Disruption of dopamine D2/D3 system function impairs the human ability to understand the mental states of other people.

Difficulties in reasoning about others' mental states (i.e., mentalising/Theory of Mind) are highly prevalent among disorders featuring dopamine dysfunctions (e.g., Parkinson's disease) and significantly affect individuals' quality of life. However, due to multiple confounding factors inherent to existing patient studies, currently little is known about whether these sociocognitive symptoms originate from aberrant dopamine signalling or from psychosocial changes unrelated to dopamine. The present study, therefore, investigated the role of dopamine in modulating mentalising in a sample of healthy volunteers. We used a double-blind, placebo-controlled procedure to test the effect of the D2/D3 antagonist haloperidol on mental state attribution, using an adaptation of the Heider and Simmel (1944) animations task. On 2 separate days, once after receiving 2.5 mg haloperidol and once after receiving placebo, 33 healthy adult participants viewed and labelled short videos of 2 triangles depicting mental state (involving mentalistic interaction wherein 1 triangle intends to cause or act upon a particular mental state in the other, e.g., surprising) and non-mental state (involving reciprocal interaction without the intention to cause/act upon the other triangle's mental state, e.g., following) interactions. Using Bayesian mixed effects models, we observed that haloperidol decreased accuracy in labelling both mental and non-mental state animations. Our secondary analyses suggest that dopamine modulates inference from mental and non-mental state animations via independent mechanisms, pointing towards 2 putative pathways underlying the dopaminergic modulation of mental state attribution: action representation and a shared mechanism supporting mentalising and emotion recognition. We conclude that dopaminergic pathways impact Theory of Mind, at least indirectly. Our results have implications for the neurochemical basis of sociocognitive difficulties in patients with dopamine dysfunctions and generate new hypotheses about the specific dopamine-mediated mechanisms underlying social cognition.

Human social sensing is an untapped resource for computational social science.

The ability to 'sense' the social environment and thereby to understand the thoughts and actions of others allows humans to fit into their social worlds, communicate and cooperate, and learn from others' experiences. Here we argue that, through the lens of computational social science, this ability can be used to advance research into human sociality. When strategically selected to represent a specific population of interest, human social sensors can help to describe and predict societal trends. In addition, their reports of how they experience their social worlds can help to build models of social dynamics that are constrained by the empirical reality of human social systems.

Single-neuronal predictions of others' beliefs in humans.

Human social behaviour crucially depends on our ability to reason about others. This capacity for theory of mind has a vital role in social cognition because it enables us not only to form a detailed understanding of the hidden thoughts and beliefs of other individuals but also to understand that they may differ from our own1-3. Although a number of areas in the human brain have been linked to social reasoning4,5 and its disruption across a variety of psychosocial disorders6-8, the basic cellular mechanisms that underlie human theory of mind remain undefined. Here, using recordings from single cells in the human dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, we identify neurons that reliably encode information about others' beliefs across richly varying scenarios and that distinguish self- from other-belief-related representations. By further following their encoding dynamics, we show how these cells represent the contents of the others' beliefs and accurately predict whether they are true or false. We also show how they track inferred beliefs from another's specific perspective and how their activities relate to behavioural performance. Together, these findings reveal a detailed cellular process in the human dorsomedial prefrontal cortex for representing another's beliefs and identify candidate neurons that could support theory of mind.

Young children infer and manage what others think about them.

We care about what others think of us and often try to present ourselves in a good light. What cognitive capacities underlie our ability to think (or even worry) about reputation, and how do these concerns manifest as strategic self-presentational behaviors? Even though the tendency to modify one's behaviors in the presence of others emerges early in life, the degree to which these behaviors reflect a rich understanding of what others think about the self has remained an open question. Bridging prior work on reputation management, communication, and theory of mind development in early childhood, here we investigate young children's ability to infer and revise others' mental representation of the self. Across four experiments, we find that 3- and 4-y-old children's decisions about to whom to communicate (Experiment 1), what to communicate (Experiments 2 and 3), and which joint activity to engage in with a partner (Experiment 4) are systematically influenced by the partner's observations of the children's own past performance. Children in these studies chose to present self-relevant information selectively and strategically when it could revise the partner's outdated, negative representation of the self. Extending research on children's ability to engage in informative communication, these results demonstrate the sophistication of early self-presentational behaviors: Even young children can draw rich inferences about what others think of them and communicate self-relevant information to revise these representations.

