Surprise! Draw the scene: Visual recall reveals poor incidental working memory following visual search in natural scenes.

Searching within natural scenes can induce incidental encoding of information about the scene and the target, particularly when the scene is complex or repeated. However, recent evidence from attribute amnesia (AA) suggests that in some situations, searchers can find a target without building a robust incidental memory of it's task relevant features. Through drawing-based visual recall and an AA search task, we investigated whether search in natural scenes necessitates memory encoding. Participants repeatedly searched for and located an easily detected item in novel scenes for numerous trials before being unexpectedly prompted to draw either the entire scene (Experiment 1) or their search target (Experiment 2) directly after viewing the search image. Naïve raters assessed the similarity of the drawings to the original information. We found that surprise-trial drawings of the scene and search target were both poorly recognizable, but the same drawers produced highly recognizable drawings on the next trial when they had an expectation to draw the image. Experiment 3 further showed that the poor surprise trial memory could not merely be attributed to interference from the surprising event. Our findings suggest that even for searches done in natural scenes, it is possible to locate a target without creating a robust memory of either it or the scene it was in, even if attended to just a few seconds prior. This disconnection between attention and memory might reflect a fundamental property of cognitive computations designed to optimize task performance and minimize resource use.

Consciousness can overflow report: Novel evidence from attribute amnesia of a single stimulus.

There is a long-standing debate on whether visual consciousness is confined to cognitive access measured by reportability, or whether it is rich and overflows reportability. Much of the debate in previous studies concentrated on whether information outside attentional focus could be consciously experienced and reportable. This study sought to address the debate from a new perspective, through testing whether fully attended supraliminal information is necessarily reportable with a variation of attribute amnesia. Participants were asked to judge the parity of a single number or whether a Chinese character referred to furniture. After several trials, they were unexpectedly asked to report the stimulus identity. The results consistently showed that participants could not correctly report the identity, indicating that fully attended information that was consciously perceived could sometimes overflow report. In addition to providing novel overflow evidence, these findings also have crucial implications in understanding the relationship between consciousness and working memory.

Attribute Amnesia in the Auditory Domain.

Individuals are often unable to report an attribute of an object to which they recently attended, if they expected to report a different attribute, a phenomenon known as attribute amnesia (AA). To date, all AA studies have occurred in the visual domain. The purpose of this study was to explore the boundary conditions of AA by testing if AA also occurs in the auditory domain and, if so, for which attributes. It was found that AA was present when reporting the location (p = .003) and the number of tones (p < .001) of an auditory stimulus, but not when reporting its pitch (p = .383). These findings can be understood in terms of the organisation of the primary cortical areas and help explain the differences between visual working memory and auditory working memory.

No explicit memory for individual trial display configurations in a visual search task.

Previous evidence demonstrated that individuals can recall a target's location in a search display even if location information is completely task-irrelevant. This finding raises the question: does this ability to automatically encode a single item's location into a reportable memory trace extend to other aspects of spatial information as well? We tested this question using a paradigm designed to elicit attribute amnesia (Chen & Wyble, Psychological Science, 26(2) 203-210, 2015a). Participants were initially asked to report the location of a target letter among digits with stimuli arranged to form one of two or four spatial configurations varying randomly across trials. After completing numerous trials that matched their expectations, participants were surprised with a series of unexpected questions probing their memory for various aspects of the display they had just viewed. Participants had a profound inability to report which spatial configuration they had just perceived when the target's location was not unique to a specific configuration (i.e., orthogonal). Despite being unable to report the most recent configuration, answer choices on the surprise trial were focused around previously seen configurations, rather than novel configurations. Thus, there were clear memories of the set of configurations that had been viewed during the experiment but not of the specific configuration from the most recent trial. This finding helps to set boundary conditions on previous findings regarding the automatic encoding of location information into memory.

Does attribute amnesia occur with the presentation of complex, meaningful stimuli? The answer is, "it depends".

Attribute amnesia (AA) is a recently reported phenomenon whereby participants are unable to report a salient attribute of a stimulus (e.g., the color or identity of a target letter) on which their attention has just been focused during a prior task. This counterintuitive effect has been repeatedly replicated with various simple stimuli such as digits and letters. The current study sought to explore boundaries of AA by investigating whether the phenomenon persists when participants encounter complex, meaningful stimuli (e.g., pictures) that have been shown to hold an advantage in cognitive processing and memory. In Experiments 1a-d, we examined whether AA was observed with different types of complex stimuli. In Experiments 2a-b and 3a-b, we linked the type of stimuli (simple vs. complex and meaningful stimuli) to the other two potential boundary factors of AA (i.e., repetitiveness of target stimulus and set effects of Einstellung) to see whether there were interactions between stimuli type and these two boundary factors. The results demonstrated that the AA effect was still consistently observed for complex stimuli in a typical AA paradigm wherein participants encountered many trials and the targets were repeated across trials. However, this effect only appeared for simple stimuli, but not for complex stimuli in two special cases: when target stimuli were never repeated through the experiment, or when the surprise test was placed on the first trial of the experiment. These findings have crucial implications in understanding the boundaries of the AA phenomenon.

