Fluency misattribution and auditory hindsight bias.

We conducted three experiments to test the fluency-misattribution account of auditory hindsight bias. According to this account, prior exposure to a clearly presented auditory stimulus produces fluent (improved) processing of a distorted version of that stimulus, which results in participants mistakenly rating that item as easy to identify. In all experiments, participants in an exposure phase heard clearly spoken words zero, one, three, or six times. In the test phase, we examined auditory hindsight bias by manipulating whether participants heard a clear version of a target word just prior to hearing the distorted version of that word. Participants then estimated the ability of naïve peers to identify the distorted word. Auditory hindsight bias and the number of priming presentations during the exposure phase interacted underadditively in their prediction of participants' estimates: When no clear version of the target word appeared prior to the distorted version of that word in the test phase, participants identified target words more often the more frequently they heard the clear word in the exposure phase. Conversely, hearing a clear version of the target word at test produced similar estimates, regardless of the number of times participants heard clear versions of those words during the exposure phase. As per Roberts and Sternberg's (Attention and Performance XIV, pp. 611-653, 1993) additive factors logic, this finding suggests that both auditory hindsight bias and repetition priming contribute to a common process, which we propose involves a misattribution of processing fluency. We conclude that misattribution of fluency accounts for auditory hindsight bias.

Components of competitor priming in task switching.

Executing an action in response to a stimulus is thought to result in the creation of an event code that integrates stimulus and action features (Allport, 1987; Hommel in Visual Cognition 5: 183-216, 1998). When switching between tasks, competitor priming occurs if a distractor stimulus cues the retrieval of a previously established event code in which that distractor is bound to a competing task, creating a source of interference with the current task whereby the observer is encouraged to apply the competing task to the distractor. We propose a second aspect of competitor priming: the misapplication of the retrieved competing task to the target stimulus. We report two task-switching experiments in which tasks applied to picture-word compound stimuli were manipulated to create conditions in which this second aspect of competitor priming could be revealed and distinguished from other sources of task- and stimulus-based priming. A substantial increase in competitor priming was observed when subjects switched between tasks that required very different processing operations and the competing task was highly relevant to the target stimulus. These results are consistent with our claim that competitor priming can result from applying the competing task either to the distractor that cued it or to the target stimulus.

Modulation of additive and interactive effects by trial history revisited.

Masson and Kliegl (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39, 898-914, 2013) reported evidence that the nature of the target stimulus on the previous trial of a lexical decision task modulates the effects of independent variables on the current trial, including additive versus interactive effects of word frequency and stimulus quality. In contrast, recent reanalyses of previously published data from experiments that, unlike the Masson and Kliegl experiments, did not include semantic priming as a factor, found no evidence for modulation of additive effects of frequency and stimulus quality by trial history (Balota, Aschenbrenner, & Yap, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39, 1563-1571, 2013; O'Malley & Besner, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34, 1400-1411, 2013). We report two experiments that included semantic priming as a factor and that attempted to replicate the modulatory effects found by Masson and Kliegl. In neither experiment was additivity of frequency and stimulus quality modulated by trial history, converging with the findings reported by Balota et al. and O'Malley and Besner. Other modulatory influences of trial history, however, were replicated in the new experiments and reflect potential trial-by-trial alterations in decision processes.

Embodied effects of conceptual knowledge continuously perturb the hand in flight.

Attending to a manipulable object evokes a mental representation of hand actions associated with the object's form and function. In one view, these representations are sufficiently abstract that their competing influence on an unrelated action is confined to the planning stages of movement and does not affect its on-line control. Alternatively, an object may evoke action representations that affect the entire trajectory of an unrelated grasping action. We developed a new methodology to statistically analyze the forward motion and rotation of the hand and fingers under different task conditions. Using this novel approach, we established that a grasping action executed after seeing a photograph of an object is systematically perturbed even into the late stages of its trajectory by the competing influence of the grasping posture associated with the object. Our results show that embodied effects of conceptual knowledge continuously modulate the hand in flight.

On the nature of action-sentence compatibility effects.

Strong versions of the embodied account of language processing propose that comprehension depends on the mental simulation of sensorimotor experiences conveyed by linguistic meaning. Primary support in favor of this view is based on demonstrations of processing advantages for compatibility between an action implied by sentence content and concurrent sensorimotor processing. Although these effects have been reported across a variety of contexts, various attempts to reproduce these results, both through direct replication and conceptual extension, have not been successful. We present a series of experiments that examine the viability of previous methods used to obtain compatibility effects and the validity of the typical interpretation of such effects as evidence for mental simulation of described actions. Our findings add to the growing body of evidence that compatibility between sentence content and sensorimotor processing does not produce robust compatibility effects. Further, our findings suggest the data obtained from some studies that have been successful in generating compatibility effects can be accounted for without appealing to the notion that these effects are due to the simulation of actions implied by the meaning of a sentence. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Features of planned hand actions influence identification of graspable objects.

