medicare/legislação & jurisprudência , Negociação , Neoplasias/tratamento farmacológico , Estados Unidos , Desenvolvimento de Medicamentos/economia , Desenvolvimento de Medicamentos/legislação & jurisprudência , Fatores de TempoRESUMO
Policy Points Spending on prescription drugs is much higher per capita in the United States than in most other industrialized nations, including France. Lower prescription drug spending in France is due to different approaches to managing drug prices, volume of prescribing, and global health budgets. Linking a drug's price to value both at the launch of the drug and over its lifetime is key to controlling spending. Regulations on prescription volume and global spending complement the interventions on prices. If the United States adopted the French approach to regulating drug pricing, Medicare could potentially save billions of dollars annually on prescription drug spending. CONTEXT: Prescription drug spending per capita in the United States is higher than in most other industrialized countries. Policymakers seeking to lower drug spending often suggest benchmarking prices against other countries, including France, which spends half as much as the United States per capita on prescription drugs. Because differences in drug prices may result from how markets are organized in each nation, we sought to directly compare drug prices and pricing regulations between the United States and France. METHODS: For the six brand-name drugs with the highest gross expenditures in Medicare Part D in 2017, we compared the price dynamics in France and the United States between 2010 and 2018 and analyzed associations between price changes in each country and key regulatory events. We also comprehensively reviewed US and French laws and regulations related to drug pricing. FINDINGS: Prices for the six drugs studied were higher in the United States than in France. In 2018, if Medicare had paid French prices for the brand-name drugs in our cohort, the agency would have saved $5.1 billion. We identified 12 factors that explain why the United States spends more than France on drugs, including variations in unit prices and the volume of prescriptions, driven by use of health technology assessment and value-based pricing in France. CONCLUSIONS: Key drivers of lower drug spending in France compared to the United States are that the French government regulates drug prices when products are launched and prohibits substantial price increases after launch. The regulation of prescription drugs in France is governed by rules that can inform discussions of US prescription drug policy and potential Medicare price negotiations.
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Redução de Custos , Regulamentação Governamental , Medicare Part D/economia , Medicamentos sob Prescrição/economia , Custos e Análise de Custo , Custos de Medicamentos/legislação & jurisprudência , França , Cobertura do Seguro , Legislação de Medicamentos , Estados UnidosAssuntos
Negociação , Estados Unidos , Humanos , Custos de Medicamentos , Medicare Part D/economia , Medicare/economiaAssuntos
Doenças Cardiovasculares , Peptídeos Semelhantes ao Glucagon , Humanos , Estados Unidos , Peptídeos Semelhantes ao Glucagon/uso terapêutico , Peptídeos Semelhantes ao Glucagon/economia , Peptídeos Semelhantes ao Glucagon/efeitos adversos , Doenças Cardiovasculares/prevenção & controle , Doenças Cardiovasculares/economia , Hipoglicemiantes/economia , Hipoglicemiantes/uso terapêutico , Medicare/economia , Definição da Elegibilidade , Idoso , Diabetes Mellitus Tipo 2/tratamento farmacológico , Diabetes Mellitus Tipo 2/prevenção & controle , Diabetes Mellitus Tipo 2/economia , Fatores de Risco de Doenças CardíacasAssuntos
Broncodilatadores , Doença Pulmonar Obstrutiva Crônica , Humanos , Combinação Fluticasona-Salmeterol/uso terapêutico , Broncodilatadores/efeitos adversos , Doença Pulmonar Obstrutiva Crônica/tratamento farmacológico , Androstadienos/uso terapêutico , Administração por Inalação , Combinação de MedicamentosAssuntos
Revelação/legislação & jurisprudência , Custos de Medicamentos/legislação & jurisprudência , Indústria Farmacêutica/legislação & jurisprudência , Medicamentos sob Prescrição/economia , Publicidade/legislação & jurisprudência , Humanos , Seguro de Serviços Farmacêuticos , Medicare , Estados UnidosRESUMO
This study analyzes the use and timing of terminal disclaimers in all biologic patents involved in litigation from 2010 to 2023.
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Produtos Biológicos , Patentes como Assunto , Produtos Biológicos/uso terapêuticoRESUMO
This work discusses initiatives designed to capture the value of public investment that will result in an accurate, comprehensive, and transparent paper trail of public funding.
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Controle de Custos , Desenvolvimento de Medicamentos , Financiamento Governamental , Financiamento Governamental/normas , Financiamento Governamental/estatística & dados numéricos , National Institutes of Health (U.S.)/economia , National Institutes of Health (U.S.)/normas , National Institutes of Health (U.S.)/estatística & dados numéricos , Apoio à Pesquisa como Assunto/economia , Apoio à Pesquisa como Assunto/normas , Apoio à Pesquisa como Assunto/estatística & dados numéricos , Estados Unidos , Desenvolvimento de Medicamentos/economia , Desenvolvimento de Medicamentos/estatística & dados numéricos , Medicamentos sob Prescrição/economia , Honorários por Prescrição de Medicamentos/estatística & dados numéricos , Controle de Custos/normas , Controle de Custos/estatística & dados numéricosRESUMO
This study analyzed the US Food and Drug Administrationlisted patents on glucagon-like peptide 1 (GLP-1) receptor agonists to determine their claim characteristics and the potential barriers they pose to generic entry.
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Diabetes Mellitus Tipo 2 , Agonistas do Receptor do Peptídeo 1 Semelhante ao Glucagon , Hipoglicemiantes , Legislação de Dispositivos Médicos , Patentes como Assunto , Humanos , Diabetes Mellitus Tipo 2/tratamento farmacológico , Peptídeo 1 Semelhante ao Glucagon/agonistas , Receptor do Peptídeo Semelhante ao Glucagon 1/agonistas , Agonistas do Receptor do Peptídeo 1 Semelhante ao Glucagon/administração & dosagem , Agonistas do Receptor do Peptídeo 1 Semelhante ao Glucagon/uso terapêutico , Hipoglicemiantes/administração & dosagem , Hipoglicemiantes/uso terapêuticoRESUMO
This Viewpoint discusses how limited-supply agreements (introduction of generic products in reduced volumes) might thwart efforts to negotiate lower prices on prescription drugs in the US.