The Causal Role of Temporoparietal Junction in Mediating Self-Other Mergence during Mentalizing.

Mentalizing is a core faculty of human social behaviors that involves inferring the cognitive states of others. This process necessitates adopting an allocentric perspective and suppressing one's egocentric perspective, referred to as self-other distinction (SOD). Meanwhile, individuals may project their own cognitive states onto others in prosocial behaviors, a process known as self-other mergence (SOM). It remains unclear how the two opposing processes coexist during mentalizing. We here combined functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) techniques with intranasal oxytocin (OTint) as a probe to examine the SOM effect in healthy male human participants, during which they attributed the cognitive states of decision confidence to an anonymous partner. Our results showed that OTint facilitated SOM via the left temporoparietal junction (lTPJ), but did not affect neural representations of internal information about others' confidence in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, which might be dedicated to SOD, although the two brain regions, importantly, have been suggested to be involved in mentalizing. Further, the SOM effect induced by OTint was fully mediated by the lTPJ activities and became weakened when the lTPJ activities were suppressed by rTMS. These findings suggest that the lTPJ might play a vital role in mediating SOM during mentalizing.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Every human mind is unique. It is critical to distinguish the minds of others from the self. On the contrary, we often project the current mental states of the self onto others; that is to say, self-other mergence (SOM). The neural mechanism underlying SOM remains unclear. We here used intranasal oxytocin (OTint) as a probe to leverage SOM, which is typically suppressed during mentalizing. We revealed that OTint specifically modulated the left temporoparietal junction (lTPJ) neural activities to fully mediate the SOM effect, while suppressing the lTPJ neural activities by transcranial magnetic stimulations causally attenuated the SOM effect. Our results demonstrate that the lTPJ might mediate SOM during social interactions.

Neural and Physiological Correlates of Prosocial Behavior: Temporoparietal Junction Activity in 3-year-old Children.

Although the development of prosocial behavior has been widely studied from the behavioral aspect, the neural mechanisms underlying prosocial behavior in the early stages of development remain unclear. Therefore, this study investigated the neural mechanisms underlying the emergence of prosocial behavior in 3-year-old children. Brain activity in the medial pFC and right TPJ (rTPJ) and facial expression activity, which are related to the ability to infer others' mental states (mentalizing), during the observation of prosocial and antisocial scenes were measured using functional near-infrared spectroscopy and electromyography, respectively. Subsequently, the children's helping and comforting behaviors toward an experimenter were assessed to examine prosocial behavioral tendencies. A correlation analysis revealed that the children who showed stronger activity levels in the rTPJ while observing prosocial scenes had more immediate helping behaviors toward others than those who did not show stronger response levels. Moreover, the amount of facial expression activity correlated with prosocial behavior, including both helping and comforting behaviors. These results suggest that the development of mentalizing ability and the social evaluation of others' actions, mediated by the rTPJ, contribute to the emergence of prosocial behavior.

Synergy of the mirror neuron system and the mentalizing system in a single brain and between brains during joint actions.

Cooperative action involves the simulation of actions and their co-representation by two or more people. This requires the involvement of two complex brain systems: the mirror neuron system (MNS) and the mentalizing system (MENT), both of critical importance for successful social interaction. However, their internal organization and the potential synergy of both systems during joint actions (JA) are yet to be determined. The aim of this study was to examine the role and interaction of these two fundamental systems-MENT and MNS-during continuous interaction. To this hand, we conducted a multiple-brain connectivity analysis in the source domain during a motor cooperation task using high-density EEG dual-recordings providing relevant insights into the roles of MNS and MENT at the intra- and interbrain levels. In particular, the intra-brain analysis demonstrated the essential function of both systems during JA, as well as the crucial role played by single brain regions of both neural mechanisms during cooperative activities. Specifically, our intra-brain analysis revealed that both neural mechanisms are essential during Joint Action (JA), showing a solid connection between MNS and MENT and a central role of the single brain regions of both mechanisms during cooperative actions. Additionally, our inter-brain study revealed increased inter-subject connections involving the motor system, MENT and MNS. Thus, our findings show a mutual influence between two interacting agents, based on synchronization of MNS and MENT systems. Our results actually encourage more research into the still-largely unknown realm of inter-brain dynamics and contribute to expand the body of knowledge in social neuroscience.

