Theory of mind as a predictor of maternal sensitivity in women with severe mental illness.

BACKGROUND: Research has shown that maternal mental illness can affect mother-infant interactions with implications for infant outcomes. Severe and chronic mental illness (SMI), particularly schizophrenia, is associated with the greatest risk. Schizophrenia is also associated with impairments in attribution of mental states, 'theory of mind' (ToM). Recent attachment research has suggested that maternal mentalizing skills are strongly associated with attachment outcome in infants. To date, no research has explored the relationship between ToM and maternal sensitivity in mothers with SMI using standard tests of ToM. The present study was designed as an exploratory study in order to investigate this. METHOD: A total of 40 women with SMI in the postpartum period were administered a battery of ToM tasks and general neuropsychological tasks. The women were also filmed in an unstructured play session with their infants, which was coded for maternal sensitivity using the Crittenden CARE-Index. RESULTS: One ToM task, the Frith-Happé Animations, predicted maternal sensitivity across all diagnoses. There was also an effect of diagnosis, with lower sensitivity observed in women with schizophrenia. ToM impairments did not fully explain the effect of diagnosis on sensitivity. Mothers of girls were rated as being more sensitive than mothers of boys. CONCLUSIONS: The results suggest that ToM is a significant predictor of maternal sensitivity across all mental health diagnoses, extending the results of studies focusing on healthy populations. Clinical interventions emphasizing the importance of understanding the perspective of the infant may enhance maternal sensitivity.

Specificity of Episodic Future Thinking in Adolescents: Comparing Childhood Maltreatment, Autism Spectrum, and Typical Development.

Maltreatment and autism can be associated with overlapping difficulties across functional domains (e.g., social, emotional, and sensory) and high rates of mental health problems. A cognitive approach focussing on affect-laden cognition, here on episodic future thinking (FT), could help inform cognitive assessments and adapt psychological interventions. Three groups of adolescents (N = 85), (i) maltreatment (n = 28), (ii) autism (n = 29), and (iii) typical development without maltreatment/autism (TD; n = 28), matched in age (10-16 years old), sex (assigned at birth), and socioeconomic status, completed a newly adapted online Autobiographical Future Thinking Test. As predicted, the maltreatment group generated significantly fewer specific future events relative to the TD group, however, the number of specific future events did not significantly differ between the autism and the other groups. Exploratory analyses showed that lower FT specificity was significantly associated with more depressive (but not anxiety) symptoms across the three groups. These findings shed light on the cognitive profiles of both maltreatment and autism during adolescence and signal FT as a potential therapeutic target for adolescents with these developmental differences. Our study lays the foundation for additional comparisons of maltreatment-related presentations versus autism with improved designs and a broader set of cognitive and clinical domains.

Developmental associations between traits of autism spectrum disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder: a genetically informative, longitudinal twin study.

BACKGROUND: Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and associated subclinical traits, regularly co-occur with one another. However, the aetiology of their co-occurrence remains poorly understood. This paper provides the first genetically informative, longitudinal analysis of the interaction between traits of ASD and ADHD, and explores their genetic and environmental overlap. METHOD: Parents of approximately 5000 twin pairs completed questionnaires assessing traits of ASD and ADHD when twins were aged 8 and 12 years. Cross-lagged longitudinal modelling explored their developmental association, enabling a consideration of phenotypic-driven processes. Overlapping aetiological influences on traits at age 12 years were explored using bivariate twin modelling. RESULTS: Traits of ADHD at age 8 years were more strongly predictive of traits of ASD at 12 years than traits of ASD at 8 years were of traits of ADHD at 12 years. Analysis of traits by subscales assessing specific symptom domains suggested that communication difficulties were most strongly associated with traits of ADHD. Bivariate modelling suggested moderate genetic overlap on traits in males (genetic correlation = 0.41), and a modest degree of overlap in females (genetic correlation = 0.23) at age 12 years. CONCLUSIONS: Traits of ADHD at age 8 years significantly influence traits of ASD at age 12 years, after controlling for their initial relationship at age 8 years. In particular, early ADHD traits influenced later communication difficulties. These findings demonstrate the dynamic nature of co-occurring traits across development. In addition, these findings add to a growing body of literature suggesting that traits of ASD and ADHD may arise via similar aetiological processes.

Association between extreme autistic traits and intellectual disability: insights from a general population twin study.

BACKGROUND: Autism is associated with intellectual disability. The strength and origin of this association is unclear. AIMS: To investigate the association between extreme autistic traits and intellectual disability in children from a community-based sample and to examine whether the association can be explained by genetic factors. METHOD: Children scoring in the extreme 5% on measures of autistic traits, IQ and academic achievement were selected from 7965 7/8-year-old and 3687 9-year-old twin pairs. Phenotypic associations between extreme autistic traits and intellectual disability were compared with associations among the full-range scores. Genetic correlations were estimated using bivariate DeFries-Fulker extremes analyses. RESULTS: Extreme autistic traits were modestly related to intellectual disability; this association was driven by communication problems characteristic of autism. Although this association was largely explained by genetic factors, the genetic correlation between autistic traits and intellectual disability was only modest. CONCLUSIONS: Extreme autistic traits are substantially genetically independent of intellectual disability.

