Not feeling right about uncertainty monitoring.

De Neys proposed a "switch" model to address what he argued to be lacuna in dual-process theory, in which he theorized about the processes that initiate and terminate analytic thinking. We will argue that the author neglected to acknowledge the abundant literature on metacognitive functions, specifically, the meta-reasoning framework developed by Ackerman and Thompson (2017), that addresses just those questions.

Who resists belief-biased inferences? The role of individual differences in reasoning strategies, working memory, and attentional focus.

A common explanation for individual differences in the ability to draw rule-based inferences, when a putative conclusion suggests a competing belief-based inference, is that the ability to do so depends on working memory capacity. In the following studies, we examined the hypothesis that the ability to draw rule-based inferences in belief bias tasks can also be explained by individual differences in reasoning strategies and in the related attentional focus. The dual-strategy model differentiates counterexample and statistical strategies that involve different information-processing styles. In the first study (N = 139), participants completed a working memory task (operation span), a strategy diagnostic questionnaire, and a belief bias task. The results showed that individual differences in strategy use predicted performance in the belief bias problems over and above any effects of working memory capacity, with counterexample reasoners producing rule-based inferences more often than statistical reasoners. In the second study (N = 196), an eye-tracking methodology was used as a process-tracing technique to investigate attentional differences between the two strategies. On problems showing a conflict between rule-based and belief-based information, counterexample reasoners demonstrated longer fixation times on the premises than did statistical reasoners, thus providing direct evidence that individual differences in strategy use reflect different processing styles. These results clearly indicate that individual differences in strategy use are an important determinant of the way that people make inferences when rule-based and belief-based cues are both present.

Investigating the Synergistic Potential of Low-Dose HDAC3 Inhibition and Radiotherapy in Alzheimer's Disease Models.

We have previously shown that histone deacetylase (HDAC) inhibition and cranial radiotherapy (RT) independently improve molecular and behavioral Alzheimer's disease (AD)-like phenotypes. In the present study, we investigate the synergistic potential of using both RT and HDACi as a low-dose combination therapy (LDCT) to maximize disease modification (reduce neuroinflammation and amyloidogenic APP processing, increase neurotrophic gene expression) while minimizing the potential for treatment-associated side effects.LDCT consisted of daily administration of the HDAC3 inhibitor RGFP966 and/or bi-weekly cranial x-irradiation. Amyloid-beta precursor protein (APP) processing and innate immune response to LDCT were assessed in vitro and in vivo using human and murine cell models and 3xTg-AD mice. After 2 months of LDCT in mice, behavioral analyses as well as expression and modification of key AD-related targets (Aß, tau, Csf1r, Bdnf, etc.) were assessed in the hippocampus (HIP) and prefrontal cortex (PFC).LDCT induced a tolerant, anti-inflammatory innate immune response in microglia and increased non-amyloidogenic APP processing in vitro. Both RT and LDCT improved the rate of learning and spatial memory in the Barnes maze test. LDCT induced a unique anti-AD HIP gene expression profile that included upregulation of neurotrophic genes and downregulation of inflammation-related genes. RT lowered HIP Aß42/40 ratio and Bace1 protein, while LDCT lowered PFC p-tau181 and HIP Bace1 levels.Our study supports the rationale for combining complementary therapeutic approaches at low doses to target multifactorial AD pathology synergistically. Namely, LDCT with RGFP966 and cranial RT shows disease-modifying potential against a wide range of AD-related hallmarks.

Logical intuition is not really about logic.

Recent research suggests that reasoners are able to draw simple logical or probabilistic inferences relatively intuitively and automatically, a capacity that has been termed "logical intuition" (see, e.g., De Neys & Pennycook, 2019). A key finding in support of this interpretation is that conclusion validity consistently interferes with judgments of conclusion believability, suggesting that information about logical validity is available quickly enough to interfere with belief judgments. In this study, we examined whether logical intuitions arise because reasoners are sensitive to the logical features of a problem or another structural feature that just happens to align with logical validity. In three experiments (N = 113, 137, and 254), we presented participants with logical (determinate) and pseudological (indeterminate) arguments and asked them to judge the validity or believability of the conclusion. Logical arguments had determinately valid or invalid conclusions, whereas pseudological arguments were all logically indeterminate, but some were pseudovalid (possible strong arguments) and others pseudoinvalid (possible weak arguments). Experiments 1 and 2 used simple modus ponens and affirming the consequent structures; Experiment 3 used more complex denying the antecedent and modus tollens structures. In all three experiments, we found that pseudovalidity interfered with belief judgments to the same extent as real validity. Altogether, these findings suggest that while people are able to draw inferences intuitively, and these inferences impact belief judgments, they are not logical intuitions. Rather, the intuitive inferences are driven by the processing of more superficial structural features that happen to align with logical validity. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Rule-based reasoning is fast and belief-based reasoning can be slow: Challenging current explanations of belief-bias and base-rate neglect.

It is commonly assumed that belief-based reasoning is fast and automatic, whereas rule-based reasoning is slower and more effortful. Dual-Process theories of reasoning rely on this speed-asymmetry explanation to account for a number of reasoning phenomena, such as base-rate neglect and belief-bias. The goal of the current study was to test this hypothesis about the relative speed of belief-based and rule-based processes. Participants solved base-rate problems (Experiment 1) and conditional inferences (Experiment 2) under a challenging deadline; they then gave a second response in free time. We found that fast responses were informed by rules of probability and logical validity, and that slow responses incorporated belief-based information. Implications for Dual-Process theories and future research options for dissociating Type I and Type II processes are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record