Beyond Trolleyology: The CNI Model of Moral-Dilemma Responses.

PUBLIC ABSTRACT: How do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.

Incidental Attitude Formation via the Surveillance Task: A Preregistered Replication of the Olson and Fazio (2001) Study.

Evaluative conditioning is one of the most widely studied procedures for establishing and changing attitudes. The surveillance task is a highly cited evaluative-conditioning paradigm and one that is claimed to generate attitudes without awareness. The potential for evaluative-conditioning effects to occur without awareness continues to fuel conceptual, theoretical, and applied developments. Yet few published studies have used this task, and most are characterized by small samples and small effect sizes. We conducted a high-powered (N = 1,478 adult participants), preregistered close replication of the original surveillance-task study (Olson & Fazio, 2001). We obtained evidence for a small evaluative-conditioning effect when "aware" participants were excluded using the original criterion-therefore replicating the original effect. However, no such effect emerged when three other awareness criteria were used. We suggest that there is a need for caution when using evidence from the surveillance-task effect to make theoretical and practical claims about "unaware" evaluative-conditioning effects.

Contextual positivity-familiarity effects are unaffected by known moderators of misattribution.

ABSTRACTThe positivity-familiarity effect refers to the phenomenon that positive affect increases the likelihood that people judge a stimulus as familiar. Drawing on the assumption that positivity-familiarity effects result from a common misattribution mechanism that is shared with conceptually similar effects (e.g. fluency-familiarity effects), we investigated whether positivity-familiarity effects are qualified by three known moderators of other misattribution phenomena: (a) conceptual similarity between affect-eliciting prime stimuli and focal target stimuli, (b) relative salience of affect-eliciting prime stimuli, and (c) explicit warnings about the effects of affect-eliciting prime stimuli on familiarity judgments of the targets. Counter to predictions, three experiments obtained robust positivity-familiarity effects that were unaffected by the hypothesised moderators. The findings pose a challenge for misattribution accounts of positivity-familiarity effects, but they are consistent with alternative accounts in terms of affective monitoring.

Experiences of liking versus ideas about liking.

We leverage the notion that abstraction enables prediction to generate novel insights and hypotheses for the literatures on attitudes and mate preferences. We suggest that ideas about liking (e.g., evaluations of categories or overall traits) are more abstract than experiences of liking (e.g., evaluations of particular exemplars), and that ideas about liking may facilitate mental travel beyond the here-and-now.

Is evaluative conditioning really resistant to extinction? Evidence for changes in evaluative judgements without changes in evaluative representations.

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is defined as the change in the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to its pairing with a positive or negative unconditioned stimulus (US). Although several individual studies suggest that EC is unaffected by unreinforced presentations of the CS without the US, a recent meta-analysis indicates that EC effects are less pronounced for post-extinction measurements than post-acquisition measurements. The disparity in research findings suggests that extinction of EC may depend on yet unidentified conditions. In an attempt to uncover these conditions, three experiments (N = 784) investigated the influence of unreinforced post-acquisition CS presentations on EC effects resulting from simultaneous versus sequential pairings and pairings with single versus multiple USs. For all four types of CS-US pairings, EC effects on self-reported evaluations were reduced by unreinforced CS presentations, but only when the CSs had been rated after the initial presentation of CS-US pairings. EC effects on an evaluative priming measure remained unaffected by unreinforced CS presentations regardless of whether the CSs had been rated after acquisition. The results suggest that reduced EC effects resulting from unreinforced CS presentations are due to judgement-related processes during the verbal expression of CS evaluations rather than genuine changes in the underlying evaluative representations.

Simultaneous conditioning of valence and arousal.

Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to the change in the valence of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to its pairing with a positive or negative unconditioned stimulus (US). To the extent that core affect can be characterised by the two dimensions of valence and arousal, EC has important implications for the origin of affective responses. However, the distinction between valence and arousal is rarely considered in research on EC or conditioned responses more generally. Measuring the subjective feelings elicited by a CS, the results from two experiments showed that (1) repeated pairings of a CS with a positive or negative US of either high or low arousal led to corresponding changes in both CS valence and CS arousal, (2) changes in CS arousal, but not changes in CS valence, were significantly related to recollective memory for CS-US pairings, (3) subsequent presentations of the CS without the US reduced the conditioned valence of the CS, with conditioned arousal being less susceptible to extinction and (4) EC effects were stronger for high arousal than low arousal USs. The results indicate that the conditioning of affective responses can occur simultaneously along two independent dimensions, supporting evidence in related areas that calls for a consideration of both valence and arousal. Implications for research on EC and the acquisition of emotional dispositions are discussed.

