When slippery slope arguments miss the mark: a lesson from one against physician-assisted death.

In 1989, Susan Wolf convincingly warned of a troublesome consequence that should discourage any movement in American society towards physician-assisted death-a legal backlash against the gains made for limiting life-sustaining treatment. The authors demonstrate that this dire consequence did not come to pass. As physician-assisted suicide gains a foothold in USA and elsewhere, many other slippery slope arguments are being put forward. Although many of these speculations should be taken seriously, they do not justify halting the new practice. Instead, our courts, regulatory agencies, journalists, professional organisations and researchers should carefully monitor and study it as it unfolds, allowing continuous improvement just as our society has done in implementing the practice of limiting life-sustaining treatment.

A Pilot Evaluation of Portfolios for Quality Attestation of Clinical Ethics Consultants.

Although clinical ethics consultation is a high-stakes endeavor with an increasing prominence in health care systems, progress in developing standards for quality is challenging. In this article, we describe the results of a pilot project utilizing portfolios as an evaluation tool. We found that this approach is feasible and resulted in a reasonably wide distribution of scores among the 23 submitted portfolios that we evaluated. We discuss limitations and implications of these results, and suggest that this is a significant step on the pathway to an eventual certification process for clinical ethics consultants.

Patient-satisfaction surveys on a scale of 0 to 10: improving health care, or leading it astray?

Patient-satisfaction surveys can call attention to the importance of treating patients with dignity and respect, but good ratings depend more on manipulable patient perceptions than on good medicine. In fact, the pressure to get good ratings can lead to bad medicine.

Two distinct Do-Not-Resuscitate protocols leaving less to the imagination: an observational study using propensity score matching.

BACKGROUND: Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) patients tend to receive less medical care after the order is written. To provide a clearer approach, the Ohio Department of Health adopted the Do-Not-Resuscitate law in 1998, indicating two distinct protocols of DNR orders that allow DNR patients to choose the medical care: DNR Comfort Care (DNRCC), implying DNRCC patients receive only comfort care after the order is written; and DNR Comfort Care-Arrest (DNRCC-Arrest), implying that DNRCC-Arrest patients are eligible to receive aggressive interventions until cardiac or respiratory arrest. The aim of this study was to examine the medical care provided to patients with these two distinct protocols of DNR orders. METHODS: Data were collected from August 2002 to December 2005 at a medical intensive care unit in a university-affiliated teaching hospital. In total, 188 DNRCC-Arrest patients, 88 DNRCC patients, and 2,051 non-DNR patients were included. Propensity score matching using multivariate logistic regression was used to balance the confounding variables between the 188 DNRCC-Arrest and 2,051 non-DNR patients, and between the 88 DNRCC and 2,051 non-DNR patients. The daily cost of intensive care unit (ICU) stay, the daily cost of hospital stay, the daily discretionary cost of ICU stay, six aggressive interventions, and three comfort care measures were used to indicate the medical care patients received. The association of each continuous variable and categorical variable with having a DNR order written was analyzed using Student's t-test and the χ2 test, respectively. The six aggressive interventions and three comfort care measures performed before and after the order was initiated were compared using McNemar's test. RESULTS: DNRCC patients received significantly fewer aggressive interventions and more comfort care after the order was initiated. By contrast, for DNRCC-Arrest patients, the six aggressive interventions provided were not significantly decreased, but the three comfort care measures were significantly increased after the order was initiated. In addition, the three medical costs were not significantly different between DNRCC and non-DNR patients, or between DNRCC-Arrest and non-DNR patients. CONCLUSIONS: When medical care provided to DNR patients is clearly indicated, healthcare professionals will provide the medical care determined by patient/surrogate decision-makers and healthcare professionals, rather than blindly decreasing medical care.

Factors associated with two different protocols of do-not-resuscitate orders in a medical ICU*.

