Dissection of the molecular circuitry controlling virulence in Francisella tularensis.

Francisella tularensis, the etiological agent of tularemia, is one of the most infectious bacteria known. Because of its extreme pathogenicity, F. tularensis is classified as a category A bioweapon by the US government. F. tularensis virulence stems from genes encoded on the Francisella pathogenicity island (FPI). An unusual set of Francisella regulators-the heteromeric macrophage growth locus protein A (MglA)-stringent starvation protein A (SspA) complex and the DNA-binding protein pathogenicity island gene regulator (PigR)-activates FPI transcription and thus is essential for virulence. Intriguingly, the second messenger, guanosine-tetraphosphate (ppGpp), which is produced during infection, is also involved in coordinating Francisella virulence; however, its role has been unclear. Here we identify MglA-SspA as a novel ppGpp-binding complex and describe structures of apo- and ppGpp-bound MglA-SspA. We demonstrate that MglA-SspA, which binds RNA polymerase (RNAP), also interacts with the C-terminal domain of PigR, thus anchoring the (MglA-SspA)-RNAP complex to the FPI promoter. Furthermore, we show that MglA-SspA must be bound to ppGpp to mediate high-affinity interactions with PigR. Thus, these studies unveil a novel pathway different from those described previously for regulation of transcription by ppGpp. The data also indicate that F. tularensis pathogenesis is controlled by a highly interconnected molecular circuitry in which the virulence machinery directly senses infection via a small molecule stress signal.

Multiprobe Amplification (MPA) with Melting Curve Analysis: A Highly Stable and Cost-Effective Platform for the Simultaneous Detection of Eight Potential Bacterial Bioterrorism Agents in Complex Samples.

We aimed to develop an efficient detection platform that can identify a larger number of suspicious samples in a single test, saving time, manpower, and material costs, and providing vital support to the public health system in coping with the current challenging and dynamic bioterrorism threat landscape, particularly in regions of turmoil and conflict. We have successfully developed a high-throughput, multitarget fluorescent array detection platform by effectively combining integrating multiprobe amplification (MPA) with melting curve analysis. Specifically, we have established reliable laboratory testing methods for eight highly pathogenic bacteria, including Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Brucella spp., Burkholderia pseudomallei, Francisella tularensis, Vibrio cholerae, Salmonella typhi, and Staphylococcus aureus. Our method achieves sensitive and specific simultaneous detection of eight target bacteria in one well by optimizing the reaction conditions of MPA. In the assessment of 192 simulated environmental samples, both positive and negative coincidence rates were 100.00%. Among 48 simulated clinical samples, the positive coincidence rate reached 97.73%, while maintaining a perfect negative coincidence rate of 100.00%. Moreover, the detection platform holds immense potential for attaining a more comprehensive bioterrorism screening, and its high cost-effectiveness enables the provision of diverse and adaptable diagnostic methods for public health quarantine in underdeveloped countries and regions.

Evaluation of sponge wipe surface sampling for collection of potential surrogates for non-spore-forming bioterrorism agents.

AIM: Evaluate the efficacy of sponge wipe sampling at recovering potential bacterial surrogates for Category A and B non-spore-forming bacterial bioterrorism agents from hard, nonporous surfaces. METHODS: A literature survey identified seven nonpathogenic bacteria as potential surrogates for selected Category A and B non-spore-forming bacterial agents. Small (2 × 4 cm) and large (35.6 × 35.6 cm) coupons made from either stainless steel, plastic, or glass, were inoculated and utilized to assess persistence and surface sampling efficiency, respectively. Three commercially available premoistened sponge wipes (3M™, Sani-Stick®, and Solar-Cult®) were evaluated. RESULTS: Mean recoveries from persistence testing indicated that three microorganisms (Yersinia ruckeri, Escherichia coli, and Serratia marcescens) demonstrated sufficient persistence across all tested material types. Sampling of large inoculated (≥107 CFU per sample) coupons resulted in mean recoveries ranging from 6.6 to 3.4 Log10 CFU per sample. Mean recoveries for the Solar-Cult®, 3M™ sponge wipes, and Sani-Sticks® across all test organisms and all material types were ≥5.7, ≥3.7, and ≥3.4 Log10 CFU per sample, respectively. Mean recoveries for glass, stainless steel, and ABS plastic across all test organisms and all sponge types were ≥3.8, ≥3.7, and ≥3.4 Log10 CFU per sample, respectively. CONCLUSIONS: Recovery results suggest that sponge wipe sampling can effectively be used to recover non-spore-forming bacterial cells from hard, nonporous surfaces such as stainless steel, ABS plastic, and glass.

