A Multisite Preregistered Paradigmatic Test of the Ego-Depletion Effect.

We conducted a preregistered multilaboratory project (k = 36; N = 3,531) to assess the size and robustness of ego-depletion effects using a novel replication method, termed the paradigmatic replication approach. Each laboratory implemented one of two procedures that was intended to manipulate self-control and tested performance on a subsequent measure of self-control. Confirmatory tests found a nonsignificant result (d = 0.06). Confirmatory Bayesian meta-analyses using an informed-prior hypothesis (δ = 0.30, SD = 0.15) found that the data were 4 times more likely under the null than the alternative hypothesis. Hence, preregistered analyses did not find evidence for a depletion effect. Exploratory analyses on the full sample (i.e., ignoring exclusion criteria) found a statistically significant effect (d = 0.08); Bayesian analyses showed that the data were about equally likely under the null and informed-prior hypotheses. Exploratory moderator tests suggested that the depletion effect was larger for participants who reported more fatigue but was not moderated by trait self-control, willpower beliefs, or action orientation.

Do Religious Primes Increase Risk Taking? Evidence Against "Anticipating Divine Protection" in Two Preregistered Direct Replications of Kupor, Laurin, and Levav (2015).

Do reminders of God encourage people to take more risks? Kupor, Laurin, and Levav (2015) reported nine studies that all yielded statistically significant results consistent with the hypothesis that they do. We conducted two large-sample Preregistered Direct Replications (N = 1,104) of studies in Kupor et al.'s article (Studies 1a and 1b) and evaluated replicability via (a) statistical significance, (b) a "small-telescopes" approach, (c) Bayes factors (BFs), and (d) meta-analyses pooled across original and replication studies. None of these approaches replicated the original studies' effects. Combining both original studies and both replications yielded strong evidence in support of the null over a default alternative hypothesis, BF01 = 11.04, meaning that the totality of evidence speaks against the possibility that religious primes increased nonmoral risk taking in these designs. This suggests that support for the "anticipating-divine-protection" hypothesis may be overstated.

Analytic cognitive style, not delusional ideation, predicts data gathering in a large beads task study.

INTRODUCTION: It has been proposed that deluded and delusion-prone individuals gather less evidence before forming beliefs than those who are not deluded or delusion-prone. The primary source of evidence for this "jumping to conclusions" (JTC) bias is provided by research that utilises the "beads task" data-gathering paradigm. However, the cognitive mechanisms subserving data gathering in this task are poorly understood. METHODS: In the largest published beads task study to date (n = 558), we examined data gathering in the context of influential dual-process theories of reasoning. RESULTS: Analytic cognitive style (the willingness or disposition to critically evaluate outputs from intuitive processing and engage in effortful analytic processing) predicted data gathering in a non-clinical sample, but delusional ideation did not. CONCLUSION: The relationship between data gathering and analytic cognitive style suggests that dual-process theories of reasoning can contribute to our understanding of the beads task. It is not clear why delusional ideation was not found to be associated with data gathering or analytic cognitive style.

Parochial prosocial religions: Historical and contemporary evidence for a cultural evolutionary process.

In our response to the 27 commentaries, we refine the theoretical claims, clarify several misconceptions of our framework, and explore substantial disagreements. In doing so, we (1) show that our framework accommodates multiple historical scenarios; (2) debate the historical evidence, particularly about "pre-Axial" religions; (3) offer important details about cultural evolutionary theory; (4) clarify the term prosociality; and (4) discuss proximal mechanisms. We review many interesting extensions, amplifications, and qualifications of our approach made by the commentators.

The cultural evolution of prosocial religions.