OBJECTIVE: The State of Ohio in the United States has the legislation for two different protocols of do-not-resuscitate orders. The objective of this study was to examine the clinical/demographic factors and outcomes associated with the two different do-not-resuscitate orders. DESIGN: Data were concurrently and retrospectively collected from August 2002 to December 2005. The clinical/demographic factors of do-not-resuscitate patients were compared with those of non-do-not-resuscitate patients, and the clinical/demographic factors of do-not-resuscitate comfort care-arrest patients were compared with those of do-not-resuscitate comfort care patients. SETTING: An ICU in a university-affiliated hospital located at Northeast Ohio in the United States. PATIENTS: A sample of 2,440 patients was collected: 389 patients were do-not-resuscitate; and 2,051 patients were non-do-not-resuscitate. Among the 389 do-not-resuscitate patients, 194 were do-not-resuscitate comfort care-arrest patients and 91 were do-not-resuscitate comfort care patients. INTERVENTIONS: None. MEASUREMENTS AND MAIN RESULTS: The factors associated with do-not-resuscitate were older age, race and ethnicity with white race, more severe clinical illness at admission to the ICU, and longer stay before admission to the ICU. Comparing do-not-resuscitate comfort care-arrest patients with do-not-resuscitate comfort care patients, those with more severe clinical illness, longer ICU stay before making a do-not-resuscitate decision, and being cared for by only one intensivist during ICU stay were significantly associated with do-not-resuscitate comfort care decisions. For 149 do-not-resuscitate patients who eventually survived to hospital discharge and 86 do-not-resuscitate patients who eventually did not, only eight (5.4%) and 23 (26.7%) had the order written within 48 hours before the end of ICU stay, respectively. CONCLUSIONS: Our study showed that some clinical/demographic factors predicted do-not-resuscitate comfort care orders. This study also suggested that Ohio's Do-Not-Resuscitate Law, clearly indicating two different protocols of do-not-resuscitate orders, facilitated early do-not-resuscitate decision.

Ethics guidelines for research with the recently dead.

The objective of the multidisciplinary expert Consensus Panel on Research with the Recently Dead (CPRRD) was to craft ethics guidelines for research with the recently dead. The CPRRD recommends that research with the recently dead: (i) receive scientific and ethical review and oversight; (ii) involve the community of potential research subjects; (iii) be coordinated with organ procurement organizations; (iv) not conflict with organ donation or required autopsy; (v) use procedures respectful of the dead; (vi) be restricted to one procedure per day; (vii) preferably be authorized by first-person consent, though both general advance research directives and surrogate consent are acceptable; (viii) protect confidentiality; (ix) not impose costs on subjects' estates or next of kin and not involve payment; (x) clearly explain ultimate disposition of the body.

Informed consent to tissue donation: policies and practice.

Nearly 10 years ago, the tissue industry's informed consent practices with donor families in the United States were criticized. In response, the industry, along with the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services, suggested elements to be included in the informed consent process. This study examines which of these elements were present in the informed consent documents of 45 (78%) of the nation's 58 Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs). Some elements, such as involvement of for-profit companies, were present in almost all. Others, such as labeling tissue as a gift from donor families, never were. The authors conclude that the time is ripe for reexamination of the informed consent process with an eye to meaningful consent that promotes the benefits of tissue transplantation and at the same time protects the rights and interests of donor families; can be realistically implemented; and, maintains the trust of the American public.

Poverty: Not a Justification for Banning Physician-Assisted Death.

Many critics of the legalization of physician-assisted death oppose it in part because they fear it will further disadvantage those who are already economically disadvantaged. This argument points to a serious problem of how economic considerations can influence medical decisions, but in the context of PAD, the concern is not borne out. We will provide empirical evidence suggesting that concerns about money influence medical decisions throughout the full course of illness, but at the end of life, financial pressure is much more likely to influence a decision to pursue or reject aggressive life-extending care than it is to influence a request for PAD. We will also address the question of whether financial pressure as a result of being poor-particularly in the context of an inadequate social safety net-robs people of their autonomy, rendering their informed request and consent invalid. We argue that it does not. We will emphasize the impracticality and injustice of rejecting the role of poverty as a legitimate factor in decision-making, the irrational distinction between PAD and withdrawal of life-sustaining care, and the more appropriate focus on the great flaws in the American health care system.

Propranolol and the prevention of post-traumatic stress disorder: is it wrong to erase the "sting" of bad memories?

The National Institute of Mental Health (Bethesda, MD) reports that approximately 5.2 million Americans experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) each year. PTSD can be severely debilitating and diminish quality of life for patients and those who care for them. Studies have indicated that propranolol, a beta-blocker, reduces consolidation of emotional memory. When administered immediately after a psychic trauma, it is efficacious as a prophylactic for PTSD. Use of such memory-altering drugs raises important ethical concerns, including some futuristic dystopias put forth by the President's Council on Bioethics. We think that adequate informed consent should facilitate ethical research using propranolol and, if it proves efficacious, routine treatment. Clinical evidence from studies should certainly continue to evaluate realistic concerns about possible ill effects of diminishing memory. If memory-attenuating drugs prove effective, we believe that the most immediate social concern is the over-medicalization of bad memories, and its subsequent exploitation by the pharmaceutical industry.