Poxviruses as Agents of Biological Warfare: The Importance of Ensuring Ethical Standards for Research with Viruses.

Historically, biological agents have been used to target various populations. One of the earliest examples could be the catastrophic effect of smallpox in Australia in the eighteenth century (as alleged by some historians). Modern biological techniques can be used to both create or provide protection against various agents of biological warfare. Any microorganism (viruses, bacteria, and fungi) or its toxins can be used as biological agents. Minnesota Department of Health has listed Smallpox (variola major) as a category A bioterrorism agent, even though it has been eradicated in 1980 through an extensive vaccination campaign. Category A agents are considered the highest risk to public health. Laboratory-associated outbreaks of poxviruses could cause unprecedented occupational hazards. Only two WHO-approved BSL-4 facilities in the United States and Russia are allowed to perform research on the variola virus. So, poxviruses present themselves as a classical case of a dual-use dilemma, since research with them can be used for both beneficial and harmful purposes. Although the importance of ethics in scientific research requires no further elaboration, ethical norms assume greater significance during experimentation with poxviruses. In this chapter, we will update the readers on the sensitive nature of conducting research with poxviruses, and how these viruses can be a source of potential biological weapons. Finally, specified ethical guidelines are explored to ensure safe research practices in virology.

Genomic population structure associated with repeated escape of Salmonella enterica ATCC14028s from the laboratory into nature.

Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurium strain ATCC14028s is commercially available from multiple national type culture collections, and has been widely used since 1960 for quality control of growth media and experiments on fitness ("laboratory evolution"). ATCC14028s has been implicated in multiple cross-contaminations in the laboratory, and has also caused multiple laboratory infections and one known attempt at bioterrorism. According to hierarchical clustering of 3002 core gene sequences, ATCC14028s belongs to HierCC cluster HC20_373 in which most internal branch lengths are only one to three SNPs long. Many natural Typhimurium isolates from humans, domesticated animals and the environment also belong to HC20_373, and their core genomes are almost indistinguishable from those of laboratory strains. These natural isolates have infected humans in Ireland and Taiwan for decades, and are common in the British Isles as well as the Americas. The isolation history of some of the natural isolates confirms the conclusion that they do not represent recent contamination by the laboratory strain, and 10% carry plasmids or bacteriophages which have been acquired in nature by HGT from unrelated bacteria. We propose that ATCC14028s has repeatedly escaped from the laboratory environment into nature via laboratory accidents or infections, but the escaped micro-lineages have only a limited life span. As a result, there is a genetic gap separating HC20_373 from its closest natural relatives due to a divergence between them in the late 19th century followed by repeated extinction events of escaped HC20_373.

Pattern of bioterrorism in ancient times: lessons to be learned from the microbial and toxicological aspects.

The current research aimed to analyze the history of bioterrorism in antiquity and to adapt the data to modern medical knowledge. To this end, a thorough evaluation of the literature related to the ancient history of bioterrorism and modern data was done using the Web of Sciences, Science Direct, Scopus, PubMed, and Google Scholar. Results showed that knowledge of bioterrorism has existed since antiquity in different civilizations. Biological and toxicological agents were used as an instrument of legal execution, as a warfare tool in battles, or to eliminate political rivals across nations. Ancient people researched bioterrorism to apply it against enemies and at the same time provide countermeasures in favor of themselves and allies. Despite the existence of the principles of bioterrorism since ancient times, adaptation of the data to modern research can assist in planning countermeasure efforts, preventive actions, and treatments in the framework of modern counterterrorism medicine.

[Understanding public health nurses' experience, knowledge, and perception of bioterrorism training in Japan].

