Technology Advances, High-Risk Research, and a Safe Way Forward.

The human and economic toll of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and the unknowns regarding the origins of the virus, with a backdrop of enormous advances in technologies and human understanding of molecular virology, have raised global concerns about the safety of the legitimate infectious disease research enterprise. We acknowledge the safety and security risks resulting from the broad availability of tools and knowledge, tools and knowledge that can be exploited equally for good or harm. The last 2 decades have shown us that the risks are real. They have also shown us that more traditional top-down regulations alone are not the answer. We encourage government to be thoughtful and nuanced in dealing with this significant challenge and to carefully consider human factors and the important role of organizational-level leadership before simply layering an additional bureaucratic burden on the enterprise without understanding value and cost.

Confronting the threat of bioterrorism: realities, challenges, and defensive strategies.

Global terrorism is a rapidly growing threat to world security, and increases the risk of bioterrorism. In this Review, we discuss the potential threat of bioterrorism, agents that could be exploited, and recent developments in technologies and policy for detecting and controlling epidemics that have been initiated intentionally. The local and international response to infectious disease epidemics, such as the severe acute respiratory syndrome and west African Ebola virus epidemic, revealed serious shortcomings which bioterrorists might exploit when intentionally initiating an epidemic. Development of new vaccines and antimicrobial therapies remains a priority, including the need to expedite clinical trials using new methodologies. Better means to protect health-care workers operating in dangerous environments are also needed, particularly in areas with poor infrastructure. New and improved approaches should be developed for surveillance, early detection, response, effective isolation of patients, control of the movement of potentially infected people, and risk communication. Access to dangerous pathogens should be appropriately regulated, without reducing progress in the development of countermeasures. We conclude that preparedness for intentional outbreaks has the important added value of strengthening preparedness for natural epidemics, and vice versa.

Implementing the global health security agenda: lessons from global health and security programs.

The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) describes a vision for a world that is safe and secure from infectious disease threats; it underscores the importance of developing the international capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to pandemic agents. In February 2014, the United States committed to support the GHSA by expanding and intensifying ongoing efforts across the US government. Implementing these goals will require interagency coordination and harmonization of diverse health security elements. Lessons learned from the Global Health Initiative (GHI), the President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program underscore that centralized political, technical, and fiscal authority will be key to developing robust, sustainable, and integrated global health security efforts across the US government. In this article, we review the strengths and challenges of GHI, PEPFAR, and CTR and develop recommendations for implementing a unified US global health security program.

Biological terrorism: understanding the threat, preparation, and medical response.

The thought of an outbreak of disease caused by the intentional release of a pathogen or toxin in an American city was alien just 10 years ago. Many people believed that biological warfare was only in the military's imagination, perhaps to be faced by soldiers on a far-away battlefield, if at all. The "anthrax letters" and the resulting deaths from inhalation anthrax have changed that perception. The national, state, and local governments in the United States are preparing for what is now called "not if, but when and how extensive" biological terrorism. In contrast to the acute onset and first-responder focus with a chemical attack, in a bioterrorist attack, the physician and the hospital will be at the center of the fray. Whether the attack is a hoax, a small food-borne outbreak, a lethal aerosol cloud moving silently through a city at night, or the introduction of contagious disease, the physician who understands threat agent characteristics and diagnostic and treatment options and who thinks like an epidemiologist will have the greatest success in limiting the impact of the attack. As individual health care providers, we must add the exotic agents to our diagnostic differentials. Hospital administrators must consider augmenting diagnostic capabilities and surveillance programs and even making infrastructure modifications in preparation for the treatment of victims of bioterrorism. Above all, we must all educate ourselves. If done correctly, preparation for a biological attack will be as "dual use" as the facility that produced the weapon. A sound public health infrastructure, which includes all of us and our resources, will serve this nation well for the control of the disease, no matter what the cause of the disease.

Future challenges in preparing for and responding to bioterrorism events.

The future success of our preparations for bioterrorism depends on many issues as presented in this article. If these issues are properly addressed, the resulting improvements in bioterrorism preparations will allow us to better deter and mitigate a bioterrorism incident and will also provide us with the added benefit of improvements in early detection, diagnosis, and treatment of natural disease outbreaks. Emergency physicians must take an active leading role in working with the various disciplines to produce a better-prepared community.

Preparedness for an anthrax attack.

Bacillus anthracis is a long-known bacterial organism with a uniquely stable spore stage. Its stability and the lethal disease which results when the spore is inhaled made it a favorite of state-sponsored biological weapons programs throughout the Cold War era. It is also believed to be high on the list of candidate microbial agents which could be used by terrorist groups or lone actors. Its unique characteristics make protection of humans, especially civilians, from an intentional biological attack very difficult. The author argues that an all-hazards/public health approach - which would also be needed for any natural or deliberate outbreak, no matter the agent - should serve as a foundation of preparation for the specific anthrax countermeasures. Because B. anthracis is a unique organism, specific countermeasures for anthrax detection, diagnostics, prophylaxis and therapy, should be developed in nations or regions where the threat of biological attack is believed to warrant such preparation. Other considerations for a nation interested in anthrax preparedness are discussed.

THE ECOLOGY AND REPRODUCTION OF A MARINE BIVALVE, MYSELLA PLANULATA (ERYCINACEA).

1. In Beebe Cove, a shallow sublittoral bay, the bivalve Mysella planulata is dispersed contagiously throughout the year. This dispersion is not associated with the mode of development of the species but may be correlated with non-random variability in the microhabitat. There is no evidence that M. planulata in Beebe Cove is symbiotically associated with any invertebrate species. 2. Mysella planulata has a life span encompassing four growing seasons and a maximum size of about 4.0 mm. About 50% of maximum length is attained by the end of the first growing season. 3. Mysella planulata is a simultaneous hermaphrodite. Spermatogenesis precedes oogenesis. The species is capable of self-fertilization and although no animals were ever observed to release sperm, the possibility of cross-fertilization is not ruled out. Egg production is limited to animals in excess of 1.7 mm. 4. Larvae are retained in the suprabranchial chamber to the straight-hinge stage of development. Upon release, the larvae are planktotrophic; starved larvae in culture grow slightly but will not metamorphose. Metamorphosis in culture occurs in about two weeks at 25° C. In the laboratory, larvae metamorphose over a wider range of size than in nature, probably reflecting predation pressure in nature. 5. Estimates of the potential reproductive contribution of the various age classes show that although the major burden is carried by animals in their 3rd season (0 + 2 class), older classes contribute significantly. This pattern is adaptive in unstable environments where high mortality of the 0-year class is probable. 6. On morphological grounds, M. planulata is believed to be a suspension feeder; probably feeding on very fine particulate organic matter.