RESUMEN
Influenza viruses with novel hemagglutinin and 1 or more accompanying genes derived from avian influenza viruses sporadically emerge in humans and have the potential to result in a pandemic if the virus causes disease and spreads efficiently in a population that lacks immunity to the novel hemagglutinin. Since 1997, multiple avian influenza virus subtypes have been transmitted directly from domestic poultry to humans and have caused a spectrum of human disease, from asymptomatic to severe and fatal. To assess the pandemic risk that avian influenza viruses pose, we have used multiple strategies to better understand the capacity of avian viruses to infect, cause disease, and transmit among mammals, including humans. Seroepidemiologic studies that evaluate the frequency and risk of human infection with avian influenza viruses in populations with exposure to domestic or wild birds can provide a better understanding of the pandemic potential of avian influenza subtypes. Investigations conducted in Hong Kong following the first H5N1 outbreak in humans in 1997 determined that exposure to poultry in live bird markets was a key risk factor for human disease. Among poultry workers, butchering and exposure to sick poultry were risk factors for antibody to H5 virus, which provided evidence for infection. A second risk assessment tool, the ferret, can be used to evaluate the level of virulence and potential for host-to-host transmission of avian influenza viruses in this naturally susceptible host. Avian viruses isolated from humans exhibit a level of virulence and transmissibility in ferrets that generally reflects that seen in humans. The ferret model thus provides a means to monitor emerging avian influenza viruses for pandemic risk, as well as to evaluate laboratory-generated reassortants and mutants to better understand the molecular basis of influenza virus transmissibility. Taken together, such studies provide valuable information with which we can assess the public health risk of avian influenza viruses.
Asunto(s)
Gripe Aviar/prevención & control , Gripe Humana/prevención & control , Salud Pública , Animales , Aves , Brotes de Enfermedades , Hurones , Salud Global , Humanos , Subtipo H5N1 del Virus de la Influenza A , Virus de la Influenza A , Gripe Humana/transmisión , Medición de Riesgo , Estudios SeroepidemiológicosRESUMEN
Polypeptide variants of the HA1 antigenic domain of the H5N1 avian influenza virus hemagglutinin (HA) molecule were produced in plants using transient and stable expression systems and fused with His/c-myc tags or with mouse or human Fc antibody fragments. The resulting peptides were purified and used for intramuscular immunization of mice. While the recombinant HA1 variants induced a significant serum humoral immune response in the mice, none of the HA1 preparations induced virus-neutralizing antibodies. Fusion with the Fc fragment improved overall yield of the constructs and allowed purification requiring only a single step, but led to no detectable fusion-related enhancement of immunogenicity or quality of immune response.
Asunto(s)
Subtipo H5N1 del Virus de la Influenza A/inmunología , Vacunas contra la Influenza/inmunología , Gripe Aviar/inmunología , Proteínas de Plantas/inmunología , Animales , Formación de Anticuerpos , Aves , Ensayo de Inmunoadsorción Enzimática , Femenino , Humanos , Gripe Aviar/genética , Ratones , Ratones Endogámicos BALB CRESUMEN
Highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza viruses that are currently circulating in southeast Asia may acquire the potential to cause the next influenza pandemic. A number of alternate approaches are being pursued to generate cross-protective, dose-sparing, safe, and effective vaccines, as traditional vaccine approaches, i.e., embryonated egg-grown, are not immunogenic. We developed a replication-incompetent adenoviral vector-based, adjuvant- and egg-independent pandemic influenza vaccine strategy as a potential alternative to conventional egg-derived vaccines. In this paper, we address suboptimal dose and longevity of vaccine-induced protective immunity and demonstrate that a vaccine dose as little as 1 x 10(6) plaque-forming unit (PFU) is sufficient to induce protective immune responses against a highly pathogenic H5N1 virus. Furthermore, the vaccine-induced humoral and cellular immune responses and protective immunity persisted at least for a year.