Objectives　Bioterrorism is a disease in which the attacks can be covert and latent, take time to manifest, and, when discovered, can result in large outbreaks. When detected, they can become large-scale outbreaks. Therefore, preparedness is essential for early detection and response for damage mitigation. Although public health nurses (PHNs) of public health centers are responsible for detecting and dealing with bioterrorism, their preparation status is not clear. Therefore, this study aimed to elucidate the status of training experience, knowledge, and awareness of bioterrorism among PHNs working in public health centers' infectious disease control departments in Japan's metropolitan areas.Methods　This was a cross-sectional, descriptive study. The participants were PHNs in the infectious disease control departments of 88 public health centers in Tokyo and its three neighboring prefectures. This are densely populated metropolitan areas with many mass gathering events and a high probability of bioterrorism. An anonymous, self-administered questionnaire survey was conducted by mail in 2019. Two PHNs per location were surveyed regarding their attributes, training experience, knowledge, and perceptions.Results　We received 71 responses (40.3%). A total of 10 (14.1%) PHNs reported having experience with bioterrorism training in the workplace. Regarding the knowledge of the four infectious diseases with a high probability of bioterrorism, more than 95% of the respondents answered they had heard of them. However, few were aware of related treatments or terrorist responses. Although survey respondents were aware of the seriousness of bioterrorism and the effectiveness of preparedness, they did not have sufficient opportunity or time to have training. They tended to be less confident in their response and were willing to have training.Conclusion　PHNs who responded to this survey do not have sufficient training experience, knowledge, opportunities, and time for bioterrorism training, and establishing a training system to improve bioterrorism preparedness is a challenge. It will be necessary for PHN students to learn about the existence of bioterrorism. Further, PHNs in public health centers need to be trained at least once using online services, including brushing up on information as needed. Based on the lessons learned from the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, health centers will formulate a Health Crisis Management Plan. This will be effective in fiscal 2024, and we believe that it is essential that preparedness against bioterrorism be a part of this plan.

Epidemiology of Pathogens Listed as Potential Bioterrorism Agents, the Netherlands, 2009‒2019.

We provide incidences (cases/10 million persons) in the Netherlands during 2009-2019 for pathogens listed as potential bioterrorism agents. We included pathogens from the highest categories of the European Medicines Agency or the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Notifiable diseases and recently published data were used to calculate the average annual incidence. Coxiella burnetii had the highest incidence because of a Q fever epidemic during 2007-2010. Incidence then decreased to 10.8 cases/. Pathogens with an incidence >1 were Brucella spp. (2.5 cases), Francisella tularensis (1.3 cases), and Burkholderia pseudomallei (1.1 cases). Pathogens with an incidence <1 were hemorrhagic fever viruses (0.3 cases), Clostridium botulinum (0.2 cases), and Bacillus anthracis (0.1 cases). Variola major and Yersinia pestis were absent. The generally low incidences make it unlikely that ill-meaning persons can isolate these pathogens from natural sources in the Netherlands. However, the pathogens are stored in laboratories, underscoring the need for biosecurity measures.

Gain of Function and Loss of Control: Genetic Modification of Microbial Agents - Viruses "On Steroids".

Gain of Function refers to genetic modification to enhance certain properties of a biological agent. "Dual use research" refers to experiments which have a primary goal of benefitting humanity, but which could produce harm if misapplied. So, for example, a virus which was being genetically modified (GM) for altruistic reasons might become more transmissible or resistant to vaccines or antimicrobial medications. Such a GM virus has bioterrorism potential. The UN Biological Weapons Convention has not been universally approved and 10 States are not signatories to the Convention. The control of such experiments is variously controlled in certain jurisdictions but in Australia these experiments are well regulated through the Gene Technology Act 2000 (Cth), the National Health Security Act 2007 (Cth) and the Crimes (Biological Weapons) Act 1976 (Cth). The controls on such experiments in Europe and the United States are less precise. There are examples in the United States and Europe where the security provisions to contain microorganisms undergoing research including genetic modification have been breached. This threatens the health and safety of laboratory workers and the wider community.

Systematic Review of In Vitro Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing for Bacillus anthracis, 1947-2019.

Bacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax, is a high-consequence bacterial pathogen that occurs naturally in many parts of the world and is considered an agent of biowarfare or bioterrorism. Understanding antimicrobial susceptibility profiles of B. anthracis isolates is foundational to treating naturally occurring outbreaks and to public health preparedness in the event of an intentional release. In this systematic review, we searched the peer-reviewed literature for all publications detailing antimicrobial susceptibility testing of B. anthracis. Within the set of discovered articles, we collated a subset of publications detailing susceptibility testing that followed standardized protocols for Food and Drug Administration-approved, commercially available antimicrobials. We analyzed the findings from the discovered articles, including the reported minimal inhibitory concentrations. Across the literature, most B. anthracis isolates were reported as susceptible to current first-line antimicrobials recommended for postexposure prophylaxis and treatment. The data presented for potential alternative antimicrobials will be of use if significant resistance to first-line antimicrobials arises, the strain is bioengineered, or first-line antimicrobials are not tolerated or available.