Precision mapping of the default network reveals common and distinct (inter) activity for autobiographical memory and theory of mind.

The default network is widely implicated as a common neural substrate for self-generated thought, such as remembering one's past (autobiographical memory) and imagining the thoughts and feelings of others (theory of mind). Findings that the default network comprises subnetworks of regions, some commonly and some distinctly involved across processes, suggest that one's own experiences inform their understanding of others. With the advent of precision functional MRI (fMRI) methods, however, it is unclear if this shared substrate is observed instead due to traditional group analysis methods. We investigated this possibility using a novel combination of methodological strategies. Twenty-three participants underwent multi-echo resting-state and task fMRI. We used their resting-state scans to conduct cortical parcellation sensitive to individual variation while preserving our ability to conduct group analysis. Using multivariate analyses, we assessed the functional activation and connectivity profiles of default network regions while participants engaged in autobiographical memory, theory of mind, or a sensorimotor control condition. Across the default network, we observed stronger activity associated with both autobiographical memory and theory of mind compared to the control condition. Nonetheless, we also observed that some regions showed preferential activity to either experimental condition, in line with past work. The connectivity results similarly indicated shared and distinct functional profiles. Our results support that autobiographical memory and theory of mind, two theoretically important and widely studied domains of social cognition, evoke common and distinct aspects of the default network even when ensuring high fidelity to individual-specific characteristics.NEW & NOTEWORTHY We used cutting-edge precision functional MRI (fMRI) methods such as multi-echo fMRI acquisition and denoising, a robust experimental paradigm, and individualized cortical parcellation across 23 participants to provide evidence that remembering one's past experiences and imagining the thoughts and feelings of others share a common neural substrate. Evidence from activation and connectivity analyses indicate overlapping and distinct functional profiles of these widely studied episodic and social processes.

Functional alterations in resting-state networks for Theory of Mind in Parkinson's disease.

In Parkinson's disease (PD), impairment of Theory of Mind (ToM) has recently attracted an increasing number of neuroscientific investigations. If and how functional connectivity of the ToM network is altered in PD is still an open question. First, we explored whether ToM network connectivity shows potential PD-specific functional alterations when compared to healthy controls (HC). Second, we tested the role of the duration of PD in the evolution of functional alterations in the ToM network. Between-group connectivity alterations were computed adopting resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rs-fMRI) data of four groups: PD patients with short disease duration (PD-1, n = 72); PD patients with long disease duration (PD-2, n = 22); healthy controls for PD-1 (HC-1, n = 69); healthy controls for PD-2 (HC-2, n = 22). We explored connectivity differences in the ToM network within and between its three subnetworks: Affective, Cognitive and Core. PD-1 presented a global pattern of decreased functional connectivity within the ToM network, compared to HC-1. The alterations mainly involved the Cognitive and Affective ToM subnetworks and their reciprocal connections. PD-2-those with longer disease duration-showed an increased connectivity spanning the entire ToM network, albeit less consistently in the Core ToM network, compared to both the PD-1 and the HC-2 groups. Functional connectivity within the ToM network is altered in PD. The alterations follow a graded pattern, with decreased connectivity at short disease duration, which broadens to a generalized increase with longer disease duration. The alterations involve both the Cognitive and Affective subnetworks of ToM.

Risk factors for internalizing symptoms: The influence of empathy, theory of mind, and negative thinking processes.