Do implicit evaluations reflect unconscious attitudes?

We extend Newell & Shanks' (N&S's) arguments to the question of whether implicit evaluations reflect unconscious attitudes. We argue that correspondence to explicit evaluations fails to meet the criteria of relevance and sensitivity. When awareness is measured adequately and in line with N&S's criteria, there is compelling evidence that people are consciously aware of their implicit evaluations.

Of mice and men: what animal research can tell us about context effects on automatic responses in humans.

Automatic responses play a central role in many areas of psychology. Counter to views that such responses are relatively rigid and inflexible, a large body of research has shown that they are highly context-sensitive. Research on animal learning and animal behavior has a strong potential to provide a deeper understanding of such context effects by revealing remarkable parallels between the functional properties of automatic responses in human and nonhuman animals. These parallels involve the contextual modulation of attitude formation and change (automatic evaluation), and the role of contextual contingencies in shaping the particular action tendencies in response to a stimulus (automatic behavior). Theoretical concepts of animal research not only provide novel insights into the processes and representations underlying context effects on automatic responses in humans; they also offer new perspectives on the interface between affect, cognition, and motivation.

Truth sensitivity and partisan bias in responses to misinformation.

Misinformation represents one of the greatest challenges for the functioning of societies in the information age. Drawing on a signal-detection framework, the current research investigated two distinct aspects of misinformation susceptibility: truth sensitivity, conceptualized as accurate discrimination between true and false information, and partisan bias, conceptualized as lower acceptance threshold for ideology-congruent information compared to ideology-incongruent information. Four preregistered experiments (n = 2,423) examined (a) truth sensitivity and partisan bias in veracity judgments and decisions to share information and (b) determinants and correlates of truth sensitivity and partisan bias in responses to misinformation. Although participants were able to distinguish between true and false information to a considerable extent, sharing decisions were largely unaffected by actual information veracity. A strong partisan bias emerged for both veracity judgments and sharing decisions, with partisan bias being unrelated to the overall degree of truth sensitivity. While truth sensitivity increased as a function of cognitive reflection during encoding, partisan bias increased as a function of subjective confidence. Truth sensitivity and partisan bias were both associated with misinformation susceptibility, but partisan bias was a stronger and more reliable predictor of misinformation susceptibility than truth sensitivity. Implications and open questions for future research are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Thinking About Reasons for One's Choices Increases Sensitivity to Moral Norms in Moral-Dilemma Judgments.

Whereas norm-conforming (deontological) judgments have been claimed to be rooted in automatic emotional responses, outcome-maximizing (utilitarian) judgments are assumed to require reflective reasoning. Using the CNI model to disentangle factors underlying moral-dilemma judgments, the current research investigated effects of thinking about reasons on sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general action preferences. Three experiments (two preregistered) found that thinking about reasons (vs. responding intuitively or thinking about intuitions) reliably increased sensitivity to moral norms independent of processing time. Thinking about reasons had no reproducible effects on sensitivity to consequences and general action preferences. The results suggest that norm-conforming responses in moral dilemmas can arise from reflective thoughts about reasons, challenging the modal view on the role of cognitive reflection in moral-dilemma judgment. The findings highlight the importance of distinguishing between degree (high vs. low elaboration) and content (intuitions vs. reasons) as distinct aspects of cognitive reflection.

The Drunk Utilitarian Revisited: Does Alcohol Really Increase Utilitarianism in Moral Judgment?

The "drunk utilitarian" phenomenon suggests that people are more likely to accept harm for the greater good when they are under the influence of alcohol. This phenomenon conflicts with the ideas that (a) acceptance of pro-sacrificial harm requires inhibitory control of automatic emotional responses to the idea of causing harm and (b) alcohol impairs inhibitory control. This preregistered experiment aimed to provide deeper insights into the effects of alcohol on moral judgments by using a formal modeling approach to disentangle three factors in moral dilemma judgments and by distinguishing between instrumental harm and impartial beneficence as two distinct dimensions of utilitarian psychology. Despite the use of a substantially larger sample and higher doses of alcohol compared with the ones in prior studies, alcohol had no significant effect on moral judgments. The results pose a challenge to the idea that alcohol increases utilitarianism in moral judgments.