Inferring thought and action in motor neurone disease.

The traditional assumption that classical motor neurone disease (MND) invariably spares cognitive function is now recognised to be incorrect. Deficits have most commonly been demonstrated on executive tasks suggesting impaired function of frontal systems. Yet, crucial aspects of frontal lobe function have not hitherto been explored. The study used tests of theory of mind (ToM) (interpretation of cartoons and stories) to examine the ability of 16 patients with MND to interpret social situations and ascribe mental states to others. Only minor differences were elicited in the MND group as a whole compared to controls, and performance was not differentially affected for cartoons and stories requiring inference of another's mental state (mental) compared to control (physical) cartoons and stories. However, abnormalities were elicited on both mental and physical tasks in a subgroup of patients with bulbar signs. Moreover, examination of individual patient scores revealed a spectrum of performance ranging from normal to severely impaired. Errors were qualitatively similar to those seen in frontotemporal dementia (FTD). Performance on the ToM tasks was significantly correlated with conventional, untimed measures of executive function, suggesting that ToM deficits in MND are likely to be linked to a more general executive failure. The findings contribute to the understanding of ToM performance in neurodegenerative disease and provide further evidence of the association between MND and FTD.

Acquired mind-blindness following frontal lobe surgery? A single case study of impaired 'theory of mind' in a patient treated with stereotactic anterior capsulotomy.

Social insight, specifically the ability to represent thoughts and feelings ('theory of mind'), may have a circumscribed and dedicated neurological substrate. Evidence of deficits in 'theory of mind' following acquired lesions would support this idea. Previous studies of lesions resulting from stroke or head injury have been hampered by lack of detailed lesion information and pre-lesion documentation. We report the case of a 76-year-old man who, following a standard surgical procedure to treat bipolar affective disorder, showed evidence of impaired 'theory of mind'. This case, which is the first of its type, may contribute to the search for the brain basis of social insight.

Reading the mind in cartoons and stories: an fMRI study of 'theory of mind' in verbal and nonverbal tasks.

Previous functional imaging studies have explored the brain regions activated by tasks requiring 'theory of mind'--the attribution of mental states. Tasks used have been primarily verbal, and it has been unclear to what extent different results have reflected different tasks, scanning techniques, or genuinely distinct regions of activation. Here we report results from a functional magnetic resonance imaging study (fMRI) involving two rather different tasks both designed to tap theory of mind. Brain activation during the theory of mind condition of a story task and a cartoon task showed considerable overlap, specifically in the medial prefrontal cortex (paracingulate cortex). These results are discussed in relation to the cognitive mechanisms underpinning our everyday ability to 'mind-read'.

Social cognition in frontotemporal dementia and Huntington's disease.

Frontotemporal dementia (FTD) and Huntington's disease (HD) are degenerative disorders, with predominant involvement, respectively of frontal neocortex and striatum. Both conditions give rise to altered social conduct and breakdown in interpersonal relationships, although the factors underlying these changes remain poorly defined. The study used tests of theory of mind (interpretation of cartoons and stories and judgement of preference based on eye gaze) to explore the ability of patients with FTD and HD to interpret social situations and ascribe mental states to others. Performance in the FTD group was severely impaired on all tasks, regardless of whether the test condition required attribution of a mental state. The HD group showed a milder impairment in cartoon and story interpretation, and normal preference judgements. Qualitative differences in performance were demonstrated between groups. FTD patients made more concrete, literal interpretations, whereas HD patients were more likely to misconstrue situations. The findings are interpreted as demonstrating impaired theory of mind in FTD, as one component of widespread executive deficits. In HD the evidence does not suggest a fundamental loss of theory of mind, but rather a tendency to draw faulty inferences from social situations. It is concluded that social breakdown in FTD and HD may have a different underlying basis and that the frontal neocortex and striatum have distinct contributions to social behaviour.

Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism: a test of relevance theory.

Sperber and Wilson's (1986) relevance theory makes explicit the role of the comprehension of intentions in human communication. Autistic people have been hypothesized to suffer from a specific and characteristic impairment in the ability to attribute such mental states (e.g., beliefs, intentions); a lack of "theory of mind". According to relevance theory, then, autistic people should have specific difficulties with the use of language for communication. Relevance theory allows precise predictions about the levels of communicative competence that should be possible with either no, first-order only, or second-order theory of mind ability. Three experiments are reported which tested predictions following from the analysis of figurative language in terms of relevance and theory of mind, in able autistic and normal young subjects. The results lend support to relevance theory. In addition, the findings suggest that some autistic subjects are eventually able to attribute mental states. Lastly, the results demonstrate close links between social and communicative understanding in autism and normal development.