Internalizing symptoms such as elevated stress and sustained negative affect can be important warning signs for developing mental disorders. A recent theoretical framework suggests a complex interplay of empathy, theory of mind (ToM), and negative thinking processes as a crucial risk combination for internalizing symptoms. To disentangle these relationships, this study utilizes neural, behavioral, and self-report data to examine how the interplay between empathy, ToM, and negative thinking processes relates to stress and negative affect. We reanalyzed the baseline data of N = 302 healthy participants (57% female, Mage = 40.52, SDage = 9.30) who participated in a large-scale mental training study, the ReSource project. Empathy and ToM were assessed using a validated fMRI paradigm featuring naturalistic video stimuli and via self-report. Additional self-report scales were employed to measure internalizing symptoms (perceived stress, negative affect) and negative thinking processes (rumination and self-blame). Our results revealed linear associations of self-reported ToM and empathic distress with stress and negative affect. Also, both lower and higher, compared to average, activation in the anterior insula during empathic processing and in the middle temporal gyrus during ToM performance was significantly associated with internalizing symptoms. These associations were dependent on rumination and self-blame. Our findings indicate specific risk constellations for internalizing symptoms. Especially people with lower self-reported ToM and higher empathic distress may be at risk for more internalizing symptoms. Quadratic associations of empathy- and ToM-related brain activation with internalizing symptoms depended on negative thinking processes, suggesting differential effects of cognitive and affective functioning on internalizing symptoms. Using a multi-method approach, these findings advance current research by shedding light on which complex risk combinations of cognitive and affective functioning are relevant for internalizing symptoms.

Agreeableness modulates mental state decoding: Electrophysiological evidence.

Agreeableness is one of the five personality traits which is associated with theory of mind (ToM) abilities. One of the critical processes involved in ToM is the decoding of emotional cues. In the present study, we investigated whether this process is modulated by agreeableness using electroencephalography (EEG) while taking into account task complexity and sex differences that are expected to moderate the relationship between emotional decoding and agreeableness. This approach allowed us to identify at which stage of the neural processing agreeableness kicks in, in order to distinguish the impact on early, perceptual processes from slower, inferential processing. Two tasks were employed and submitted to 62 participants during EEG recording: the reading the mind in the eyes (RME) task, requiring the decoding of complex mental states from eye expressions, and the biological (e)motion task, involving the perception of basic emotional actions through point-light body stimuli. Event-related potential (ERP) results showed a significant correlation between agreeableness and the contrast for emotional and non-emotional trials in a late time window only during the RME task. Specifically, higher levels of agreeableness were associated with a deeper neural processing of emotional versus non-emotional trials within the whole and male samples. In contrast, the modulation in females was negligible. The source analysis highlighted that this ERP-agreeableness association engages the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Our findings expand previous research on personality and social processing and confirm that sex modulates this relationship.

Network and state specificity in connectivity-based predictions of individual behavior.

Predicting individual behavior from brain functional connectivity (FC) patterns can contribute to our understanding of human brain functioning. This may apply in particular if predictions are based on features derived from circumscribed, a priori defined functional networks, which improves interpretability. Furthermore, some evidence suggests that task-based FC data may yield more successful predictions of behavior than resting-state FC data. Here, we comprehensively examined to what extent the correspondence of functional network priors and task states with behavioral target domains influences the predictability of individual performance in cognitive, social, and affective tasks. To this end, we used data from the Human Connectome Project for large-scale out-of-sample predictions of individual abilities in working memory (WM), theory-of-mind cognition (SOCIAL), and emotion processing (EMO) from FC of corresponding and non-corresponding states (WM/SOCIAL/EMO/resting-state) and networks (WM/SOCIAL/EMO/whole-brain connectome). Using root mean squared error and coefficient of determination to evaluate model fit revealed that predictive performance was rather poor overall. Predictions from whole-brain FC were slightly better than those from FC in task-specific networks, and a slight benefit of predictions based on FC from task versus resting state was observed for performance in the WM domain. Beyond that, we did not find any significant effects of a correspondence of network, task state, and performance domains. Together, these results suggest that multivariate FC patterns during both task and resting states contain rather little information on individual performance levels, calling for a reconsideration of how the brain mediates individual differences in mental abilities.