We demonstrate that constituents of motor actions associated with handled objects play a role in identifying such objects. Subjects held in working memory action plans for reaching movements; these action plans specified both the hand to be used (left or right) and a wrist orientation (vertical or horizontal). Speeded object identification was impaired when a pictured object matched the action on only one of these two categorical dimensions (e.g., a beer mug with its handle facing left, an action plan involving the right hand and vertical wrist orientation), relative to when the object matched the action on both dimensions or neither dimension. This result implies that identification of a manipulable object leads to automatic retrieval of matching features of a planned action along with nonmatching features to which they are bound. These discrepant features conflict with those of the target object, which results in delayed identification.

Investigating the relationship between the Bayes factor and the separation of credible intervals.

We examined the relationship between the Bayes factor and the separation of credible intervals in between- and within-subject designs under a range of effect and sample sizes. For the within-subject case, we considered five intervals: (1) the within-subject confidence interval of Loftus and Masson (1994); (2) the within-subject Bayesian interval developed by Nathoo et al. (2018), whose derivation conditions on estimated random effects; (3) and (4) two modifications of (2) based on a proposal by Heck (2019) to allow for shrinkage and account for uncertainty in the estimation of random effects; and (5) the standard Bayesian highest-density interval. We derived and observed through simulations a clear and consistent relationship between the Bayes factor and the separation of credible intervals. Remarkably, for a given sample size, this relationship is described well by a simple quadratic exponential curve and is most precise in case (4). In contrast, interval (5) is relatively wide due to between-subjects variability and is likely to obscure effects when used in within-subject designs, rendering its relationship with the Bayes factor unclear in that case. We discuss how the separation percentage of (4), combined with knowledge of the sample size, could provide evidence in support of either a null or an alternative hypothesis. We also present a case study with example data and provide an R package 'rmBayes' to enable computation of each of the within-subject credible intervals investigated here using a number of possible prior distributions.

The next generation: the value of reminding.

In two experiments, we investigated the influence of repeated processing in the context of the generation effect. In both experiments, participants studied words once or twice. Once-studied words either were read or were generated from a definition. Twice-studied words were read both times, generated both times, or read once and generated once. Free recall was best (in order of decreasing performance) after generating twice, after generating plus reading, and finally after generating once; any generation was better than purely reading. Recognition showed a similar pattern, except that the benefit of generating twice was not as striking as in recall and that reading plus generating was just as effective as generating twice. The overall pattern of results is accounted for by a simple model in which a second encoding results in a reminding of the first encoding, and this additional encoding supports subsequent recollection. This reminding is, consequently, more effective in recall than in recognition, and it operates in accordance with the principles of transfer-appropriate processing.

A pre-registered, multi-lab non-replication of the action-sentence compatibility effect (ACE).

The Action-sentence Compatibility Effect (ACE) is a well-known demonstration of the role of motor activity in the comprehension of language. Participants are asked to make sensibility judgments on sentences by producing movements toward the body or away from the body. The ACE is the finding that movements are faster when the direction of the movement (e.g., toward) matches the direction of the action in the to-be-judged sentence (e.g., Art gave you the pen describes action toward you). We report on a pre-registered, multi-lab replication of one version of the ACE. The results show that none of the 18 labs involved in the study observed a reliable ACE, and that the meta-analytic estimate of the size of the ACE was essentially zero.

A tutorial on a practical Bayesian alternative to null-hypothesis significance testing.

Null-hypothesis significance testing remains the standard inferential tool in cognitive science despite its serious disadvantages. Primary among these is the fact that the resulting probability value does not tell the researcher what he or she usually wants to know: How probable is a hypothesis, given the obtained data? Inspired by developments presented by Wagenmakers (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14, 779-804, 2007), I provide a tutorial on a Bayesian model selection approach that requires only a simple transformation of sum-of-squares values generated by the standard analysis of variance. This approach generates a graded level of evidence regarding which model (e.g., effect absent [null hypothesis] vs. effect present [alternative hypothesis]) is more strongly supported by the data. This method also obviates admonitions never to speak of accepting the null hypothesis. An Excel worksheet for computing the Bayesian analysis is provided as supplemental material.

Motor representations evoked by objects under varying action intentions.