Autism: beyond "theory of mind".

The theory of mind account of autism has been remarkably successful in making specific predictions about the impairments in socialization, imagination and communication shown by people with autism. It cannot, however, explain either the non-triad features of autism, or earlier experimental findings of abnormal assets and deficits on non-social tasks. These unexplained aspects of autism, and the existence of autistic individuals who consistently pass false belief tasks, suggest that it may be necessary to postulate an additional cognitive abnormality. One possible abnormality-weak central coherence--is discussed, and preliminary evidence for this theory is presented.

Acquired 'theory of mind' impairments following stroke.

The ability to attribute thoughts and feelings to self and others ('theory of mind') has been hypothesised to have an innate neural basis and a dedicated cognitive mechanism. Evidence in favour of this proposal has come from autism; a brain-based developmental disorder which appears to be characterised by impaired theory of mind, despite sometimes good general reasoning skills/IQ. To date no case of specific acquired theory of mind impairment has been reported. The present study examined theory of mind in adults who had suffered right hemisphere stroke, a group known to show pragmatic and social difficulties. In one study using story materials and two using cartoons, patients' understanding of materials requiring attribution of mental states (e.g. ignorance, false belief) was significantly worse than their understanding of non-mental control materials. Data from healthy elderly subjects, and a small group of left hemisphere patients (who received the tasks in modified form), suggest that this impairment on mental state tasks is not a function of task difficulty. The findings support the notion of a dedicated cognitive system for theory of mind, and suggest a role for the healthy right hemisphere in the attribution of mental states.

Other minds in the brain: a functional imaging study of "theory of mind" in story comprehension.

The ability of normal children and adults to attribute independent mental states to self and others in order to explain and predict behaviour ("theory of mind") has been a focus of much recent research. Autism is a biologically based disorder which appears to be characterised by a specific impairment in this "mentalising" process. The present paper reports a functional neuroimaging study with positron emission tomography in which we studied brain activity in normal volunteers while they performed story comprehension tasks necessitating the attribution of mental states. The resultant brain activity was compared with that measured in two control tasks: "physical" stories which did not require this mental attribution, and passages of unlinked sentences. Both story conditions, when compared to the unlinked sentences, showed significantly increased regional cerebral blood flow in the following regions: the temporal poles bilaterally, the left superior temporal gyrus and the posterior cingulate cortex. Comparison of the "theory of mind" stories with "physical" stores revealed a specific pattern of activation associated with mental state attribution: it was only this task which produced activation in the medial frontal gyrus on the left (Brodmann's area 8). This comparison also showed significant activation in the posterior cingulate cortex. These surprisingly clear-cut findings are discussed in relation to previous studies of brain activation during story comprehension. The localisation of brain regions involved in normal attribution of mental states and contextual problem solving is feasible and may have implication for the neural basis of autism.

'Theory of mind' in the brain. Evidence from a PET scan study of Asperger syndrome.

The ability to attribute mental states to others ('theory of mind') pervades normal social interaction and is impaired in autistic individuals. In a previous positron emission tomography scan study of normal volunteers, performing a 'theory of mind' task was associated with activity in left medial prefrontal cortex. We used the same paradigm in five patients with Asperger syndrome, a mild variant of autism with normal intellectual functioning. No task-related activity was found in this region, but normal activity was observed in immediately adjacent areas. This result suggests that a highly circumscribed region of left medial prefrontal cortex is a crucial component of the brain system that underlies the normal understanding of other minds.

The neuroanatomy of autism: a voxel-based whole brain analysis of structural scans.

Autism is a biological disorder which affects social cognition, and understanding brain abnormalities of the former will elucidate the brain basis of the latter. We report structural MRI data on 15 high-functioning individuals with autistic disorder. A voxel-based whole brain analysis identified grey matter differences in an amygdala centered system relative to 15 age- and IQ-matched controls. Decreases of grey matter were found in anterior parts of this system (right paracingulate sulcus, left inferior frontal gyrus). Increases were found in posterior parts (amygdala/peri-amygdaloid cortex, middle temporal gyrus, inferior temporal gyrus), and in regions of the cerebellum. These structures are implicated in social cognition by animal, imaging and histopathological studies. This study therefore provides converging evidence of the physiological basis of social cognition.

An advanced test of theory of mind: understanding of story characters' thoughts and feelings by able autistic, mentally handicapped, and normal children and adults.