Neural correlates of static and dynamic social decision-making in real-time sibling interactions.

In traditional game theory tasks, social decision-making is centered on the prediction of the intentions (i.e., mentalizing) of strangers or manipulated responses. In contrast, real-life scenarios often involve familiar individuals in dynamic environments. Further research is needed to explore neural correlates of social decision-making with changes in the available information and environmental settings. This study collected fMRI hyperscanning data (N = 100, 46 same-sex pairs were analyzed) to investigate sibling pairs engaging in an iterated Chicken Game task within a competitive context, including two decision-making phases. In the static phase, participants chose between turning (cooperate) and continuing (defect) in a fixed time window. Participants could estimate the probability of different events based on their priors (previous outcomes and representation of other's intentions) and report their decision plan. The dynamic phase mirrored real-world interactions in which information is continuously changing (replicated within a virtual environment). Individuals had to simultaneously update their beliefs, monitor the actions of the other, and adjust their decisions. Our findings revealed substantial choice consistency between the two phases and evidence for shared neural correlates in mentalizing-related brain regions, including the prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus. Specific neural correlates were associated with each phase; increased activation of areas associated with action planning and outcome evaluation were found in the static compared with the dynamic phase. Using the opposite contrast, dynamic decision-making showed higher activation in regions related to predicting and monitoring other's actions, including the anterior cingulate cortex and insula. Cooperation (turning), compared with defection (continuing), showed increased activation in mentalizing-related regions only in the static phase, while defection, relative to cooperation, exhibited higher activation in areas associated with conflict monitoring and risk processing in the dynamic phase. Men were less cooperative and had greater TPJ activation. Sibling competitive relationship did not predict competitive behavior but showed a tendency to predict brain activity during dynamic decision-making. Only individual brain activation results are included here, and no interbrain analyses are reported. These neural correlates emphasize the significance of considering varying levels of information available and environmental settings when delving into the intricacies of mentalizing during social decision-making among familiar individuals.

Theory of mind in mild cognitive impairment and Parkinson's disease: The role of memory impairment.

BACKGROUND: Social cognition is impaired in Parkinson's disease (PD). Whether social cognitive impairment (iSC) is a by-product of the underlying cognitive deficits in PD or a process independent of cognitive status is unknown. To this end, the present study was designed to investigate the weight of specific cognitive deficits in social cognition, considering different mild cognitive impairment subtypes of PD (PD-MCI). METHODS: Fifty-eight PD patients underwent a neuropsychological battery assessing executive functions, memory, language, and visuospatial domains, together with social cognitive tests focused on theory of mind (ToM). Patients were divided into subgroups according to their clinical cognitive status: amnestic PD-MCI (PD-aMCI, n = 18), non-amnestic PD-MCI (PD-naMCI, n = 16), and cognitively unimpaired (PD-CU, n = 24). Composite scores for cognitive and social domains were computed to perform mediation analyses. RESULTS: Memory and language impairments mediated the effect of executive functioning in social cognitive deficits in PD patients. Dividing by MCI subgroups, iSC occurred more frequently in PD-aMCI (77.8%) than in PD-naMCI (18.8%) and PD-CU (8.3%). Moreover, PD-aMCI performed worse than PD-CU in all social cognitive measures, whereas PD-naMCI performed worse than PD-CU in only one subtype of the affective and cognitive ToM tests. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that ToM impairment in PD can be explained by memory dysfunction that mediates executive control. ToM downsides in the amnesic forms of PD-MCI may suggest that subtle changes in social cognition could partly explain future transitions into dementia. Hence, the evaluation of social cognition in PD is critical to characterize a possible behavioral marker of cognitive decline.

Dogs do not use their own experience with novel barriers to infer others' visual access.

