Droplet- Rather than Aerosol-Mediated Dispersion Is the Primary Mechanism of Bacterial Transmission from Contaminated Hand-Washing Sink Traps.

An alarming rise in hospital outbreaks implicating hand-washing sinks has led to widespread acknowledgment that sinks are a major reservoir of antibiotic-resistant pathogens in patient care areas. An earlier study using green fluorescent protein (GFP)-expressing Escherichia coli (GFP-E. coli) as a model organism demonstrated dispersal from drain biofilms in contaminated sinks. The present study further characterizes the dispersal of microorganisms from contaminated sinks. Replicate hand-washing sinks were inoculated with GFP-E. coli, and dispersion was measured using qualitative (settle plates) and quantitative (air sampling) methods. Dispersal caused by faucet water was captured with settle plates and air sampling methods when bacteria were present on the drain. In contrast, no dispersal was captured without or in between faucet events, amending an earlier theory that bacteria aerosolize from the P-trap and disperse. Numbers of dispersed GFP-E. coli cells diminished substantially within 30 minutes after faucet usage, suggesting that the organisms were associated with larger droplet-sized particles that are not suspended in the air for long periods.IMPORTANCE Among the possible environmental reservoirs in a patient care environment, sink drains are increasingly recognized as a potential reservoir to hospitalized patients of multidrug-resistant health care-associated pathogens. With increasing antimicrobial resistance limiting therapeutic options for patients, a better understanding of how pathogens disseminate from sink drains is urgently needed. Once this knowledge gap has decreased, interventions can be engineered to decrease or eliminate transmission from hospital sink drains to patients. The current study further defines the mechanisms of transmission for bacteria that colonize sink drains.

A Guide to Investigating Suspected Outbreaks of Mucormycosis in Healthcare.

This report serves as a guide for investigating mucormycosis infections in healthcare. We describe lessons learned from previous outbreaks and offer methods and tools that can aid in these investigations. We also offer suggestions for conducting environmental assessments, implementing infection control measures, and initiating surveillance to ensure that interventions were effective. While not all investigations of mucormycosis infections will identify a single source, all can potentially lead to improvements in infection control.

Outbreak investigation of Pseudomonas aeruginosa infections in a neonatal intensive care unit.

A Pseudomonas aeruginosa outbreak was investigated in a neonatal intensive care unit that had experienced a prior similar outbreak. The 8 cases identified included 2 deaths. An investigation found the cause of the outbreak: tap water from contaminated hospital plumbing which was used for humidifier reservoirs, neonatal bathing, and nutritional preparation. Our findings reinforce a recent Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services memo recommending increased attention to water management to improve awareness, identification, mitigation, and prevention of water-associated, health care-associated infections.

Case Report: Imported Case of Lassa Fever - New Jersey, May 2015.

We report a fatal case of Lassa fever diagnosed in the United States in a Liberian traveler. We describe infection control protocols and public health response. One contact at high risk became symptomatic, but her samples tested negative for Lassa virus; no secondary cases occurred among health care, family, and community contacts.

Challenges During a Chlorine Gas Emergency Response.

OBJECTIVE: A chlorine gas release occurred at a poultry processing plant as a result of an accidental mixing of sodium hypochlorite and an acidic antimicrobial treatment. We evaluated the public health and emergency medical services response and developed and disseminated public health recommendations to limit the impact of future incidents. METHODS: We conducted key informant interviews with the state health department; local fire, emergency medical services, and police departments; county emergency management; and representatives from area hospitals to understand the response mechanisms employed for this incident. RESULTS: After being exposed to an estimated 40-pound chlorine gas release, 170 workers were triaged on the scene and sent to 5 area hospitals. Each hospital redistributed staff or called in extra staff (eg, physicians, nurses, and respiratory therapists) in response to the event. Interviews with hospital staff emphasized the need for improved communication with responders at the scene of a chemical incident. CONCLUSIONS: While responding, hospitals handled the patient surge without outside assistance because of effective planning, training, and drilling. The investigation highlighted that greater interagency communication can play an important role in ensuring that chemical incident patients are managed and treated in a timely manner. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2016;10:553-556).

National survey of Laboratory Response Network sentinel laboratory preparedness.

OBJECTIVE: The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) is the United States' laboratory system for detecting, confirming, and reporting potential bioterrorism agents. The first tier-sentinel laboratories-is composed principally of hospital-based laboratories and is tasked with ruling out potential biological threat agents in clinical specimens or the identification of suspicious specimens for further testing in higher tiers of the LRN system. The aim of the present study was to broadly describe preparedness of the first tier of the hospital LRN, the sentinel laboratories, with a specific focus on training, personnel, and communications. METHODS: A semistructured cross-sectional survey of US sentinel laboratories was designed and conducted. Hospitals with greater than 250 beds and an emergency department were considered eligible for inclusion. A geographically weighted sample of 201 hospitals was selected for inclusion. The survey was administered by telephone to the microbiology managers (or designees) at the selected hospitals. The survey contained questions related to drill frequency, proficiency survey participation, personnel training, personnel responsibilities, procedures for biological threat response, and overall confidence in preparedness. RESULTS: Overall, 179 hospitals (89.1%) identified themselves as sentinel laboratories and participated in the survey; 11.7% reported that they had had an emergency alert within the last 2 years. Although rates of internal drills were low (20.7%), participation in some form of bioterrorism proficiency evaluation was high (79.9%). In all, 83.8% of laboratories reported that they had personnel designated to coordinate response to acts of bioterrorism. More than 73% of respondents indicated that they had sufficient personnel, equipment, and training to respond to a biological terrorism event. By multivariate analysis, sentinel laboratories were 3.4 times more likely to feel confident that they had sufficient personnel, equipment, and training to respond to a biological terrorism event if they had designated personnel for bioterrorism roles. CONCLUSIONS: This pilot study of sentinel laboratory bioterrorism preparedness demonstrated that hospital laboratory personnel, training, and communication preparedness were not universal, despite designation as sentinel laboratories. A need for unified monitoring of sentinel laboratories exists, and efforts should be made to develop standardized metrics for sentinel laboratory preparedness.