We develop a cultural evolutionary theory of the origins of prosocial religions and apply it to resolve two puzzles in human psychology and cultural history: (1) the rise of large-scale cooperation among strangers and, simultaneously, (2) the spread of prosocial religions in the last 10-12 millennia. We argue that these two developments were importantly linked and mutually energizing. We explain how a package of culturally evolved religious beliefs and practices characterized by increasingly potent, moralizing, supernatural agents, credible displays of faith, and other psychologically active elements conducive to social solidarity promoted high fertility rates and large-scale cooperation with co-religionists, often contributing to success in intergroup competition and conflict. In turn, prosocial religious beliefs and practices spread and aggregated as these successful groups expanded, or were copied by less successful groups. This synthesis is grounded in the idea that although religious beliefs and practices originally arose as nonadaptive by-products of innate cognitive functions, particular cultural variants were then selected for their prosocial effects in a long-term, cultural evolutionary process. This framework (1) reconciles key aspects of the adaptationist and by-product approaches to the origins of religion, (2) explains a variety of empirical observations that have not received adequate attention, and (3) generates novel predictions. Converging lines of evidence drawn from diverse disciplines provide empirical support while at the same time encouraging new research directions and opening up new questions for exploration and debate.

Methodological concerns underlying a lack of evidence for cultural heterogeneity in the replication of psychological effects.

The multi-site replication study, Many Labs 2, concluded that sample location and setting did not substantially affect the replicability of findings. Here, we examine theoretical and methodological considerations for a subset of the analyses, namely exploratory tests of heterogeneity in the replicability of studies between "WEIRD and less-WEIRD cultures". We conducted a review of literature citing the study, a re-examination of the existing cultural variability, a power stimulation for detecting cultural heterogeneity, and re-analyses of the original exploratory tests. Findings indicate little cultural variability and low power to detect cultural heterogeneity effects in the Many Labs 2 data, yet the literature review indicates the study is cited regarding the moderating role of culture. Our reanalysis of the data found that using different operationalizations of culture slightly increased effect sizes but did not substantially alter the conclusions of Many Labs 2. Future studies of cultural heterogeneity can be improved with theoretical consideration of which effects and which cultures are likely to show variation as well as a priori methodological planning for appropriate operationalizations of culture and sufficient power to detect effects.

'So Help Me God'? Does oath swearing in courtroom scenarios impact trial outcomes?

In countries such as Britain and the US, court witnesses must declare they will provide truthful evidence and are often compelled to publicly choose between religious ("oath") and secular ("affirmation") versions of this declaration. Might defendants who opt to swear an oath enjoy more favourable outcomes than those who choose to affirm? Two preliminary, pre-registered survey studies using minimal vignettes (Study 1, N = 443; Study 2, N = 913) indicated that people associate choice of the oath with credible testimony; and that participants, especially religious participants, discriminate against defendants who affirm. In a third, Registered Report study (Study 3, N = 1821), we used a more elaborate audiovisual mock trial paradigm to better estimate the real-world influence of declaration choice. Participants were asked to render a verdict for a defendant who either swore or affirmed, and were themselves required to swear or affirm that they would try the defendant in good faith. Overall, the defendant was not considered guiltier when affirming rather than swearing, nor did mock-juror belief in God moderate this effect. However, jurors who themselves swore an oath did discriminate against the affirming defendant. Exploratory analyses suggest this effect may be driven by authoritarianism, perhaps because high-authoritarian jurors consider the oath the traditional (and therefore correct) declaration to choose. We discuss the real-world implications of these findings and conclude the religious oath is an antiquated legal ritual that needs reform.

Reminders of secular authority reduce believers' distrust of atheists.

Atheists have long been distrusted, in part because they do not believe that a watchful, judging god monitors their behavior. However, in many parts of the world, secular institutions such as police, judges, and courts are also potent sources of social monitoring that encourage prosocial behavior. Reminders of such secular authority could therefore reduce believers' distrust of atheists. In our experiments, participants who watched a video about police effectiveness (Experiment 1) or were subtly primed with secular-authority concepts (Experiments 2-3) expressed less distrust of atheists than did participants who watched a control video or were not primed, respectively. We tested three distinct alternative explanations for these findings. Compared with control participants, participants primed with secular-authority concepts did not exhibit reduced general prejudice against out-groups (Experiment 1), prejudice reactions associated with functional threats that particular out-groups are perceived to pose (specifically, viewing gays with disgust; Experiment 2), or general distrust of out-groups (Experiment 3). These findings contribute to theory regarding both the psychological bases of prejudices and the psychological functions served by gods and governments.