In an extension of Gibson's (1979) concept of object affordance, it has been proposed that motor representations are automatically evoked by pictures of graspable objects. A variety of effects on left/right-handed keypress responses to the perceptual attributes of such images have been taken as evidence that features of actions, including the hand best suited to grasp an object, contribute to the effect of the handle's left/right location on response selection. We present an argument against this claim by establishing that all of these effects are based on spatial codes, including effects mistakenly interpreted to reflect the influence of limb-specific features of a grasp action. We also present 6 experiments showing that under certain task conditions, limb-specific effects on response selection are indeed automatically generated by the task-irrelevant image of a graspable object. These effects are found either when the observer makes keypress or reach-and-grasp responses to the laterality of a pictured hand superimposed on a depicted object. Both tasks recruit control processes that determine how the hand is selected and configured to grasp an object. We infer that processes implicated in the planning of a reach-and-grasp action themselves determine whether the task-irrelevant picture of an object triggers motor-based rather than spatial features. Our results have deep implications for the widely used concept of an affordance for action furnished by an object. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

The role of cognitive control and top-down processes in object affordances.

A widely held though debatable claim is that the picture of an object like a frying pan automatically elicits features of a left/right-handed grasp action even in perceptual tasks that make no demands on the observer to consider the graspable properties of the depicted object. Here, we sought to further elucidate this claim by relying on a methodology that allowed us to distinguish between the influence of motor versus spatial codes on the selection of a left/right-handed response while electroencephalographic data were recorded. In our experiment, participants classified images of frying pans as upright or inverted using a left/right key press or by making a left/right-handed reach-and-grasp action towards a centrally located response element while we recorded electroencephalographic (EEG) data. In line with previous evidence (Bub, Masson, & van Noordenne, Journal of Experiment Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 47(1), 53-80, 2021), these two modes of responding generated distinct correspondence effects on performance induced by the same set of images. In terms of our EEG data, we found that neither motor (the lateralized readiness potential) nor visual (N100 and P100) potentials were sensitive to handle-response hand correspondence. However, an exploratory theta analysis revealed that changes in frontal theta power mirrored the different correspondence effects evoked by the image on key press responses versus reach and grasp actions. Importantly, our results provide a link between these disparate effects and the engagement of cognitive control, highlighting a possible role of top-down control processes in separating motor features from the task-irrelevant features of an object, and thus in claims regarding object affordances more generally.

The bicycle illusion: sidewalk science informs the integration of motion and shape perception.

The authors describe a new visual illusion first discovered in a natural setting. A cyclist riding beside a pair of sagging chains that connect fence posts appears to move up and down with the chains. In this illusion, a static shape (the chains) affects the perception of a moving shape (the bicycle), and this influence involves assimilation (averaging) rather than opposition (differentiation). These features distinguish the illusion from illusions of motion capture and induced motion. The authors take this bicycle illusion into the laboratory and report 4 findings: Naïve viewers experience the illusion when discriminating horizontal from sinusoidal motion of a disc in the context of stationary curved lines; the illusion shifts from motion assimilation to motion opposition as the visual size of the display is increased; the assimilation and opposition illusions are dissociated by variations in luminance contrast of the stationary lines and the moving disc; and the illusion does not occur when simply comparing two stationary objects at different locations along the curved lines. The bicycle illusion provides a unique opportunity for studying the interactions between shape and motion perception.

Sources of bias in the Goodman-Kruskal gamma coefficient measure of association: implications for studies of metacognitive processes.

In many cognitive, metacognitive, and perceptual tasks, measurement of performance or prediction accuracy may be influenced by response bias. Signal detection theory provides a means of assessing discrimination accuracy independent of such bias, but its application crucially depends on distributional assumptions. The Goodman-Kruskal gamma coefficient, G, has been proposed as an alternative means of measuring accuracy that is free of distributional assumptions. This measure is widely used with tasks that assess metamemory or metacognition performance. The authors demonstrate that the empirically determined value of G systematically deviates from its actual value under realistic conditions. A distribution-specific variant of G, called G-sub(c), is introduced to show why this bias arises. The findings imply that caution is needed when using G as a measure of accuracy, and alternative measures are recommended.

Long-term repetition priming of briefly identified objects.