Safety of Antimicrobials for Postexposure Prophylaxis and Treatment of Anthrax: A Review.

BACKGROUND: Bacillus anthracis, the causative agent for anthrax, poses a potential bioterrorism threat and is capable of causing mass morbidity and mortality. Antimicrobials are the mainstay of postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) and treatment of anthrax. We conducted this safety review of 24 select antimicrobials to identify any new or emerging serious or severe adverse events (AEs) to help inform their risk-benefit evaluation for anthrax. METHODS: Twenty-four antimicrobials were included in this review. Tertiary data sources (e.g. Lactmed, Micromedex, REPROTOX) were reviewed for safety information and summarized to evaluate the known risks of these antimicrobials. PubMed was also searched for published safety information on serious or severe AEs with these antimicrobials; AEs that met inclusion criteria were abstracted and reviewed. RESULTS: A total of 1316 articles were reviewed. No consistent observations or patterns were observed among the abstracted AEs for a given antimicrobial; therefore, the literature review did not reveal evidence of new or emerging AEs that would add to the risk-benefit profiles already known from tertiary data sources. CONCLUSIONS: The reviewed antimicrobials have known and/or potential serious or severe risks that may influence selection when recommending an antimicrobial for PEP or treatment of anthrax. Given the high fatality rate of anthrax, the risk-benefit evaluation favors use of these antimicrobials for anthrax. The potential risks of antimicrobials should not preclude these reviewed antimicrobials from clinical consideration for anthrax but rather guide appropriate antimicrobial selection and prioritization across different patient populations with risk mitigation measures as warranted.

Systematic Review of Hospital Treatment Outcomes for Naturally Acquired and Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax, 1880-2018.

BACKGROUND: Bacillus anthracis can cause anthrax and is a potential bioterrorism agent. The 2014 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommendations for medical countermeasures against anthrax were based on in vitro data and expert opinion. However, a century of previously uncompiled observational human data that often includes treatment and outcomes is available in the literature for analysis. METHODS: We reviewed treatment outcomes for patients hospitalized with anthrax. We stratified patients by meningitis status, route of infection, and systemic criteria, then analyzed survival by treatment type, including antimicrobials, antitoxin/antiserum, and steroids. Using logistic regression, we calculated odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals to compare survival between treatments. We also calculated hospital length of stay. Finally, we evaluated antimicrobial postexposure prophylaxis (PEPAbx) using data from a 1970 Russian-language article. RESULTS: We identified 965 anthrax patients reported from 1880 through 2018. After exclusions, 605 remained: 430 adults, 145 children, and 30 missing age. Survival was low for untreated patients and meningitis patients, regardless of treatment. Most patients with localized cutaneous or nonmeningitis systemic anthrax survived with 1 or more antimicrobials; patients with inhalation anthrax without meningitis fared better with at least 2. Bactericidal antimicrobials were effective for systemic anthrax; addition of a protein synthesis inhibitor(s) (PSI) to a bactericidal antimicrobial(s) did not improve survival. Likewise, addition of antitoxin/antiserum to antimicrobials did not improve survival. Mannitol improved survival for meningitis patients, but steroids did not. PEPAbx reduced risk of anthrax following exposure to B. anthracis. CONCLUSIONS: Combination therapy appeared to be superior to monotherapy for inhalation anthrax without meningitis. For anthrax meningitis, neither monotherapy nor combination therapy were particularly effective; however, numbers were small. For localized cutaneous anthrax, monotherapy was sufficient. For B. anthracis exposures, PEPAbx was effective.

Antimicrobial Treatment and Prophylaxis of Plague: Recommendations for Naturally Acquired Infections and Bioterrorism Response.