Attitudinal Effects of Stimulus Co-occurrence and Stimulus Relations: Paradoxical Effects of Cognitive Load.

Research suggests that evaluations of an object can be jointly influenced by (a) the mere co-occurrence of the object with a pleasant or unpleasant stimulus (e.g., mere co-occurrence of object A and negative event B) and (b) the object's specific relation to the co-occurring stimulus (e.g., object A starts vs. stops negative event B). Three experiments investigated the impact of cognitive load during learning on the effects of stimulus co-occurrence and stimulus relations. Counter to the shared prediction of competing theories suggesting that effects of stimulus relations should be reduced by cognitive load during learning, effects of stimulus relations were greater (rather than smaller) under high-load compared with low-load conditions. Effects of stimulus co-occurrence were not significantly affected by cognitive load. The results are discussed in terms of theories suggesting that cognitive load can influence behavioral outcomes via strategic shifts in resource allocation in response to task-specific affordances.

Temporal Stability of Moral Dilemma Judgments: A Longitudinal Analysis Using the CNI Model.

Although moral dilemma judgments are influenced by a variety of situational factors, there is evidence for considerable disagreement between individuals. Using the CNI model to disentangle (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas, the current research examined the temporal stability of individual differences along the three dimensions. Across two time points 1 month apart, sensitivity to consequences (r = .81) and sensitivity to norms (r = .84) showed high levels of stability that were comparable to the Big Five personality traits; general preference for inaction versus action showed lower stability (r = .41). Exploratory analyses revealed reliable associations between the three dimensions of moral dilemma judgments and three of the Big Five (extraversion, agreeableness, openness). Together, these findings provide evidence for stable individual differences in moral dilemma judgments that are related to basic personality traits.

A Signal Detection Approach to Understanding the Identification of Fake News.

Researchers across many disciplines seek to understand how misinformation spreads with a view toward limiting its impact. One important question in this research is how people determine whether a given piece of news is real or fake. In the current article, we discuss the value of signal detection theory (SDT) in disentangling two distinct aspects in the identification of fake news: (a) ability to accurately distinguish between real news and fake news and (b) response biases to judge news as real or fake regardless of news veracity. The value of SDT for understanding the determinants of fake-news beliefs is illustrated with reanalyses of existing data sets, providing more nuanced insights into how partisan bias, cognitive reflection, and prior exposure influence the identification of fake news. Implications of SDT for the use of source-related information in the identification of fake news, interventions to improve people's skills in detecting fake news, and the debunking of misinformation are discussed.

Political Ideology and Moral Dilemma Judgments: An Analysis Using the CNI Model.

Many real-world dilemmas involve disagreement about whether decisions should follow moral norms in an unconditional manner (deontology) or be based on the consequences for the greater good (utilitarianism). To examine how political ideology may account for some of these disagreements, the current research used a formal modeling approach to investigate the associations between political ideology and (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Across three studies (N = 996) with samples from the United States (Studies 1 and 3) and the United Kingdom (Study 2), conservatives were less influenced by overall consequences for the greater good in comparison with liberals. Political ideology was not significantly associated with sensitivity to moral norms and general action tendencies. The findings provide more nuanced insights into how political ideology may contribute to disagreements on real-world moral dilemmas.

Attitudinal Effects of Stimulus Co-Occurrence and Stimulus Relations: Range and Limits of Intentional Control.

Research suggests that evaluations of an object can be simultaneously influenced by (a) the mere co-occurrence of the object with a pleasant or unpleasant stimulus (e.g., mere co-occurrence of object A and negative event B) and (b) the object's particular relation to the co-occurring stimulus (e.g., object A starts vs. stops negative event B). Using a multinomial modeling approach to disentangle the two kinds of influences on choice decisions, three experiments investigated whether learners can intentionally control the relative impact of stimulus co-occurrence and stimulus relations. An integrative analysis of the data from the three experiments (N = 1,154) indicate that incentivized instructions to counteract effects of stimulus co-occurrence by focusing on stimulus relations increased the impact of stimulus relations without affecting the impact of stimulus co-occurrence. Implications for evaluative learning, intentional control, and public policy are discussed.