The authors provide evidence that long-term memory encoding can occur for briefly viewed objects in a rapid serial visual presentation list, contrary to claims that the brief presentation and quick succession of objects prevent encoding by disrupting a memory consolidation process that requires hundreds of milliseconds of uninterrupted processing. Subjects performed a search task in which each item was presented for only 75 ms. Nontargets from the search task generated priming on 2 subsequent indirect memory tests: a search task and a task requiring identification of visually masked objects. Additional experiments revealed that information encoded into memory for these nontargets included perceptual and conceptual components, and that these results were not due to subjects maintaining items in working memory during list presentation. These results are consistent with recent neurophysiological evidence showing that stimulus processing can occur at later stages in the cognitive system even when a subsequent new stimulus is presented that initiates processing at earlier stages.

Far-Transfer Effects of Strategy-Based Working Memory Training.

We assessed the transfer effects of training working memory strategies to a novel problem-solving task. Previous WM training studies have produced little evidence for transfer across contexts. In the current study, 64 6- to 9-year-olds were randomly assigned to one of four training conditions: semantic and rehearsal training, semantic training only, rehearsal training only, and treated control group. All training groups performed significantly better on the transfer task than the control group, but training groups did not differ significantly from each other. Implications of the findings for cognitive interventions and future WM training studies are discussed.

Evocation of functional and volumetric gestural knowledge by objects and words.

We distinguish between grasping gestures associated with using an object for its intended purpose (functional) and those used to pick up an object (volumetric) and we develop a novel experimental framework to show that both kinds of knowledge are automatically evoked by objects and by words denoting those objects. Cued gestures were carried out in the context of depicted objects or visual words. On incongruent trials, the cued gesture was not compatible with gestures typically associated with the contextual item. On congruent trials, the gesture was compatible with the item's functional or volumetric gesture. For both gesture types, response latency was longer for incongruent trials indicating that objects and words elicited both functional and volumetric manipulation knowledge. Additional evidence, however, clearly supports a distinction between these two kinds of gestural knowledge. Under certain task conditions, functional gestures can be evoked without the associated activation of volumetric gestures. We discuss the implication of these results for theories of action evoked by objects and words, and for interpretation of functional imaging results.

Intentions and actions.

Manipulable objects have the potential to evoke mental representations of hand actions. Behavioural evidence favouring the view that this process happens automatically while passively viewing objects is critically examined. A case is made for the alternative proposal that objects may evoke action representations when observers concurrently operate with an intention to engage in a reach-and-grasp action. In addition, the nature of hand action representations was examined by considering two components of actions, hand selection and wrist orientation, and it is shown that the relationship between these dimensions is modulated by task context. When an action representation is evoked by a task-irrelevant object, these two dimensions are to a large extent independent of one another, but when an observer prepares an action for immediate production, these two action features are hierarchically integrated, with hand selection dominating the hierarchy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Time course of motor affordances evoked by pictured objects and words.

Correspondence effects based on the relationship between the left/right position of a pictured object's handle and the hand used to make a response, or on the size of the object and the nature of a grip response (power/precision), have been attributed to motor affordances evoked by the object. Effects of this nature, however, are readily explained by the similarity in the abstract spatial coding of the features that define the stimulus and response, without recourse to object-based affordances. We propose that in the task context of making reach-and-grasp actions, pictured objects may evoke genuine, limb-specific action constituents. We demonstrate that when subjects make reach-and-grasp responses, there is a qualitative difference in the time course of correspondence effects induced by pictures of objects versus the names of those objects. For word primes, this time course was consistent with the abstract spatial coding account, in which effects should emerge slowly and become apparent only among longer response times. In contrast, correspondence effects attributable to object primes were apparent even among the shortest response times and were invariant across the entire response-time distribution. Using rotated versions of object primes provided evidence for a short-lived competition between canonical and depicted orientations of an object with respect to eliciting components of associated actions. These results suggest that under task conditions requiring reach-and-grasp responses, pictured objects rapidly trigger constituents of real-world actions. (PsycINFO Database Record

Grasp representations depend on knowledge and attention.

Seeing pictures of objects activates the motor cortex and can have an influence on subsequent grasping actions. However, the exact nature of the motor representations evoked by these pictures is unclear. For example, action plans engaged by pictures could be most affected by direct visual input and computed online based on object shape. Alternatively, action plans could be influenced by experience seeing and grasping these objects. We provide evidence for a dual-route theory of action representations evoked by pictures of objects, suggesting that these representations are influenced by both direct visual input and stored knowledge. We find that that familiarity with objects has a facilitative effect on grasping actions, with knowledge about the object's canonical orientation or its name speeding grasping actions for familiar objects compared to novel objects. Furthermore, the strength of contributions from each route to action can be modulated by the manner in which the objects are attended. Thus, evocation of grasping representations depends on an interaction between one's familiarity with perceived objects and how those objects are attended while making grasp actions. (PsycINFO Database Record