Research has suggested that the core handicaps of autism result from a specific impairment in theory of mind (ToM). However, this account has been challenged by the finding that a minority of autistic subjects pass 1st- and even 2nd-order ToM tests while remaining socially handicapped. In the present study, able autistic subjects who failed ToM tasks, those who passed 1st-order, and those who passed 2nd-order tasks were tested with a battery of more naturalistic and complex stories. Autistic subjects were impaired at providing context-appropriate mental state explanations for the story characters' nonliteral utterances, compared to normal and mentally handicapped controls. Performance on the stories was closely related to performance on standard ToM tasks, but even those autistic subjects who passed all ToM tests showed impairments on the more naturalistic story materials relative to normal adult controls.

The getting of wisdom: theory of mind in old age.

Theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states, has been little explored beyond the early school years. Yet, later development, including possible patterns of breakdown, has important implications for current debate concerning the modularity/domain-specificity of the cognitive and neurological systems underlying theory of mind. This article reports a first study of theory of mind in normal aging. The results suggest that although performance on tasks with nonmental content may decrease with age, performance on theory of mind tasks remains intact and may even improve over the later adult years. The implications of these findings for the cognitive processes underlying theory of mind are discussed.

Distinguishing lies from jokes: theory of mind deficits and discourse interpretation in right hemisphere brain-damaged patients.

Right-hemisphere brain damaged (RHD) patients and a normal control group were tested for their ability to infer first- and second-order mental states and to understand the communicative intentions underlying ironic jokes and lies. Subjects listened to stories involving a character who had either a true or a false belief about another character's knowledge. Stories ended either with an ironic joke or a lie by this character. In the joke stories, the speaker knew that the listener knew the truth (a true second-order belief) and did not expect the listener to believe what was said; in the lie stories, the speaker did not know that the listener actually knew the truth (a false second-order belief) and thus did expect the listener to believe what was said. RHD patients performed significantly worse than control subjects on one of two measures of second-order belief, which suggests that the ability to make second-order mental state attributions is fragile and unreliable following right-hemisphere damage. RHD patients in addition performed worse than controls when asked to distinguish lies from jokes, confirming their known difficulties with discourse interpretation. For both groups, the ability to distinguish lies from jokes was strongly correlated with two measures of the ability to attribute correctly second-order beliefs. These results suggest that the fragility of RHD patients' understanding of second-order mental states underlies a portion of their difficulties in discourse comprehension, but that the underlying impairment is not restricted to right hemisphere dysfunction.

Defining the cognitive phenotype of autism.

Although much progress has been made in determining the cognitive profile of strengths and weaknesses that characterise individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), there remain a number of outstanding questions. These include how universal strengths and deficits are; whether cognitive subgroups exist; and how cognition is associated with core autistic behaviours, as well as associated psychopathology. Several methodological factors have contributed to these limitations in our knowledge, including: small sample sizes, a focus on single domains of cognition, and an absence of comprehensive behavioural phenotypic information. To attempt to overcome some of these limitations, we assessed a wide range of cognitive domains in a large sample (N=100) of 14- to 16-year-old adolescents with ASDs who had been rigorously behaviourally characterised. In this review, we will use examples of some initial findings in the domains of perceptual processing, emotion processing and memory, both to outline different approaches we have taken to data analysis and to highlight the considerable challenges to better defining the cognitive phenotype(s) of ASDs. Enhanced knowledge of the cognitive phenotype may contribute to our understanding of the complex links between genes, brain and behaviour, as well as inform approaches to remediation.

Intact theory of mind in TBI with behavioural disturbance.

Behavioural disturbance following TBI is common. Theory of mind(ToM) deficits have been noted in autism where difficulties with social interaction and communication are evident. It was hypothesised that TBI patients with behavioural disturbance would show deficits on ToM tasks independent of executive function. Twenty TBI patients with behavioural disturbance and 20 TBI patients without were assessed on verbal (stories) and non-verbal (cartoons) ToM tasks,standard psychometry, and measures of executive function.TBI patients were unimpaired on the ToM tasks. Both groups were unimpaired on standard tests of executive function (verbal fluency and trail making test) but were impaired on the Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS). Groups did not differ significantly on these tests. It is concluded that ToM ability does not predict behavioural disturbance and may be independent of executive functioning.

Studying weak central coherence at low levels: children with autism do not succumb to visual illusions. A research note.

While anecdotal reports of abnormal perceptual experiences in autism abound, there have been to date no experimental studies showing fundamental perceptual peculiarities. The present paper reports results from a first study of low-level visual integration in autism. Twenty-five subjects with autism, 21 normal 7- and 8-year-olds, and 26 children with learning difficulties were asked to make simple judgements about six well-known visual illusions. Two conditions were used, in an attempt to explore group differences; standard two-dimensional black and white line drawings, and the same figures augmented with raised coloured lines. The subjects with autism were less likely to succumb to the two-dimensional illusions than were the other groups, and were less aided by the three-dimensional 'disembedded' condition. These striking results are discussed with reference to the 'central coherence' account of autism.