This report provides CDC recommendations to U.S. health care providers regarding treatment, pre-exposure prophylaxis, and postexposure prophylaxis of plague. Yersinia pestis, the bacterium that causes plague, leads to naturally occurring disease in the United States and other regions worldwide and is recognized as a potential bioterrorism weapon. A bioweapon attack with Y. pestis could potentially infect thousands, requiring rapid and informed decision making by clinicians and public health agencies. The U.S. government stockpiles a variety of medical countermeasures to mitigate the effects of a bioterrorism attack (e.g., antimicrobials, antitoxins, and vaccines) for which the 21st Century Cures Act mandates the development of evidence-based guidelines on appropriate use. Guidelines for treatment and postexposure prophylaxis of plague were published in 2000 by a nongovernmental work group; since then, new human clinical data, animal study data, and U.S. Food and Drug Administration approvals of additional countermeasures have become available. To develop a comprehensive set of updated guidelines, CDC conducted a series of systematic literature reviews on human treatment of plague and other relevant topics to collect a broad evidence base for the recommendations in this report. Evidence from CDC reviews and additional sources were presented to subject matter experts during a series of forums. CDC considered individual expert input while developing these guidelines, which provide recommended best practices for treatment and prophylaxis of human plague for both naturally occurring disease and following a bioterrorism attack. The guidelines do not include information on diagnostic testing, triage decisions, or logistics involved in dispensing medical countermeasures. Clinicians and public health officials can use these guidelines to prepare their organizations, hospitals, and communities to respond to a plague mass-casualty event and as a guide for treating patients affected by plague.

Assessing dual use research of concern (DURC)-lessons learned from the United States government institutional DURC policy.

Life science research was analyzed for potential misuse in the 2004 report "Biotechnology Research in an Age of Bioterrorism". However, it was not until 2015 that the United States Government (USG) Institutional Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) policy went into effect. Institutions receiving USG funding for life science research are required to scan their research portfolios for research involving one of 15 agents and subsequent 7 experimental effects described in the policy. In practice, this policy was implemented in a variety of ways with varying outcomes and lessons learned. First and foremost, reviewing research for potential DURC is a highly subjective process that differs depending on the risk tolerance, experience, and training of the individuals charged with reviewing research for an institution as well as the review process itself. The information being reviewed also lends to the subjectivity of the process, that is, the experimental data provided. It is difficult to determine whether research is potential DURC without experimental data. Any review process is hypothetical until there is data. Lastly, reviewers of the research should look beyond the research proposals, like how compounding existing research information can create new risks, potential use in other organisms or systems, or the creation of a roadmap that, for example, shows how to create a concerning organism or could be used in a pathogen.

Bioterrorism: An analysis of biological agents used in terrorist events.

BACKGROUND: The Covid19 pandemic has reignited debates and discussions around healthcare systems' biosecurity vulnerabilities and cast a spotlight on the potential weaponization of biological agents. Terrorist and violent extremist groups have already attempted to incite the intentional spread of Covid19 and to use it as an improvised form of a biological weapon. This study aims to provide an epidemiological description of all terrorism-related attacks using biological agents sustained between 1970 and 2019. METHODS: Data collection was performed using a retrospective database search through the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD was searched using the internal database search functions for all events using biological weapons between January 1, 1970 - December 31, 2019. RESULTS: 33 terrorist attacks involving biological agents were recorded between 1970 and 2019, registering 9 deaths and 806 injuries. 21 events occurred in the United States, 3 in Kenya, 2 each in both the United Kingdom and Pakistan and a single event in Japan, Columbia, Israel, Russia and Tunisia. CONCLUSION: The reported use of biological agents as a terrorist weapon is extremely rare and accounts for 0.02% of all historic terrorist attacks. Despite its apparent rarity, however, bioterrorism has the ability to inflict mass injuries unmatched by conventional weapons. Anthrax has been the most commonly used in previous bioterrorism events with the vast majority of reported attacks occurring in the United States by a single suspected perpetrator. Counter-Terrorism Medicine (CTM) and Disaster Medicine (DM) specialists need to be proactive in delivering ongoing educational sessions on biological events to first responder communities, and anticipate emerging novel biotechnology threats.

Knowledge and preparedness of healthcare providers towards bioterrorism.

BACKGROUND: Several emergent circumstances require healthcare providers to recognize the unusual and dangerous and pathogenic agents. An in-depth literature review showed that studies about bioterrorism preparedness amongst healthcare providers are lacking. Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the knowledge and preparedness level of first emergency respondents towards bioterrorism events. METHODS: This study has a cross-sectional design and was carried out at the Emergency departments and poison control centers/clinical laboratories three in major tertiary care hospitals in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The subjects were randomly selected to complete the self-administered questionnaire to collect study outcomes. RESULTS: A total of 1030 participants were included in the final data analysis. The mean knowledge score in the basic concepts of bioterrorism and introductory clinical presentations of bioterrorism-related agents was 4.92 ± 1.86 out of 12 points. Moreover, the findings showed a mean knowledge score of 22.80 ± 3.92 out of 38 in the bioterrorism preparedness and governing policies and procedures. Respondents who received previous training in bioterrorism preparedness had a significantly higher number of perceived benefits than those not sure and without prior training (z = - 2.67, p = 0.008) and (z = - 4.4, p < 0.0001), respectively. About 79.4% of participants did not have previous training in bioterrorism preparedness, but 68.7% expressed willingness in the institution's response and control to assist in a bioterrorist attack incident. CONCLUSION: Although healthcare professionals have reported their desire to help in bioterrorism events, they need to enhance their knowledge of bioterrorism preparedness.