Ellen Grass Memorial Lecture: Brain Death: Useful Myth or Problem Waiting to Happen?

In this paper, I will argue that in an intensive care environment, the exact moment of death is neither a scientific nor philosophical "fact." Rather, it is a socially constructed notion used to maximize organ procurement while avoiding responsibility for killing patients by removing their organs-the so-called dead donor rule. I will first review the tremendous importance of the declaration of death in all societies and point out how it once was and now has again become problematic. Next, I will review the importance of distinguishing among definitions, criteria, and tests. I will conclude that the current protocols for taking organs from brain-dead patients do so by maintaining several legal and clinical fictions. They are fictions because they are conceptually and clinically suspect and have been created primarily to avoid controversy. This has allowed removal of organs that save and improve many thousands of lives. I will argue that while brain-dead patients are not certainly dead, they are certainly beyond harm. In this sense, they are as good as dead as long as they and their families have agreed to organ procurement. Whether the current fictions about brain death are durable remains to be seen.

The Outcome of Patients With 2 Different Protocols of Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders: An Observational Cohort Study.

Lack of clarity about the exact clinical implications of do-not-resuscitate (DNR) has caused confusion that has been addressed repeatedly in the literature. To provide improved understanding about the portability of DNR and the medical care provided to DNR patients, the state of Ohio passed a Do-Not-Resuscitate Law in 1998, which clearly pointed out 2 different protocols of do-not-resuscitate: DNR comfort care (DNRCC) and DNR comfort care arrest (DNRCC-Arrest). The objective of this study was to examine the outcome of patients with the 2 different protocols of DNR orders.This is a retrospective observational study conducted in a medical intensive care unit (MICU) in a hospital located in Northeast Ohio. The medical records of the initial admissions to the MICU during data collection period were concurrently and retrospectively reviewed. The association between 2 variables was examined using Chi-squared test or Student's t-test. The outcome of DNRCC, DNRCC-Arrest, and No-DNR patients were compared using multivariate logistic regression analysis.The total of 188 DNRCC-Arrest, 88 DNRCC, and 2051 No-DNR patients were included in this study. Compared with the No-DNR patients, the DNRCC (odds ratio = 20.77, P < 0.01) and DNRCC-Arrest (odds ratio = 3.69, P < 0.01) patients were more likely to die in the MICU. Furthermore, the odds of dying during MICU stay for DNRCC patients were 7.85 times significantly higher than that for DNRCC-Arrest patients (odds ratio = 7.85, P < 0.01).Given Do-Not-Resuscitate Law in Ohio, we examined the outcome of the 2 different protocols of DNR orders, and to compare with the conventional DNR orders. Similar to conventional DNR, DNDCC and DNRCC-Arrest were both associated with the increased risk of death. Patients with DNRCC were more likely to be associated with increased risk of death than those with DNRCC-Arrest.

Death and organ procurement: public beliefs and attitudes.

While brain death and the dead donor rule (patients must not be killed by organ retrieval) have been clinically and legally accepted in the US as a prerequisite to organ removal, there is little data about public attitudes and beliefs concerning these matters. To examine the public attitudes and beliefs about the determination of death and its relationship to organ transplantation, 1351 Ohio residents >or=18 years were randomly selected and surveyed using random digit dialing (RDD) sample frames. The RDD telephone survey was conducted using computer-assisted telephone interviews. The survey instrument was developed from information provided by 12 focus groups and a pilot study of the questionnaire. Three scenarios based on hypothetical patients were presented: brain dead, in a coma, or in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Respondents' provided personal assessments of whether the patient in each scenario was dead and their willingness to donate that patient's organs in these circumstances. Over 98% of respondents had heard of the term brain death, but only one-third (33.7%) believed that someone who was brain dead was legally dead. The majority of respondents (86.2%) identified the brain dead patient in the first scenario as dead, 57.2% identified the patient in a coma as dead (Scenario 2), and 34.1% identified the patient in a PVS as dead (Scenario 3). Nearly, a third (33.5%) were willing to donate the organs of patients they classified as alive for at least one scenario, in seeming violation of the dead donor rule. Most respondents were not willing to violate the dead donor rule, although a substantial minority was. However, the majority of respondents were unaware, misinformed or held beliefs that were not congruent with current definitions of brain death. This study highlights the need for more public dialogue and education about brain death and organ donation.