Illusory-Correlation Effects on Implicit and Explicit Evaluation.

Research suggests that people sometimes perceive a relationship between stimuli when no such relationship exists (i.e., illusory correlation). Illusory-correlation effects are thought to play a central role in the formation of stereotypes and evaluations of minority versus majority groups, often leading to less favorable impressions of minorities. Extant theories differ in terms of whether they attribute illusory-correlation effects to processes operating during learning (belief formation) or measurement (belief expression), and whether different evaluation measures should be differentially sensitive to illusory-correlation effects. Past research found mixed evidence for dissociative effects of illusory-correlation manipulations on measures of implicit (i.e., automatic) and explicit (i.e., controlled) evaluation. Four high-powered studies obtained illusory-correlation effects on explicit evaluations, but not implicit evaluations probed with an Implicit Association Test, Evaluative Priming Task, and Affect Misattribution Procedure. The results are consistent with theories that attribute illusory-correlation effects to processes during belief expression.

Contrast effects in backward evaluative conditioning: Exploring effects of affective relief/disappointment versus instructional information.

Past studies of backward evaluative conditioning (EC) have found an assimilation effect, in that neutral conditional stimuli (conditional stimulus [CS]) were found to acquire the valence of co-occurring unconditional stimuli (US). Recent studies employing a concurrent forward and backward conditioning paradigm with instructions suggesting a contrastive relation between the US and the backward CS have resulted in contrast effects, in that backward CSs acquired valence opposite to the US. The current research investigated whether these effects were in fact due to the instructions highlighting the contrastive relation between the US and CS, or whether affective relief/disappointment experienced at US offset could account for this result. Consistent with the hypothesized role of instructions, backward CS contrast effects occurred only when instructions highlighted the valence of the US and attributed control of that US to the CSs. In contrast to the affective relief/disappointment hypothesis, no backward CS contrast effects were found without such instructions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The development of spontaneous gender stereotyping in childhood: relations to stereotype knowledge and stereotype flexibility.

The development of spontaneous gender stereotyping in children was investigated using the newly developed Action Interference Paradigm (AIP). This task consists of assigning gender-stereotypical toys as quickly as possible to boys and girls in either a stereotype-congruent or a stereotype-incongruent manner. A pilot study with 38 children (mean age 5.1 years) provided evidence for spontaneous gender stereotyping in the AIP, which was reflected in higher latencies for stereotype-incongruent compared with stereotype-congruent toy assignments. The main study, with 66 children (aged 5, 8 and 11 years), compared the development of spontaneous stereotyping with established measures of stereotype flexibility and stereotype knowledge. Stereotype flexibility showed a strong increase from age 5 to 11. In contrast, stereotype knowledge and spontaneous stereotyping remained stable at high levels. The results provide evidence for a dissociation between stereotype flexibility and spontaneous stereotyping, suggesting that spontaneous stereotyping may be more closely related to stereotype knowledge than to stereotype flexibility.

Attitudes and physical distance to an individual with schizophrenia: the moderating effect of self-transcendent values.

BACKGROUND: There is evidence that personal value priorities may influence prejudicial behaviors. In particular, it has been hypothesized that those who place a high priority on values such as equality, benevolence and social justice may be less likely to express any prejudicial personal attitudes in behavior. In the present study, we tested this hypothesis in the context of physical distance with reference to a person with schizophrenia. Self-transcendent value priorities and attitudes toward a young woman described as having schizophrenia were assessed in 95 university students. They were then led to anticipate meeting the person and the distance they sat from the expected location of the ill person was assessed. RESULTS: Women sat closer to the anticipated seat of the person with schizophrenia. In addition, there was a significant interaction between priority placed on self-transcendent values and attitude toward the person in predicting seating distance. There was a significant relationship between favorability of attitudes and sitting closer for those who were low in self-transcendent values, but attitudes did not predict physical proximity for those with high self-transcendent values. CONCLUSION: The impact of attitudes toward an individual with schizophrenia and subtle aspects of behavior such as physical proximity appear to be moderated by self-transcendent personal values. The role of implicit in comparison to explicit attitudes in explaining these results is worthy for further investigation.