Addressing Biodisaster X Threats With Artificial Intelligence and 6G Technologies: Literature Review and Critical Insights.

BACKGROUND: With advances in science and technology, biotechnology is becoming more accessible to people of all demographics. These advances inevitably hold the promise to improve personal and population well-being and welfare substantially. It is paradoxical that while greater access to biotechnology on a population level has many advantages, it may also increase the likelihood and frequency of biodisasters due to accidental or malicious use. Similar to "Disease X" (describing unknown naturally emerging pathogenic diseases with a pandemic potential), we term this unknown risk from biotechnologies "Biodisaster X." To date, no studies have examined the potential role of information technologies in preventing and mitigating Biodisaster X. OBJECTIVE: This study aimed to explore (1) what Biodisaster X might entail and (2) solutions that use artificial intelligence (AI) and emerging 6G technologies to help monitor and manage Biodisaster X threats. METHODS: A review of the literature on applying AI and 6G technologies for monitoring and managing biodisasters was conducted on PubMed, using articles published from database inception through to November 16, 2020. RESULTS: Our findings show that Biodisaster X has the potential to upend lives and livelihoods and destroy economies, essentially posing a looming risk for civilizations worldwide. To shed light on Biodisaster X threats, we detailed effective AI and 6G-enabled strategies, ranging from natural language processing to deep learning-based image analysis to address issues ranging from early Biodisaster X detection (eg, identification of suspicious behaviors), remote design and development of pharmaceuticals (eg, treatment development), and public health interventions (eg, reactive shelter-at-home mandate enforcement), as well as disaster recovery (eg, sentiment analysis of social media posts to shed light on the public's feelings and readiness for recovery building). CONCLUSIONS: Biodisaster X is a looming but avoidable catastrophe. Considering the potential human and economic consequences Biodisaster X could cause, actions that can effectively monitor and manage Biodisaster X threats must be taken promptly and proactively. Rather than solely depending on overstretched professional attention of health experts and government officials, it is perhaps more cost-effective and practical to deploy technology-based solutions to prevent and control Biodisaster X threats. This study discusses what Biodisaster X could entail and emphasizes the importance of monitoring and managing Biodisaster X threats by AI techniques and 6G technologies. Future studies could explore how the convergence of AI and 6G systems may further advance the preparedness for high-impact, less likely events beyond Biodisaster X.

Bioterrorism.

Bioterrorism is the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria, toxins, or fungi with the goal of causing panic, mass casualties, or severe economic disruption. From 1981 to 2018, there were 37 bioterrorist attacks worldwide. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) lists anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers as category A agents that are the greatest risk to national security. An emerging infectious disease (e.g., novel respiratory virus) may also be used as a biological agent. Clinicians may be the first to recognize a bioterrorism-related illness by noting an unusual presentation, location, timing, or severity of disease. Public health authorities should be notified when a biological agent is recognized or suspected. Treatment includes proper isolation and administration of antimicrobial or antitoxin agents in consultation with regional medical authorities and the CDC. Vaccinations for biological agents are not routinely administered except for smallpox, anthrax, and Ebola disease for people at high risk of exposure. The American Academy of Family Physicians, the CDC, and other organizations provide bioterrorism training and response resources for clinicians and communities. Clinicians should be aware of bioterrorism resources.

Plague and Pregnancy: Why Special Considerations Are Needed.

Pregnant women are an important at-risk population to consider during public health emergencies. These women, like nonpregnant adults, may be faced with the risk of acquiring life-threatening infections during outbreaks or bioterrorism (BT) events and, in some cases, can experience increased severity of infection and higher morbidity compared with nonpregnant adults. Yersinia pestis, the bacterium that causes plague, is a highly pathogenic organism. There are 4 million births annually in the United States, and thus the unique needs of pregnant women and their infants should be considered in pre-event planning for a plague outbreak or BT event.