The Einstein effect provides global evidence for scientific source credibility effects and the influence of religiosity.

People tend to evaluate information from reliable sources more favourably, but it is unclear exactly how perceivers' worldviews interact with this source credibility effect. In a large and diverse cross-cultural sample (N = 10,195 from 24 countries), we presented participants with obscure, meaningless statements attributed to either a spiritual guru or a scientist. We found a robust global source credibility effect for scientific authorities, which we dub 'the Einstein effect': across all 24 countries and all levels of religiosity, scientists held greater authority than spiritual gurus. In addition, individual religiosity predicted a weaker relative preference for the statement from the scientist compared with the spiritual guru, and was more strongly associated with credibility judgements for the guru than the scientist. Independent data on explicit trust ratings across 143 countries mirrored our experimental findings. These findings suggest that irrespective of one's religious worldview, across cultures science is a powerful and universal heuristic that signals the reliability of information.

Practical Methodological Reform Needs Good Theory.

In the face of unreplicable results, statistical anomalies, and outright fraud, introspection and changes in the psychological sciences have taken root. Vibrant reform and metascience movements have emerged. These are exciting developments and may point toward practical improvements in the future. Yet there is nothing so practical as good theory. This article outlines aspects of reform and metascience in psychology that are ripe for an injection of theory, including a lot of excellent and overlooked theoretical work from different disciplines. I review established frameworks that model the process of scientific discovery, the types of scientific networks that we ought to aspire to, and the processes by which problematic norms and institutions might evolve, focusing especially on modeling from the philosophy of science and cultural evolution. We have unwittingly evolved a toxic scientific ecosystem; existing interdisciplinary theory may help us intelligently design a better one.

Mere visual perception of other people's disease symptoms facilitates a more aggressive immune response.

An experiment (N = 28) tested the hypothesis that the mere visual perception of disease-connoting cues promotes a more aggressive immune response. Participants were exposed either to photographs depicting symptoms of infectious disease or to photographs depicting guns. After incubation with a model bacterial stimulus, participants' white blood cells produced higher levels of the proinflammatory cytokine interleukin-6 (IL-6) in the infectious-disease condition, compared with the control (guns) condition. These results provide the first empirical evidence that visual perception of other people's symptoms may cause the immune system to respond more aggressively to infection. Adaptive origins and functional implications are discussed.

Atheist horns and religious halos: Mental representations of atheists and theists.

Theists often receive the benefit of being stereotyped as trustworthy and moral, whereas atheists are viewed as untrustworthy and immoral. The extreme divergence between the stereotypes of theists and atheists suggests that mental images of the two groups may also diverge. We investigated whether people have biased mental images of theists and atheists. The results suggest that mental images of theists are associated with more positive attributes than images of atheists (Study 1), and these mental images influence who is believed to behave morally and immorally (Study 2). Together the findings suggest that mental images may represent a subtle mechanism reinforcing group-based prejudices. (PsycINFO Database Record

Mentalizing skills do not differentiate believers from non-believers, but credibility enhancing displays do.

The ability to mentalize has been marked as an important cognitive mechanism enabling belief in supernatural agents. In five studies we cross-culturally investigated the relationship between mentalizing and belief in supernatural agents with large sample sizes (over 67,000 participants in total) and different operationalizations of mentalizing. The relative importance of mentalizing for endorsing supernatural beliefs was directly compared with credibility enhancing displays-the extent to which people observed credible religious acts during their upbringing. We also compared autistic with neurotypical adolescents. The empathy quotient and the autism-spectrum quotient were not predictive of belief in supernatural agents in all countries (i.e., The Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States), although we did observe a curvilinear effect in the United States. We further observed a strong influence of credibility enhancing displays on belief in supernatural agents. These findings highlight the importance of cultural learning for acquiring supernatural beliefs and ask for reconsiderations of the importance of mentalizing.

Override the controversy: Analytic thinking predicts endorsement of evolution.

