RESUMO
This paper addresses institutional constraints that have affected Brazilian politics regarding provision of anti-retroviral treatment (ART) to HIV/Aids patients. We analyzed the normative conflict resulting from international agreements on intellectual property rights, especially patent protection, and the constitutional rights of Brazilian patients to universal and free access to ART. These constraints have not substantially changed the Brazilian public policy yet, but they may impact the future sustainability of this policy. As the main barrier to the production of patented drugs is not technological but institutional, Brazilian government faces a dilemma. It may either abide by existing monopolistic restrictions or it may incite competitiveness of domestic industries and developing countries in the pharmaceutical market.
Assuntos
Antirretrovirais/uso terapêutico , Política de Saúde , Brasil , Aprovação de Drogas , Uso de Medicamentos/normas , HumanosRESUMO
This article describes the antiretroviral (ARV) manufacturing market in Brazil and contextualizes the challenges for the public policy of supplying ARVs through the National STD/AIDS Program. Increasing expenditure on these drugs is the main source of uncertainty for the policy's future. Brazil's domestic scenario is one of growing external dependence, both for the finished drugs and the active ingredients. Experience in the National Program has shown that it is the state's role to provide public goods, which presupposes ensuring mutual compatibility between company interests and social interests. This balance is currently at stake in Brazil, since structural changes in the market have raised challenges for the National Program's sustainability, requiring new public policy instruments in defense of the collective interest. The article drew on a literature review, using bibliographic indexing sources, systematic organization of primary data, government publications, relevant legislation, research reports, and articles recommended by experts from the field.