Learning how to exploit sources of information.

How is our strategy for forming memories shaped by experience with a task? Previous work using surprise questions (i.e., unexpected by the participant) has shown a remarkable inability to report attributes of an attended target in a search display. This representational poverty presumably reflects a form of information exploitation, in which control processes specialize the conversion of available information into memory representations. We hypothesize that such control is refined by repeated experience with a task, and as a result, memory representations will specialize as task experience accrues, such that report accuracy for an unexpected question will progressively worsen as the number of preceding trials increases. To test this, subjects were asked to report the location of a letter among three digits. The ability to respond correctly to a surprise question about the identity of that letter became worse as the experiment progressed. A follow-up study evaluated whether this incremental worsening of report accuracy could be explained as a buildup of proactive interference by varying the set of letters for the surprise test. The results were unchanged relative to the original experiment, which argues against a primary contribution of proactive interference in the worsening performance. The effect was replicated in a similar paradigm using color disks. These findings illustrate that repeated performance of a prescriptive task engages an adaptive modification of control processes that focus information processing on specific attributes of a stimulus that are expected to be necessary in the future, regardless of their immediate task relevance.

Amnesia for object attributes: failure to report attended information that had just reached conscious awareness.

People intuitively believe that when they become consciously aware of a visual stimulus, they will be able to remember it and immediately report it. The present study provides a series of striking demonstrations of behavior that is inconsistent with such an intuition. Four experiments showed that in certain conditions, participants could not report an attribute (e.g., letter identity) of a stimulus even when that attribute had been attended and had reached a full state of conscious awareness just prior to being questioned about it. We term this effect attribute amnesia, and it occurs when participants repeatedly locate a target using one attribute and are then unexpectedly asked to report that attribute. This discovery suggests that attention to and awareness of a stimulus attribute are insufficient to ensure its immediate reportability. These results imply that when attention is configured by using an attribute for target selection, that attribute will not necessarily be remembered.

Flexibility Retained: Unimpaired Updating of Expectations in Schizophrenia.

Flexibly and actively updating expectations based on feedback is crucial for navigating daily life. Previous research has shown that people with schizophrenia (PSZ) have difficulty adjusting their expectations. However, there are studies suggesting otherwise. To explore this further, we used a novel trial-based expectation updating paradigm called attribute amnesia. In the task, the participants needed to report the location of a target stimulus among distractors in pre-surprise trials. In the surprise trial, they were unexpectedly asked to report the identity of the target before reporting its location. Afterward, control trials were conducted whereby the participants were asked the same questions as in the surprise trial. Notably, the surprise trial and control trials were nearly identical, except that the participants expected to be asked about identity information in the control trials but not in the surprise trial. Thus, an improvement in identity reporting accuracy in the control trials in comparison with the surprise trial indicated active updating of expectations. In the current study, a total of 63 PSZ and 60 healthy control subjects (HCS) were enrolled. We found that both the PSZ and the HCS were unable to report information that they had fully attended to (i.e., identity) in the surprise trial. However, both groups showed a significant improvement in reporting identity information even in the first control trial. Critically, there was no significant difference in the magnitude of improvement between the two groups. The current findings indicate that PSZ have the ability to update their expectations as quickly and flexibly as HCS, at least in the context of the current task. The possible factors that might contribute to the discrepancy regarding expectation updating are discussed.

Attention with or without working memory: mnemonic reselection of attended information.

Attention has been regarded as the 'gatekeeper' controlling what information gets selected into working memory. However, a new perspective has emerged with the discovery of attribute amnesia, a phenomenon revealing that people are frequently unable to report information they have just attended to moments ago. This report failure is thought to stem from a lack of consolidating the attended information into working memory, indicating a dissociation between attention and working memory. Building on these findings, a new concept called memory reselection is proposed to describe a secondary round of selection among the attended information. These discoveries challenge the conventional view of how attention and working memory are related and shed new light onto modeling attention and memory as dissociable processes.

Insights on overflow from failure to report tasks.

Theories of consciousness diverge on the functional requirement that a conscious state need be reportable. Some maintain that the perceptual system's capacity for consciousness exceeds that of its capacity for access. Others contend that what is accessed is all there is to consciousness. Here, we suggest a compelling case for access-free consciousness cannot be made reliant on experimental evidence where access is necessarily invoked. However, a bona fide empirical separation of consciousness and report could counter the claim that reportability, and hence access, is all there is to consciousness. We first overview recent neurophysiological findings from no-report tasks, before examining a series of studies in which participants were unable to report features of clearly visible items. These new data present a challenge for a hard "access-only" view of consciousness, as they appear to demonstrate that properties of our visual experience can remain unreportable. In so doing, we highlight the utility and underappreciated value of so-called failure to report tasks.