Despite extensive research into the Theory of Mind abilities in non-human animals, it remains controversial whether they can attribute mental states to other individuals or whether they merely predict future behaviour based on previous behavioural cues. In the present study, we tested pet dogs (in total, N = 92) on adaptations of the 'goggles test' previously used with human infants and great apes. In both a cooperative and a competitive task, dogs were given direct experience with the properties of novel screens (one opaque, the other transparent) inserted into identical, but differently coloured, tunnels. Dogs learned and remembered the properties of the screens even when, later on, these were no longer directly visible to them. Nevertheless, they were not more likely to follow the experimenter's gaze to a target object when the experimenter could see it through the transparent screen. Further, they did not prefer to steal a forbidden treat first in a location obstructed from the experimenter's view by the opaque screen. Therefore, dogs did not show perspective-taking abilities in this study in which the only available cue to infer others' visual access consisted of the subjects' own previous experience with novel visual barriers. We conclude that the behaviour of our dogs, unlike that of infants and apes in previous studies, does not show evidence of experience-projection abilities.

Disentangling the relationship between social cognition, executive functions and behaviour changes in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis.

BACKGROUND: Social cognition (SC) deficits are included in the amyotrophic lateral sclerosis-frontotemporal spectrum disorder (ALS-FTDS) revised diagnostic criteria. However, the impact of SC assessment on cognitive classification and the cognitive-behavioural correlates of SC remain unclear. This cross-sectional study aimed to assess the impact of SC assessment on ALS-FTDS categorisation and explore the relationship of SC with executive functions (EF) and behaviour changes in a cohort of ALS patients. METHODS: 121 patients and 56 healthy controls from the Turin ALS Centre underwent cognitive/behavioural testing, including the SC subdomains of facial emotion recognition, and cognitive and affective theory of mind (ToM). RESULTS: Patients performed significantly worse than controls in all SC explored domains, and 45% of patients exhibited a deficit in at least one SC test, dissociated from the presence of EF deficits. In 13% of cases, the SC deficit was isolated and subclinical. SC assessment contributed to the attribution of cognitive impairment in 10% of patients. Through a statistical clustering approach, we found that ToM only partially overlaps with EF while behaviour changes are associated with emotional disorders (anxiety and depression). CONCLUSIONS: SC is overall independent of EF in ALS, with ToM only partially associated with specific EF measures, and behaviour changes associated with emotional disorders. The influence of SC on cognitive categorisation and the frequent identification of a subclinical SC impairment have implications in a clinical setting, considering the substantial impact of cognitive impairment on disease burden and therapeutic choices.

Subthalamic Nucleus Stimulation Modulates Cognitive Theory of Mind in Parkinson's Disease.

BACKGROUND: Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' mental state, is essential for social interaction among human beings. It has been widely reported that both cognitive (inference of knowledge) and affective (inference of emotion) components of ToM are disrupted in Parkinson's disease (PD). Previous studies usually focused on the involvement of the prefrontal cortex. OBJECTIVE: This study investigated the causal role of the subthalamic nucleus (STN), a key hub of the fronto-basal ganglia loops, in ToM. METHODS: Thirty-four patients with idiopathic PD (15 women, aged 62.2 ± 8.3 years) completed a Yoni task with deep brain stimulation (DBS) ON and OFF. The Yoni task was designed to separate the cognitive and affective components of ToM. Volumes of tissue activated (VTA) were computed for three subregions of the STN. RESULTS: DBS showed insignificant effects on ToM inference costs at the group level, which may be due to the large interindividual variability. The associative VTA correlated with the cognitive inference cost change but not the affective inference cost change. Patients with greater associative STN stimulation infer more slowly on cognitive ToM. Stimulating associative STN can adversely affect cognitive ToM in PD patients, especially in patients with a wide range of stimulation (≥0.157) or cognitive decline (Montreal Cognitive Assessment < 26). CONCLUSIONS: The associative STN plays a causal role in cognitive ToM in patients with PD. However, stimulating the associative STN likely impairs cognitive ToM and potentially leads to social interaction deficits in PD. © 2024 International Parkinson and Movement Disorder Society.