Despite overwhelming scientific consensus, popular opinions regarding evolution are starkly divided. In the USA, for example, nearly one in three adults espouse a literal and recent divine creation account of human origins. Plausibly, resistance to scientific conclusions regarding the origins of species-like much resistance to other scientific conclusions (Bloom & Weisberg, 2007)-gains support from reliably developing intuitions. Intuitions about essentialism, teleology, agency, and order may combine to make creationism potentially more cognitively attractive than evolutionary concepts. However, dual process approaches to cognition recognize that people can often analytically override their intuitions. Two large studies (total N=1324) found consistent evidence that a tendency to engage analytic thinking predicted endorsement of evolution, even controlling for relevant demographic, attitudinal, and religious variables. Meanwhile, exposure to religion predicted reduced endorsement of evolution. Cognitive style is one factor among many affecting opinions on the origin of species.

Good for God? Religious motivation reduces perceived responsibility for and morality of good deeds.

Many people view religion as a crucial source of morality. However, 6 experiments (total N = 1,078) revealed that good deeds are perceived as less moral if they are performed for religious reasons. Religiously motivated acts were seen as less moral than the exact same acts performed for other reasons (Experiments 1-2 and 6). Religious motivations also reduced attributions of intention and responsibility (Experiments 3-6), an effect that fully mediated the effect of religious motivations on perceived morality (Experiment 6). The effects were not explained by different perceptions of motivation orientation (i.e., intrinsic vs. extrinsic) across conditions (Experiment 4) and also were evident when religious upbringing led to an intuitive moral response (Experiment 5). Effects generalized across religious and nonreligious participants. When viewing a religiously motivated good deed, people infer that actually helping others is, in part, a side effect of other motivations rather than an end in itself. Thus, religiously motivated actors are seen as less responsible than secular actors for their good deeds, and their helping behavior is viewed as less moral than identical good deeds performed for either unclear or secular motivations.

Everything is permitted? People intuitively judge immorality as representative of atheists.

Scientific research yields inconsistent and contradictory evidence relating religion to moral judgments and outcomes, yet most people on earth nonetheless view belief in God (or gods) as central to morality, and many view atheists with suspicion and scorn. To evaluate intuitions regarding a causal link between religion and morality, this paper tested intuitive moral judgments of atheists and other groups. Across five experiments (N = 1,152), American participants intuitively judged a wide variety of immoral acts (e.g., serial murder, consensual incest, necrobestiality, cannibalism) as representative of atheists, but not of eleven other religious, ethnic, and cultural groups. Even atheist participants judged immoral acts as more representative of atheists than of other groups. These findings demonstrate a prevalent intuition that belief in God serves a necessary function in inhibiting immoral conduct, and may help explain persistent negative perceptions of atheists.

Perceiving Minds and Gods: How Mind Perception Enables, Constrains, and Is Triggered by Belief in Gods.

Most people believe in the existence of empirically unverifiable gods. Despite apparent heterogeneity, people's conceptions of their gods center on predictable themes. Gods are overwhelmingly represented as intentional agents with (more or less) humanlike mental lives. This article reviews converging evidence suggesting that this regularity in god concepts exists in part because the ability to represent gods emerges as a cognitive by-product of the human capability to perceive minds. Basic human mind-perception abilities both facilitate and constrain belief in gods, with profound implications for individual differences in religious beliefs, implicit representations of supernatural agents, and the varieties of nonreligious experience. Furthermore, people react similarly to both reminders of gods and cues of social surveillance (e.g., audiences or video cameras), leading to interesting consequences in the domains of prosocial behavior, socially desirable responding, and self-awareness. Converging evidence indicates that mind perception is both cause and consequence of many religious beliefs.

The origins of religious disbelief.

Although most people are religious, there are hundreds of millions of religious disbelievers in the world. What is religious disbelief and how does it arise? Recent developments in the scientific study of religious beliefs and behaviors point to the conclusion that religious disbelief arises from multiple interacting pathways, traceable to cognitive, motivational, and cultural learning mechanisms. We identify four such pathways, leading to four distinct forms of atheism, which we term mindblind atheism, apatheism, inCREDulous atheism, and analytic atheism. Religious belief and disbelief share the same underlying pathways and can be explained within a single evolutionary framework that is grounded in both genetic and cultural evolution.