And like that, they were gone: A failure to remember recently attended unique faces.

Attribute amnesia (AA) is a phenomenon in which participants have difficulty answering an unexpected question about an attended attribute of the most recent target stimulus. A similar situation can occur in cases of real-life eyewitness identification when the eyewitness did not explicitly try to remember the alleged perpetrator's face despite having attended to it. We found that AA is generalizable to novel faces, such that when participants were unexpectedly asked to identify a face, performance was poor, even though they had just attended to that face seconds ago (N = 40 each in an initial experiment and its replication). This finding shows that unexpected face identification is inaccurate even when the face had just been attended to and suffered minimal decay and interference, implying that AA can explain some cases of failure of eyewitness identification that cannot be attributed to a lack of attention or post-event interference.

Using the attribute amnesia paradigm to test the automatic memory advantage of person names.

Person names, which hold within them extensive meaning, such as gender and cultural information, play an essential role in our social interaction. The intentional memory advantage of person names has been proved, but whether the automatic memory advantage of them exists remains unclear. In order to explore this question, we used a paradigm called attribute amnesia that allows us to test the automatic memory of person names in a working memory task. In Experiment 1, we adopted a classic attribute amnesia paradigm including 11 pre-surprise trials requiring participants to report the location of the target (person names or animal names) among three distractors and one surprise trial requiring them to unexpectedly report the identity of the target. The results showed that the identity report accuracy of person names in the surprise test was significantly better than that of animal names that served as a control group. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 but increased the number of pre-surprise trials that could reduce the report accuracy of surprise test according to previous studies. The results revealed that the accuracy of the surprise test of person names decreased significantly, and showed no significant difference from that of animal names. These results suggest that there exists an automatic memory advantage of person names in working memory; however, such an automatic memory advantage effect could be reduced after participants learn to stop automatically encoding the attended but no-need-to-report person names through experiencing sufficient trials.

Does consciousness overflow cognitive access? Novel insights from the new phenomenon of attribute amnesia.

The moment we open our eyes, we experience a rich and detailed visual world, but the amount of information available to report is rather limited. This dissociation relates to a major debate regarding the nature of visual consciousness. The overflow argument suggests that our conscious experience is quite rich and far beyond what can be reported, standing in sharp contrast to the no-overflow argument that visual consciousness is severely impoverished and limited to what can be reported. In this paper, we systematically reviewed existing evidence in favor of the overflow argument, including studies of several variations of the iconic memory paradigm and the divided attention paradigm, as well as studies of neural correlates of consciousness. Simultaneously, we expounded some critical objections and alternative interpretations to such evidence, as well as some opposing evidence. Finally, we introduced a series of our recent studies based on a striking phenomenon of attribute amnesia, which we believe could provide new insight into the overflow view of visual consciousness.

Remembering more than you can say: Re-examining "amnesia" of attended attributes.

Attribute amnesia (AA) describes a phenomenon whereby observers fail a surprise memory test which asks them to report an attribute they had just attended and used to fulfil a task goal. This finding has cast doubt on the prominent theory that attention results in encoding into working memory (WM), to which two competing explanations have been proposed: (1) task demands dictate whether attended information is encoded into WM, and (2) attended information is encoded in a weak state that does not survive the demands of the surprise memory test. To address this debate our study circumvented the limitations of a surprise memory test by embedding a second search task within a typical color-based AA search task. The search task was modified so that the attended attribute would reappear in the second search as either the target, a distractor, or not at all. Critically, our results support encoding of the attended attribute in WM though to a weaker extent than the attribute that is required for report. A second experiment confirmed that WM encoding only occurs for the attended attribute, though distractor attributes produce a bias consistent with negative priming. Our data provide novel support for a theory of memory consolidation that links the strength of a memory's representation with expectations for how it will be used in a task. Implications for the utility of this procedure in future investigations previously limited by single trial data (i.e., surprise question methodology) are discussed.

Attribute amnesia is greatly reduced with novel stimuli.

Attribute amnesia is the counterintuitive phenomenon where observers are unable to report a salient aspect of a stimulus (e.g., its colour or its identity) immediately after the stimulus was presented, despite both attending to and processing the stimulus. Almost all previous attribute amnesia studies used highly familiar stimuli. Our study investigated whether attribute amnesia would also occur for unfamiliar stimuli. We conducted four experiments using stimuli that were highly familiar (colours or repeated animal images) or that were unfamiliar to the observers (unique animal images). Our results revealed that attribute amnesia was present for both sets of familiar stimuli, colour (p < .001) and repeated animals (p = .001); but was greatly attenuated, and possibly eliminated, when the stimuli were unique animals (p = .02). Our data shows that attribute amnesia is greatly reduced for novel stimuli.