Assessing social cognition in patients with schizophrenia and healthy controls using the reading the mind in the eyes test (RMET): a systematic review and meta-regression.

The reading the mind in the eyes test (RMET) - which assesses the theory of mind component of social cognition - is often used to compare social cognition between patients with schizophrenia and healthy controls. There is, however, no systematic review integrating the results of these studies. We identified 198 studies published before July 2020 that administered RMET to patients with schizophrenia or healthy controls from three English-language and two Chinese-language databases. These studies included 41 separate samples of patients with schizophrenia (total n = 1836) and 197 separate samples of healthy controls (total n = 23 675). The pooled RMET score was 19.76 (95% CI 18.91-20.60) in patients and 25.53 (95% CI 25.19-25.87) in controls (z = 12.41, p < 0.001). After excluding small-sample outlier studies, this difference in RMET performance was greater in studies using non-English v. English versions of RMET (Chi [Q] = 8.54, p < 0.001). Meta-regression analyses found a negative association of age with RMET score and a positive association of years of schooling with RMET score in both patients and controls. A secondary meta-analysis using a spline construction of 180 healthy control samples identified a non-monotonic relationship between age and RMET score - RMET scores increased with age before 31 and decreased with age after 31. These results indicate that patients with schizophrenia have substantial deficits in theory of mind compared with healthy controls, supporting the construct validity of RMET as a measure of social cognition. The different results for English versus non-English versions of RMET and the non-monotonic relationship between age and RMET score highlight the importance of the language of administration of RMET and the possibility that the relationship of aging with theory of mind is different from the relationship of aging with other types of cognitive functioning.

Neural activations during cognitive and affective theory of mind processing in healthy adults with a family history of alcohol use disorder.

BACKGROUND: Social cognition impairments are a common feature of alcohol use disorders (AUD). However, it remains unclear whether these impairments are solely the consequence of chronic alcohol consumption or whether they could be a marker of vulnerability. METHODS: The present study implemented a family history approach to address this question for a key process of social cognition: theory of mind (ToM). Thirty healthy adults with a family history of AUD (FH+) and 30 healthy adults with a negative family history of AUD (FH-), matched for age, sex, and education level, underwent an fMRI cartoon-vignette paradigm assessing cognitive and affective ToM. Participants also completed questionnaires evaluating anxiety, depressive symptoms, childhood trauma, and alexithymia. RESULTS: Results indicated that FH+ individuals differed from FH- individuals on affective but not cognitive ToM processing, at both the behavioral and neural levels. At the behavioral level, the FH+ group had lower response accuracy for affective ToM compared with the FH- group. At the neural level, the FH+ group had higher brain activations in the left insula and inferior frontal cortex during affective ToM processing. These activations remained significant when controlling for depressive symptoms, anxiety, and childhood trauma. CONCLUSIONS: These findings highlight difficulties during affective ToM processing among first-degree relatives of AUD patients, supporting the idea that some of the impairments exhibited by these patients may already be present before the onset of AUD and may be considered a marker of vulnerability.

The neural structures of theory of mind are valence-sensitive: evidence from three tDCS studies.

Several cortical structures are involved in theory of mind (ToM), including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and the right temporo- parietal junction (rTPJ). We investigated the role of these regions in mind reading with respect to the valence of mental states. Sixty-five healthy adult participants were recruited and received transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) (1.5 mA, 20 min) with one week interval in three separate studies. The stimulation conditions were anodal tDCS over the dlPFC coupled with cathodal tDCS over the vmPFC, reversed stimulation conditions, and sham in the first study, and anodal tDCS over the vmPFC, or dlPFC, and sham stimulation, with an extracranial return electrode in the second and third study. During stimulation, participants underwent the reading mind from eyes/voice tests (RMET or RMVT) in each stimulation condition. Anodal left dlPFC/cathodal right vmPFC stimulation increased the accuracy of negative mental state attributions, anodal rTPJ decreased the accuracy of negative and neutral mental state attributions, and decreased the reaction time of positive mental state attributions. Our results imply that the neural correlates of ToM are valence-sensitive.